Environmental Management (2016) 57:1041–1053 DOI 10.1007/s00267-016-0677-3

Creating Conditions for Policy Change in National Parks: Contrasting Cases in Yellowstone and Yosemite Michael J. Yochim1 • William R. Lowry2

Received: 10 June 2015 / Accepted: 4 February 2016 / Published online: 16 February 2016  Springer Science+Business Media New York 2016

Abstract Public agencies face significant political obstacles when they try to change long-standing policies. This paper examines efforts by the U.S. National Park Service to change long-term policies in Yellowstone and Yosemite national parks. We argue that, to be successful, the agency and pro-change allies must expand the sphere of conflict to engage the support of the broader American public through positive framing, supportive science, compelling economic arguments, consistent goals, and the commitment of other institutional actors. We show that the agency is capable of creating these conditions, as in the reintroduction of wolves to Yellowstone, but we argue that this is not always the outcome, as in reducing automobile congestion in Yosemite Valley. Keywords

Policy
Parks
Change
Management

Introduction As the steward of our national parks, the National Park Service (NPS) regularly makes policy decisions that impact our nation’s most precious lands. Now in its 100th year, the NPS manages lands that are held in great esteem by the American public. A recent Hart Research poll, for instance, showed support for federal protection of national parks similar across partisan lines with 92 % of Democrats and 81 % of Republicans saying it is either ‘‘quite important’’ or

& William R. Lowry [email protected] 1

National Park Service (retired), Fenton, MO, USA

2

Washington University in St. Louis, St. Louis, MO, USA

‘‘extremely important’’ (National Parks Conservation Association 2012). The NPS thus makes decisions that are important to many people and is often subject to criticism. Some have accused the agency of ‘‘playing God’’ in national parks, although the agency is not and never has been what political scientists refer to as a ‘‘runaway bureaucracy’’ (Chase 1985; Weingast and Moran 1982). Another prominent analysis of natural resource agencies says the agency just ‘‘muddles through,’’ by avoiding tough calls and only making routine decisions (Clarke and McCool 1996). Contrary to that perspective, NPS managers do make policies and they often try to change existing policies. They just don’t always get the outcome they want. Why are they sometimes successful and often not? Over its 100-year history, one thing about the NPS has always been clear. It is a political agency, one subject to the constraints of working in a political context. Analysts, historians, and even members of the NPS acknowledge that parks have been frequently managed to serve parochial interests or short-term political goals (US NPS 1991; Freemuth 1991; Frome 1992; Lowry 1994; O’Brien 1999; Pritchard 1999; Runte 1979, 1990; Sellars 1997; Yochim 2013). Thus, even though park managers do pursue preferences, the NPS has always been an agency that faces substantial constraints. Our experiences working for the agency and analyzing it from the outside lead us to argue that its managers only succeed if they create certain conditions that engage the broad American public. The empirical context of this paper involves efforts by NPS managers to change policies in two of America’s most revered parks. More specifically, the policies involve management of wolves in Yellowstone and control of automobiles in Yosemite. These cases are interesting for many reasons, not the least being that the agency has achieved varying levels of success in achieving desired

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outcomes. In short, the agency was more successful creating conditions for change in Yellowstone than at Yosemite and the outcomes reflect that contrast. The paper is organized as follows. The first section describes the larger context, the difficulty of changing policies, both generically (other issue areas) and then in the national parks. We make the argument that changing park policies requires the same difficult coalition-building and issue framing that occurs in other policy contexts. The second section examines that argument in terms of wolf reintroduction in Yellowstone and the third section considers the policies involving automobiles in Yosemite. We finish with some brief conclusions.

The Challenge of Changing Policies Changing public policies has never been easy. It is possible, however, under certain conditions. The Challenge Generically Public policy scholars have long argued that incremental change has dominated assessments of policy change for decades (Jones and Baumgartner 2005; Lindblom 1959). The American political system, with checks and balances as well as veto points, is designed this way to avoid potentially dangerous changes. Even beyond institutional obstacles to major changes, public policies once in place take on a life of their own. In spite of the obstacles to radical changes, however, some public policies have changed so dramatically that they are best seen as reversals of past goals. Policies on issues ranging from civil rights to regulation of pesticides to encouragement of nuclear power have changed dramatically over time (Bosso 1987; Baumgartner and Jones 1993). How have such dramatic changes occurred? Virtually every effort to change policies involves conflicts between those who benefit from the status quo and those who are trying to alter it. One of the bedrock arguments in political science involves the importance of building coalitions to achieve policy outcomes. Coalitions, defined as a temporary alliance of factions for some common purpose, are prominent in American politics as a way for advocates to share resources, combine skills, and impact public policies (Baumgartner et al. 2009; Nelson and Yackee 2012; Schlozman and Tierney 1986).Thus, one part of a causal argument for change is the presence of an effective coalition of advocates. A growing literature in political science asserts and examines the impact of advocacy coalitions that include interest groups, journalists, researchers, and even agency officials in a particular policy domain (Sabatier and Weible 2007). Scholars using this framework have

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described at least some impact on policy change from coalitions in literally hundreds of empirical analyses (Jenkins-Smith et al. 2014). The more inclusive and the more coordinated these different parts of the coalition, the more effective they can be in changing past policies. A second part of the argument involves one of the classic arguments of political science. The logic dates to Schattschneider’s classic The Semi-Sovereign People (1960) in which he describes the ability of one party to engage the larger audience into a fight as determinant of the outcome. In other words, if someone is losing in a fight, their best strategy is to expand the sphere of conflict (Schattschneider 1960). Scholars have applied this argument to analyze policy changes in public lands at both the federal and state levels of American politics (Lowry 2009; Reno 2007). We argue that several conditions are necessary, but not alone sufficient, for an agency to successfully expand the sphere of conflict. First, as suggested above, change proponents need to build an inclusive advocacy coalition. Second, they need to frame the issue so that an alternative outcome is more attractive to the public than the status quo outcome. Framing a policy is a form of issue definition that creates an image of a ‘‘supporting set of ideas structuring how policymakers think about and discuss the policy’’ (Baumgartner and Jones 2002, p. 12). For instance, those seeking to reduce the use of nuclear power gained momentum by shifting the image from electricity generation to one focused on public safety and environmental damage after Three Mile Island. Framing an alternative to existing policy to emphasize benefits can attract previously unrealized support. Third, those coalitions are also more likely to engage the public if their position is validated by scientific arguments and evidence. Studies have shown that efforts to change policies are not likely to succeed if they are not supported by hard science (Kamieniecki 2006, p. 60). For example, recent efforts to achieve changes to climate policies are gaining momentum with the growing scientific consensus over the causes and consequences of global warming. Fourth, pro-change coalitions are more likely to attract public support if they can point to economic evidence that a new policy will produce either greater benefits or fewer costs than the existing policy. A classic example occurred in the context of hydroelectric dams when David Brower and other opponents to traditional policies supporting the construction of new dams used economic arguments to question support for proposed dams in the Grand Canyon area in the 1960s (Reisner 1987, p. 295). In the context of national parks, arguments for economic benefits are likely to resonate with the broader public but also with concessionaires in the parks themselves. These economic actors have had considerable influence over policymaking in parks (Hartzog 1988; Runte 1990, p. 203; Sax 1980). Pro-change coalitions may

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be able to recruit their support, or at least reduce their opposition, with arguments that new policies will foster greater visitation and thus greater profits. Fifth, coalitions will be more effective if they get commitment from institutional actors, both internal (mainly their own employees and perseverance) and/or external (other government agencies, courts, and state and local governments). Many a coalition has failed because it did not put adequate effort toward realizing its goal or because a key employee moved on before the policy objective was attained. Similarly, coalitions including a government agency do better if that agency ensures that sister agencies see their concerns and goals reflected in the policy proposal—and even join the coalition. With virtually all NPS policy-making accomplished through an Environmental Impact Statement prepared pursuant to the National Environmental Policy Act, institutional commitment is necessary to see the policy change through the act’s methodical process, which takes at least three years. Sixth, proposed policies must be consistent with the agency mandate. In the case of parks, for example, policy makers are more likely to succeed if their proposed changes do not threaten public access. Without such consistency, agency employees are unlikely to commit to the proposed policy changes. The Empirical Context of National Parks The American national park system contains a remarkable set of public spaces that are supposed to be managed to be enjoyed but also to be conserved ‘‘unimpaired’’ for future generations. Beginning with the protection of Yosemite in 1864 and the designation of Yellowstone as the first national park in 1872, the system has grown to over 400 of the most valued natural and cultural sites in the country. Congress created the NPS in 1916 to manage these units in ways that achieve the dual mandate of use and preservation. This paper focuses on two of the most important issues in two of America’s most revered parks. At Yellowstone, the reintroduction of wolves after decades of absence was one of the most prominent conservation success stories in American history. Reintroduction was so successful that the wolves have recently been removed from the threatened and endangered species list. At Yosemite, one of the most controversial policies in national parks called for removal of automobiles from the Valley in 1980. In 2014, as part of a recent planning effort, the NPS shifted positions on this policy. We analyze how the agency and its allies have attempted, not completely successfully, to create conditions to overcome political constraints in these situations. The obvious research design question regarding using these two cases is comparability. Indeed, important differences exist. For instance, the Yellowstone case involves

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national legislation (the Endangered Species Act) and significant national media attention, whereas the Yosemite case was, to some extent, more localized. Nevertheless, both cases involve policies that had been in effect for decades, entrenched stakeholders including influential concessionaires, a wide range of opinions, the development of EISs, and the NPS playing a key role. We will not dismiss the differences between the cases but will instead describe them where appropriate. We do argue that the commonalities are sufficient to allow comparisons of the overall dynamics of policy change.

Wolves in Yellowstone The reintroduction of wolves to Yellowstone National Park is one of the greatest success stories in the history of ecosystem restoration. The role of predators in ecosystems is a source of controversy in public lands all over the world (Pritchard 1999; Quammen 2003; Vaillant 2010). At Yellowstone, the effort to reintroduce wolves succeeded in spite of serious objections and controversy, but it also succeeded so well that wolves in the Yellowstone area were recently removed from the endangered species list. Now that wolves have been delisted, state and local officials have gained management control, a potential outcome as described below that was not insignificant in building the coalition to support the plan. The Reestablishment of Natural Predators Some creatures, especially predators, have always inspired controversy. Wolves are perhaps the single best example. Indeed, their own ability to adapt and colonize has inspired fear and hatred around the world for centuries. Not surprisingly then, Americans and their agencies hunted wolves vigorously as they settled the country. The establishment of Yellowstone National Park in 1872 and the NPS in 1916 did not stop the killing. Instead, NPS officials viewed wolf hunting as a way to protect other animals in the park, such as elk, that were visible to visitors. They condoned and even sponsored wolf killing in the park until no viable population was left by the 1930s. The timeline for wolf reintroduction is summarized in Table 1. The absence of wolves caused significant changes to the Yellowstone ecosystem. The elk population grew substantially even despite the fact that the NPS killed or removed more than 58,000 of them between 1935 and 1961 (Chase 1985, p. 28). That growth had severe consequences for stream banks, vegetation, and wildlife that were dependent on the vegetation. By the 1930s, scientists began to argue that protecting predators could benefit the larger ecosystem (Wright et al. 1933). By the 1940s, ecologists

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1872

Establishment of Park

1971

First interagency meeting for management of wolves in Yellowstone

1973

Passage of Endangered Species Act; wolves listed

1980 1987

FWS completes Northern Rocky Mountain Wolf Recovery Plan FWS completes revised Northern Rocky Mountain Wolf Recovery Plan

1987

Bill to reintroduce wolves to Yellowstone fails in Congress

1988

Congress directs NPS and FWS to conduct studies for reintroduction

1989

Bill to reintroduce wolves to Yellowstone fails in Congress

1990

Bill to reintroduce wolves to Yellowstone fails in Congress

1991

Congress directs FWS and NPS to prepare draft EIS by 1994

1993

Draft EIS completed and presented for comment

1994

Final EIS released

1995

Wolves released into park

2000

Circuit court ruling allowing wolves to stay in park

2008

Bush administration attempts to delist wolves

2011

Congress delists wolves in Idaho and Montana

Source U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service (1994), Appendix 1

such as Aldo Leopold were more emphatic, arguing that the NPS should reintroduce wolves to Yellowstone. In a report to Congress in 1963, Leopold’s son A. Starker Leopold and others recommended that ‘‘biotic associations within each park be maintained, or where necessary recreated, as nearly as possible in the condition that prevailed when the area was first visited by the white man’’ (Leopold 1963, p. 32). The Leopold report became a seminal document for park management (Weaver 1978). Scientific arguments for ecosystem integrity resonated within the NPS and the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS). These agencies began deliberating about reintroduction in the 1970s. After the FWS called for a recovery plan for wolves under the Endangered Species Act, the NPS explicitly recommended in its 1974 Master Plan for Yellowstone ‘‘the reestablishment of natural predators within the range of the northern Yellowstone elk herd’’ (U.S. NPS 1974, p. 1). Meanwhile, wolves were making their way from Canada back to the northern Rockies, but only occasional anecdotes suggested any had found their way to the park. Deliberations about reestablishing a viable population of wolves aroused intense opposition, particularly among livestock owners in the area and their representatives in Congress. Moderate crusaders in Congress such as Wayne Owens (D-UT) offered bills to support reintroduction in the late 1980s but the legislation lacked wide support. To the contrary, Representative Don Young (R-Alaska) vilified the wolf and then warned, ‘‘God help the poor cattle rancher and the sheep rancher when he tries to protect his stock’’ (U.S. House 1989, p. 8). Senator Conrad Burns (RMontana) warned that if wolves came back to Yellowstone, ‘‘There’ll be a dead child within a year’’ (Begley 1991,

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p. 40). Wolf proposals involved not just the renewed presence of a predator but reintroduction by the federal government, anathema in much of the American West (Ferguson 1996, p. 69). Expanding the Sphere of Conflict over Wolves Overcoming this opposition to wolf reintroduction took an historic effort and a rare convergence of favorable conditions. (1)

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An effective coalition As evident in the following discussion, the effort to bring wolves back to Yellowstone involved a wide range of environmental groups, journalists, academics, scientists, and agency officials. Ultimately, this informal coalition engaged the most significant actor, the broader American public. Positive framing The shifting of the image of wolves from despised villain to ecosystem savior took decades, but it accelerated into the early 1990s with the help of authors, filmmakers, and journalists who described the animals in glowing terms, noting their attributes such as family loyalty and teamwork (Mowat 1963; Lopez 1978; Peters 1985). Hollywood turned Mowat’s Never Cry Wolf into a popular movie in 1983 and Kevin Costner’s Dances with Wolves won Best Picture in 1990. As one rancher said at the time, ‘‘Now, only one and a half percent of the population is involved with agriculture and the other 98-plus percent has been indoctrinated by a Disney mentality about the wolf’’ (Egan 1994, p. 1). Between the summer of 1989 and the fall of 1991,

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three major U.S. news magazines published articles on the possible wolf reintroduction, complete with eye-catching photos. Public agencies and environmental groups, notably Defenders of Wildlife, made a concerted effort to educate the public about the possible benefits of reintroduction. As Doug Smith, the NPS Wolf Project Leader, said years later, ‘‘The public outreach for this program in the early 1990s was arguably the most ever done for a wildlife project’’ (Interview with author 10/6/2008). Scientific justification The scientific and academic communities rallied around the argument that reintroduction would restore some integrity to the natural ecosystem. Much of the discussion focused on the idea of a trophic cascade. In Yellowstone, wolves would cull elk herds, thus enabling the regrowth of aspen on stream banks. The concept of trophic cascades has inspired considerable debate, but in this instance, the evidence strongly pointed to the need for natural predators. Indeed the elk population had tripled in size between the 1960s and the 1990s, thus impacting many other species (Tennesen 1999; Chase 1985). Many wildlife experts endorsed the potential benefits of bringing back predators and pointed to evidence from other reintroduction programs, such as wolves in Minnesota (Mech 1970; Pritchard 1999, p. 299; Wilkinson 1993, p. 29). Economic support Like any other public policy, wolf reintroduction created benefits as well as costs. By virtually any systematic analysis, the former exceeded the latter. The NPS and the FWS anticipated costs of managing the program at less than $1 million per year. They also estimated the costs from livestock losses and lost elk hunting at between $400,000 and $900,000 per year. On the plus side, however, they anticipated benefits from increased visitation and spending, including travel, hotels, and food at about $23 million per year (U.S. FWS 1994). The promise of increased numbers of tourists fostered support from businesses in the region and the park who relished the prospect of more visitors. Independent economic analyses supported the projected figures (Duffield 1992; Schullery 1996, p. 212). Indeed, these compelling forecasts were accurate if not a bit conservative. Agency commitment The enthusiasm for the project among NPS and FWS employees grew during the early 1990s. Initial wariness by top agency personnel diminished with the proposed designation of the wolves as an experimental, rather than endangered, species as the preferred option in the EIS. This distinction defused much of the controversy in that it

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allowed wolves that caused problems outside the park to be destroyed and it gave state wildlife officials greater freedom in dealing with wolves (Pritchard 1999, p. 297). However, this designation also raised legal issues. The Wyoming Farm Bureau and others sued, claiming that differentiating experimental animals from naturally occurring ones would be impossible. Some environmental groups also objected to the experimental status since it does not confer the same full protection as endangered or threatened. These objections gained a temporary victory that was overturned in 2000 by the 10th U.S. Circuit Court allowing the experimental wolves to stay in the park. Overall, the designation enhanced agency support and even convinced some livestock owners to support such compromise protection because it would be less restrictive than the full endangered status wolves would receive if they made it to the park on their own (Skeele 1993). In addition, the agency laid out specific targets that, if reached, could lead to the delisting of the species from the federal Endangered Species Act and reversion of management authority to state and local governments. Consistency with agency mandate The final proposal for wolf reintroduction in the Environmental Impact Statement then was fully consistent with the NPS mandate. Wolves in the park would not impact visitor access but rather would in all likelihood entice more visitor engagement. They would certainly contribute to preserving the park in natural condition by restoring a missing piece of the ecosystem.

The Power of an Informed Public The factors described above fostered overwhelming public support for the project. Public reaction in neighboring areas was only tepid at first. Surveys in 1987 showed more in favor of reintroduction than opposed in Montana (44–40), Wyoming (49–35), and Idaho (56–27). By 1990, however, other surveys showed Wyoming residents in favor by a 3–1 margin and Idaho residents by 72–22. Nationally, the results were remarkable, one 1992 survey showing 97 % in favor (Bath 1996; Pritchard 1999, p. 302; Wilkinson 1993). How much did strong public support matter? As Project Manager Smith said later, ‘‘the reversal of policy in this case came about from an informed public’’ (Interview with author 6/21/1999). Those favoring the policy had built an effective coalition and created the conditions to engage the broader public. In May 1994, Secretary of Interior Babbitt, acting

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for the Clinton administration, approved the reintroduction plan. Proponents in Congress then funded the program, and NPS and FWS personnel put the project into effect. The first group of transplanted wolves was released into the Yellowstone wilderness in early 1995 and another group in 1996. As mentioned above, the 10th U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals formally validated the use of experimental status for the reintroduced wolves. Delisting but on What Terms The wolves recovered so well that within a decade of being reintroduced, many policymakers were talking about delisting the wolves from the federal Endangered Species Act. Delisting of an endangered species is supposed to occur when the plant or animal in question has recovered to target levels that allow sustainable growth. At that point, federal protection is removed and the species is managed under the laws of the relevant states. The target levels for the reintroduced wolves were 300 animals and 30 breeding pairs for three consecutive years in the three recovery zones—greater Yellowstone, central Idaho, and northwest Montana. By the mid-2000s, over 1500 wolves, including over 100 breeding pairs, roamed the northern Rockies. The Bush administration proposed in 2003 to downgrade the wolves from endangered to threatened and transfer responsibility for the animals within state jurisdictions to state governments. The pro-wolf coalition filed suit in opposition, warning that state policies would not provide sufficient protection. In February 2004, a U.S. District Court agreed, ruling that the action was based on political expediency rather than on science. The Bush administration’s FWS continued to pursue delisting, but subsequent court rulings stopped specific efforts to downgrade wolf protection until 2011 (Johnson 2008). In March 2011, in response to growing pressure, several conservation groups made a settlement with Department of Interior officials to lift federal wolf protection in Montana and Idaho, thereby allowing hunting, while still keeping the species on the endangered list in Wyoming, Oregon, Washington, and Utah. In April, a federal judge denied the settlement, saying that exposing part of an endangered species population to hunting violated the ESA. Congress responded to the federal ruling almost immediately. Senator Jon Tester (D-MT) and Representative Mike Simpson (R-ID) tacked a rider to a budget bill that removed wolves in Montana and Idaho from the endangered species list. Recognizing that such direct intervention into the ESA would be subject to litigation, the rider also precluded judicial review (Barringer and Broder 2011). With federal protection removed, wolf hunting resumed. The debates continue today about the impacts of these moves on wolf populations (Gershman 2014).

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Whatever the ultimate result of delisting, one cannot say the process of delisting went the way the NPS wanted. In the context of our theoretical framework, the outcome should not be surprising. The pro-wolf coalition was not nearly as united in opposition to delisting as it had been in favor of the initial reintroduction. While the FWS pursued delisting, the NPS took a more nuanced position. The NPS view, personified by project manager Smith, endorsed delisting if the reduction in federal protection for wolves came along with responsible management plans in the neighboring states. Smith testified to that effect during the hearing over the Defenders of Wildlife lawsuit decided in May 2008 (Defenders of Wildlife v U.S. FWS 2008). Prodelisting forces effectively framed the issue by saying the wolves were a robust population. Scientific opinion was mixed, with some scientists arguing that continued federal protection was needed while others stated that the wolf population had recovered enough to be ‘‘resilient’’ (Dawson 2007; Johnson 2008). Economic constituents applied extensive pressure for delisting. Ranchers wanted more freedom to kill wolves potentially threatening their livestock while hunters wanted not only to hunt wolves but also a larger elk population. The coalition favoring a more careful delisting fragmented and ultimately lost control to the ultimate institutional authority of Congress, as driven by local interests and concerns.

Automobiles in Yosemite On the very first page of the 1980 General Management Plan for Yosemite National Park, the NPS stated explicitly that ‘‘the intent of the National Park Service is to remove all automobiles from Yosemite Valley’’ (U.S. NPS 1980, p. 1). Several decades later, during another planning process, the NPS revised that goal. How can we explain this evolving policy? This is an important question not just for Yosemite but for parks in general. Indeed, the tension between access to, whether through automobiles or other means, and preservation of natural conditions is at the heart of countless controversies involving parks and other public lands (Louter 2006). The Serpent in the Valley Visitors to Yosemite National Park have always recognized the mile-wide, 7-mile long Valley as a special place. Teddy Roosevelt once termed it ‘‘the most beautiful place in the world’’ and John Muir described it as a ‘‘temple’’ with Nature’s ‘‘choicest treasures’’ (Everhart 1983, p. 113; Muir 1912). Early visitors to the park wanted easier access to the Valley than existed in the late 19th century, with a 16-h stagecoach ride and then a 37-h ride by horse or mule. State

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and federal officials thus began construction of a road into the Valley in the early 20th century despite the warning of British Ambassador James Bryce that ‘‘It would be hard to find scenery any more perfect. If Adam had known what harm the serpent was going to work, he would have tried to prevent him from finding lodging in Eden; and if you were to realize what the result of the automobile will be in that wonderful, incomparable Valley, you will keep it out’’ (Bryce 1913). Others did not see automobiles the same way as Bryce. John Muir and the Sierra Club initially ‘‘embraced the automobile as a way to expand the political support for parks’’ (Louter 2006, p. 26). California state legislators and park managers ignored Bryce’s warnings and opened the All-Year Highway allowing automobile access to the Valley year-round in 1927. With the automobile came more visitors, more roads, more concessions and services. In 1914, Yosemite hosted just over 14,000 visitors per year. By 1966, with visitation nearing 2 million, the Wall Street Journal published a front-page story titled ‘‘Ah Wilderness: Severe Overcrowding Brings Ills of the City to Scenic Yosemite.’’ The article described ‘‘a soaring crime rate, traffic snarls, juvenile rowdyism, and even smog’’ (Mapes 1966, p. 1). Development intensified with a wood-burning display shoved over a cliff each evening, the filming of a television series, proposals for a tramway to Glacier Point, and the continually increasing onslaught of traffic. Noted environmentalist Ed Abbey concluded about the Valley in 1977, ‘‘It is not the proper place for paved roads and motor traffic in any form’’ (Abbey 1977, p. 144). NPS officials occasionally expressed sentiments similar to those of Abbey and other critics although the agency was not very consistent in its messages or actions. Table 2 summarizes various efforts over time. One of the most important changes occurred in 1970 when the NPS closed

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the eastern end of the Valley to automobile traffic, allowing only bikes and shuttle buses powered by propane. But in the late 1970s, drafts of the General Management Plan actually did not deal with automobiles at all, prompting criticism from environmental groups and even members of Congress that the plans had been written by the concessionaires (U. S. House of Representatives 1975). The agency accordingly revised the plan. Park staff held 84 public hearings and the process involved 62,000 participants. The agency responded with a plan in 1980 that included over 300 specific recommendations as well as some tough language on automobiles: ‘‘Increasing automobile traffic is the single greatest threat to enjoyment of the natural and scenic qualities of Yosemite’’ (U.S. NPS 1980, p. 3). The agency thus proposed ending automobile access over roughly a 10-year period but also providing alternative ways to get people into the Valley. Paved with Good Intentions The NPS has made some progress on many of the recommendations in the 1980 plan but its efforts on automobiles produced more frustration than results. Indeed, a major effort to update the goals of 1980 and revise the plan (to actually moderate the goal of eliminating traffic to reducing it) with a new Yosemite Valley Plan (YVP) in 2000 produced intense litigation and controversy but little change on automobile policy. In a 2008 interview, Chief Planner Linda Dahl offered this summary comment, ‘‘Politically, there are a lot of obstacles’’ (Interview with author 7/17/2008). (1)

The lack of an effective coalition In contrast to the coalition pursuing change at Yellowstone, those seeking different policies at Yosemite were not able

Table 2 Timeline of actions related to policy changes at Yosemite 1890

Establishment of Park

1949

Master plan proposes moving facilities outside of park

1980

General management plan proposes eliminating cars from valley .

1987

Yosemite Valley/El Portal Comprehensive Design outlines options for changes

2000

Yosemite Valley Plan released

2000

First Merced River Plan released; litigation follows

2005

NPS Supplement to 2000 Merced River Plan addressing deficiencies identified in court ruling; litigation again follows.

2006

U.S. district court rules against Merced River Plan

2008

Circuit court upholds district court ruling on Merced River Plan

2009

NPS reaches settlement with litigants stipulating a new management plan

2013

NPS releases draft Merced River Plan

2014

NPS releases final Merced River Plan

Source (U.S. NPS 2000; U.S. NPS 2014, pp 2–7, 2–8)

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to put together an effective, unified coalition. Instead, many of the potential parties to such a coalition have conflicting perspectives on actions regarding parking and traffic in the Valley. This schism became quite apparent in responses to the YVP. It was challenged in the public sphere by neighboring communities who feared the lost tourism from reduced automobile access and in court by local environmental groups who thought it did not go far enough. Prominent environmentalist David Brower condemned the plan as ‘‘green-wash for a half-baked development plan’’ (Brower 2000). NPS Planner Dahl described the conflicting perspectives as ‘‘street-fighting with uninformed sharp objects’’ (Interview with author 7/17/2008). Such intense feelings make coalition building extremely challenging. Damaging framing Change advocates have been unable to frame policy changes regarding automobiles in the most positive light throughout the history of this effort. At the time when the 1980 plan was being developed, in a front-page story, the New York Times reported that NPS ‘‘officials are wondering if they may soon have to restrict access’’ (Shabecoff 1980). The article did not provide the rest of the context. The NPS did not really want to reduce access but rather make people make choices regarding how they would access the park—for example, by bus instead of car. Newswire organizations reported the plan in similar terms. For instance, in late October of that year, UPI headlined a story that ran nationwide ‘‘Park Service Planning Ban on Cars in Yosemite Valley’’ (UPI 1980). Again, the story did not discuss the provision of alternative means of getting into the park (for example, regional buses); instead it stressed ‘‘significant immediate reductions of private vehicle traffic and an eventual ban on all such traffic.’’ Since then, opponents of subsequent efforts to reduce automobile traffic into the Valley have used similar language about limiting access. Representative George Radanovich (R-California), visible as a spokesperson for the local community, offered frequent warnings against ‘‘locking people out of the park’’ (Dougherty 2003). Scientific uncertainty NPS officials have long argued that changing transportation patterns in the park would improve the health of the ecosystem, particularly air quality. The agency conducted air quality impact analyses for different projected scenarios of reduced automobile traffic, concluding that the improvements would range from 10 to 83 % (U.S. NPS 2000, pp. I-6). The range therein reflects the indefinite nature of the findings; indeed, the air

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quality issue is so complex that any future projections are tenuous. Not surprisingly then, many comments in the EIS expressed frustration with the lack of conclusive data. Critics also questioned the lack of in-depth analysis of the impact of diesel fuels used in buses and the complex language used in discussing air quality in the document (U.S. NPS 2000, pp. III123–125). One comment was especially revealing. The U.S. Environmental Protection Agency questioned the scientific analysis of the impacts from the preferred alternative on the basis of insufficient information (U.S. EPA 2000). Such conclusions do not inspire public confidence. Economic questions Pro-change advocates faced a daunting task convincing other interested parties, particularly neighboring gateway communities and park concessionaires, that reducing automobile traffic in the Valley would bring more benefits than costs. In both Mariposa (west of park) and Mono (east of park) counties, the tourism and service industries account for about half the employment. In public hearings as well as comments on the 2000 YVP, representatives of those communities expressed concerns about the possibility of decreased tourism in general, lost drive-through traffic, decreased lodging, confusion about the methodology used in the socioeconomic analyses, and skepticism over the admitted lack of a rigorous cost–benefit analysis (U.S. NPS 2000, pp. III376–370; III-271). Concessionaires within the park too worried openly about potential lost visitation. During congressional hearings in early 2001, the president of the primary park concessionaire, Delaware North Companies., warned of a perception that Yosemite National Park is not open and accessible to private vehicles (U.S. House 2001). Skepticism over access The NPS is constantly aware that its mandate includes making parks accessible to visitors. At Yosemite, this awareness often focuses on automobile access to the Valley. The NPS has tried to convince people in these areas that changing the means of transportation into the Valley would not necessarily result in reduced access. Indeed, in the YVP, the NPS concluded that ‘‘visitor demand would remain unchanged in the future from its current conditions’’ (U.S. NPS 2000, p. I-3). However, the perception that access was being restricted remains persistent, so the agency’s assurances rang hollow. Of more than 10,000 comments on the YVP during the notice-and-comment procedure, nearly 10 % came from the park and the immediately surrounding areas that included concessionaires and local businesses (U.S. NPS 2000, pp. III-491–498).

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Many of these commenters opposed the idea of accessing the Valley via bus. For example, one individual from Yosemite itself, and thus likely a concessionaire employee, commented explicitly that ‘‘Concession headquarters needs to remain in valley…not via a bus ride out of the valley. Out of the valley makes no sense!’’ (U.S. NPS 2000, p. III-378). Inconsistent agency commitment Finally, the agency’s own commitment to the goal of eliminating automobiles in the Valley has not been consistent over time (Nolte 1990; Runte 1990). The larger problem is that, even if agency officials were committed to implementing the goals of the GMP or the YVP, they lacked the necessary resources. Referring to the transportation goals in the 1980 plan, Superintendent Mike Finley said in 1992, ‘‘Our annual budget is only $15 million here and that project ran over $70 million (Interview with author 8/10/1992). Similarly, in 2008, Planner Dahl referred to the $457 million estimate for alternative transportation facilities in the 2000 plan and commented, ‘‘We can’t even afford to clean the bathrooms in this park and nobody is standing in line to give us $457 million’’ (Interview with author 7/17/2008). While laudable, the goal of eliminating automobiles in the Valley was not all that attainable.

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to build a coalition, and how to create conditions for policy changes. These plans have all been management plans prepared pursuant to the Wild and Scenic Rivers Act (WSRA). The Merced River, which flows through the heart of Yosemite Valley, was added to the country’s inventory of wild and scenic rivers in 1987. In addition to mandating a management plan, WSRA also requires the protection and enhancement of the river’s free-flowing nature, the river’s water quality, and the other values that make the river worth protecting; these values may extend  mile away from the river. WSRA also requires the management plan to specify the visitor capacity for the river. Because almost all visitors to the Merced River (still) arrive by car and because most of Yosemite Valley is within  mile of the river, the debate over automobiles and related levels of development in the valley since 2000 has been under the guise of WSRA. After completing its first Merced River Plan (MRP) in 2000 and then a supplement to that plan in 2005 and then seeing both plans rejected by federal judges, agency personnel worked diligently to release a final plan in early 2014. That massive 3-volume, 3000-page tome has yet to be litigated—because, as with wolf reintroduction, the agency took the time to create the conditions for success (Cathcart-Rake 2009; U.S. NPS 2014). (1)

A Lost Opportunity The NPS has attempted to reduce commercial impacts and automobile usage of the Valley through incremental adjustments such as reduced day parking and increased shuttle services. To the frustration and consternation of many agency employees and pro-change advocates, this falls far short of the ambitious goals stated in 1980 and again in 2000. Jay Watson, a key player in developing and defending the YVP, warned that ‘‘We are rapidly approaching a point where a historic opportunity becomes a lost opportunity’’ (Squatriglia 2007, p. A1). However, without an effective coalition for change or compelling science and economics and with persistent framing of diminished access, that historic opportunity may only have existed for a short time after the GMP was released—if it ever really did. Recent Changes Unable to eliminate automobiles from the Valley, in the last decade NPS managers have pursued several iterations to the plans regarding Yosemite. The way that agency personnel have pursued these efforts reflects some institutional learning about the feasibility of the 1980 goal, how

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Agency commitment First, agency personnel took the task more seriously this time. The mere fact that the agency took five times as long to prepare this plan as it did with either the first plan or its supplement speaks volumes. Moreover, the agency hired several new staff members to write the plan, and then subjected much of the document to both peer and legal review. Such reviews took time, but managers such as Superintendent Don Neubacher were determined to build support (Interview with author 7/3/ 2014). An effective coalition Recognizing that the street fighting from its antecedent planning efforts led in part to their demise, park planners held public meetings throughout the planning effort and did their best to address all the prominent concerns. This attention brought the agency a number of allies representing most factions of the debate, from the National Parks Conservation Association (promoting protection of the river and nearby meadows) to American Whitewater (promoting paddling access to the river). Similarly, park planners met with seven different Native American tribes, altering their proposal to protect resources of concern and further broadening the sphere of conflict. More significantly, the agency tackled directly the issue that had gone unresolved for 34 years by amending the GMP to

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explicitly allow automobile use to continue at levels close to existing use. Interestingly, almost no one criticized that move, including the environmental community. With these moves, the agency had a strong coalition that even included the fiery U.S. House Congressman representing the area, Tom McClintock (R-CA) (U.S. NPS 2014, Chap. 10, Appendix A; NPCA 2014; American Whitewater 2014; NPCA 2014; U.S. House 2014). Scientific justification The agency began this planning effort with a comprehensive literature review and identification of gaps in that literature. Honing in on the critical information needs, the agency spent over $1 million on research and updated resource condition assessments. For example, one project assessed the condition of the Merced’s riverbanks along its entire reach in Yosemite Valley (Cardno/ Entrix 2014). Another examined possible effects of groundwater pumping on water tables in the valley (Newcomb and Fogg 2014). Still another looked at the condition of the valley’s iconic meadows (Ballenger 2012). Park planners then utilized this information in the plan, including management actions to address all identified problems, such as restoring 189 acres of meadow and riparian habitat. After having the studies peer reviewed, the agency hosted a public meeting to present the results and posted the final papers on its website. Through these actions, the agency established a robust research base and a solid foundation for many of the actions in the plan. In contrast to the earlier planning efforts, the scientific basis for this plan’s actions never became a matter of public criticism but instead strengthened the agency’s position (U.S. NPS 2014, p. ES-4). Consistency with agency mandate As noted, the planning effort was grounded in a suite of actions intended to protect, enhance, and/or restore the Merced River and its related values. No one disputed those actions, although a minority of the public (particularly those representing the Friends of Yosemite Valley, one of the former litigants) desired more radical actions such as the complete removal of Yosemite Lodge (U.S. NPS 2014, p. L 242; Onishi 2013). However, seeking to balance the two parts of its mission, agency planners dismissed removal of the lodge as impractical and instead chose a final plan that allowed existing visitation to continue but which fixed several traffic circulation and parking problems to make visits to the valley more enjoyable. As noted above, that access would be primarily by private automobile, with a much lesser amount by bus (U.S. NPS 2014, pp. 8-197; 8-234). At a 2014 public meeting to roll out the final plan, more than

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one member of the public—some of them representing environmental organizations or former plaintiffs—lauded the balance that the agency had struck. While some of them were subdued in their praise, it was clear that the plan successfully balanced visitor access with resource preservation. Economic support By ensuring continued access by private automobile and by retaining existing visitation levels, the final plan posed little threat to the concessionaire or to gateway economies. Nevertheless, the Delaware North Companies resented proposed restrictions on some money-making forms of recreation (ice skating and raft rentals) it provided in the Valley. Even though the profits from those enterprises were a drop in the bucket of its net receipts, the company lobbied aggressively to retain them, urging its guests to voice their opinions to the NPS. Park managers revised the plan to continue offering them, which prevented economic concerns from derailing the policy-making effort. And a year later, when that concession contract—the most lucrative in the park system—was put up for bid, they chose a different company (Yosemite Hospitality, LLC), in part because its proposal displayed a stronger commitment to implementing the concessionaire actions of the Merced River Plan. Concessionaires may have an oversized influence on NPS policy-making, but the NPS was clearly in control here (U.S. NPS 2014, pp. 6, 9-104–9-108). Positive framing If there was a weak spot in the agency’s efforts to craft a successful plan, it was in its framing of the issue. Other than the tagline on the cover of its draft and final plans—‘‘providing access and protecting resources’’—the agency seemed not to employ a consistent, readily identifiable frame in its public discussions about the plan. Nevertheless, it appears that, as of this writing, the agency succeeded in producing a workable plan for the management of the Merced River corridor.

To summarize NPS efforts at policy change in Yosemite, the agency has not been able to achieve the goal of the 1980 plan. It is questionable whether that goal was attainable to begin with, despite the agency’s own role in crafting it. Rarely has the agency ever succeeded in eliminating an established form of public access, especially motorized access (Yochim 2013). Something as fundamental as automobile access to Yosemite’s star attraction is almost an American birthright, unlikely to ever disappear completely. Recognizing that, agency personnel have instead built more successful coalitions to pursue alternative plans such as the Merced Wild and Scenic River Plan that do limit automobile usage in the Valley, but at high

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levels. Thus, while such alternative plans may protect this remarkable public space, the lofty goal of eliminating automobiles remains unrealized.

Conclusions The National Park Service has always been faced with a challenging mandate of providing use and preservation for our most precious lands. Whenever the agency tries to make or change policies that significantly impact these places, agency leaders face substantial political, economic, and legal challenges. When confronting entrenched policies, those seeking changes need to do a number of things to recruit public support. To succeed requires that they build an effective coalition, frame the changes in positive terms, justify the policy scientifically and economically, maintain consistency with the agency mandate, and get commitment from other institutional actors such as other agencies. The Yellowstone case is illustrative. Those seeking to reintroduce wolves into the ecosystem faced deep-seated objections and hostile environments in Congress as well as state legislatures. But they built a strong, informal coalition that included bureaucrats, advocates, scientists, and journalists. They framed the reintroduction effort as heroic and justified it with scientific characterizations of future trophic cascades. The promise of economic benefits fostered at least some receptivity among many businesses who anticipated higher visitation totals. Change advocates engendered full commitment from relevant agencies and even some receptivity among other institutional actors by reintroducing the wolves as experimental. Ultimately, public support was overwhelming. The Yosemite case did not produce the same outcome. After formulating a strong, specific goal to remove automobiles from the Valley in the 1980 plan, agency personnel were not able to build an effective coalition for change. They were not able to overcome opponents who framed the effort as limiting access. Nor were they able to provide compelling economic and scientific arguments to persuade important constituents such as concessionaires and neighboring communities of the potential benefits of reducing automobiles in the Valley. In recent years, the agency has instead pursued alternative plans, notably the Merced Wild and Scenic River Plan, with better success because, after 30 years of trying, it learned that eliminating automobiles from the Valley is an impossible dream. What of the overall theoretical argument? Are all six conditions essential for change to occur? While the current Merced River case seems to indicate that the NPS can be successful without effective framing, we still argue that employing a consistent framing that portrays the agency’s

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policy proposal positively can greatly aid the agency. Indeed, wolf reintroduction would never have happened without doing so. In the Merced River case, perhaps the issue was too complex to frame succinctly, or perhaps the agency just enjoyed good fortune. In short, to successfully achieve policy changes, the agency does need to create all, or nearly all, of the conditions described above. Without them, its efforts are likely doomed to litigation and stagnation. Finally, how applicable are the theoretical arguments to other national parks, or even to other efforts to change public policies? The NPS is frequently attempting to update or change policies in units all over the country, to mixed degrees of success. We argue that the theoretical framework herein provides a useful means of explaining those outcomes by identifying necessary conditions for success. Though complete discussion is beyond the scope of this work, consider as one prominent example the massive restoration effort in the Everglades. This project continues to face challenges in terms of mixed framing (is it a rescue effort or a costly pork barrel?), high economic costs (impacts on agricultural and urban development), and scientific skepticism about ecological impacts. The result is some progress but also ‘‘increasingly frustrating financial, procedural, and policy constraints impeding project implementation’’ (National Research Council 2014; Grunwald 2007; Lowry 2009, Chap. 4). For the NPS as well as for other public agencies, changing policies is difficult. To do so requires the creation of strong coalitions and favorable conditions for change. Acknowledgments Michael Yochim thanks his former colleagues in Yellowstone and Yosemite for their comments and their work protecting parks in changing times. William Lowry thanks the Property and Environment Research Center for funding his participation in the conference National Park Service at 100 and the comments of conference participants on a draft of this paper.

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