Guastello, S. J. (2014). Vigilance phenomena, cognitive workload, and fatigue. American Psychologist, 69, 85-86. doi:10.1037/a0034941 Hancock, P. A. (2013). In search of vigilance: The problem of iatrogenically created psychological phenomena. American Psychologist, 68, 97-109. doi:10.1037/a0030214 Hancock, P. A., & Caird, J. K. (1993). Experimental evaluation of a model of mental workload. Human Factors, 35(3), 413-429. Hancock, P. A., Desmond, P. A., & Matthews, G. (2012). Defining and conceptualizing fatigue. In G. Matthews, P. A. Desmond, C. Neubauer, & P. A. Hancock (Eds.), The handbook of operator fatigue (pp. 63-73). Farnham, Surrey, England: Ashgate. Hancock, P. A., & Newell, K. M. (1985). The movement speed-accuracy relationship in space-time. In H. Heuer, U. Kleinbeck, & K. H. Schmidt (Eds.), Motor behavior: Programming, control and acquisition (pp. 153188). BerUn, Germany: Springer. doi:10.1007/ 978-3-642-69749-4_5 Hancock, P. A., & Warm, J. S. (1989). A dynamic model of stress and sustained attention. Human Factors, 31, 519-537. Parasuraman, R., & Davies, D. R. (1976). Decision theory analysis of response latencies in vigilance. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Human Perception and Performance, 2, 578-590. doi: 10.1037/0096-1523.2.4.578 Warm, J. S., Demher, W. N., & Hancock, P. A. (1996). Vigilance and workload in automated systems. In R. Parasuraman & M. Mouloua (Eds.), Automation and human performance: Theory and applications (pp. 183-200). Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum.
Correspondence concerning this comment should be addressed to P. A. Hancock, Department of Psychology, Building 99, Room 30ID, University of Central Florida, 4000 Central Florida Boulevard, Oriando, FL 32826. E-mail: [email protected] DOI: 10.1037/a0034866
A Phenomenologist's Response to Alan Waterman James Morley Ramapo College of New Jersey Distancing positive psychology from humanistic psychology, Alan Waterman (Apdl 2013) wishes to close the conversation between the two cognate psychological paradigms. It's true that strong fences can make good neighbors, and a desire for amicable separation on the basis of irreconcilable differences is understandable. The fecundity of psychology lies in our perpetual diversity of methodologies and theoretical perspectives. Personally, I have sympathy with positive psychology and celebrate its success. I also believe that Alan Waterman's gracious style is an exemplary model for respectful dis-
88
agreement. However, in distancing positive psychology from humanistic psychology generally, Alan Waterman represented phenomenology as the philosophical foundation to humanistic psychology in a way that is seriously mistaken at worst and problematic at best. Putting aside the issue of the relationship between phenomenology and humanistic psychology (as well as positive psychology), the following brief commentary will limit itself to those points where Waterman invoked the term phenomenological with broad strokes that invite friendly clarification. First, Waterman (2013) did not distinguish philosophical from psychological phenomenology. As with positivist philosophy and experimental psychology, these are interrelated yet distinct disciplines. In his essay. Waterman made the understandable category error of collapsing philosophical and psychological phenomenology. In bdef, the former asks general (ontological) questions, whereas the latter asks empirical questions—albeit both from within a shared epistemological framework. For example, philosophical phenomenology asks, "What is the meaning of imagination?" whereas phenomenological psychology asks, "What is the direct experience of imagination for particular persons?" While the two disciplines are very collaborative, they do represent distinct divisions of labor (Morley, 2011). It causes confusion to cite only philosophical sources. Since 1970, an entire journal (the Journal of Phenomenological Psychology) and innumerable publications have established a rich research tradition that should be directly cited and permitted to speak for itself. Phenomenology is not idiographic. Waterman (2013) incorrectly linked phenomenology with "idiographic objectives" (p. 128). In actual fact, Husserl (1970), the founder of modern phenomenology, devoted his entire life's work to establishing phenomenology as a rigorous science directed toward generalizable knowledge. Husserl's overall epistemological approach was systemized by Giorgi (1970, 2009) into a particularly "psychological" empirical procedure called "descriptive phenomenological method." In this method the researcher collects naive descriptions from several subjects and then follows a standardized procedure for documenting how the researcher elucidates the psychological patterns common to all naive reports. These common intersubjective patterns are represented as "general structures" that are far from idiographic. These general structures make claims to generalizable knowledge that is open to expert scientific critique. While distancing itself from the sort of "positivism" that is unnecessarily based on the assumptions of the physical sci-
ences, phenomenological psychology embraces a positive scientific program of generalizable nomothetic claims. Phenomenology does not treat communication as unreliable. Waterman (2013) incorrectly stated that for phenomenologists, "Communicadon is, by necessity, unreliable" (p. 127). This is a remarkable misunderstanding, as exactly the opposite is true. More than any other approach to psychology, phenomenological methodology is based on a faith in the human being to be able to offer reliable descriptions of his or her direct experiences of psychological phenomena. Communicated expressions are exactly the datum of descriptive phenomenological research. Phenomenology has always maintained that experience is radically intersubjective and that the shared social world is the paramount human reality. To phenomenologists there is no "problem of other minds" as there is for psychological methods based on the physical sciences. In phenomenological epistemology, directly intuited experience is the "crossing of avenues" between self, other, and world (Merleau-Ponty, 1968, p. 160). Phenomenological psychologists are especially devoted to the issue of how to best describe, elucidate, and interrogate this common crossing of lived human expressions in a rigorously scientific manner. Phenomenology does not close dialogue with quantitative methods. Waterman (2013) devoted a considerable section of his essay to an appeal for more crossmethodological dialogue between qualitative and quantitative methods (p. 130). While it is true that phenomenological psychology has established an empirical tradition distinct from experimentalism, I would cite the current example of neurophenomenology (Gallagher & Zahavi, 2012) and historical schools such as gestalt psychology as examples of fruitful interchanges of ideas between divergent systems of qualitadve and quantitative thought. For over 12 years, an entire journal. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences, has been devoted to exactly this dialogue between qualitative and quandtative research. This is another significant oversight. These misunderstandings are forgivable. Like urban myths, such mistakes are rife throughout the secondary literature. However, it behooves us as scientists and scholars to be cognizant of the primary sources behind the literature we are citing. The tragedy here is that much potentially construcdve cross-paradigm research is thwarted by such misapprehensions. Regardless of whether we agree or disagree
January 2014 • American Psychologist
with one another, scientific discourse is only furthered if we have clarity about one another's theoretical paradigms and research etideavors. With such clarity, perhaps we could actually "all just get along"—at least a little better.
repeatedly characterized humanistic psychology as focusing on the "tragic." My response to this article comes not only from my experience as past president of the Society for Humanistic Psychology but from my 40 years of clinical experience. I wonder if the situation described in this artiREFERENCES cle looks different to clinical practitiotiers. In my practice, I am client-centered; I Gallagher, S., & Zahavi, D. (2012). Thephenomtake my cues from the client. I work colenological mind. New York, NY: Routledge. Iaboratively as we discover points of access Giorgi, A. (1970). Psychology as a human science: A phenomenologically based approach. and openness to experience and change. I neither approach him or her seeking tragNew York, NY: Harper & Row. Giorgi, A. (2009). The descriptive phenomenolog- edy nor approach him or her with an intenical method in psychology: A modified Husser- tion to change. lian approach, Pittsburgh, PA: Duquesne UniHaving trained and taught at the New versity Press. York Institute for Gestalt Therapy with Husserl, E. (1970). The crisis of European sciLaura Perls, I leamed about being in the ences and transcendental phenomenology: An moment and working spontaneously to introduction to phenomenological philosophy help people develop awareness of them(W. Biemel, Ed., & D. Carr, Trans.). Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press. selves and others. With my focus on the Merleau-Ponty, M. (1968). The visible and the flow of the therapeutic process, I may ininvisible (A. Lingis, Trans.). Evanston, IL: troduce other techniques if needed. I may Northwestern University Press. use eye movemetit desensitization and reMorley, J. (2011). Phenomenologieal psycholprocessitig, mindfulness and imagery, and ogy. In S. Luft & S. Overgaard (Eds.), The Routledge companion to phenomenology (pp. prescribe homework—just as sometimes I am schoolteacher, mother, or counselor to 586-596). New York, NY: Routledge. Waterman, A. (2013). The humanistic psycholomy clients. gy-positive psychology divide: Contrasts in And just as I hope that future rephilosophical foundations. American Psycholsearchers will use combinations of qualitaogist, 68, 124-133. doi:10.1037/a0032168 tive and quantitative methodologies, I would hope that future clinicians will cling not to theory but to the lived experience of James Morley is editor-in-chief of the Journal of the person sitting opposite them. HumanisPhenomenological Psychology, Correspondence concerning this comment tic psychologists explore clients' joys and should be addressed to James Morley, School of celebrate their triumphs as well as examine Social Science and Human Services, Ramapo their experiences of tragedy atid existential College of New Jersey, 505 Ramapo Valley crises. This, to me, is the heart of humanRoad, Mahwah, NJ 07430. E-mail: jmorley@ istic psychotherapy. ramapo.edu DOI: lü.lO37/aOO34987
A Therapist's Response to Alan Waterman llene A. Serlin Union Street Health Associates, San Francisco, California Alan Waterman's (April 2013) article brought a useful discerning eye to the differences between humanistic and positive psychology and their different theoretical and methodological assumptions. It is important that these differences tiot be glossed over too quickly by those who seek complementarity or integration of the two. However, Waterman also polarized them unnecessarily, which is unfortunate. He asserted strongly several times throughout the article that rapprochement is unlikely, and
January 2014 • American Psychologist
REFERENCE
Waterman, A. S. (2013). The humanistic psychology-positive psychology divide: Contrasts in philosophical foundations. American Psychologist, 68, 124-133. doi:10.1037/ aOO32168
Correspondence concerning this comment should be addressed to llene A. Serlin, Union Street Health Associates, 2084 Union Street, San Francisco, CA 94123. E-mail: iserlin® ileneserlin.eom DOI: I0.1037/a0034865
Are Humanistic and Positive Psychology Really Incommensurate? Hards Friedman University of Florida
Positive psychology forged its initial identity by distaticing itself from humanistic psychology with an opening salvo of criticisms (e.g., claiming that humanistic psychology is unscientific, fosters narcissism, etc.; Seligman & Csikszentmihalyi, 2000), and Waterman (April 2013) admitted that these initial attacks were tnisplaced. Irotiically, as a movement based on the value of positivity, positive psychology was launched through a batTage of negativity. Waterman has continued this distancing maneuver by proclaiming that the two subdisciplines are incotnmensurate. He made this proclamation after acknowledging that they basically study the same content (namely, utiderstanding and promoting human flourishing), that their preferred research methods (qualitative research favored by most humanistic psychologists and quantitative research favored by most positive psychologists) are complementary, and that their overall approaches are neither itiherently superior nor inherently inferior. He even mentioned that certain topics, such as the so-called "true self," can be studied well using the assumptions of either approach. Nevertheless, Waterman argued that humanistic and positive psychology are incommensurate. Waterman (2013) put some of his cards on the table by revealing that he identifies with positive psychology and finds it more useful than humatiistic psychology. He also mentioned that he strives to be fair in his article, and that is evident. Sometimes, however, subtle biases seem to leak out (e.g., humanistic psychology is condescendingly described in the negative as not being a spent force, while positive psychology is described as vibrant and growing in its reach). So if, as Waterman acktiowledged, past positive psychology attacks on humanistic psychology were tnisplaced and reflected a desire to distance positive psychology from humanistic psychology, what is the function of proclaiming that the two are incortunensurate other than to create distance? Unfortunately, Waterman's article appears to be an apologia for the negativity that emanated from positive psychology at its inception, but it is in fact a subtle continuation of that negativity. The gjst of Waterman's (2013) argtiment is that the two are incommensurate because of philosophical (e.g., ontological, epistemological, and practical) divides. He built a case for this by first stating that the philosophers cited by each side barely overlap (i.e., Aristotle being the sole exception mentioned) and then concluding that this lack of overlap shows a radical difference in how they view human nature. Waterman then more specifically argued that the two use different ontologies about human nature, based on his informal observation that phenomenological probletns often trouble htitnanistic
89
Copyright of American Psychologist is the property of American Psychological Association and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use.
Correspondence concerning this comment should be addressed to P. A. Hancock, Department of Psychology, Building 99, Room 30ID, University of Central Florida, 4000 Central Florida Boulevard, Oriando, FL 32826. E-mail: [email protected] DOI: 10.1037/a0034866
A Phenomenologist's Response to Alan Waterman James Morley Ramapo College of New Jersey Distancing positive psychology from humanistic psychology, Alan Waterman (Apdl 2013) wishes to close the conversation between the two cognate psychological paradigms. It's true that strong fences can make good neighbors, and a desire for amicable separation on the basis of irreconcilable differences is understandable. The fecundity of psychology lies in our perpetual diversity of methodologies and theoretical perspectives. Personally, I have sympathy with positive psychology and celebrate its success. I also believe that Alan Waterman's gracious style is an exemplary model for respectful dis-
88
agreement. However, in distancing positive psychology from humanistic psychology generally, Alan Waterman represented phenomenology as the philosophical foundation to humanistic psychology in a way that is seriously mistaken at worst and problematic at best. Putting aside the issue of the relationship between phenomenology and humanistic psychology (as well as positive psychology), the following brief commentary will limit itself to those points where Waterman invoked the term phenomenological with broad strokes that invite friendly clarification. First, Waterman (2013) did not distinguish philosophical from psychological phenomenology. As with positivist philosophy and experimental psychology, these are interrelated yet distinct disciplines. In his essay. Waterman made the understandable category error of collapsing philosophical and psychological phenomenology. In bdef, the former asks general (ontological) questions, whereas the latter asks empirical questions—albeit both from within a shared epistemological framework. For example, philosophical phenomenology asks, "What is the meaning of imagination?" whereas phenomenological psychology asks, "What is the direct experience of imagination for particular persons?" While the two disciplines are very collaborative, they do represent distinct divisions of labor (Morley, 2011). It causes confusion to cite only philosophical sources. Since 1970, an entire journal (the Journal of Phenomenological Psychology) and innumerable publications have established a rich research tradition that should be directly cited and permitted to speak for itself. Phenomenology is not idiographic. Waterman (2013) incorrectly linked phenomenology with "idiographic objectives" (p. 128). In actual fact, Husserl (1970), the founder of modern phenomenology, devoted his entire life's work to establishing phenomenology as a rigorous science directed toward generalizable knowledge. Husserl's overall epistemological approach was systemized by Giorgi (1970, 2009) into a particularly "psychological" empirical procedure called "descriptive phenomenological method." In this method the researcher collects naive descriptions from several subjects and then follows a standardized procedure for documenting how the researcher elucidates the psychological patterns common to all naive reports. These common intersubjective patterns are represented as "general structures" that are far from idiographic. These general structures make claims to generalizable knowledge that is open to expert scientific critique. While distancing itself from the sort of "positivism" that is unnecessarily based on the assumptions of the physical sci-
ences, phenomenological psychology embraces a positive scientific program of generalizable nomothetic claims. Phenomenology does not treat communication as unreliable. Waterman (2013) incorrectly stated that for phenomenologists, "Communicadon is, by necessity, unreliable" (p. 127). This is a remarkable misunderstanding, as exactly the opposite is true. More than any other approach to psychology, phenomenological methodology is based on a faith in the human being to be able to offer reliable descriptions of his or her direct experiences of psychological phenomena. Communicated expressions are exactly the datum of descriptive phenomenological research. Phenomenology has always maintained that experience is radically intersubjective and that the shared social world is the paramount human reality. To phenomenologists there is no "problem of other minds" as there is for psychological methods based on the physical sciences. In phenomenological epistemology, directly intuited experience is the "crossing of avenues" between self, other, and world (Merleau-Ponty, 1968, p. 160). Phenomenological psychologists are especially devoted to the issue of how to best describe, elucidate, and interrogate this common crossing of lived human expressions in a rigorously scientific manner. Phenomenology does not close dialogue with quantitative methods. Waterman (2013) devoted a considerable section of his essay to an appeal for more crossmethodological dialogue between qualitative and quantitative methods (p. 130). While it is true that phenomenological psychology has established an empirical tradition distinct from experimentalism, I would cite the current example of neurophenomenology (Gallagher & Zahavi, 2012) and historical schools such as gestalt psychology as examples of fruitful interchanges of ideas between divergent systems of qualitadve and quantitative thought. For over 12 years, an entire journal. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences, has been devoted to exactly this dialogue between qualitative and quandtative research. This is another significant oversight. These misunderstandings are forgivable. Like urban myths, such mistakes are rife throughout the secondary literature. However, it behooves us as scientists and scholars to be cognizant of the primary sources behind the literature we are citing. The tragedy here is that much potentially construcdve cross-paradigm research is thwarted by such misapprehensions. Regardless of whether we agree or disagree
January 2014 • American Psychologist
with one another, scientific discourse is only furthered if we have clarity about one another's theoretical paradigms and research etideavors. With such clarity, perhaps we could actually "all just get along"—at least a little better.
repeatedly characterized humanistic psychology as focusing on the "tragic." My response to this article comes not only from my experience as past president of the Society for Humanistic Psychology but from my 40 years of clinical experience. I wonder if the situation described in this artiREFERENCES cle looks different to clinical practitiotiers. In my practice, I am client-centered; I Gallagher, S., & Zahavi, D. (2012). Thephenomtake my cues from the client. I work colenological mind. New York, NY: Routledge. Iaboratively as we discover points of access Giorgi, A. (1970). Psychology as a human science: A phenomenologically based approach. and openness to experience and change. I neither approach him or her seeking tragNew York, NY: Harper & Row. Giorgi, A. (2009). The descriptive phenomenolog- edy nor approach him or her with an intenical method in psychology: A modified Husser- tion to change. lian approach, Pittsburgh, PA: Duquesne UniHaving trained and taught at the New versity Press. York Institute for Gestalt Therapy with Husserl, E. (1970). The crisis of European sciLaura Perls, I leamed about being in the ences and transcendental phenomenology: An moment and working spontaneously to introduction to phenomenological philosophy help people develop awareness of them(W. Biemel, Ed., & D. Carr, Trans.). Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press. selves and others. With my focus on the Merleau-Ponty, M. (1968). The visible and the flow of the therapeutic process, I may ininvisible (A. Lingis, Trans.). Evanston, IL: troduce other techniques if needed. I may Northwestern University Press. use eye movemetit desensitization and reMorley, J. (2011). Phenomenologieal psycholprocessitig, mindfulness and imagery, and ogy. In S. Luft & S. Overgaard (Eds.), The Routledge companion to phenomenology (pp. prescribe homework—just as sometimes I am schoolteacher, mother, or counselor to 586-596). New York, NY: Routledge. Waterman, A. (2013). The humanistic psycholomy clients. gy-positive psychology divide: Contrasts in And just as I hope that future rephilosophical foundations. American Psycholsearchers will use combinations of qualitaogist, 68, 124-133. doi:10.1037/a0032168 tive and quantitative methodologies, I would hope that future clinicians will cling not to theory but to the lived experience of James Morley is editor-in-chief of the Journal of the person sitting opposite them. HumanisPhenomenological Psychology, Correspondence concerning this comment tic psychologists explore clients' joys and should be addressed to James Morley, School of celebrate their triumphs as well as examine Social Science and Human Services, Ramapo their experiences of tragedy atid existential College of New Jersey, 505 Ramapo Valley crises. This, to me, is the heart of humanRoad, Mahwah, NJ 07430. E-mail: jmorley@ istic psychotherapy. ramapo.edu DOI: lü.lO37/aOO34987
A Therapist's Response to Alan Waterman llene A. Serlin Union Street Health Associates, San Francisco, California Alan Waterman's (April 2013) article brought a useful discerning eye to the differences between humanistic and positive psychology and their different theoretical and methodological assumptions. It is important that these differences tiot be glossed over too quickly by those who seek complementarity or integration of the two. However, Waterman also polarized them unnecessarily, which is unfortunate. He asserted strongly several times throughout the article that rapprochement is unlikely, and
January 2014 • American Psychologist
REFERENCE
Waterman, A. S. (2013). The humanistic psychology-positive psychology divide: Contrasts in philosophical foundations. American Psychologist, 68, 124-133. doi:10.1037/ aOO32168
Correspondence concerning this comment should be addressed to llene A. Serlin, Union Street Health Associates, 2084 Union Street, San Francisco, CA 94123. E-mail: iserlin® ileneserlin.eom DOI: I0.1037/a0034865
Are Humanistic and Positive Psychology Really Incommensurate? Hards Friedman University of Florida
Positive psychology forged its initial identity by distaticing itself from humanistic psychology with an opening salvo of criticisms (e.g., claiming that humanistic psychology is unscientific, fosters narcissism, etc.; Seligman & Csikszentmihalyi, 2000), and Waterman (April 2013) admitted that these initial attacks were tnisplaced. Irotiically, as a movement based on the value of positivity, positive psychology was launched through a batTage of negativity. Waterman has continued this distancing maneuver by proclaiming that the two subdisciplines are incotnmensurate. He made this proclamation after acknowledging that they basically study the same content (namely, utiderstanding and promoting human flourishing), that their preferred research methods (qualitative research favored by most humanistic psychologists and quantitative research favored by most positive psychologists) are complementary, and that their overall approaches are neither itiherently superior nor inherently inferior. He even mentioned that certain topics, such as the so-called "true self," can be studied well using the assumptions of either approach. Nevertheless, Waterman argued that humanistic and positive psychology are incommensurate. Waterman (2013) put some of his cards on the table by revealing that he identifies with positive psychology and finds it more useful than humatiistic psychology. He also mentioned that he strives to be fair in his article, and that is evident. Sometimes, however, subtle biases seem to leak out (e.g., humanistic psychology is condescendingly described in the negative as not being a spent force, while positive psychology is described as vibrant and growing in its reach). So if, as Waterman acktiowledged, past positive psychology attacks on humanistic psychology were tnisplaced and reflected a desire to distance positive psychology from humanistic psychology, what is the function of proclaiming that the two are incortunensurate other than to create distance? Unfortunately, Waterman's article appears to be an apologia for the negativity that emanated from positive psychology at its inception, but it is in fact a subtle continuation of that negativity. The gjst of Waterman's (2013) argtiment is that the two are incommensurate because of philosophical (e.g., ontological, epistemological, and practical) divides. He built a case for this by first stating that the philosophers cited by each side barely overlap (i.e., Aristotle being the sole exception mentioned) and then concluding that this lack of overlap shows a radical difference in how they view human nature. Waterman then more specifically argued that the two use different ontologies about human nature, based on his informal observation that phenomenological probletns often trouble htitnanistic
89
Copyright of American Psychologist is the property of American Psychological Association and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use.
