J . Chem. Tech. Biotechnol. 1992, 53, 125-126
Comment Biotechnology and the Third Review Conference of the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention Nicholas A. Sims Department of International Relations, London School of Economics & Political Science, University of London, Houghton Street, London WC2A 2AE, UK
procedures which could offer a substitute for direct verification. The 1986 review had built on these foundations and added the novel element of confidence-building measures (CBMs), as they are now called. Governments adopted a politically-binding commitment to declare annually high-containment facilities for handling dangerous pathogens, unusual outbreaks of disease, scientific contacts and publications in fields relevant to the Convention. These CBMs were intended to give greater substance to the Convention’s vague reference to the desirability of greater international co-operation in the peaceful applications of microbiology, especially for the prevention of disease. At the same time it was hoped that they would build up a pattern of information-sharing, a fuller picture of peaceful activities, which would reduce the incidence of ambiguities or suspicions leading to accusations of non-compliance : accusations which, since the early 1980s, had hung in the air, never satisfactorily resolved, but eroding confidence both in the possibility of obtaining reassurance over compliance concerns, and in the BTW ban itself. It was, as it turned out, on CBMs that the Third Review Conference did best. Governments agreed to sharpen the focus of the 1986 batch, so that information of greater relevance to treaty compliance would be exchanged under the existing CBMs, such as any past or present R&D (and other activities) undertaken in the name of BTW defence. Greater transparency in permitted activities would, it was hoped, dispel unnecessary suspicions and also show up in sharper relief anything that did require closer scrutiny. The Conferelice also considerably expanded the range of CBMs. Governments agreed in future to declare also any facilities for vaccine production, export controls against BTW proliferation, import controls against pathogenic micro-organisms, national legislation to give domestic effect to the Convention’s obligations, and any offensive BTW programmes from 1 January 1946 until they became illegal.
Biotechnology, and more particularly the opportunities its unscrupulous exploitation might afford for surreptitious breaches of ‘the world’s first disarmament treaty’, was an underlying concern of that treaty’s most recent review. How could the thin dividing line between permitted and forbidden activities in this field best be monitored in the common interest of upholding the global ban on biological and toxin weapons (BTW) ? This was one of the questions posed, but not fully answered, by the Third Review Conference of states parties to the 1972 Convention banning BTW. The Convention is now in force for 118 states. Of these, 78 were represented at Geneva for the conference held 927 September 1991. The ban extends to the development, production, stockpiling, acquisition, retention and transfer of the prohibited items, subject to an exemption for ‘prophylactic, protective or other peaceful purposes’. This presents one of several definitional problems. The Convention does not constrain research, neither does it require facilities for producing weapons to be destroyed. These omissions present more problems. All the more necessary, then, to develop some reliable means of assuring compliance with the obligations that are included. This has become one of the principal functions of successive review conferences. Their original purpose, however, which remains relevant, has always been to review the Convention’s operation, assess its effectiveness and take account of relevant scientific and technological developments, as well as of progress in the protracted negotiation of a complementary (but much more complicated) treaty for chemical disarmament. Hopes were high for the Third Review Conference. Even in the glacial depths of the ‘second cold war’ the 1980 review had succeeded in agreeing a few clarifications of the treaty text, recognising that some of its provisions (such as those requiring co-operation and consultation in solving problems) held latent potential for developing 125
J . Chem. Tech. Biotechnol. 0268-2575/92/$05.00. 0 1992 SCI. Printed in Great Britain
126
Comment: Biotechnology and the Third Review Conference of the B T W convention
The conference was more cautious on verification, in the sense of intrusive, ‘anytime, anywhere’ inspections at short notice. The US delegate stated, three times in one speech, that the Convention was not effectively verifiable. Other states, mainly Western, which came to the conference with a more open mind on the subject, were broadly content to leave the argument to a group of governmental experts. They concentrated their efforts accordingly on persuading the US to allow such a group to be set up, albeit (in deference to US reservations) with no mandate to produce proposals for a verification protocol but only to examine the feasibility of different verification measures from a scientific and technical viewpoint. The group will meet on 30 March 1992, for two weeks, and thereafter (US policy permitting) through 1992-93. A special conference to examine its report could take place in 1994 (or even 1993 if Canada has its way) if a majority of states parties to the Convention so decides. It seems likely, then, that a decision for or against grafting verification provisions on to the Convention will be taken well before the Fourth Review Conference foregathers in 1996. The feasibility study may well conclude that some of the prohibitions in the 1972 Convention are more directly verifiable than others (perhaps at the point of BTW weaponisation?), while some (for example, small-scale development of microbial agents or toxins for hostile purposes) may be hardly verifiable at all. Biotechnology
firms will undoubtedly be affected if the existing BTW treaty constraints on development or production of micro-organisms or ‘toxins, whether naturally or artificially created or altered ’, become subject to verification by challenge inspection of any suspect location, whether included in a national declaration of high-containment facilities (or other CBMs) or not. But the 1991 conference stopped well short of any such decision; what is decided in 1993 or 1994 will undoubtedly be influenced, not only by the experts’ report on feasibility of verification in the BTW case, but also by whatever verification provisions may by that time have been concluded in the Chemical Weapons Convention. In the meantime the conference has encouraged (with due acknowledgement of the danger that assistance may unwittingly be given to BTW proliferators if the intended use is uncertain) ‘international co-operation and exchange in the peaceful uses of biotechnology.’ It noted ‘with concern the increasing gap between the developed and the developing countries in the field of biotechnology, genetic engineering, microbiology and other related areas’, and urged ‘the developed countries possessing advanced biotechnology to adopt positive measures to promote technological transfer and international co-operation on an equal and non-discriminatory basis, in particular with the developing countries, for the benefit of all mankind.’
Comment Biotechnology and the Third Review Conference of the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention Nicholas A. Sims Department of International Relations, London School of Economics & Political Science, University of London, Houghton Street, London WC2A 2AE, UK
procedures which could offer a substitute for direct verification. The 1986 review had built on these foundations and added the novel element of confidence-building measures (CBMs), as they are now called. Governments adopted a politically-binding commitment to declare annually high-containment facilities for handling dangerous pathogens, unusual outbreaks of disease, scientific contacts and publications in fields relevant to the Convention. These CBMs were intended to give greater substance to the Convention’s vague reference to the desirability of greater international co-operation in the peaceful applications of microbiology, especially for the prevention of disease. At the same time it was hoped that they would build up a pattern of information-sharing, a fuller picture of peaceful activities, which would reduce the incidence of ambiguities or suspicions leading to accusations of non-compliance : accusations which, since the early 1980s, had hung in the air, never satisfactorily resolved, but eroding confidence both in the possibility of obtaining reassurance over compliance concerns, and in the BTW ban itself. It was, as it turned out, on CBMs that the Third Review Conference did best. Governments agreed to sharpen the focus of the 1986 batch, so that information of greater relevance to treaty compliance would be exchanged under the existing CBMs, such as any past or present R&D (and other activities) undertaken in the name of BTW defence. Greater transparency in permitted activities would, it was hoped, dispel unnecessary suspicions and also show up in sharper relief anything that did require closer scrutiny. The Conferelice also considerably expanded the range of CBMs. Governments agreed in future to declare also any facilities for vaccine production, export controls against BTW proliferation, import controls against pathogenic micro-organisms, national legislation to give domestic effect to the Convention’s obligations, and any offensive BTW programmes from 1 January 1946 until they became illegal.
Biotechnology, and more particularly the opportunities its unscrupulous exploitation might afford for surreptitious breaches of ‘the world’s first disarmament treaty’, was an underlying concern of that treaty’s most recent review. How could the thin dividing line between permitted and forbidden activities in this field best be monitored in the common interest of upholding the global ban on biological and toxin weapons (BTW) ? This was one of the questions posed, but not fully answered, by the Third Review Conference of states parties to the 1972 Convention banning BTW. The Convention is now in force for 118 states. Of these, 78 were represented at Geneva for the conference held 927 September 1991. The ban extends to the development, production, stockpiling, acquisition, retention and transfer of the prohibited items, subject to an exemption for ‘prophylactic, protective or other peaceful purposes’. This presents one of several definitional problems. The Convention does not constrain research, neither does it require facilities for producing weapons to be destroyed. These omissions present more problems. All the more necessary, then, to develop some reliable means of assuring compliance with the obligations that are included. This has become one of the principal functions of successive review conferences. Their original purpose, however, which remains relevant, has always been to review the Convention’s operation, assess its effectiveness and take account of relevant scientific and technological developments, as well as of progress in the protracted negotiation of a complementary (but much more complicated) treaty for chemical disarmament. Hopes were high for the Third Review Conference. Even in the glacial depths of the ‘second cold war’ the 1980 review had succeeded in agreeing a few clarifications of the treaty text, recognising that some of its provisions (such as those requiring co-operation and consultation in solving problems) held latent potential for developing 125
J . Chem. Tech. Biotechnol. 0268-2575/92/$05.00. 0 1992 SCI. Printed in Great Britain
126
Comment: Biotechnology and the Third Review Conference of the B T W convention
The conference was more cautious on verification, in the sense of intrusive, ‘anytime, anywhere’ inspections at short notice. The US delegate stated, three times in one speech, that the Convention was not effectively verifiable. Other states, mainly Western, which came to the conference with a more open mind on the subject, were broadly content to leave the argument to a group of governmental experts. They concentrated their efforts accordingly on persuading the US to allow such a group to be set up, albeit (in deference to US reservations) with no mandate to produce proposals for a verification protocol but only to examine the feasibility of different verification measures from a scientific and technical viewpoint. The group will meet on 30 March 1992, for two weeks, and thereafter (US policy permitting) through 1992-93. A special conference to examine its report could take place in 1994 (or even 1993 if Canada has its way) if a majority of states parties to the Convention so decides. It seems likely, then, that a decision for or against grafting verification provisions on to the Convention will be taken well before the Fourth Review Conference foregathers in 1996. The feasibility study may well conclude that some of the prohibitions in the 1972 Convention are more directly verifiable than others (perhaps at the point of BTW weaponisation?), while some (for example, small-scale development of microbial agents or toxins for hostile purposes) may be hardly verifiable at all. Biotechnology
firms will undoubtedly be affected if the existing BTW treaty constraints on development or production of micro-organisms or ‘toxins, whether naturally or artificially created or altered ’, become subject to verification by challenge inspection of any suspect location, whether included in a national declaration of high-containment facilities (or other CBMs) or not. But the 1991 conference stopped well short of any such decision; what is decided in 1993 or 1994 will undoubtedly be influenced, not only by the experts’ report on feasibility of verification in the BTW case, but also by whatever verification provisions may by that time have been concluded in the Chemical Weapons Convention. In the meantime the conference has encouraged (with due acknowledgement of the danger that assistance may unwittingly be given to BTW proliferators if the intended use is uncertain) ‘international co-operation and exchange in the peaceful uses of biotechnology.’ It noted ‘with concern the increasing gap between the developed and the developing countries in the field of biotechnology, genetic engineering, microbiology and other related areas’, and urged ‘the developed countries possessing advanced biotechnology to adopt positive measures to promote technological transfer and international co-operation on an equal and non-discriminatory basis, in particular with the developing countries, for the benefit of all mankind.’
