Archives of Sexual Behavior, VoL 20, No. 4, 1991
L e t t e r s to t h e E d i t o r
A COMMENT ON THE CONCEPT OF TRANSHOMOSEXUALITY, OR THE DISSOCIATION OF THE MEANING In the clinical note by Clare and Tully (1989), the following components of "transhomosexual accounts" were described. The first component was the penchant for homosexuality of the opposite sex, referring to an overwhelming attraction and idealization of homosexual relationship-style. The second component was empathy, referring to the feeling that such relationships expressed almost perfectly the desires and roles that seemed right for the individual. The third component was the wish to participate in homosexual activities of the opposite sex. (Tully elaborated that this may seem rather difficult, but that ingenuity and a degree of bisexuality in some homosexuals make the "improbable" possible.) Finally, the fourth component was identification with homosexuals of the opposite sex, possibly to the degree that a desire for sex reassignment may develop. In the clinical note, revised by Tully after Clare's death, the interpretation of transhomosexuality is seen as a unique psychosexual identity in which gender dysphoria develops secondary to a penchant or sexual orientation towards members of the opposite sex who identify themselves as homosexual, or to an identification with a homosexual relationship-style. Tully's argument that transhomosexuals' attractions are significantly different from other postoperative transsexuals who might be in homosexual relationships needs to be clarified. In an unpublished abstract, Clare (1987) described the phenomenon of transhomosexuality in gender-dysphoric individuals whose psychosexual identity is that of homosexual persons of the biologically opposite sex. In particular, she referred to female-to-male transsexuals with a male homosexual self-identification and life-style. Clare indicated that gender identity and gender dysphoria were separate from sexual orientation. However, in the recent clinical note (Clare and Tully, 1989), gender identity and sexual orientation are assumed to be interrelated and the findings are interpreted as indicative of an abnormal and unusual dissociation of sexual orientation and sex object choice. It seems that the original meaning that 419 0004-0002/91/0800-0419506.50/0 © 1991 Plenum Publishing Corporation
420
Letters to the Editor
Clare was using to describe transhomosexuality was the unusual combination of a female gender-dysphoric individual who had sexual attraction for the opposite biological sex. Thus, she described these individuals as transhomosexuals. It is unclear whether Clare changed her interpretation or that Tully had a different interpretation. We have found Clare's original interpretation useful. For example, we interviewed two biological females with predominant male gender identities who had been in a committed relationship with one another for 10 years. While both had desired hormonal and surgical sex reassignment, they did not pursue this because of the cost and complications of getting professionals to acknowledge their transsexual status given their sexual orientation. They each identified themselves as gay men and their relationship as a gay male relationship. They led a gay male life-style and successfully passed in the gay community as a gay male couple. When defining sexual orientation on the basis of their biological sex, this relationship would be considered a lesbian one. However, in this case, it seems more accurate to define their sexual orientation on the basis of their gender identities. In that case, this relationship would be considered a gay male relationship. In Clare and Tully's terms, this would be a case of transhomosexuality or two cases of transhomosexual females bonded together in a relationship. R a t h e r than coming up with a n o t h e r category for each possible combination of individuals based upon their biological sex and gender identity, sexual orientation, and sex object choice, we see limitations in the definition of homosexuality as sex between persons of the same genital morphology. Sex between persons with the same gender identity is a b e t t e r umbrella term. Transsexualism and sexual orientation seem to be two entities, two aspects of one person, that run independently. This may also be inferred from nontranssexual homosexuals. The great majority have a solid gender identity as male or female but are erotosexually attracted to persons of the same gender. In other words, transsexuality is not a more serious form of homosexuality, not an overshoot, nor is gender dysphoria. Each of these dimensions exist on a continuum. By sticking to limited categories of sexual orientation, labeling individuals as heterosexual or homosexual, and subsequently being confused when on the basis of biological sex, a "heterosexual" female is sexual with a " h o m o s e x u a l " male, a c o n c e p t like t r a n s h o m o s e x u a l i t y is n e e d e d to squeeze these individuals into a new category. Furthermore, if the term transhomosexuality is coined, why not coin the flip side also, i.e., transheterosexuality? Tully and Clare probably did not think of this because transheterosexuality is so "normal" and normal things do not need a special label. R a t h e r than suggesting a yet-undiscovered species, we suggest
421
Letters to the Editor
that we broaden our understanding of sexual identity and sexual orientation to incorporate the cases described. In an effort to realize this, we (Coleman, 1987; Coleman and Bockting, 1988; Coleman et al., 1987) have p r o p o s e d the n e e d for a c o m p r e h e n s i v e assessment m o d e l of sexual orientation that allows for a variety of combinations of the various components of sexual identity.
Walter O. Bockting, Drs., and Eli Coleman, Ph.D. Program in Human Sexuality Department of Family Practice and Community Health Medical School, University of Minnesota 1300 So. 2nd Street, Minneapolis, MN 55454-1015
REFERENCES
Clare, D. (1987). Transsexualism, gender dysphoria, and transhomosexuality. Abstract submitted to the 10th International Symposium on Gender Dysphoria, Amsterdam, The Netherlands. Clare, D., and Tully, B. (1989). Transhomosexuality, or the dissociation of sexual orientation and sex object choice. Arch. Sex. Behav. 18(6): 531-536. Coleman, E. (1987). Assessment of sexual orientation. In Coleman, E. (ed.), Psychotherapy for Homosexual Men and Women, Haworth, New York, pp. 9-24. Coleman, E., and Bockting, W. O. (1988). "Heterosexual" prior to sex reassignment, "homosexual" afterwards. A case study of a female-to-male transsexual. J. Psychol. Hum. Sex. 1(2): 69-82. Coleman, E., Bockting, W. O., and Gooren, L. J. G. (1987, December). Homosexual and bisexual identity development in female-to-male transsexuals. Workshop presented at the International Scientific Conference "Homosexuality Beyond Disease," Amsterdam, The Netherlands.
REPLY TO "CONFUSING T H E ACTOR WITH T H E ACT" Until the other day, I had not read DeCecco's letter (1990), "Confusing the Actor with the Act: Muddled Notions About Homosexuality." I was startled (perhaps shocked may be a more appropriate word) to read DeCecco's ideas. H e says that sexual orientation is a matter of taste as if it were no more than some aesthetic choice dictated by fad or fashion, that it "requires no more explanation than eating North Sea fish or Nebraska beef, pursuing Swedish blondes, or Italian brunettes, and furnishing an apartment with Scandinavian or Victorian furniture" (p. 409). In another place he says, "one preference is as good as any other: you favor Volvos, but I worship Toyotas." I was astonished to see this reductio ad absurdum,
422
Letters to the Editor
this trivialization of such a fundamental part of life as choice of gender in a sexual partner. I have heard DeCecco criticize both those who favor a biological explanation such as prenatal brain programming and those who favor a cultural or familial origin as do some psychoanalysts. Now I can understand why he says, in essence, "A plague on both houses." To him, choosing a sexual partner carries with it about as much significance as changing one coat for another. I have argued as has Money (1987) that it is not a matter of choice. W h e t h e r one likens it to left-handedness, or as M o n e y does, to the learning of a basic language (you do not choose your native language as a preference even though you are born without it. Native language becomes locked in by virtue of the people who speak to you and listen when you speak it), our patterns of love and eroticism are laid down early in life, providing a basic script for later sexual behavior. Powerful feelings and desires are part of this script making it difficult for most (though to be sure not all) people to freely choose between partners of the same or other sex. The concept of voluntary choice or " p r e f e r e n c e " is in error. Reducing the selection between partners of the same or opposite sex to a matter of fashion and relatively easy choice opens the floodgates to increasing homophobia. Most uninformed opinion, including that of the clergy, mistakenly sees gay behavior in precisely the terms that DeCecco describes, namely, that of choice. If it is a simple matter for a person to choose one or the other, then certainly one can control his or her behavior. In the eyes of many people, perhaps the majority, failure to do so makes it a sin or an immoral act. His argument strengthens the hands of those who wish to discriminate against or even punish those who engage in homosexual behavior. In my arguing the case against homophobia before a group of Episcopal bishops, I have made as strong a case as possible that homosexual behavior is not a matter of choice. Fundamental powerful forces are set in motion early in one's life that determine sexual orientation. If I had presented DeCecco's arguments to this group I would have derailed my thesis completely. It is pleasing to r e a d part of the R o m a n Catholic bishops' s t a t e m e n t on homosexuality that says, "Such an orientation, in itself, is not sinful because it is not freely chosen," although paradoxically the bishops still see homosexuality as "evil" (Philadelphia Inquirer, November 15, 1990, p. 3A). Furthermore, DeCecco depersonalizes and dehumanizes sexuality, as if behavior were the only dimension of human activity that should concern us. In his attempt to separate the act from the actor, he goes overboard. Are not thoughts, fantasies, desires, erotic feelings, and feelings of love part of the human condition? DeCecco's failure to take into account per-
423
Letters to the Editor
sonality or "character" is made more striking by his reference to Socrates and his pupil, Alcibiades. DeCecco implies that this was a beautiful, loving h o m o s e x u a l relationship, when in fact Stone (1988) c o m m e n t e d that Socrates "seems to have been the one exception to the sexual irresistibility of Alcibiades, as we know from the latter's rueful account in Plato's Symposium, of the austere and uneventful night he spent under the same blanket with Socrates" (Stone, p. 65). Xenophon described Alcibiades as "the most licentious, the most arrogant, and the most violent" of Greeks. Alcibiades is hardly the romantic homosexual figure implied in DeCecco's comment. He died naked, ambushed in a woman's bed by a band of assassins. Is it possible to fully understand a person's sexual behavior without understanding a person's character? DeCecco speaks disdainfully of "heterosexualists" (and strangely, of "homosexualists" who develop careers in sexology). After centuries of homophobia, is heterophobia now acceptable? Is one bigotry a substitute for another? If one subscribes to the beliefs set forth by DeCecco that sexual behavior is simply a matter of fad or fashion, one to be easily discarded for another, then one would have to agree that he is right in believing that it makes no sense to search for the causes of sexual behavior. I grant the correctness of the oft-stated comment that we do not know the origins of heterosexuality any better than we do of homosexuality. Yet, that does not mean we should stop searching for the group of factors that lead a person to one orientation or another or in some cases the capacity for bisexuality. DeCecco says that there is no use in this pursuit, that it is an idle pursuit, that there is really nothing to understand other than the whims and fancies of mankind. This is foolish talk.
Harold L Lief, M.D. 700 Spruce Street Philadelphia, PA 19106
REFERENCES DeCeeeo, J. P. (1990). Confusing the actor with the act: Muddled notions about homosexuality. Arch. Sex. Behav. 19: 409-412. Money, J. (1987). Sin, sickness or status: Homosexual gender identity and psychoneuroendocrinology. Am. PsyehoL 42: 384-399. Stone, I. F. (1988). The Trial of Socrates, Little, Brown, Boston.
L e t t e r s to t h e E d i t o r
A COMMENT ON THE CONCEPT OF TRANSHOMOSEXUALITY, OR THE DISSOCIATION OF THE MEANING In the clinical note by Clare and Tully (1989), the following components of "transhomosexual accounts" were described. The first component was the penchant for homosexuality of the opposite sex, referring to an overwhelming attraction and idealization of homosexual relationship-style. The second component was empathy, referring to the feeling that such relationships expressed almost perfectly the desires and roles that seemed right for the individual. The third component was the wish to participate in homosexual activities of the opposite sex. (Tully elaborated that this may seem rather difficult, but that ingenuity and a degree of bisexuality in some homosexuals make the "improbable" possible.) Finally, the fourth component was identification with homosexuals of the opposite sex, possibly to the degree that a desire for sex reassignment may develop. In the clinical note, revised by Tully after Clare's death, the interpretation of transhomosexuality is seen as a unique psychosexual identity in which gender dysphoria develops secondary to a penchant or sexual orientation towards members of the opposite sex who identify themselves as homosexual, or to an identification with a homosexual relationship-style. Tully's argument that transhomosexuals' attractions are significantly different from other postoperative transsexuals who might be in homosexual relationships needs to be clarified. In an unpublished abstract, Clare (1987) described the phenomenon of transhomosexuality in gender-dysphoric individuals whose psychosexual identity is that of homosexual persons of the biologically opposite sex. In particular, she referred to female-to-male transsexuals with a male homosexual self-identification and life-style. Clare indicated that gender identity and gender dysphoria were separate from sexual orientation. However, in the recent clinical note (Clare and Tully, 1989), gender identity and sexual orientation are assumed to be interrelated and the findings are interpreted as indicative of an abnormal and unusual dissociation of sexual orientation and sex object choice. It seems that the original meaning that 419 0004-0002/91/0800-0419506.50/0 © 1991 Plenum Publishing Corporation
420
Letters to the Editor
Clare was using to describe transhomosexuality was the unusual combination of a female gender-dysphoric individual who had sexual attraction for the opposite biological sex. Thus, she described these individuals as transhomosexuals. It is unclear whether Clare changed her interpretation or that Tully had a different interpretation. We have found Clare's original interpretation useful. For example, we interviewed two biological females with predominant male gender identities who had been in a committed relationship with one another for 10 years. While both had desired hormonal and surgical sex reassignment, they did not pursue this because of the cost and complications of getting professionals to acknowledge their transsexual status given their sexual orientation. They each identified themselves as gay men and their relationship as a gay male relationship. They led a gay male life-style and successfully passed in the gay community as a gay male couple. When defining sexual orientation on the basis of their biological sex, this relationship would be considered a lesbian one. However, in this case, it seems more accurate to define their sexual orientation on the basis of their gender identities. In that case, this relationship would be considered a gay male relationship. In Clare and Tully's terms, this would be a case of transhomosexuality or two cases of transhomosexual females bonded together in a relationship. R a t h e r than coming up with a n o t h e r category for each possible combination of individuals based upon their biological sex and gender identity, sexual orientation, and sex object choice, we see limitations in the definition of homosexuality as sex between persons of the same genital morphology. Sex between persons with the same gender identity is a b e t t e r umbrella term. Transsexualism and sexual orientation seem to be two entities, two aspects of one person, that run independently. This may also be inferred from nontranssexual homosexuals. The great majority have a solid gender identity as male or female but are erotosexually attracted to persons of the same gender. In other words, transsexuality is not a more serious form of homosexuality, not an overshoot, nor is gender dysphoria. Each of these dimensions exist on a continuum. By sticking to limited categories of sexual orientation, labeling individuals as heterosexual or homosexual, and subsequently being confused when on the basis of biological sex, a "heterosexual" female is sexual with a " h o m o s e x u a l " male, a c o n c e p t like t r a n s h o m o s e x u a l i t y is n e e d e d to squeeze these individuals into a new category. Furthermore, if the term transhomosexuality is coined, why not coin the flip side also, i.e., transheterosexuality? Tully and Clare probably did not think of this because transheterosexuality is so "normal" and normal things do not need a special label. R a t h e r than suggesting a yet-undiscovered species, we suggest
421
Letters to the Editor
that we broaden our understanding of sexual identity and sexual orientation to incorporate the cases described. In an effort to realize this, we (Coleman, 1987; Coleman and Bockting, 1988; Coleman et al., 1987) have p r o p o s e d the n e e d for a c o m p r e h e n s i v e assessment m o d e l of sexual orientation that allows for a variety of combinations of the various components of sexual identity.
Walter O. Bockting, Drs., and Eli Coleman, Ph.D. Program in Human Sexuality Department of Family Practice and Community Health Medical School, University of Minnesota 1300 So. 2nd Street, Minneapolis, MN 55454-1015
REFERENCES
Clare, D. (1987). Transsexualism, gender dysphoria, and transhomosexuality. Abstract submitted to the 10th International Symposium on Gender Dysphoria, Amsterdam, The Netherlands. Clare, D., and Tully, B. (1989). Transhomosexuality, or the dissociation of sexual orientation and sex object choice. Arch. Sex. Behav. 18(6): 531-536. Coleman, E. (1987). Assessment of sexual orientation. In Coleman, E. (ed.), Psychotherapy for Homosexual Men and Women, Haworth, New York, pp. 9-24. Coleman, E., and Bockting, W. O. (1988). "Heterosexual" prior to sex reassignment, "homosexual" afterwards. A case study of a female-to-male transsexual. J. Psychol. Hum. Sex. 1(2): 69-82. Coleman, E., Bockting, W. O., and Gooren, L. J. G. (1987, December). Homosexual and bisexual identity development in female-to-male transsexuals. Workshop presented at the International Scientific Conference "Homosexuality Beyond Disease," Amsterdam, The Netherlands.
REPLY TO "CONFUSING T H E ACTOR WITH T H E ACT" Until the other day, I had not read DeCecco's letter (1990), "Confusing the Actor with the Act: Muddled Notions About Homosexuality." I was startled (perhaps shocked may be a more appropriate word) to read DeCecco's ideas. H e says that sexual orientation is a matter of taste as if it were no more than some aesthetic choice dictated by fad or fashion, that it "requires no more explanation than eating North Sea fish or Nebraska beef, pursuing Swedish blondes, or Italian brunettes, and furnishing an apartment with Scandinavian or Victorian furniture" (p. 409). In another place he says, "one preference is as good as any other: you favor Volvos, but I worship Toyotas." I was astonished to see this reductio ad absurdum,
422
Letters to the Editor
this trivialization of such a fundamental part of life as choice of gender in a sexual partner. I have heard DeCecco criticize both those who favor a biological explanation such as prenatal brain programming and those who favor a cultural or familial origin as do some psychoanalysts. Now I can understand why he says, in essence, "A plague on both houses." To him, choosing a sexual partner carries with it about as much significance as changing one coat for another. I have argued as has Money (1987) that it is not a matter of choice. W h e t h e r one likens it to left-handedness, or as M o n e y does, to the learning of a basic language (you do not choose your native language as a preference even though you are born without it. Native language becomes locked in by virtue of the people who speak to you and listen when you speak it), our patterns of love and eroticism are laid down early in life, providing a basic script for later sexual behavior. Powerful feelings and desires are part of this script making it difficult for most (though to be sure not all) people to freely choose between partners of the same or other sex. The concept of voluntary choice or " p r e f e r e n c e " is in error. Reducing the selection between partners of the same or opposite sex to a matter of fashion and relatively easy choice opens the floodgates to increasing homophobia. Most uninformed opinion, including that of the clergy, mistakenly sees gay behavior in precisely the terms that DeCecco describes, namely, that of choice. If it is a simple matter for a person to choose one or the other, then certainly one can control his or her behavior. In the eyes of many people, perhaps the majority, failure to do so makes it a sin or an immoral act. His argument strengthens the hands of those who wish to discriminate against or even punish those who engage in homosexual behavior. In my arguing the case against homophobia before a group of Episcopal bishops, I have made as strong a case as possible that homosexual behavior is not a matter of choice. Fundamental powerful forces are set in motion early in one's life that determine sexual orientation. If I had presented DeCecco's arguments to this group I would have derailed my thesis completely. It is pleasing to r e a d part of the R o m a n Catholic bishops' s t a t e m e n t on homosexuality that says, "Such an orientation, in itself, is not sinful because it is not freely chosen," although paradoxically the bishops still see homosexuality as "evil" (Philadelphia Inquirer, November 15, 1990, p. 3A). Furthermore, DeCecco depersonalizes and dehumanizes sexuality, as if behavior were the only dimension of human activity that should concern us. In his attempt to separate the act from the actor, he goes overboard. Are not thoughts, fantasies, desires, erotic feelings, and feelings of love part of the human condition? DeCecco's failure to take into account per-
423
Letters to the Editor
sonality or "character" is made more striking by his reference to Socrates and his pupil, Alcibiades. DeCecco implies that this was a beautiful, loving h o m o s e x u a l relationship, when in fact Stone (1988) c o m m e n t e d that Socrates "seems to have been the one exception to the sexual irresistibility of Alcibiades, as we know from the latter's rueful account in Plato's Symposium, of the austere and uneventful night he spent under the same blanket with Socrates" (Stone, p. 65). Xenophon described Alcibiades as "the most licentious, the most arrogant, and the most violent" of Greeks. Alcibiades is hardly the romantic homosexual figure implied in DeCecco's comment. He died naked, ambushed in a woman's bed by a band of assassins. Is it possible to fully understand a person's sexual behavior without understanding a person's character? DeCecco speaks disdainfully of "heterosexualists" (and strangely, of "homosexualists" who develop careers in sexology). After centuries of homophobia, is heterophobia now acceptable? Is one bigotry a substitute for another? If one subscribes to the beliefs set forth by DeCecco that sexual behavior is simply a matter of fad or fashion, one to be easily discarded for another, then one would have to agree that he is right in believing that it makes no sense to search for the causes of sexual behavior. I grant the correctness of the oft-stated comment that we do not know the origins of heterosexuality any better than we do of homosexuality. Yet, that does not mean we should stop searching for the group of factors that lead a person to one orientation or another or in some cases the capacity for bisexuality. DeCecco says that there is no use in this pursuit, that it is an idle pursuit, that there is really nothing to understand other than the whims and fancies of mankind. This is foolish talk.
Harold L Lief, M.D. 700 Spruce Street Philadelphia, PA 19106
REFERENCES DeCeeeo, J. P. (1990). Confusing the actor with the act: Muddled notions about homosexuality. Arch. Sex. Behav. 19: 409-412. Money, J. (1987). Sin, sickness or status: Homosexual gender identity and psychoneuroendocrinology. Am. PsyehoL 42: 384-399. Stone, I. F. (1988). The Trial of Socrates, Little, Brown, Boston.
