Waste Management 34 (2014) 919–928

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Cap and trade schemes on waste management: A case study of the Landfill Allowance Trading Scheme (LATS) in England Maria Calaf-Forn a,b,⇑, Jordi Roca c, Ignasi Puig-Ventosa b a

Institut de Ciència i Tecnologia Ambientals (ICTA), Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona (UAB), E-08193 Bellaterra, Barcelona, Spain ENT Environment and Management, Carrer Sant Joan 39, First Floor, E-08800 Vilanova i la Geltrú, Barcelona, Spain c Departament de Teoria Econòmica, Universitat de Barcelona (UB), Diagonal, 696, E-08034 Barcelona, Spain b

a r t i c l e

i n f o

Article history: Received 24 May 2013 Accepted 23 February 2014 Available online 21 March 2014 Keywords: Landfill Allowance Trading Scheme (LATS) Cap and trade schemes Biodegradable municipal waste Landfill Tax England Landfill Directive

a b s t r a c t The Landfill Allowance Trading Scheme (LATS) is one of the main instruments used in England to enforce the landfill diversion targets established in the Directive 1999/31/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 April 1999 on the landfill of waste (Landfill Directive). Through the LATS, biodegradable municipal waste (BMW) allowances for landfilling are allocated to each local authority, otherwise known as waste disposal authorities (WDAs). The quantity of landfill allowances received is expected to decrease continuously from 2005/06 to 2019/20 so as to meet the objectives of the Landfill Directive. To achieve their commitments, WDAs can exchange, buy, sell or transfer allowances among each other, or may reprofile their own allocation through banking and/or borrowing. Despite the goals for the first seven years – which included two target years (2005/06 and 2009/10) – being widely achieved (the average allocation of allowances per WDA was 22.9% higher than those finally used), market activity among WDAs was high and prices were not very stable. Results in terms of waste reduction and recycling levels have been satisfactory. The reduction of BMW landfilled (in percentage) was higher during the first seven years of the LATS period (2005/06–2011/12) (around 7% annually) than during the previous period (2001/02– 2004/05) (4.2% annually). Since 2008, the significance of the LATS diminished because of an increase in the rate of the UK Landfill Tax. The LATS was suppressed after the 2012/13 target year, before what it was initially scheduled. The purpose of this paper is to describe the particularities of the LATS, analyse its performance as a waste management policy, make a comparison with the Landfill Tax, discuss its main features as regards efficiency, effectiveness and the application of the ‘‘polluter pays’’ principle and finally discuss if the effect of the increase in the Landfill Tax is what made the LATS ultimately unnecessary. Ó 2014 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

1. Introduction 1.1. Background and justification The problem of not reflecting ‘‘external costs’’ in market prices has been widely and extensively analysed. Since Pigou (1920), there has been a progressively growing acceptance of the idea that public intervention is needed to prevent or reduce these costs. Many different instruments can be used in environmental policy design in order to provide producers and consumers with an economic incentive to act towards publicly defined environmental targets. Among these, economic instruments (indirectly) achieve this by changing the relative prices of various goods or technologies,

⇑ Corresponding author at: ENT Environment and Management, Carrer Sant Joan 39, First Floor, E-08800 Vilanova i la Geltrú, Barcelona, Spain. Tel.: +34 93 893 51 04. E-mail address: [email protected] (M. Calaf-Forn). http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.wasman.2014.02.022 0956-053X/Ó 2014 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

or by means of the introduction of subsidies, fees, charges, taxes, marketable emission permits or deposit-refund systems, among others (Pearce and Turner, 1990). First proposed by Dales (1968), emissions trading schemes (also called cap and trade schemes) are one of these types of economic instruments for environmental policymaking. A central authority (usually a government body) sets a limit or cap on the amount a pollutant can be emitted. The corresponding allowances are either allocated for free or sold to different market players in the form of emission permits, which represent the right to emit or discharge a certain amount of the specified pollutant. These permits can be used or exchanged among polluters, in order not to exceed the overall cap (Martínez Alier and Roca Jusmet, 2001). Currently, there are active emissions trading programmes for several air pollutants. The first large-scale programme – for sulphur emissions in the United States – was approved in 1990 and introduced in 1995 (Stavins, 1998); there are also several regional markets for

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Nomenclature BMW DEFRA EA EEA ETS GHG LAS LATS LCF MBT

Biodegradable municipal waste Department for Environment, Food, and Rural Affairs Environment Agency for England and Wales (the Agency) European Environment Agency Emissions Trading Scheme/System Greenhouse gases Landfill Allowances Scheme Landfill Allowance Trading Scheme Landfill Communities Fund Mechanical biological treatment

nitrogen oxides in the US. The largest scheme of this type is the European Union Emissions Trading System (EU ETS), which was launched in 2005 for greenhouse gases (GHG); it constitutes one of the major pillars of EU climate policy. On the other hand, the large amount of municipal solid waste (MSW) generated in most industrialised countries has prompted increased efforts to improve recycling rates and to reduce the amount of waste sent to final disposal. According to data from Eurostat, in the European Union (EU15), each citizen generated an average of 460 kg of municipal waste in 1995; this rose to 519 kg (EU-27) in 2008 before falling to 500 kg (EU-27) in 2011. The trend seems to have stabilised at around 520 kg per capita (EU-27) (Blumenthal, 2011). This indicates that efforts to prevent the generation of waste should be significantly reinforced if the aim of the Sixth Environment Action Programme (a 50% of reduction on 2000 levels by 2050) is to be achieved (EEA, 2008). Historically, disposal in landfills has been the predominant destination of municipal waste, but over the last two decades, considerable reductions in landfilling have taken place. In 2003, 49% of total EU municipal waste was landfilled, 16% incinerated and 32% recycled or composted. By 2008, landfilled waste had been reduced to 40% of the total EU municipal waste; this was achieved by increasing waste recovery through different recycling or composting actions (achieving 39% of the total MSW in 2008), but also through increased incineration (19% in 2008). By 2020, landfilling of waste is expected to further decrease to around 35% of total EU municipal waste (EEA, 2008, 2010). Methane emissions – one of the six greenhouse gases included in the Kyoto Protocol – are linked to landfill operations. Landfills are also responsible for the pollution of surface water, groundwater and soil (EEA, 2008). To address this question, the Directive 1999/ 31/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 April 1999 on the landfill of waste (Landfill Directive) established targets for Member States (MS) to reduce the amount of biodegradable municipal waste (BMW) sent to landfill (landfill diversion targets). Member States must set up a national strategy for the implementation of this reduction, which may include measures such as recycling, composting, biogas production or material/energy recovery (including incineration). To achieve these targets, some EU countries have applied economic incentives, of which landfill taxes are most common (Fischer et al., 2012; Watkins et al., 2012), but which also include fee-rebate systems (Puig-Ventosa, 2004) or cap and trade schemes (otherwise known as tradable permits systems). The present article focuses on an economic instrument based on the latter – the Landfill Allowance Trading Scheme (LATS) – implemented in England, whose main objective is to comply with the landfill diversion targets.

MS MSW RDF UA WCA WDA WDF WET Act WRAP

Member States Municipal solid waste Refuse-derived fuel Unitary authority Waste collection authority Waste disposal authority Waste Data Flow Waste and Emissions Trading Act Waste and Resources Action Programme

This article describes its particularities and key aspects, and analyses its performance as a waste management policy, as well as tries to examine the effect of the increase of the Landfill Tax on the LATS. It is divided into the following sections. Section 2 presents the main methodological aspects. Section 3 introduces the specificities of emissions trading schemes as economic instruments for waste management. Section 4 describes in detail the Landfill Allowance Trading Scheme (LATS) in England and analyses its results. Then, Section 5 compares the LATS and the UK Landfill Tax. Finally, some conclusions are presented. 2. Methodology For the development of this article, several sources have been analysed, most of which originated from the Department of Environment, Food and Rural Affairs (DEFRA), which is the national authority responsible for the LATS. For the achievement of the results, real data has also been treated and analysed. In addition, some interviews have been conducted with officials responsible for the application of the LATS. Aside from this, the general framework of this article is based on an exhaustive literature review.

3. Specificities of the emissions trading schemes as economic instruments for waste management In this section, a review of the specificities in terms of effectiveness and efficiency of cap and trade schemes will be presented, and some particularities for waste management will be discussed. Furthermore, their characteristics will be compared with other environmental policies, such as environmental taxes and command and control measures. In general, mechanisms which operate through the market, such as cap and trade schemes and environmental taxes, can ensure that a given environmental outcome is achieved at the lowest cost to the economy; or, in other words, that the marginal cost of reducing pollution for the different agents tends to equalize (Van Beukering et al., 2009) and thus (static) efficiency is guaranteed. Regulatory measures, on the other hand, do not have this particularity. Nevertheless, by comparing environmental taxes and cap and trade permits some authors (e.g. Driesen, 2003) maintain that taxes are more favourable for enhancing technological changes, and that they have the property of dynamic efficiency. On the contrary, tradable permit schemes do not accomplish this feature. In short, when innovation that makes the abatement options cheaper is available, the demand for allowances diminishes and their price falls, therefore reducing the economic incentive to reduce pollution.

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In terms of effectiveness, cap and trade schemes can be considered superior to environmental taxes because the achievement of environmental objectives is more guaranteed. However, an uncertainty exists in cap and trade systems regarding the market price of the permits. In order to reduce excessive price oscillations, flexibilities may be introduced into the market; for instance, the possibility of accumulating allowances for the future (known as banking), or the possibility of anticipating the use of future allowances (known as borrowing). In this case, the control of annual effectiveness vanishes (Perman et al., 2003), although the effectiveness for the whole period may be equally guaranteed. Similarly, under a situation of economic crisis, decreases in industrial production and energy demand causes a reduction of pollution/waste generation. In this case, the price of allowances goes down, and this causes a disincentive for reducing pollution/waste generation, as has happened recently in the case of EU ETS (EC, 2012). Again, in the case of environmental taxes, this does not occur. On the other hand, cap and trade schemes have a much higher capacity to adapt to inflation, since, unlike environmental taxes, they readjust to new prices automatically, without regulatory or legislative measures. Another aspect to be assessed is the ‘‘polluter pays’’ principle. While easy to accomplish through environmental taxes, this principle is not satisfied in the case of tradable permits if pollution allowances are distributed for free. Moreover, the criteria to distribute permits are obviously a conflictive topic. If historical emissions are considered in the allocation (i.e. grandfathering), those with higher pollution levels will obtain a higher number of allowances, without recognising previous efforts of those who have already reduced pollution. On the contrary, when distributing allowances through auctioning, the system is much more similar to taxes and it also accomplishes the ‘‘polluter pays’’ principle (Tietenberg, 1990). Nevertheless, in most cap and trade schemes an initial free distribution of allowances based on the status quo is predominant (e.g. EU ETS until 2012, SOx in USA, LATS, etc.). In addition, another difference between taxes and tradable emissions systems is that the former creates some revenue, whereas the latter do not, except in cases where allowances are distributed via an auction. On the other hand, a possible particularity for cap and trade schemes when applied to waste instead of air emissions could be the greater difficulty in controlling illegal dumping, although this may be minimised when permits are allocated to public authorities (as in the case of the LATS). On the other hand, the allocation of allowances to public authorities, rather than companies or individual users, means that the incentive is not so directly perceived by private users, possibly implying less effectiveness throughout the whole process. 4. The Landfill Allowance Trading Scheme (LATS) in England The present section includes a brief background of the situation regarding municipal waste management in the UK; a general description of the instrument (regulation, implementation, agents, etc.); an analysis of the results; and an identification of the key factors that ensure the satisfactory operation of the LATS. 4.1. Background and situation in the United Kingdom Under the landfill diversion targets set out in Article 5.2 of Directive 1999/31/EC, the UK must reduce their amount of biodegradable municipal waste (BMW)1 sent to landfill in 2010 to 75% 1 Defined in the WET Act 2003 as any waste that is capable of undergoing anaerobic or aerobic decomposition, such as food and garden waste, and paper and paperboard.

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(referring to 1995 reference year levels), to 50% by 2013, and to 35% by 2020. One of the main UK policies to enforce these targets are the Landfill Allowances Schemes (LASs), which differ between the four regional administrations of England, Wales, Scotland and Northern Ireland. They were all launched in April 2005, except for Wales, which was introduced in October 2004 (EEA, 2007). Their legal basis is regulated by the Waste and Emissions Trading Act 2003 (WET Act), which essentially transposes the Landfill Directive to the British legal framework. This Act gives the Secretary of State power to impose a duty upon local authorities2 to ensure that they landfill no more BMW than that for which they hold the equivalent number of landfill allowances,3 allocated through a system of grandfathering by DEFRA (see Section 4.2.2). The targets, and hence the LASs, only apply to municipal waste. As a result of a public consultation developed by DEFRA, the initial definition of municipal waste was changed in October 2011. This also involved changes to the system operation (see Section 4.2.5). However, in the present research, most data presented are prior to this date. For this reason, the conceptual terms and definitions used are those that applied initially. LASs in the different regions are not conceived of in the same way. Notably, only England and Scotland4 allow trading of allowances (hence, in England the scheme is known as the Landfill Allowances Trading Scheme or LATS). In Wales and Northern Ireland only banking and borrowing are allowed. In addition, the biodegradable content of waste is assumed to be different in each country. In case of non-compliance, a sanction regime applies, which is set at £150 per tonne of excess BMW landfilled in all regions, except for Wales, where it is established at £200 per tonne. In addition, a penalty of £1,000 is established if the reporting requirements are not satisfied (WET Act 2003). Another important economic instrument which deals with waste management and the Landfill Directive targets is the Landfill Tax (see Section 5), which is set by the national government.

4.2. Description The LATS in England is regulated by the Landfill Allowances and Trading Scheme (England) Regulations 2004 and subsequent modifications (hereafter, the LATS Regulations), and it can be defined as a quantity constraint on the amount of biodegradable waste that can be landfilled by local authorities in line with the UK targets derived from the EU Landfill Directive. Landfilled BMW can be reduced either by sending less material to landfill or by reducing the biodegradability of waste which is landfilled. Initially, allowances were allocated for each scheme year from 2005/06 to 2019/20 (see Section 4.2.2). The allocation method did not take into account the population growth of each municipality, as predictions of population growth were considered highly uncertain (DEFRA, 2010a). To meet their commitments, allowances may be exchanged between local authorities or Waste Disposal Authorities (WDAs). Therefore, those who landfill less waste than defined by their allowance can sell or transfer the excess to others. In addition, LATS offers local authorities additional flexibility to meet their obligations: they may re-profile their own allocations through banking 2 Known as Waste Disposal Authorities (WDAs), as described in Part 2 of the Environmental Protection Act 1990 (c. 43). 3 One allowance permits the holder to dispose of one tonne of BMW to landfill. Estimations of the real BMW content in municipal waste are described in Section 4.2.3. 4 However, trading was only permitted from 2008. For this reason and due to lack of data, it has not been an object of analysis.

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Table 1 Evolution of landfill operators during the period 2005–2010 under the LATS scheme in England.

Number of landfill sites Number of companies operating landfills

2005/06

2006/07

2007/08

2008/09

2009/10

334 111

196 75

162 25

157 21

139 22

and/or borrowing under certain restrictions analysed in Section 4.2.4 (DEFRA, 2010a,b). Trading allowances help in overcoming the fact that different WDAs will face different additional costs of diversion from landfill depending on their particular circumstances. This way, WDAs with comparatively low marginal diversion costs will have an incentive to divert as much BMW from landfill as possible, selling their surplus of allowances to WDAs that face higher marginal costs of diversion. Therefore, the possibility of trading tends to ensure that the overall diversion goal is achieved at the lowest cost across all authorities (DEFRA, 2011), therefore accomplishing the property of static efficiency. 4.2.1. Structure of waste management responsibilities in England In the UK, local governments are often split into two tiers: those of the lower-tier (the district and borough councils) and those of the upper-tier (the county councils), although in some (usually metropolitan) areas, the responsibilities are vested in one single body known as unitary authorities (UAs). Waste collection is a responsibility of the lower-tier of local government by means of waste collection authorities (WCAs). Waste treatment and disposal, as well as operations of civic amenity sites and spatial planning as it affects waste, are all responsibilities of the upper-tier administrative bodies, known as waste disposal authorities (WDAs). UAs fulfil both functions for the area they cover (Eunomia, 2009). Throughout this document, they both are generally referred to as waste disposal authorities (WDAs). According to LATS Regulations, landfill operators5 that receive municipal solid waste (MSW) at their facilities must report the amount and type of waste they accept and the WDA it comes from (EA, 2009), and are obliged to inform the amount of municipal waste accepted at the landfill. In the LATS period 2005/06–2009/10, the number of landfill operators decreased substantially, which might have been caused by a reduction in the total amount of MSW landfilled (Table 1) and also on account of the provisions of the Landfill Directive on the closure of landfills not accomplishing with certain standards, as regulated in articles 13 and 14. 4.2.2. Allocation mechanism According to the WET Act 2003, the Secretary of State specified the maximum amount of biodegradable municipal waste allowed in each scheme year to be disposed of in landfills from each region (England, Scotland, Wales, Northern Ireland, plus the whole of the United Kingdom). The amounts had to be consistent with the obligations of the United Kingdom under article 5.2 of the Council Directive 1999/31/EC, under the supervision of the allocating authority (the Secretary of State for England, the Scottish Ministers for Scotland, the National Assembly for Wales and the Department of the Environment in the case of Northern Ireland). Then, the allocating authorities were responsible for allocating allowances to the WDAs. In England, the allocation of allowances in the target years (2009/10, 2012/13 and 2019/20) was made by a system of grandfathering, based on the total amount of waste arising and the amount sent for disposal, recycling, composting or recovery as 5

The operator is the person who holds the license to operate the site.

Number of allowances

Data on landfill operators

Fig. 1. Initial BMW allowances allocation in England. Notes: One allowance is equivalent to one tonne of BMW to landfill. Years marked with (*) are target years.

reported to DEFRA by each local authority in the 2001/02 Municipal Waste Management Survey (Fig. 1). As shown in Fig. 1, for the period between target years, allocation consists of a distribution of the difference between their respective goals. To ensure that the curve was steeper towards the end of the period, the annual reductions for the scheme years 2005/06–2009/10 were 10, 15, 20, 25 and 30%, respectively.6 For the subsequent scheme years, the interpolation is lineal.

4.2.3. BMW calculations and considerations on the total amount of waste under the scheme In order to calculate the amount of BMW in waste being landfilled, the LATS Regulations require WDAs to keep records not only of the municipal waste they send to landfills (regulation 11[1][b]), but also of all ‘‘collected municipal waste’’ in their areas (regulation 11[1][a]).7 The initial definition of collected municipal waste included commercial waste collected either by a WCA or by a private contractor, who should then declare the amount to the respective authority. As regards section 45 of the Environmental Protection Act 1990, WDAs are entitled to receive reasonable reimbursement from WCAs for making arrangements for the disposal of commercial and industrial waste collected in the WDA’s area. However, commercial waste collected by the private sector avoided being treated by WDAs, due to the gap existing in the definition of municipal waste under the WET Act 2003. The revision of October 2011 amended this (see Section 4.2.5). Waste submitted to incineration as a final destination or waste treated in MBT (mechanical biological treatment) facilities is not subject to this scheme, nor is refuse resulting from thermal treatment.8 However, rejects resulting from MBT processes and recycling processes that are disposed of in landfills are subject to the scheme (Fig. 2). Therefore, the incentive is not only to reduce the amount of 6 This means that the average allocation fell by 15% in the first scheme year (2006/ 07), 20% in the second scheme year (2007/08), 25% in the next scheme year and then 30% the following year so as to achieve the first Landfill Directive target in 2009/10. 7 The Environment Agency request that all WDAs and WCAs make the data returns required by the LATS Regulations through WasteDataFlow (WDF). However, the duty to provide the information to the monitoring authority rests with the WDA. 8 Supposedly, because BMW content is negligible.

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Fig. 2. Mass balance calculation of BMW landfilled for the LATS. aRB% is first multiplied by an adjustment factor if a monitoring plan has been agreed and data provided. Note: MSWT (total municipal solid waste); BMWT (total biodegradable municipal Waste); BMWL (biodegradable municipal waste landfilled); REST (total residual waste for disposal); RESB (residual biodegradable waste); DIVT (waste collected for recycling or reuse); DIVB (biodegradable content of diverted waste); RB% (residual biodegradable percentage). Source: Adaptation from Eunomia (2009).

BMW landfilled, but also to increase MBT efficiency and maintain the quality of materials separately collected. The Environment Agency monitors WDAs’ compliance with the LATS by undertaking a mass balance calculation. The mass balance approach assumes that if the weight of biodegradable materials diverted from landfill can be measured, and if the proportion of biodegradable material that was initially in the waste is known,9 then it is possible to calculate the amount of BMW landfilled (see Fig. 2 and the methodology in DEFRA, 2006). According to Fig. 2, the calculation of the quantity of biodegradable municipal waste landfilled (BMWL) depends on the residual biodegradable waste (RESB), which at the time depends on the total biodegradable municipal waste (BMWT) content in the total MSW, and also on the quantity of biodegradable content of diverted waste (DIVB). Therefore, actions that were not initially accounted for in the quantity of DIVB, such as home composting, could not fully contribute to an overall BMWL reduction. In this sense, some amendments were introduced to account for the amount of BMW composted (Eunomia, 2009). 4.2.4. Trading, borrowing and banking Each WDA needs to establish whether the most cost-effective solution is to (a) manage within its own allowances without banking or borrowing; (b) re-profile its own allowances by banking and borrowing; (c) be a net buyer or a net seller of allowances; or (d) a combination of the above. Banking consists of saving some allowances not needed in the present to be used in future years; 9

It is assumed that the percentage of the biodegradable component of collected municipal waste is 68% in England. Paper and cardboard, putrescible waste and vegetable oil are considered 100% biodegradable municipal waste; whereas footwear, furniture and textiles are considered to have a biodegradable content of 50% of their weight.

meanwhile, borrowing means to use future allowances. The trading scheme also allows buying and selling of allowances from other WDAs for future years. These flexibilities help authorities manage their landfill allowances more efficiently. But in order to reduce the risk of not achieving the Landfill Directive targets, certain restrictions have been built into the scheme. Authorities may only borrow up to 5% of the following year’s allocated allowances, except for target years and the year before, when borrowing is not allowed. In addition, in target years, banking for future years is not allowed and banked allowances cannot be used either, i.e. banked allowances have to be used before the end of the previous scheme year.

4.2.5. Changes in the scheme The original definition of municipal waste in section 21(3) of the WET Act 2003 was wide and vague, defined as waste from households, and other waste that, because of its nature or composition, is similar to waste from households. It included municipal waste collected by or under possession of a WCA which, according to section 45 of the Environmental Protection Act 1990, could Table 2 Landfill diversion targets for achieving objectives of the Landfill Directive in British countries (in miles of tonnes of biodegradable municipal waste). Source: Waste and Emissions Trading Act 2003 and Landfill Regulations 2011. Country

England Scotland Wales Northern Ireland United Kingdom

2012/13

2019/20

Original

Amended

Original

Amended

7460 880 470 320 9130

14,515 1798 919 612 17,844

5220 620 330 220 6390

10,161 1258 643 429 12,491

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include any commercial or industrial waste ‘‘requested by the occupier of premises’’, i.e. some commercial or industrial waste collected by the private sector might escape of the scheme. This initial situation implied an evasion of tonnes of BMW originated by commercial activities. It seems that reduction of municipal waste generation in the first years of the scheme was occurring at the expense of an increase in the growth rate of commercial waste. From October 2011, the UK, along with the European Commission, agreed that municipal waste collected by local authorities had to be differentiated from that collected by the private sector, but both had to participate in the scheme. This modification was regulated through the amendment of the Waste and Emissions Trading Act 2003 (Amendment) Regulations 2011. The changes also affected the UK landfill diversion targets (Table 2), since it implied an increase to the quantity of waste included. 4.2.6. Finalisation of the scheme Despite the results of the scheme being successful for the first seven years, the increase of the Landfill Tax meant a reduction of its relevance (see some additional argumentation in Section 5). As first announced by the 2011 Government Waste Review, the LATS in England was projected to end in 2012/13. Legislation ending the Scheme was laid in Parliament on 30 January 2013. The Scheme continued as normal until trading closed at the end of the reconciliation period on 30 September 2013. Meanwhile, all local authorities had to continue with the current LATS arrangements until that time (EA, 2013). 4.3. Results This section focuses on the results achieved by the scheme. Firstly, the evolution of the allowances’ price is presented; secondly, a review of the market activity for the period 2005/06 to 20011/12 is carried out; and thirdly, the results are checked against the targets, along with an analysis of the waste strategies followed by WDAs.

£ per tonne

4.3.1. Allowances’ price evolution The evolution of the allowances’ price in the first five years did not follow a clear trend. As observed in Fig. 3, it decreased substantially in the first target year (2009/10) in relation to the previous year, and this trend continued for two more years. As regards price evolution before the target years, although in a theoretical framework of unlimited banking and borrowing and perfect foresight it should have followed a steady trend, this has

Fig. 3. Allowances’ average price evolution between 2005/06 and 2011/12 (in £ per tonne). Note: The average price of the allowances for the 2011/12 scheme year was very variable, since almost half of the purchases took place in the reconciliation period. This is the moment when price tends to be lower, i.e. from April to September, just after the effective scheme year closing in March, as happened in previous years. Source: Compilation from LATS reports from 2005/06 to 2011/12 (EA, 2006, 2009, 2010, 2011, 2013).

been erratic in reality. In 2009, for instance, allowances trading for the second target year (2012/13) had a price of around £15– 20 per tonne, but in subsequent years the price decreased significantly. Several commentators expected allowance values to increase to higher values as a result of supply being much tighter and demand for allowances increasing (Eunomia, 2009). In the context of waste management in the UK, where landfill gate fees ranged from £12–55 per tonne (with an average around £20 per tonne) (WRAP, 2011), and where the Landfill Tax was between £18–24 per tonne, the size of the allowances’ price during the 2005–2007 period was quite significant (Fig. 3). However, since 2008, when the Landfill Tax was £32 per tonne and an annual increase of £8 per tonne was established, the price of the allowances became much less significant in relative terms (Section 5). 4.3.2. Market activity In relation to market activity, the number of transfers, purchases and sales was significant throughout the period (Table 3), and especially higher in the last two years. The use of banked and borrowed allowances followed different trends. Borrowing was carried out less often, and had a clear decreasing tendency, with a maximum use in the first year due to banked allowances not being available until the second year. In the second and third scheme years, it had less relevance due to the high availability of banked allowances. In the year after the first target year, borrowing gained importance again due to a lack of banked allowances. During the first three scheme years (2005/06–2008/09) an increase of banked allowances occurred, which might have been caused by an initial excess in the allocation of allowances and by a higher diversion of BMW. During the period 2005/06 to 2011/12, the percentage of allowances transferred ranged annually from 1.2% to 7.5%, with the highest values obtained in the first and final years. Along with this, the percentage of WDA trading allowances followed a similar trend, although there was a greater variation between values (from 10.7% to 40.7% in the case of WDAs transferring allowances; and from 5.8% to 29.3% in the case of WDAs only buying them) (Table 3). This means that not many allowances were traded by those WDAs that did not comply with the BMW objectives through the increase of separate waste collection. In general, thanks to the allocation mechanism and the high flexibility derived from banking and borrowing, a large number of WDAs could comply with the targets year-by-year while optimising compliance cost. From Table 3, it may be also deduced that the high number of allowances that were banked from 2005/06 to 2007/08 had an impact on trading, which tended to be reduced. The higher value of trading in the first target year (2009/10) and in the following year (2010/11) may be ascribed to the lack of banked allowances. In the case of the target year, the effect of the prohibition of borrowing must be added. In relation to Fig. 1, it can be observed that the total amount of banked allowances is a significant percentage of the total amount of allowances allocated, in contrast to what occurs for traded or borrowed allowances. Table 4 is obtained by adding banked and borrowed allowances to the final number of allowances available year-on-year. As shown in Table 4, as a result of the possibilities of banking and borrowing, the final amount of allowances available in 2006/ 07 was 2.8 million tonnes above the initial allocation (as observed in Fig. 4); in 2007/08, this increased by another 5.8 million tonnes; and following this, in 2008/09 and 2011/12, with 8.8 and 2.2 million tonnes in excess, respectively. 4.3.3. Meeting BMW landfill targets The achievement of different targets from 2005/06 to the first target year 2009/10 and to the 2011/12 scheme year was widely

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M. Calaf-Forn et al. / Waste Management 34 (2014) 919–928 Table 3 Evolution of allowances market activity, between 2005/06 and 2011/12 scheme years.

Transferring Allowances transferred (t)a Percentage Total value of allowances (£) Number of WDAs transferring allowancesa Number of WDAs buying extra allowances Borrowing Allowances borrowed (t) Percentage Number of WDAs borrowing Banking Allowances banked (t) Percentage Number of WDAs banking Number of WDA using banked allowances

2005/06

2006/07

2007/08

2008/09

2009/10

2010/11

2011/12

339,792 2.7% 5,704,100 31 7

189,664 1.6% 3,352,244 22 17

160,886 1.5% 1,943,700 19 13

116,055 1.2% 2,339,534 13 7

264,106 3.1% 2,022,601 46 20

545,661 7.0% 2,546,174 30 30

476,993 7.5% 1,128,188 50 36

9518 0.08% 3

477 0.004% 1

439 0.004% 1

Not allowed – –

Not allowed – –

26,663 0.34% 12

Not allowed – –

2,824,551 22.8% 119 0

5,797,295 50.2% 118 –b

8,829,531 83.4% 120 11

Not allowed – – 13

Not allowed – – Not allowed

2,208,873 28.4% 111 No available allowances

Not allowed – – –b

Notes: Banked allowances in 2008/09, 2009/10 and 2011/12 were zero, although the use of allowances banked in previous years was not zero in 2008/09 and in 2011/12, unlike in 2009/10. The percentage of allowances transferred, borrowed and banked has been calculated in relation to the real BMW landfilled. Source: Compiled from LATS reports from 2005/06 to 2011/12 (EA, 2006, 2009, 2010, 2011, 2013). a Transferring means selling or buying allowances at a specific price or just transferring for free. b No information available.

Table 4 Number of allowances available from 2005/06 to 2011/12 (in million tonnes of BMW after banking and borrowing). Source: Compiled from LATS reports from 2005/06 to 2011/12 (EA, 2006, 2009, 2010, 2011, 2013).

Allowances availability

a

2005/06

2006/07

2007/08

2008/09

2009/10

2010/11

2011/12

15.21

17.34

19.44

21.37

11.20

9.98

10.89

Milion tonnes

Notes: No available information exists for years 2010/11 and 2011/12. a These allowances include the previous year’s banked allowances, plus the following year’s borrowed allowances, minus the previous year’s borrowed allowances. They include the present year’s banked allowances.

Fig. 4. Evolution of allowance allocation of BMW and final quantity of BMW landfilled. Source: Compiled from LATS reports from 2005/06 to 2011/12 (EA, 2006, 2009, 2010, 2011, 2013).

successful. On average, each scheme year had an over-availability of 22.9% of allowances (Fig. 4). From 2005/06 to 2011/12, the total amount of BMW sent to landfill decreased by 48.3% (around 6 million tonnes), and from 2001/02 (the base year) to 2011/12 it declined by 59%. After the 2009/10 target year, the next and final Landfill Directive target year under the LATS regime was 2012/13. By then, the number of allowances was expected to be higher than in 2009/10, due to the change in the definition of municipal waste (Section 4.2.5). Although additional commercial waste entered into the system, it did not seem difficult to achieve the Landfill Directive target. 4.3.4. Waste management strategy The achievement of BMW targets implied several changes in waste flows from 2005/06 to 2011/12.10 First of all, the total 10

The period for which data exist.

amount of municipal waste landfilled fell from 17.87 to 9.57 million tonnes (a reduction of 46.5%) (Table 5 and Fig. 5). In addition, data indicate that there was a total waste reduction of 10.9% in the period (3.15 million tonnes), and the total amount of municipal waste recycled or composted increased by 2.91 million tonnes, passing from 27.1% to 41.8% in the period. In contrast, incineration of waste increased from 9.9% to 19.1%, which means 2 million tonnes more (Fig. 5, Fig. 6 and Table 5). Hence, it can be derived that the main way to achieve the objective of the Landfill Directive was by increasing recycling or composting, followed by an increase in incineration. In terms of waste recycling, effects have been different for the different waste fractions. According to WasteDataFlow (WDF) from England, an increase in the recycling of household plastics was much higher for the period 2005/06 to 2009/10 than for the period 1999/00 to 2003/04. A similar pattern was followed by compost, cans and textiles, but with a lower rate of increase. On the other hand, paper, cardboard and glass followed steady or even diminishing trends. Although there was an average increase of 1.5% of municipal waste generated per year during the period 2000/01 to 2004/05, there was an average reduction of 2% per year during the first seven LATS scheme years. When referring only to landfilled municipal waste, in the first period there was an average reduction of 2% per year, in contrast to a 10% annual reduction during the LATS period (Fig. 5). Finally, in relation to incineration, while in the first period there was an overall increase of 1 percentage point – from 8.5% to 9.5% – the increase was of 9.1 percentage points in the LATS period. As regards Fig. 7, during the period 2005/06 to 2011/12, the decrease of BMW landfilled ran in parallel to a positive evolution on the amount of BMW recycled and composted. However, the high

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Table 5 Evolution of municipal waste generation and its management in England, from 2000/01 to 2011/12 (in million tonnes). Source: Environment Agency from England (2013).

MSW landfilled MSW incinerated (with EfW a) MSW incinerated (without EfW a) MSW recycled or composted Other Total MSW

2001/02

2002/03

2003/04

2004/05

2005/06

2006/07

2007/08

2008/09

2009/10

2010/11

2011/12

22.04 2.39 0.02 3.45 0.16 28.06

22.42 2.44 0.01 3.92 0.12 28.91

22.07 2.60 0.01 4.57 0.15 29.39

20.94 2.60 0.01 5.54 0.04 29.11

19.82 2.81 0.01 6.95 0.03 29.62

17.87 2.85 0.01 7.80 0.20 28.75

16.89 3.23 0.01 8.94 0.12 29.19

15.51 3.16 0.01 9.70 0.12 28.51

13.78 3.33 0.01 10.08 0.20 27.33

12.49 3.61 0.01 10.28 0.26 26.54

11.39 3.98 0.01 10.59 0.36 26.31

9.57 4.88 0.004 10.71 0.44 25.60

EfW (Energy from Waste).

negative slope of this graphic is also explained by the deviation of waste to incineration, which increased by 2.8 million tonnes in the same period, and it could be also due to total waste reduction, partially explained by the economic crisis occurred during this period. From these results, there are signs that the implementation of the LATS had an overall effect on waste management flows and in the achievement of the Landfill Directive targets. However, its effect has been concurrent with that of the Landfill Tax (Sections 5 and 6). According to Hogg et al. (2011), the LATS has been effective in diverting biodegradable waste from landfill, but there is no evidence of its impact on waste prevention.

Milion tonnes

a

2000/01

5. Comparison between the LATS and the Landfill Tax Fig. 5. Evolution of total municipal waste generation compared to municipal waste landfilled, from 1997 to 2011/12. Source: Environment Agency of England (EA, 2006, 2009, 2010, 2011, 2013).

Total BMW landfilled (milion t)

Fig. 6. Evolution of municipal waste treatment in England, from 2005/06 to 2011/ 12. Source: Environment Agency of England (EA, 2006, 2009, 2010, 2011, 2013).

MSW recycled or composted (milion t) Fig. 7. Bivariate analysis amongst the evolution of the total amount of BMW landfilled and the amount of MSW recycled or composted, from 2005/06 to 2011/ 12.

The UK government introduced the Landfill Tax in 1996 to ensure that landfill waste disposal was properly priced to reflect its environmental cost, as well as to help to promote a more sustainable approach to waste management, in which less waste was produced and more was reused or recycled. This tax was placed on every tonne of waste (domestic, commercial or industrial) which goes to landfill for disposal. When introduced, the tax was set at £7 per tonne for active waste (most household and municipal waste), and £2 per tonne for inert waste (rocks, soil, glass, ceramics, etc.). In 1999, as well as in 2002, subsequent reviews acknowledged that the 1996 tax rate level was too low to change behaviours. For this reason, and in order to achieve the aims of the Landfill Directive, the UK government introduced an ‘‘escalator’’ – a mechanism through which the cost of landfilling active waste rose year-on-year. During 1999–2004, the tax increased by £1 per year; during the period 2004–2007 it rose by £3 per year; and since 2007 it increased by £8 per year, until 2014/15, when it will reach £80 per tonne; thereafter, the tax rate will not fall below this amount. As it can be observed, it was not until the introduction of accompanying policy instruments (e.g. LATS and LASs in 2005) that the tax rose to a significant level (Eunomia, 2008). Considerably raising the cost of landfilling encouraged the adoption of alternative waste management strategies, as they became more economically competitive against an increasingly expensive landfill. The Landfill Tax is governed by the Finance Act 1996 and the Landfill Tax (Amendment) Regulation 2009 (Landfill Tax Regulations). It charges for material disposed of at a landfill site since 1 October 1996. The revenue raised by the Landfill Tax is partially used through the LCF (Landfill Communities Fund) to contribute to the promotion of sustainable waste management. The persons liable to pay the tax are the landfill site operators, who must collect the tax from those depositing the waste. Credits can be given to operators under regulations, provided prescribed conditions are fulfilled. The LCF enables landfill operators to claim a credit against their Landfill Tax payment if they make a voluntary

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contribution to an approved environmental body for an approved project under one of the categories listed in the Landfill Tax Regulations. The Landfill Tax is additional to the gate fees of landfills, which in 2012 represented around 24% of the total cost of landfill. In 2010, the gate fee of organic matter treatment plants was on average £43 per tonne for the anaerobic facilities, and £24 per tonne for composting plants. These values are lower than the mechanical– biological treatment (MBT) facilities (£54 per tonne for previous to 2000 facilities and £73 per tonne for subsequent facilities) (WRAP, 2011). According to a report for the European Commission (Watkins et al., 2012), there is a relationship between higher landfill taxes (and higher total landfill charges11) and lower percentages of municipal waste being sent to landfill. Since 2008, the significant increase in the Landfill Tax has acted as a much greater incentive to divert waste from landfill, and has thus reduced the importance of the LATS. In spite of this, during the period the LATS was functioning, the price did not fall to zero, which demonstrates that the cap on BMW landfilled had a complementary effect to that of the Landfill Tax. Recycling targets have been broadly complementary to the LATS to the extent that frequently in places where recycling has increased, an important proportion of the additional material collected separately is biodegradable (paper, cardboard, food waste, garden waste, textiles, etc.), which also implies a corresponding reduction of BMW landfilled.

6. Discussion and conclusions The LATS has achieved a reduction in the amount of waste landfilled and an increase in the recycling levels of the biodegradable fraction, with subsequent positive effects on the recycling levels of other fractions. As shown in Section 4.3, targets from 2005/06 to 2011/12 have been successfully achieved, and the level of reduction has been higher than expected: the amount of waste disposed of in landfills was on average 22.9% lower than the initial allowances allocation. During the first seven years of LATS period (2005/06–2011/12) the reduction of BMW landfilled was 7% per year, proportionally higher than during the previous period (2001/02–2004/05), wherein this increased 4.2% annually. In addition, during the five previous years of the LATS (2000/01–2004/05) there was a 1.5% annual general increase in waste generation, while during the LATS period (2005/06–2011/12) there was an average reduction of 2%, as well as a higher reduction in the amount of municipal waste landfilled by an annual average of 10%, compared to 2% in the previous period (2000/01–2004/05). All this data indicate that the effect of LATS has been positive. However, it is not possible to separate its incidence from that of the Landfill Tax. Both have had a positive effect during the LATS period, but after the significant increase in the Landfill Tax (since 2008) the LATS has probably had less importance, which may justify the finalisation of the scheme in 2013. Nevertheless, the coexistence of two parallel environmental policies enabled municipalities to achieve objectives without significantly increasing costs. The reduction of total costs that entails the free allocation of allowances may be seen as an aid for adaptation to more stringent targets. Among the strategies followed by municipalities to achieve the BMW targets of the Landfill Directive, recycling or composting was the most significant one, increasing from 27.1% of the total municipal waste in 2005/06 to 41.8% in 2011/12. Besides this, waste incineration also increased from 9.9% to 19.1% in the same period. 11

Which includes landfill tax plus gate fee.

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However, landfilling and incineration together were reduced from 72.1% of total waste generation to 56.4% in the same period. Moreover, total waste reduction was also significant, partially explained by the economic crisis. Since the biodegradable content of rejects from recycling or MBT processes are subject to LATS, incentive not only aimed to reduce BMW to landfill, but to improve the quality of recycled materials and increase MBT efficiency. In the end, the decision as to which final treatments of waste are subject to the scheme or to the Landfill Tax is political. So, if the aim is to disincentivize any final treatment, waste incineration should also be subject to both schemes. If both are to be reduced but landfill disposal is considered a priority, then the schemes should affect the flows going to both treatments; however, landfilling should be subjected to more stringent objectives (i.e. higher taxes rates or reduced number of permits). With the standardization of RDF (refuse-derived fuel) production and a greater use of the MBT processes, the correct separation of organic matter at the source may become less appealing for municipalities. If the political will is to promote recycling and waste separation at the source, RDF production and MBT should also be penalized, albeit to a lesser extent. In the same sense, some more efficient and effective systems of waste collection should be prioritized by municipalities, such as the introduction of ‘‘pay-asyou-throw’’ schemes or door-to-door collecting systems (PuigVentosa et al., 2013; Teerioja et al., 2012). The allocation mechanism of the LATS only considers the status quo of each municipality according to historical data, and establishes the same quantity of BMW reduction per municipality, independently of their previous efforts. In order to mitigate unfair allocation in future cases – and in order to apply the ‘‘polluter pays’’ principle – it is suggested either to establish a cap based on waste generation per capita (of the refuse fraction) or to allocate the allowances by an auctioning process. In the allocation mechanism, another suggestion could be to reflect some of the changing circumstances of the local authorities, e.g. evolution of the population. Potentially, revenues from the auctioning process could be earmarked and dedicated to prevention and recycling policies. The evolution of the price of allowances in the LATS scheme (Section 4.3.1) decreased substantially in the first target year (2009/10), as well as in the subsequent years before the second target year (2012/13). There were also oscillations during the previous period, but these were not so relevant. This fact can be linked to the lack of flexibility of target years; according to Section 3, this is what tends to cause higher price instability. For future implementations, the role of borrowing and banking should be decided based on the effectiveness and price stability desired. The LATS was subject to a modification that aimed to include commercial waste which could escape from the previous scheme. ‘‘Leaks’’ tend to be a problem of some environmental policies, since sometimes apparent improvements do not materialise because they transfer the initial environmental problem to other places (Ichinose and Yamamoto, 2011). The possible increase in illegal dumping could be also a leak; however, this has not been assessed due to a lack of data. These could be a possible cause of the reduction registered in the growth rate of municipal waste in the LATS period. An attempt to reproduce a landfill allowance trading scheme to other kinds of waste – e.g. to demolition or industrial waste – should be considered. Focusing on other municipal waste fractions, such as packaging, could also work. The difference would be that, for the landfilling of this kind of waste, no European objectives exist and they are less relevant in terms of weight. However, the effectiveness of a LATS would increase if it could cover every waste disposed of in landfills, since it would have an overall reduction effect on all fractions.

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Finally, it may be concluded that, in terms of waste management – especially waste recycling – the coexistence of LATS with the Landfill Tax had concurrent and mutually reinforcing positive effects. Acknowledgements The authors would like to thank the collaboration of the Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs (DEFRA) of England, especially Mark Millet, who is responsible for the area of Waste Improvement and Efficiency Household and Local Authority Collected Waste. We also would like to thank Esteve Corbera from the Autonomous University of Barcelona (UAB) and Annelies Broekman for their helpful comments. Besides, Jordi Roca acknowledges financial support from the project ECO2012-34591 (Ministerio de Economía y Competitividad). References Blumenthal, K., 2011. Generation and treatment of municipal waste. Eurostat. European Commission, Luxembourg. Dales, J.H., 1968. Pollution, Property and Prices. University of Toronto Press, Toronto. DEFRA (Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs), 2006. Guidance on the Landfill Allowance Schemes: Municipal waste. DEFRA, London. DEFRA (Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs), 2010a. Information Sheet 9 – LATS Strategy. DEFRA, London. (accessed 9.3.14). DEFRA (Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs), 2010b. Impact Assessment of Landfill Allowance Trading Scheme. DEFRA, London. (accessed 9.3.14). DEFRA (Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs), 2011. The Economics of Waste and Waste Policy: Waste Economics Team – Environment and Growth Economics. DEFRA, London. Driesen, D.M., 2003. The economic dynamics of environmental law. MIT Press, Cambridge, MA. EA (Environment Agency), 2006. Report on the Landfill Allowances and Trading Scheme (LATS) 2005/6. Environment Agency, London. EA (Environment Agency), 2009. Report on the Landfill Allowances and Trading Scheme (LATS) 2008/9. Environment Agency, London. EA (Environment Agency), 2010. Report on the Landfill Allowances and Trading Scheme (LATS) 2009/10. Environment Agency, London. EA (Environment Agency), 2011. Report on the Lanfill Allowance Trading Scheme 2010/11, November 2011. Environment Agency, London. EA (Environment Agency), 2013. Report on the Lanfill Allowance Trading Scheme 2011/12, January 2013. Environment Agency, London. European Commission (EC), 2012. Report from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council. The state of the European carbon market in 2012. COM (2012) 652 final. European Commission, Brussels.

EEA (European Environment Agency), 2007. The road from landfilling to recycling: common destination, different routes. European Environment Agency, Copenhagen. EEA (European Environment Agency), 2008. EEA Briefing 2008/01. European Environment Agency, Copenhagen. EEA (European Environment Agency), 2010. Percentage of municipal waste landfilled in EEA countries, 2003 and 2008; and development of municipal waste management in EU-27, 1995–2008. EEA, Copenhagen: (accessed 9.3.14). Eunomia, 2008. ‘Biostabilisation´ of Wastes: Making the Case for a Differential Rate of Landfill Tax. Eunomia Research & Consulting, Bristol: (Accessed 9.3.14). Eunomia, 2009. International Review of Waste Management Policy: Annexes to Main Report. Eunomia Research & Consulting, Bristol. Fischer, C., Lehner, M., Lindsay McKinnon, D., 2012. Overview of the use of landfill taxes in Europe. European Topic Centre on Sustainable Consumption and Production (ETC./SCP), Copenhagen. Hogg, D., Sherrington, C., Vergunst, T., (Eunomia), 2011. A Comparative Study on Economic Instruments Promoting Waste Prevention: Final Report to Bruxelles Environment. Eunomia, Bristol. Ichinose, D., Yamamoto, M., 2011. On the relationship between the provision of waste management service and illegal dumping. Resour. Energy Econ. 33 (1), 79–93. Martínez Alier, J., Roca Jusmet, J., 2001. Economía ecológica y política ambiental. Textos de Economía, México. Pearce, D., Turner, R., 1990. Economics of Natural Resources and the Environment, first ed. Harvester Wheatsheaf, Hemel Hempstead. Perman, R., Ma, Y., McGilvray, J., Common, M., 2003. Natural Resource and Environmental Economics, third ed. Pearson Education Ltd.. Pigou, A.C., 1920. The Economics of Welfare. Macmillan & Co., London. Puig-Ventosa, I., 2004. Potential use of feebate systems to foster environmentally sound urban waste management. Waste Manage. 24, 3–7. Puig-Ventosa, I., Freire-González, J., Jofra-Sora, M., 2013. Determining factors for the presence of impurities in selectively collected biowaste. Waste Manage. Res. 31 (5), 510–517. Stavins, R.N., 1998. What can we learn from the grand policy experiment? Lessons from SO2 allowance trading. J. Econ. Perspect. 12 (3), 69–88. Teerioja, N., Kuvaja, E., Ollikainen, M., Punkkinen, H., Merta, E., 2012. Pneumatic vs. door-to-door waste collection systems in existing urban areas: a comparison of economic performance. Waste Manage. 32, 1782–1791. Tietenberg, T.H., 1990. Economic instruments for environmental regulation. Oxford Rev. Econ. Policy 6 (1), 17–33. Van Beukering, P.J.H., Bartelings, H., Linderhof, V.G.M., Oosterhuis, F.H., 2009. Effectiveness of unit-based pricing of waste in the Netherlands: applying a general equilibrium model. Waste Manage. 29, 2892–2901. Watkins, E., Hogg, D., Mitsios, A., Mudgal, Sh., Neubauer, A., Reisinger, H., Troeltsch, J., Van Acoleyen, M., 2012. Use of Economic Instruments and Waste Management Performances. European Commission (DG ENV): (accessed 9.3.14). WRAP, 2011. Comparing the cost of alternative waste treatment option. Gate Fees Report, 2011. WRAP, Banbury.

Cap and trade schemes on waste management: a case study of the landfill allowance trading scheme (LATS) in England.

The Landfill Allowance Trading Scheme (LATS) is one of the main instruments used in England to enforce the landfill diversion targets established in t...
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