Topics in Cognitive Science 6 (2014) 146–147 Copyright © 2013 Cognitive Science Society, Inc. All rights reserved. ISSN:1756-8757 print / 1756-8765 online DOI: 10.1111/tops.12055
Diversifying the Knowledge Base Michele I. Feist Institute of Cognitive Science, University of Louisiana at Lafayette
As cognitive scientists, we seek to understand the common elements underlying human cognition. Frequently, this understanding is sought via studies of “representative” samples drawn from within a single culture and population, which “presumes a single mental capacity, idealized away from all the ‘noise’ of individual variation or systematic cultural diversity” (Levinson, 2012, p. 397). Beller, Bender, and Medin (2012, p. 346), however, argue that “the issue of cognitive diversity… cannot be satisfied from a passive perspective that is content to equate “people in general” with college students but requires empirical examination… by virtue of being cognitive scientists, many researchers feel that they may justly be interested in generalizable findings only and hence delegate any exploration of diversity to the fringes. But generality must be demonstrated, not assumed.” The possibility of generalizing rests on the assumption that there are sufficient commonalities to support the inference that a phenomenon observed in one subgroup is true of other subgroups. This assumption, in the form of the existence of cognitive and linguistic universals, has recently been the subject of much debate (e.g., Evans & Levinson, 2009; Henrich, Heine, & Norenzayan, 2010). The strength of our generalizations is limited by the strength of universals in cognition and in language: The more characteristics that we find to be true across human societies, the stronger our generalizing inferences regarding new findings can be. But the evidence for universals has been shaky, with proposed abstract universals being challenged by concrete examples of diversity in language and cognition, and few theory-neutral options for assessing these challenges (cf., Evans & Levinson, 2009, and the commentaries thereon). To interpret the diversity and look for potential patterns that would support generalizing inferences, we require researchers with crosscultural and cross-linguistic expertise, that is, anthropologists and linguistic typologists. Research in linguistic typology suggests that the issues surrounding universals may be more subtle than the question of whether there are specific characteristics shared by all Correspondence should be sent to Michele I. Feist, The Institute of Cognitive Science, PO Drawer 43772, University of Louisiana, Lafayette, LA 70504-3772. E-mail: [email protected]
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languages. While evidence regarding unrestricted absolute universals suggests that they may be “few and unprofound” (Evans & Levinson, 2009, p. 429), there is growing evidence for common structure underlying and constraining cross-linguistic variation (Croft, 2010; Feist, 2008; Levinson, Meira, & The Language and Cognition Group, 2003). Echoing results from anthropology which suggest “a distinction between categories of universals…and their varied content” (Norenzayan & Heine, 2005, p. 764), Feist (2008) found that the variation in naming patterns across spatial terms drawn from 24 languages could be accommodated by a two-dimensional similarity space defined by geometric aspects of the scenes, such as the relative vertical positions of the entities, and qualitative physical aspects of the scenes, such as location control. She argued that the dimensions defining the space serve to constrain variation in this domain. This finding invites predictions about the dimensions humans attend to in parsing spatial scenes, both linguistically and nonlinguistically, thus suggesting a direction along which cross-cultural generalizations may be valid. To understand when and how our findings may generalize across cultures, we need a clearer understanding of the nature of diversity, variation, and constraints on variation. It is just this type of understanding that we should expect the fields of anthropology and linguistic typology to contribute. References Beller, S., Bender, A., & Medin, D. L. (2012). Should anthropology be part of cognitive science? Topics in Cognitive Science, 4 (3), 342–353. Croft, W. (2010). Relativity, linguistic variation and language universals. CogniTextes, 4. Available at: http:// cognitextes.revues.org/303 Evans, N., & Levinson, S. C. (2009). The myth of language universals: Language diversity and its importance for cognitive science. Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 32, 429–492. Feist, M. I. (2008). Space between languages. Cognitive Science, 32(7), 1177–1199. Henrich, J., Heine, S. J., & Norenzayan, A. (2010). The weirdest people in the world? Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 33, 61–135. Levinson, S. C. (2012). The original sin of cognitive science. Topics in Cognitive Science, 4(3), 396–403. Levinson, S. C., & Meira, S. & The Language and Cognition Group (2003). “Natural concepts” in the spatial topological domain—adpositional meanings in crosslinguistic perspective: An exercise in semantic typology. Language, 79(3), 485–516. Norenzayan, A., & Heine, S. J. (2005). Psychological universals: What are they and how can we know? Psychological Bulletin, 131(5), 763–784.
Diversifying the Knowledge Base Michele I. Feist Institute of Cognitive Science, University of Louisiana at Lafayette
As cognitive scientists, we seek to understand the common elements underlying human cognition. Frequently, this understanding is sought via studies of “representative” samples drawn from within a single culture and population, which “presumes a single mental capacity, idealized away from all the ‘noise’ of individual variation or systematic cultural diversity” (Levinson, 2012, p. 397). Beller, Bender, and Medin (2012, p. 346), however, argue that “the issue of cognitive diversity… cannot be satisfied from a passive perspective that is content to equate “people in general” with college students but requires empirical examination… by virtue of being cognitive scientists, many researchers feel that they may justly be interested in generalizable findings only and hence delegate any exploration of diversity to the fringes. But generality must be demonstrated, not assumed.” The possibility of generalizing rests on the assumption that there are sufficient commonalities to support the inference that a phenomenon observed in one subgroup is true of other subgroups. This assumption, in the form of the existence of cognitive and linguistic universals, has recently been the subject of much debate (e.g., Evans & Levinson, 2009; Henrich, Heine, & Norenzayan, 2010). The strength of our generalizations is limited by the strength of universals in cognition and in language: The more characteristics that we find to be true across human societies, the stronger our generalizing inferences regarding new findings can be. But the evidence for universals has been shaky, with proposed abstract universals being challenged by concrete examples of diversity in language and cognition, and few theory-neutral options for assessing these challenges (cf., Evans & Levinson, 2009, and the commentaries thereon). To interpret the diversity and look for potential patterns that would support generalizing inferences, we require researchers with crosscultural and cross-linguistic expertise, that is, anthropologists and linguistic typologists. Research in linguistic typology suggests that the issues surrounding universals may be more subtle than the question of whether there are specific characteristics shared by all Correspondence should be sent to Michele I. Feist, The Institute of Cognitive Science, PO Drawer 43772, University of Louisiana, Lafayette, LA 70504-3772. E-mail: [email protected]
M. I. Feist / Topics in Cognitive Science 6 (2014)
147
languages. While evidence regarding unrestricted absolute universals suggests that they may be “few and unprofound” (Evans & Levinson, 2009, p. 429), there is growing evidence for common structure underlying and constraining cross-linguistic variation (Croft, 2010; Feist, 2008; Levinson, Meira, & The Language and Cognition Group, 2003). Echoing results from anthropology which suggest “a distinction between categories of universals…and their varied content” (Norenzayan & Heine, 2005, p. 764), Feist (2008) found that the variation in naming patterns across spatial terms drawn from 24 languages could be accommodated by a two-dimensional similarity space defined by geometric aspects of the scenes, such as the relative vertical positions of the entities, and qualitative physical aspects of the scenes, such as location control. She argued that the dimensions defining the space serve to constrain variation in this domain. This finding invites predictions about the dimensions humans attend to in parsing spatial scenes, both linguistically and nonlinguistically, thus suggesting a direction along which cross-cultural generalizations may be valid. To understand when and how our findings may generalize across cultures, we need a clearer understanding of the nature of diversity, variation, and constraints on variation. It is just this type of understanding that we should expect the fields of anthropology and linguistic typology to contribute. References Beller, S., Bender, A., & Medin, D. L. (2012). Should anthropology be part of cognitive science? Topics in Cognitive Science, 4 (3), 342–353. Croft, W. (2010). Relativity, linguistic variation and language universals. CogniTextes, 4. Available at: http:// cognitextes.revues.org/303 Evans, N., & Levinson, S. C. (2009). The myth of language universals: Language diversity and its importance for cognitive science. Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 32, 429–492. Feist, M. I. (2008). Space between languages. Cognitive Science, 32(7), 1177–1199. Henrich, J., Heine, S. J., & Norenzayan, A. (2010). The weirdest people in the world? Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 33, 61–135. Levinson, S. C. (2012). The original sin of cognitive science. Topics in Cognitive Science, 4(3), 396–403. Levinson, S. C., & Meira, S. & The Language and Cognition Group (2003). “Natural concepts” in the spatial topological domain—adpositional meanings in crosslinguistic perspective: An exercise in semantic typology. Language, 79(3), 485–516. Norenzayan, A., & Heine, S. J. (2005). Psychological universals: What are they and how can we know? Psychological Bulletin, 131(5), 763–784.
