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Journal of Personality Assessment Publication details, including instructions for authors and subscription information: http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/hjpa20

Conceptualizing and Measuring Self-Criticism as Both a Personality Trait and a Personality State a

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David C. Zuroff , Gentiana Sadikaj , Allison C. Kelly & Michelle J. Leybman

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Department of Psychology, McGill University, Montreal, Quebec, Canada Published online: 05 Jun 2015.

Click for updates To cite this article: David C. Zuroff, Gentiana Sadikaj, Allison C. Kelly & Michelle J. Leybman (2015): Conceptualizing and Measuring Self-Criticism as Both a Personality Trait and a Personality State, Journal of Personality Assessment, DOI: 10.1080/00223891.2015.1044604 To link to this article: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00223891.2015.1044604

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Journal of Personality Assessment, 0(0), 1–8, 2015 Copyright Ó Taylor & Francis Group, LLC ISSN: 0022-3891 print / 1532-7752 online DOI: 10.1080/00223891.2015.1044604

Conceptualizing and Measuring Self-Criticism as Both a Personality Trait and a Personality State DAVID C. ZUROFF, GENTIANA SADIKAJ, ALLISON C. KELLY, AND MICHELLE J. LEYBMAN

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Department of Psychology, McGill University, Montreal, Quebec, Canada Blatt’s (2004, 2008) conceptualization of self-criticism is consistent with a state–trait model that postulates meaningful variation in selfcriticism both between persons (traits) and within person (states). We tested the state–trait model in a 7-day diary study with 99 college student participants. Each evening they completed a 6-item measure of self-criticism, as well as measures of perceived social support, positive and negative affect, compassionate and self-image goals during interactions with others, and interpersonal behavior, including overt self-criticism and given social support. As predicted, self-criticism displayed both trait-like variance between persons and daily fluctuations around individuals’ mean scores for the week; slightly more than half of the total variance was between persons (ICC D .56). Numerous associations at both the between-persons and within-person levels were found between self-criticism and the other variables, indicating that individuals’ mean levels of self-criticism over the week, and level of self-criticism on a given day relative to their personal mean, were related to their cognitions, affect, interpersonal goals, and behavior. The results supported the construct validity of the daily self-criticism measure. Moreover, the findings were consistent with the state–trait model and with Blatt’s theoretical analysis of self-critical personality.

Blatt’s theories concerning personality, psychopathology, and psychotherapy were far-ranging, richly detailed, and continually evolving over more than five decades of scholarship (Blatt, 2004, 2008). A brief summary cannot do justice to the complexity of his thinking. Nevertheless, many of his key ideas can be captured in three interlocking sets of hypotheses concerning personality differences, mental structures, and developmental processes. First, he proposed that the broadest and most fundamental domains of individual differences are those that describe people’s patterns of relatedness to others and self-definition (Blatt, 2008). The widely studied personality trait of dependency reflects disruptions in the development of relatedness; the trait of self-criticism reflects disruptions in the development of self-definition. Second, in an integration of psychodynamic object relations theory, attachment theory, and Piagetian cognitive developmental theory, Blatt proposed that the underlying structural elements that explained individual differences in relatedness and self-definition are mental representations of the self and other. Individuals’ mental representations differ both in their content and the degree to which they are differentiated, integrated, and abstract rather than concrete (e.g., Blatt, Auerbach, & Levy, 1997). Third, in an elaboration and extension of Erikson’s (1963) stage theory of development, Blatt proposed that relatedness and self-definition emerge in an interactive, dialectical process that unfolds across the life span (e.g., Blatt & Blass, 1996). Crucial developmental experiences, as well as transformative experiences

in psychotherapy, leave their mark by altering mental representations of self and other (e.g., Blatt & Behrends, 1987). Even this brief summary of Blatt’s theory makes it clear that he viewed personality as dynamic and potentially changeable rather than fixed and immutable. Each developmental stage brings with it the possibility of new experiences (e.g., gratifying new relationships or professional success) that can reengage the dialectic between relatedness and self-definition, transform or create new mental representations, and lead to changes in personality such as decreases in self-criticism. Blatt also believed that through processes similar to those at play during development, psychotherapy—especially longterm, intensive psychotherapy—can modify or build new mental representations and thereby alter personality. Developmental or psychotherapy-related experiences that modify mental representations of self and other are expected to lead to long-lasting and broad-based changes in personality. There are, however, less far-reaching fluctuations in personality that can also be expected based on Blatt’s theory. In reaction to findings that depressed patients’ scores on vulnerability measures varied along with the intensity of their symptoms, Zuroff, Blatt, Sanislow, Bondi, and Pilkonis (1999) proposed a state–trait model of personality vulnerability. They suggested that the availability (i.e., content and structure) of underlying mental structures is in general quite stable, including over the course of short-term treatments, but the accessibility of such structures can fluctuate with present mood, social context, and biological factors. Thus, measures of personality vulnerabilities reflect both stable, trait-like characteristics of individuals and state-like fluctuations from observation to observation. Moreover, Blatt’s analyses of psychotherapy case histories (e.g., Blatt, 1974; Blatt, Zuroff, Hawley, & Auerbach, 2010) reveal that he saw patients as having multiple mental representations of the self and others, whose prominence waxes and wanes as they are activated or deactivated by the changing context of the treatment. Put differently, patients’ patterns of relating to themselves and others

Received February 2, 2015; Revised March 23, 2015. Allison C. Kelly is now at the Department of Psychology, University of Waterloo, Ontario, Canada. Michelle J. Leybman is now at the Borderline Personality Disorder Clinic, Centre for Addiction and Mental Health, Toronto, Ontario, Canada. Address correspondence to David C. Zuroff, Department of Psychology, McGill University, 1205 Dr. Penfield Avenue, Montreal, Quebec H3A 1B1, Canada; Email: [email protected]

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2 (i.e., their personality) can change within sessions or across parts of the treatment as their transferential reactions to the therapist and treatment context change. Given that transference occurs in daily life as well as in psychotherapy (Andersen & Berk, 1998), personality is expected to fluctuate over brief time periods as well as to undergo more enduring changes in response to developmental events or transformative experiences in psychotherapy. Contemporary personality psychologists have reached similar conclusions about stability and variability in personality (Moskowitz, Brown, & C^ ote, 1997; Moskowitz & Fournier, 2015). After decades of debate about the roles of “persons” and “situations” in behavior, a consensus has emerged that personality is stable in the sense that the mean level of a trait obtained by averaging over a set of occasions or situational contexts is highly predictive of the mean obtained by averaging over a second, independent set of observations. However, this mean-level stability coexists with a significant degree of variability around the mean over differing occasions or contexts. The dual state–trait nature of personality characteristics is a very general rule, rather than an exception limited to a few traits (Moskowitz et al., 1997). Fleeson (2001) introduced a novel way of conceptualizing this duality by postulating that for each personality variable, every individual has a density distribution of personality states. Although an individual’s personality states vary considerably over occasions and contexts, the individual’s mean over the distribution of states provides a meaningful measure of his or her trait level. For example, a person might be in highly agreeable personality states during some points in a day, and in less agreeable or even disagreeable personality states at others. However, an average over 1 week would be highly similar to averages over other weeks, revealing a stable personality trait level of agreeableness. Research designs based on intensive repeated measures in naturalistic settings and multilevel modeling to analyze the resulting data have provided powerful new tools for studying stability and variability in personality (Moskowitz, Russell, Sadikaj, & Sutton, 2009). Multilevel modeling permits researchers to separate between-persons variability in average level of response from within-person variability over occasions or contexts. Between-persons variability in mean scores reflects the stable, trait-like component of personality. Within-person variability around those mean scores reflects fluctuations in the characteristic in question, that is, the state-like component. The ratio of between-persons variance to total variance (between-persons C within-person variance) is called the intraclass correlation (ICC) and is a convenient index of the extent to which trait or state influences are predominant; ICCs approaching 1.0 suggest very high levels of stability, whereas ICCs approaching 0.0 suggest very high levels of variability. (Within-person variability includes both systematic variability and random error, and therefore ICCs tend to underestimate trait effects.) Research has consistently found that personality characteristics display moderate ICCs, supporting the hypothesized dual state–trait nature of such variables (Fournier, Moskowitz, & Zuroff, 2008; Fleeson & Gallagher, 2009). Multilevel modeling also makes it possible to identify the correlates of both between-persons and within-person variability. Establishing such correlates, particularly for less well-studied within-person fluctuations, is important for demonstrating that

ZUROFF, SADIKAJ, KELLY, LEYBMAN variability is psychologically meaningful rather than random or trivial. Thus, both Blatt’s integrative psychodynamic theory and empirical personality research suggest that the personality variables of dependency and self-criticism should conform to a state–trait model. Dependency is a complex characteristic with both adaptive and maladaptive aspects (Blatt, Zohar, Quinlan, Zuroff, & Mongrain, 1995; Bornstein, 1993; Pincus & Gurtman, 1995). We focus in this article on self-criticism because it is more robustly related to psychopathology. To date there is surprisingly little evidence on stability and variability in self-criticism, because the principal measure, the Depressive Experience Questionnaire (DEQ; Blatt, D’Afflitti, & Quinlan, 1976), has been used primarily as a one-time questionnaire that cannot reveal variability over occasions. In fact, the available evidence stems primarily from studies using measures of maladaptive forms of perfectionism, variously termed evaluative concerns perfectionism or self-critical perfectionism, which are closely related to Blatt’s construct of self-criticism (Dunkley, Zuroff, & Blankstein, 2003). Zuroff, Blatt, et al. (1999) used structural equation modeling (SEM) to examine the state–trait model for self-critical perfectionism in depressed outpatients; autoregressive paths for perfectionism indexed relative stability over time and concurrent paths from depression to perfectionism indexed moodstate dependent variability. Both paths were significant, supporting the state–trait model for self-critical perfectionism. Similar results were reported by Cox and Enns (2003) and Beevers and Miller (2004). Using somewhat different SEM models, Hawley, Ho, Zuroff, and Blatt (2006) and McGrath et al. (2012) showed that changes over time in self-critical perfectionism predicted subsequent levels of depressive symptoms. Three studies using nonclinical subjects (Boone & Soenens, 2015; Boone, Soenens, Vansteenkiste, & Braet, 2012; Shafran, Lee, Payne, & Fairburn, 2006) experimentally induced elevated perfectionism and demonstrated associations between state (daily) perfectionism and eating disorder symptoms. Finally, two studies used multilevel modeling to examine variability in maladaptive perfectionism. Zuroff, Mongrain, and Santor (2004) found an ICC of .78 for self-critical perfectionism assessed every 6 months during an 18month follow-up of short-term treatment for depression. Boone, Soenens, Mouratidis, et al. (2012) conducted a weeklong diary study in which daily measures of perfectionism and eating disorder symptoms were administered to adolescent boys and girls. They found a moderate ICC of .63 for evaluative concerns perfectionism, indicating the presence of variability at both the state (daily) and trait (weekly) levels. Moreover, they found that daily levels of perfectionism and eating disorder symptoms were positively associated. In summary, the available evidence is consistent with the proposal that self-criticism can be conceptualized as both a personality state and a personality trait, but there are two important gaps in the literature. First, studies of measures specifically intended to assess Blatt’s construct of self-criticism are needed. Second, evidence is needed that variability in selfcriticism is related in theoretically expected ways to variability in other constructs, including a broader range of constructs than the symptom-focused measures studied to date. In response to these needs, we conducted a week-long diary study. At the end of each day, college students completed

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STATE–TRAIT MODEL OF SELF-CRITICISM measures of self-criticism, interpersonal perception (perceived social support), negative and positive affect, interpersonal goals (compassion and self-image goals for interactions with others), and interpersonal behavior (overt self-criticism and giving social support to others). Although we were mindful that between-persons and within-person relations between variables need not be the same (Singer, 1998), we looked to the extensive literature on the between-persons correlates of self-criticism to select variables for inclusion in the study. Summaries of that literature are available in Blatt (2004, 2008), Luyten and Blatt (2013), and Zuroff, Santor, and Mongrain (2005). Numerous studies have found that self-criticism is negatively associated with perceived social support (e.g., Mongrain, 1998; Priel & Shahar, 2000), presumably reflecting self-critical individuals’ generally negative mental representations of others. Self-criticism has also been associated with high levels of negative affect and low levels of positive affect (e.g., Mongrain & Zuroff, 1995; Zuroff, Moskowitz, & C^ ote, 1999). Self-critical individuals are highly motivated to maintain a positive self-image and to impress others, and less motivated to experience interpersonal intimacy (Mongrain & Zuroff, 1995). Perhaps ironically, they engage in high levels of overt self-criticism in front of others (Powers & Zuroff, 1992). They also tend to be disagreeable and competitive toward others, including both friends (Santor & Zuroff, 1997) and romantic partners (Santor, Pringle, & Israeli, 2000). Two sets of hypotheses were developed based on Blatt’s theory and the available empirical literature. First, we expected that all measures would exhibit both between-persons and within-person variability, leading to moderate ICCs in the range from .3 to .8. Second, we expected to find relations between self-criticism and the other variables at both the trait and state levels. Stated more precisely, we predicted both between-persons and within-person relations between higher self-criticism and lower perceived support, lower positive affect, higher negative affect, lower compassion goals, higher self-image goals, higher overt selfcriticism, and lower given social support. Such results would bolster the state–trait model of self-criticism, demonstrate that daily variability in self-criticism was psychologically meaningful, and support the construct validity of the daily measure of self-criticism.

METHOD Participants Participants were recruited through online advertisements on Craigslist, Facebook, and the McGill University classified ads in the winter of 2011. Participants were required to be undergraduate students in Montreal, between the ages of 18 and 25, and fluent in written English. One-hundred and twenty-two participants (59 male, 63 female) were recruited and began the study. Twenty-three participants (18.9%) who completed fewer than five diaries or who missed two consecutive diaries were dropped to eliminate possible sources of lower quality data. The final sample consisted of 99 participants (48 male, 51 female) with a mean age of 20.5 years (SD D 1.76). Their self-reported ethnicities were 70% White (n D 69), 13% South Asian (n D 13), 5% Chinese (n D 5), 2%

3 Black (n D 2), 2% Latin American (n D 2), 2% West Asian (n D 2), 1% Korean (n D 1), and 5% unspecified (n D 5).

Procedure The study involved a laboratory session and an online daily diary component. In the laboratory session, participants learned about the study, provided informed consent, and completed a battery of questionnaires on Survey Monkey (www. surveymonkey.com). Of these questionnaires, we report data only for the DEQ (Blatt et al., 1976). For 7 days, beginning the day after the laboratory session, participants were e-mailed a link to complete the daily measures on Survey Monkey. They were asked to complete the measures between 6 p.m. that evening and 4 a.m. the following morning. Diaries completed after 4 a.m. the next day were considered missed. Participants were told that they could miss up to one diary, and that if this occurred, they would be emailed an additional diary link at the end of the 7-day period. Participants were compensated up to $32 if they completed all assessments. Daily Measures The daily measures were modified versions of widely used and validated questionnaires. The instructions were modified to ask participants to focus on their experiences or behavior for the past day, and the items were rewritten to use the past tense to refer to the events of the day. For example, the DEQ item, “I have a tendency to be very self-critical,” was revised to read, “I had a tendency to be very self-critical.” Reliability was assessed using Geldhof, Preacher, and Zyphur’s (2014) procedure for computing omega in a multilevel context. Omega is conceptually similar to the more familiar coefficient alpha, but makes less restrictive assumptions about the relations between items and constructs. Between-persons reliability indicates the extent to which differences in weekly average scores across individuals are consistent across items. Within-person reliability can be thought of as the extent to which daily changes in item scores around their mean are similar across items. Between- and within-person omegas can be found in Table 1. Between-persons reliability was high for all variables except for self-image goals, for which reliability was still acceptable (omega D .76). Within-person reliability was acceptable for all variables except given social support, for which reliability was marginal (omega D .60). Self-Criticism. We used Rudich, Lerman, Gurevich, Weksler, and Shahar’s (2008) six-item short form of the DEQ (DEQ–SC6). Rudich et al. selected items that had high face validity as indicators of self-criticism, explicitly referencing setting high standards for oneself and self-punitive responding to failures, but that did not contain references to mood. Like the DEQ, items are rated on a 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly agree) scale. Sample items for the daily version include, “I had a tendency to be very self-critical,” and “I did not live according to my standards or ideals.” In a series of six validity studies, Rudich et al. showed that their scale had consistently high internal consistency (alphas > .80), correlated highly with the self-criticism factor from the standard 66-item DEQ (DEQ–SC), and had generally similar predictive

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ZUROFF, SADIKAJ, KELLY, LEYBMAN

TABLE 1.—Between-persons correlations (below the diagonal), within-person correlations (above the diagonal), intraclass correlations, means, standard deviations, and reliabilities for the study variables. Variable

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1. DEQ–SC6 2. Perceived social support 3. Positive affect 4. Negative affect 5. Compassionate goals 6. Self-image goals 7. Overt self-criticism 8. Given social support M (between) SD (between) M (within) SD (within) ICC Reliability (between) Reliability (within)

1

2

3

— ¡.32** ¡.17 .56*** ¡.02 .35** .60*** .15 2.76 0.96 0.00 0.84 .56 .98 .86

¡.23 — .25* ¡.39*** .49*** .04 ¡.23 .19 5.77 0.62 0.00 0.62 .70 .99 .74 ***

4

¡.39 .23** — .08 .45*** .28* .16 .50*** 2.88 0.56 0.00 0.56 .50 .99 .94 ***

5 ***

.45 ¡.15*** ¡.23*** — ¡.13 .45*** .64*** .25* 1.89 0.50 0.00 0.45 .55 .99 .88

6

¡.17 .17*** .28*** ¡.09 — .52*** .04 .36*** 3.71 0.58 0.00 0.49 .58 .99 .90 ***

.05 .04 .03 .01 .02 — .31** .36** 2.90 0.54 0.00 0.78 .32 .76 .79

7

8 ***

.24 ¡.05 ¡.07 .29*** ¡.02 .06 — .34*** 1.79 0.80 0.00 0.79 .51 .99 .93

¡.14** .26*** .32*** ¡.10* .29*** .05 .06 — 3.89 0.91 0.00 1.05 .43 .98 .60

Note. Within-person means are defined to be 0.00. Between-person means and all standard deviations are maximum likelihood estimates. Reliabilities are omegas, computed following Geldhof, Preacher, and Zyphur’s (2014) recommendations. DEQ–SC6 D Six-item short form of the Depressive Experience Questionnaire; ICC D intraclass correlation. *p < .05.**p < .01.***p < .001.

relations as the DEQ–SC with other variables including longitudinally measured depressive symptoms. In this study, participants’ average scores for the daily DEQ–SC6 correlated moderately, r(96) D .53, p < .001, with the DEQ–SC from the initial laboratory testing session.

Perceived Social Support and Given Social Support. Perceived social support (PSS) and given social support (GSS) were assessed using shortened three-item subscales of the Social Provisions Scale (SPS ; Cutrona, 1989; Cutrona & Russell, 1987). For each of three social provisions—guidance (advice or information), reliable alliance (tangible assistance), and attachment (caring)—participants were asked to rate on a 1 (not at all) to 7 (very much) scale the extent to which they perceived the provision to be potentially available if they needed it on that day, and the extent to which they gave the provision in question to someone else on that day. The threeitem versions of the SPS subscales have been successfully used in previous diary studies (e.g., Dunkley, Ma, Lee, Preacher, & Zuroff, 2014; Dunkley et al., 2003; Kelly, Zuroff, Leybman, & Gilbert, 2012). Positive Affect and Negative Affect. The Positive Affect (PA) and Negative Affect (NA) subscales of the PANAS (Watson, Clark, & Tellegen, 1988) each include 10 affect adjectives that participants were asked to rate from 1 (very slightly or not at all) to 5 (extremely) according to their experience over the past day. Sample PA items are happy, enthusiastic, proud, and excited, and sample NA items are afraid, hostile, guilty, and sad. The daily version of the PANAS has shown expected relations with measures of self-criticism and social support in prior diary studies (e.g., Dunkley et al., 2014; Dunkley et al., 2003; Kelly et al., 2012). Compassionate and Self-Image Goals. Compassionate goals include desires to support and benefit others, and selfimage goals include desires to maintain a positive image in the eyes of others and oneself. The Compassionate and Self-Image Goals Scale (Crocker & Canevello, 2008) is a 13-item questionnaire rated on a 5-point scale ranging from 1

(not at all) to 5 (extremely). The instructions were slightly modified for the daily form to read, “Today, in the area of friendships, how much did you want to or try to . . .?” Seven items assessed compassionate goals (e.g., “make a positive difference in someone else’s life”) and six items assessed selfimage goals (e.g., “get others to recognize or acknowledge your positive qualities”).

Overt Self-Criticism. Powers and Zuroff (1992) developed a seven-item measure of overt self-criticism, which they defined as the tendency to make overt, negative, self-evaluative comments in the presence of others. Participants’ self-ratings on the scale were significantly correlated with ratings provided by others who knew them well. Powers, Zuroff, and Topciu (2004) showed that overt self-criticism was moderately related to the DEQ–SC, and that both contributed to the prediction of scores on a depression inventory. For this study, we reduced the scale to five items (e.g., “I said critical things about myself in front of others”) that were rated on a 7-point scale ranging from 1 (not at all) to 7 (frequently). Results Means, standard deviations, ICCs, and reliabilities for the study variables can be found in Table 1. Analyses were conducted using Mplus 7.2, which can decompose observed variables with variance at both levels into latent between-persons variables and latent within-person variables. The resulting within-person latent variables are implicitly centered around the latent means for the individual and therefore can be interpreted as deviations or fluctuations around the individual’s average scores. The tabled between-persons means, betweenpersons standard deviation, and within-person standard deviation are maximum likelihood estimates. We used the full information maximum likelihood robust estimator, which permits unbalanced data and is relatively less sensitive to nonnormality of data. It can be seen from Table 1 that self-criticism displayed both between-persons and within-person variance, with slightly more than half of the total variance at the betweenpersons level (ICC D .56). The ICCs for the dependent

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STATE–TRAIT MODEL OF SELF-CRITICISM

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variables ranged from .32 (self-image goals) to .70 ( PSS). Thus, as predicted, all variables displayed variance at both levels, with the most trait-like variable being PSS and the most variable over days being self-image goals. Between-persons and within-person correlations were estimated using Mplus and are also presented in Table 1. It can be seen that self-criticism was correlated at the between-persons level with four of the seven dependent variables; it was correlated at the within-person level with all the dependent variables except self-image goals. The primary analyses were multilevel regression analyses conducted using the Mplus TWOLEVEL procedure. Self-criticism was the sole within-person predictor. Between-persons predictors were gender and self-criticism. There were trends for women to report higher levels of perceived support (b D .183, SE D .096, z D 1.91, p D .056), compassion goals (b D .190, SE D .100, z D 1.90, p D .058), and GSS (b D .196, SE D .101, z D 1.95, p D .051). The direction of these gender differences was consistent with the tendency of women to score higher on the trait of agreeableness (Costa, Terracciano, & McCrae, 2001). The results for self-criticism are summarized in Table 2. Standardized between-persons regression coefficients (slopes) indicated that participants who reported high average levels of self-criticism also reported low average levels of PSS, high NA, high self-image goals, and high overt self-criticism. The strongest between-persons effects were observed for NA and overt self-criticism. Contrary to prediction, highly self-critical persons did not report significantly lower PA, compassion goals, or GSS. Standardized within-person regression coefficients indicated that elevated daily levels of self-criticism were associated with lower daily PSS, lower PA, higher NA, lower compassion goals, higher overt self-criticism, and lower GSS. The strongest within-person effects were observed for NA and PA. Contrary to prediction, daily self-criticism was not associated with higher daily self-image goals.

DISCUSSION Three principal sets of findings emerged. First, Rudich et al.’s (2008) six-item version of the DEQ was found to be a reliable, internally consistent instrument for measuring both trait-like differences between participants in their mean levels of self-criticism over the study period and state-like differences in self-criticism across days. Moreover, the moderate ICC TABLE 2.—Standardized slopes for within-person and between-persons effects of self-criticism on dependent variables. Within-Person Dependent Variable Slope Perceived support Positive affect Negative affect Compassion goal Self-image goal Overt self-criticism Given support

¡0.233 ¡0.387 0.454 ¡0.167 0.048 0.236 ¡0.141

SE

z

.054 ¡4.29*** .037 ¡10.53*** .044 10.33*** .046 ¡3.62*** .044 1.07 .060 3.93*** .050 ¡2.83**

Between-Persons Slope

SE

z

¡0.315 ¡0.176 0.557 ¡0.014 0.366 0.598 0.154

.112 .109 .093 .122 .117 .080 .129

¡2.82** ¡1.61 5.97*** ¡0.12 3.12** 7.48*** 1.20

Note. Gender was included as an additional between-persons covariate in all analyses. *p < .05.**p < .01.***p < .001.

for the DEQ–SC6 demonstrated that, as predicted by the state–trait model of self-criticism, there was considerable variability in scores at both the between-persons and within-person levels of analysis. Second, and consistent with much past research, between-persons differences in self-criticism were associated with between-person differences in multiple other variables, including perceived support, negative affect, selfimage goals for interactions with friends, and overt self-criticism. Third, within-person differences in self-criticism were associated with daily differences in numerous variables, including aspects of interpersonal perception, affect, interpersonal goals, and interpersonal behavior. To our knowledge, this is the first demonstration of the covariation of state selfcriticism with state levels of variables beyond the realm of symptoms. Such covariation also demonstrates that daily fluctuations in self-criticism are psychologically important rather than random variability that can be neglected. Several implications of these findings are noteworthy. Perhaps the most fundamental is that the state–trait model is indeed applicable to self-criticism. Consistent with Blatt’s theorizing and contemporary personality science, it is meaningful to speak of personality states and personality traits for selfcriticism, just as one can for other personality variables. The numerous correlates of state and trait self-criticism support Blatt’s contention that the self-definitional domain is of fundamental importance for describing and understanding personality. Moreover, the evidence for the validity of the DEQ–SC6 opens the way for novel investigations of the role of state selfcriticism in the wide range of phenomena to which it has been linked in traditional between-persons research. For example, one could investigate whether state self-criticism is associated with state levels of trust for others, state levels of autonomous motivation, state levels of defense mechanisms and coping strategies, and state levels of biological stress markers. Trait self-criticism presents a special challenge for clinicians because it is a pernicious, transdiagnostic vulnerability factor (Blatt, 1995) that responds slowly to treatment (Blatt & Zuroff, 2005) and that limits the rate of symptomatic change in response to treatment (Hawley et al., 2006). Most clinicians would agree that a reduction in trait self-criticism is a highly desirable outcome, and yet assessing such changes is complicated by state-like fluctuations. Determining when a client has achieved a reduction in trait self-criticism likely requires an extended assessment period and evaluation of change in the mental representations that give rise to self-criticism. An additional implication of the results is that clinicians should anticipate and be sanguine in the face of within-session or daily fluctuations in clients’ self-criticism. Decreases or increases in self-criticism do not necessarily signal the success or failure of treatment, but rather are opportunities to try to understand and to intervene regarding the contextual factors that account for the fluctuations. Such factors could include the therapist’s behavior, the behavior of significant others, chronic or acute stressors, and even biological factors. Several specific aspects of the results also warrant comment. There were unpredicted differences between some of the between-persons and within-person findings. Self-criticism was related at the trait but not the state level to self-image goals, and at the state but not the trait level to compassion goals and given social support. That is, a focus on bolstering one’s self-image during interactions with friends was

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6 associated with the trait of self-criticism, but a willingness to focus on others’ needs was linked to state levels of self-criticism. Highly self-critical individuals are therefore generally concerned with defending their self-images, but when their state levels of self-criticism are lower, can also show increased concern with others’ needs and well-being. Conversely, those low in trait self-criticism are not necessarily consistently kind to others, but can display decreased compassion and support giving when they experience heightened state self-criticism. The association of both state and trait self-criticism with overt self-criticism is intriguing in the context of evidence that overt self-criticism in a laboratory interaction elicited public displays of support for the self-criticizer but also private negative judgments about their adjustment and competence (Powers & Zuroff, 1988). One might expect highly self-critical individuals, or individuals feeling momentarily self-critical, to avoid putting themselves down for fear of losing others’ respect. However, it appears that overt self-criticism can be an effective interpersonal influence tactic in the short term, despite running the risk of longer term negative consequences. It is possible that high levels of trait or state self-criticism trigger overt self-criticism as a defensive strategy to ward off anticipated rejection or competitive responses from others. However, chronically self-critical individuals risk incurring exactly what they fear as others find their overt self-criticism to be unattractive, begin to avoid them, and confirm the selfcritic’s negative mental representations of themselves and others. This hypothetical sequence illustrates the dynamic reciprocal interaction between self-critical personality and the social environment that was postulated by Blatt (2008) and Zuroff et al. (2004). There are important questions about causality that these data cannot address. Although we have presented evidence that self-criticism fluctuates in meaningful ways over days, and Blatt’s (2004, 2008) theory suggests that the underlying cause of such fluctuations is alterations in the accessibility of various mental representations, we have little theoretical understanding of what specific cues in the environment activate different representations. Moreover, we have no direct, experimental evidence of a link between mental representations and personality states of self-criticism. The causal relationships between daily changes in self-criticism and daily changes in our dependent variables also remain to be determined, as one can construct plausible arguments for either causal direction. For example, it might be that increases in self-criticism lead to decreases in one’s motivation to be compassionate toward others, but it is equally conceivable that downward fluctuations in compassion trigger self-criticism for failing to be a good friend. Bidirectional causal relationships are another possibility, as are “third variables” that might actually drive the covarying fluctuations. Experiments relying on priming methodologies and induced behavioral changes (e.g., Boone, Soenens, Vansteenkiste, et al., 2012) will be valuable in determining the causal mechanisms explaining the covariation of state levels of personality, cognitive, affective, motivational, and behavioral variables. This study was limited in several ways. First, we only examined fluctuations in self-criticism at a daily level. Fluctuations on both shorter time scales (e.g., specific interactions) and longer time scales are needed. Second, our sample consisted solely of college students. Although we have no reason to doubt the

ZUROFF, SADIKAJ, KELLY, LEYBMAN generalizability of the state–trait model of self-criticism, it is clearly necessary to test it in a wider range of participants, including clinical samples. It could be that different populations are characterized by lesser or greater amounts of within-person variability in self-criticism, or different patterns of coupling with other personality states. Third, all of the measures were self-report questionnaires. Observational data or reports from knowledgeable informants would be a valuable addition in future studies, especially for assessing interpersonal variables such as given social support and overt self-criticism. Moreover, self-report measures of self-criticism can only reveal self-criticism that participants are conscious of and willing to disclose. Blatt’s psychodynamic theory also allows for unconscious self-critical tendencies and, from a cognitive neuroscience perspective, it can be hypothesized that the neural networks subserving self-criticism can be chronically or momentarily activated, yet not to a sufficient degree to reach conscious awareness. Measuring individual differences in unconscious self-criticism will require methodological creativity, perhaps relying on implicit measures such as the projective tests that Blatt favored or the priming methods developed by cognitive psychologists (Segal & Ingram, 1994). Finally, the conceptual framework and methodological approach of this article and Boone, Soenens, Mouratidis, et al. (2012) should be extended to other self-definitional variables (e.g., narcissism) and to variables from the other fundamental domain in Blatt’s theorizing, relatedness, especially dependency. Many other personality variables of contemporary interest, such as mindfulness, self-compassion, autonomous motivation, and controlled motivation, could be analyzed in a similar fashion. In conclusion, Blatt’s (2004, 2008) theory did not portray selfcriticism as a fixed and immutable property of the individual. Our results strongly support the state–trait model of self-criticism, which acknowledges the existence and psychological importance of both stable individual differences in mean levels of self-criticism and fluctuations of self-criticism around those mean, trait levels. Moreover, the results demonstrate that the DEQ–SC6 is a promising measure for further explorations of both personality states and traits of self-criticism.

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