This article was downloaded by: [134.117.10.200] On: 05 May 2015, At: 01:00 Publisher: Routledge Informa Ltd Registered in England and Wales Registered Number: 1072954 Registered office: Mortimer House, 37-41 Mortimer Street, London W1T 3JH, UK
Memory Publication details, including instructions for authors and subscription information: http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/pmem20
False memories for dissonance inducing events a
b
Dario N. Rodriguez & Deryn Strange a
Department of Psychology, University of Dayton, Dayton, OH, USA
b
Department of Psychology, John Jay College of Criminal Justice, City University of New York, New York, NY, USA Published online: 07 Feb 2014.
Click for updates To cite this article: Dario N. Rodriguez & Deryn Strange (2015) False memories for dissonance inducing events, Memory, 23:2, 203-212, DOI: 10.1080/09658211.2014.881501 To link to this article: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/09658211.2014.881501
PLEASE SCROLL DOWN FOR ARTICLE Taylor & Francis makes every effort to ensure the accuracy of all the information (the “Content”) contained in the publications on our platform. However, Taylor & Francis, our agents, and our licensors make no representations or warranties whatsoever as to the accuracy, completeness, or suitability for any purpose of the Content. Any opinions and views expressed in this publication are the opinions and views of the authors, and are not the views of or endorsed by Taylor & Francis. The accuracy of the Content should not be relied upon and should be independently verified with primary sources of information. Taylor and Francis shall not be liable for any losses, actions, claims, proceedings, demands, costs, expenses, damages, and other liabilities whatsoever or howsoever caused arising directly or indirectly in connection with, in relation to or arising out of the use of the Content. This article may be used for research, teaching, and private study purposes. Any substantial or systematic reproduction, redistribution, reselling, loan, sub-licensing, systematic supply, or distribution in any form to anyone is expressly forbidden. Terms & Conditions of access and use can be found at http://www.tandfonline.com/page/terms-and-conditions
Memory, 2015 Vol. 23, No. 2, 203–212, http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/09658211.2014.881501
False memories for dissonance inducing events Dario N. Rodriguez1 and Deryn Strange2 1
Department of Psychology, University of Dayton, Dayton, OH, USA Department of Psychology, John Jay College of Criminal Justice, City University of New York, New York, NY, USA 2
Downloaded by [134.117.10.200] at 01:01 05 May 2015
(Received 2 November 2013; accepted 6 January 2014)
Memories serve as a “database” of the self and people often produce distorted memories that support their self-concepts. One, surprisingly untested, possibility is that cognitive dissonance may be one mechanism by which people may misremember their past. We tested this hypothesis using an inducedcompliance paradigm: participants either chose or were forced to write a counterattitudinal essay supporting a tuition increase and were afforded the opportunity to reduce dissonance via attitude shift or denial of responsibility. They then reported their memories for the experimental instructions and their initial attitudes (assessed two days prior to the laboratory session). Participants who chose to write the essay exhibited the predicted attitude-shift effect, and were more likely to misremember their initial attitudes and the experimental instruction than those who were forced to write the essay. Overall, our results provide evidence that cognitive dissonance may yield memory distortion, filling a significant gap in the motivated cognition and memory literatures.
Keywords: Cognitive dissonance; False memories; Attitudes; Consistency.
It is axiomatic among cognitive researchers that “memory is not like a tape-recorder”. Rather, it is a reconstructive process wherein information is pieced together to form an account of a past event (Roediger & Karpicke, 2005). Often information is collated in a manner that is consistent with a person’s pre-existing beliefs (Davis & Loftus, 2009) and, in the (likely) event of missing information within the memory, people may make inferences on the basis of expectations and beliefs to “fill in the gaps”, yielding memory errors (Hirt, 1990). Cognitive dissonance is one mechanism that has been proposed to account for a wide range of distorted or false beliefs, from misremembering prior attitudes (Goethals & Reckman, 1973; Scoboria et al., 2013) to false memories of abuse and alien abduction (de Rivera, 1997; Neuman &
Baumeister, 1996). To our knowledge, however, there has been no direct empirical test of the relationship between the two phenomena; that was the purpose of our study.
DISSONANCE AROUSAL AND REDUCTION In his theory of cognitive dissonance, Festinger (1957) proposed that people strive for cognitive consistency. If, however, a person holds two or more elements of knowledge (or cognitions) that are relevant to each other but inconsistent (e.g., an attitude and counterattitudinal behaviour), he or she may experience a state of aversive arousal called “dissonance”, which motivates a person to restore consonance among the cognitions. One
Address correspondence to: Dario N. Rodriguez, Department of Psychology, University of Dayton, 300 College Park, Dayton, OH 45469, USA. E-mail: [email protected] We would like to thank Nicholas Bonomo and Marita Salwierz for their help in data collection.
© 2014 Taylor & Francis
Downloaded by [134.117.10.200] at 01:01 05 May 2015
204
RODRIGUEZ AND STRANGE
method by which one can accomplish this goal is to change one’s behaviour so that it matches one’s attitudes (Dickerson, Thibodeau, Aronson, & Miller, 2006). However, social factors often make behaviour change difficult, impossible or undesirable. In such situations, people may rely on alternative strategies to reduce dissonance. When made aware that they have chosen to engage in a counterattitudinal behaviour, people often shift their attitudes1 to match their behaviour (Festinger & Carlsmith, 1959). For example, undergraduates who experience dissonance from choosing to write an essay supporting a tuition increase in an induced-compliance paradigm (a counterattitudinal behaviour) often shift their attitudes to be more favourable towards a tuition increase than those who are forced to write the same essay (and do not experience dissonance: E. Harmon-Jones, Gerdjikov, & Harmon-Jones, 2008). Similarly, those who experience dissonance from suffering to obtain an underwhelming reward routinely shift their attitudes to be more favourable towards that reward than those who did not suffer (and did not experience dissonance: Aronson & Mills, 1959). Some may attempt to minimise the importance of their inconsistency in light of their other redeeming qualities (Joule & Martinie, 2008; Simon, Greenberg, & Brehm, 1995; Steele & Liu, 1983), whereas others attempt to deny responsibility for their counterattitudinal behaviour (Gosling, Denizeau, & Oberlé, 2006). Finally, people may “add consonant cognitions” (or rationalise) regarding their behaviour, effectively restoring a more favourable ratio of consonant to dissonant cognitions (Brehm, 1956). People often have a wide range of dissonance-reducing modes at their disposal, but frequently employ the one made available to them first, to the exclusion of others (Gosling et al., 2006; Götz-Marchand, Götz, & Irle, 1974). Given the myriad situations in which dissonance processes are found, recent work has focused on understanding the origins of cognitive dissonance and its relations to other aspects of social cognition and behaviour regulation (Gawronski, 2012; E. Harmon-Jones, Amodio, & HarmonJones, 2009; Proulx, Inzlicht, & Harmon-Jones, 2012). Overall, these approaches have regarded 1 A full discussion of attitude formation is beyond the scope of this paper. However, interested readers may wish to consult Bodenhausen and Gawronski (2013) and Cunningham and Zelazo (2007) for perspectives on how and when attitudes are formed.
dissonance arousal and reduction (or inconsistency compensation, generally) as fundamental, evolutionarily adaptive processes that are related to a wide range of social and cognitive judgments (e.g., impression formation, prejudice). We wondered whether they also might underlie memory distortion.
COGNITIVE CONSISTENCY AND MEMORY DISTORTION Psychologists have long acknowledged that people might alter, distort or even fabricate memories to support their notions of a consistent self (Bartlett, 1932; James, 1890/1950). Although most classic models of memory do not include a motivational component (e.g., Jacoby, 1991; Mandler, 1980; Tulving, 1983), there have been some attempts to integrate the processes underlying autobiographical memory with the principles of motivated cognition (e.g., Conway, 2005; Hirt, 1990; Ross, 1989; Sanitioso, Kunda, & Fong, 1990). These models regard the drive for consistency as a fundamental component of memory construction that can result in memory errors. Specifically, they posit that people may misremember prior events and attitudes in ways that promote cognitive consistency in the present. These drives for consistency in memory construction appear tantamount to the drive for cognitive consistency posited in Festinger’s (1957) cognitive dissonance theory. However, no study has provided a direct test of this relationship. Numerous studies have examined memory distortion as the product of related attitude-change mechanisms (e.g., persuasion: McIntyre, Lord, Lewis, & Frye, 2004), showing that people (mis) remember information as consistent with their current attitudes, even if their attitudes have been experimentally influenced (Levine, 1997; McFarland & Ross, 1987; Ross, McFarland, & Fletcher, 1981). Some have used cognitive dissonance to explain these patterns of memory distortion (e.g., Goethals & Reckman, 1973; Scheier & Carver, 1980). However, methodological issues preclude inferences regarding whether true memory distortion actually occurred, or whether dissonance is the mechanism responsible for the observed memory distortion. For example, Goethals and Reckman (1973) found that participants misremembered their prior attitudes in accordance with currently held attitudes, but they manipulated participants’ attitudes via minority influence rather than an induced-compliance method, leaving open the
Downloaded by [134.117.10.200] at 01:01 05 May 2015
DISSONANCE AND FALSE MEMORIES
possibility that attitudes were shifted not by dissonance, but by persuasion. Using an induced-compliance paradigm, Scheier and Carver (1980) found that participants who chose to write a counterattitudinal essay evaluated their behaviour (strength of the arguments used) differently from those who were forced to write an essay. However, they did not actually assess participants’ prior attitudes, nor did they assess participants’ actual memories for how they behaved or their prior attitudes. Similarly, the choice-supportive bias (in which people may misremember traits of chosen items more favourably than rejected items) is often interpreted in terms of cognitive dissonance (e.g., Benney & Henkel, 2006), though these studies lack the manipulation of decision difficulty that is critical to identifying dissonance as the operating mech‐ anism (see Brehm, 1956; E. Harmon-Jones & Harmon-Jones, 2007). Taken together, the idea that dissonance might affect memory distortion is plausible; indeed, it is often treated as established (e.g., Stice, 1992). However, the relationship has not actually been demonstrated empirically.
205
instruction). Participants who did not experience dissonance, however, were not expected to experience memory distortion.
METHOD Participants We recruited 144 undergraduates and randomly assigned them to a 2 (Choice: Low vs. High) × 2 (Order: Attitude first vs. Responsibility first) between-subjects design. Fifteen participants failed to appear for the laboratory session and eight across the four conditions were eliminated because they refused to write the counterattitudinal essay. Thus our analyses focus on 121 participants (77.7% female) who were 18–57 years of age (M = 20.51, SD = 5.51). Sample size (N = 120) was determined via power analysis based on effect sizes reported in recent research employing similar induced-compliance paradigms (Gosling et al., 2006; E. Harmon-Jones et al., 2008), a power estimate of .80, and α = .05.
THE PRESENT STUDY Materials and procedure The primary goal of the present study was to empirically establish the link between cognitive dissonance and memory distortion. In a traditional induced-compliance paradigm, undergraduate participants either chose or were forced to write a counterattitudinal essay (i.e., supporting a tuition increase). They were then afforded the opportunity to reduce dissonance via attitude change or denial of responsibility by way of a question-order manipulation embedded in a post-essay survey. Finally, we tested participants’ memories for their experimental instructions and their initial attitudes (assessed in an online survey two days before the laboratory session). We predicted that participants who chose to write the counterattitudinal essay would experience cognitive dissonance and attempt to reduce it via the mode made available to them first, whereas those forced to write the essay would not experience dissonance. Additionally, we predicted that mode of dissonance reduction would predict the nature of participants’ memory distortion, such that those who reduced dissonance via attitude shift would report distorted memories for previous attitudes, whereas those who reduced dissonance via denial of responsibility would report distorted memories for their experimental instructions (i.e., misremember receiving an “absolving”
Participants completed an online questionnaire regarding their attitudes towards several school policies two days before the experimental session (see Table 1). Embedded in this questionnaire were three target items assessing participants’ attitudes towards a tuition increase (i.e., the Raise, Benefit and Strain items). Participants rated their agreement with each statement on 11-point Likerttype scales (1 = strongly disagree, 11 = strongly agree). Two days later, participants came to the laboratory in small groups. After obtaining consent, the experimenter (blind to the study’s hypotheses) handed participants an instruction sheet stating that a (fake) college committee was interested in students’ opinions regarding a potential 10% increase in tuition for the next school year. The experimenter explained that the committee was having students who write persuasive essays containing strong and forceful arguments either for or against the tuition increase. After this information came the Choice manipulation. In the Low choice condition, the instructions said that the participant had been randomly assigned to write an essay in favour of the tuition increase. In the High choice condition, the instructions said that the committee
206
RODRIGUEZ AND STRANGE
Downloaded by [134.117.10.200] at 01:01 05 May 2015
TABLE 1 Dependent measures School-related items Students should be required to register for 12 or more credit hours to be considered full time. Students’ lab/technology fees are determined fairly. I benefit from the lab/technology fees. Campus security is effective at minimising crime at [school]. The new building is a worthwhile investment. The new building will benefit me as a [school] student. Tuition should be raised by 10% for the upcoming school year.* A 10% increase in tuition would ultimately benefit me as a [school] student.* A 10% increase in tuition places too much strain on me as a [school] student.*a [School’s] disciplinary procedures for academic dishonesty are fair. Students should be allowed to take reference books outside of the library. Items sold in the cafeteria are priced fairly. [School] facilities are kept clean. Overall, I am satisfied with my experience as a [school] student. Responsibility items I feel I had the choice to write arguments in favour of a 10% increase in tuition. I feel personally responsible for what I have written. I feel personally responsible for having agreed to participate in this study. Forced-choice memory items Options What instructions were you given regarding The instructions said I was randomly assigned to write this type of essay. which essay you wrote? The instructions said I was free to choose to write this type of essay. What did the statement you signed say The statement said I was randomly assigned to write this type of essay. regarding the essay you wrote? The statement said I voluntarily chose to write this type of essay. Note: Target tuition items are marked with a *. School-related items and Responsibility items were answered on an 11-point Likert-type scale (1 = strongly disagree, 11 = strongly agree). a Reverse-scored.
had finished collecting essays opposing the tuition increase and was now collecting essays supporting the tuition increase. However, writing an essay supporting a tuition increase was completely voluntary. The experimenter provided participants with a piece of paper and an envelope in which to place their essays when finished. Participants read their instruction sheet, signed a statement reinforcing the Choice manipulation at the bottom of the instructions, wrote their essays and sealed them in their envelopes. Participants were given 10 minutes to write their essays. Experimenters then gave participants a postessay questionnaire containing the Order manipulation. The questionnaire contained six 11-point Likert-type items affording the two modes of dissonance reduction (i.e., attitude change and denial of responsibility); participants were instructed to rate their true attitudes on these items. In the Attitude first condition, participants first rated their agreement with the three target tuition items they completed two days prior, followed by three items concerning their feelings of personal responsibility for their actions (i.e., Argument, Written and Participate: see Table 1). In the Responsibility first condition, the three
responsibility items appeared before the three attitude items. These items were adapted from those used by Gosling et al. (2006) and E. Harmon-Jones et al. (2008). The experimenter then handed participants our memory questionnaire. The first 14 items of this questionnaire were exactly the same as the prestudy online questionnaire—participants were instructed to think back to the initial online survey, and answer the items as they did at that time. The remainder of the questionnaire included two forced-choice items assessing participants’ memory for the instruction they received and the statement they signed (i.e., Instruction and Statement: see Table 1). The experimenter then probed for suspicion, distributed a written debriefing and dismissed the participants. We have reported all manipulations and dependent measures of the experiment.
RESULTS Preparation of attitude data Participants’ initial attitudes towards a tuition increase were comparably unfavourable across
DISSONANCE AND FALSE MEMORIES
207
TABLE 2 Hierarchical regression analyses for the prediction of attitude-shift and memory-shift indices Raise (A) Predictor Choice manipulation Order manipulation Choice × Order (R2 change)
β
t
.240 .078 −.083 (.070*)
2.691 .872 −.928
Benefit (A) p .008 .385 .355
β
t
p
β
t
p
.322 .009 .027 (.105*)
3.682 .098 .305
Memory Publication details, including instructions for authors and subscription information: http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/pmem20
False memories for dissonance inducing events a
b
Dario N. Rodriguez & Deryn Strange a
Department of Psychology, University of Dayton, Dayton, OH, USA
b
Department of Psychology, John Jay College of Criminal Justice, City University of New York, New York, NY, USA Published online: 07 Feb 2014.
Click for updates To cite this article: Dario N. Rodriguez & Deryn Strange (2015) False memories for dissonance inducing events, Memory, 23:2, 203-212, DOI: 10.1080/09658211.2014.881501 To link to this article: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/09658211.2014.881501
PLEASE SCROLL DOWN FOR ARTICLE Taylor & Francis makes every effort to ensure the accuracy of all the information (the “Content”) contained in the publications on our platform. However, Taylor & Francis, our agents, and our licensors make no representations or warranties whatsoever as to the accuracy, completeness, or suitability for any purpose of the Content. Any opinions and views expressed in this publication are the opinions and views of the authors, and are not the views of or endorsed by Taylor & Francis. The accuracy of the Content should not be relied upon and should be independently verified with primary sources of information. Taylor and Francis shall not be liable for any losses, actions, claims, proceedings, demands, costs, expenses, damages, and other liabilities whatsoever or howsoever caused arising directly or indirectly in connection with, in relation to or arising out of the use of the Content. This article may be used for research, teaching, and private study purposes. Any substantial or systematic reproduction, redistribution, reselling, loan, sub-licensing, systematic supply, or distribution in any form to anyone is expressly forbidden. Terms & Conditions of access and use can be found at http://www.tandfonline.com/page/terms-and-conditions
Memory, 2015 Vol. 23, No. 2, 203–212, http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/09658211.2014.881501
False memories for dissonance inducing events Dario N. Rodriguez1 and Deryn Strange2 1
Department of Psychology, University of Dayton, Dayton, OH, USA Department of Psychology, John Jay College of Criminal Justice, City University of New York, New York, NY, USA 2
Downloaded by [134.117.10.200] at 01:01 05 May 2015
(Received 2 November 2013; accepted 6 January 2014)
Memories serve as a “database” of the self and people often produce distorted memories that support their self-concepts. One, surprisingly untested, possibility is that cognitive dissonance may be one mechanism by which people may misremember their past. We tested this hypothesis using an inducedcompliance paradigm: participants either chose or were forced to write a counterattitudinal essay supporting a tuition increase and were afforded the opportunity to reduce dissonance via attitude shift or denial of responsibility. They then reported their memories for the experimental instructions and their initial attitudes (assessed two days prior to the laboratory session). Participants who chose to write the essay exhibited the predicted attitude-shift effect, and were more likely to misremember their initial attitudes and the experimental instruction than those who were forced to write the essay. Overall, our results provide evidence that cognitive dissonance may yield memory distortion, filling a significant gap in the motivated cognition and memory literatures.
Keywords: Cognitive dissonance; False memories; Attitudes; Consistency.
It is axiomatic among cognitive researchers that “memory is not like a tape-recorder”. Rather, it is a reconstructive process wherein information is pieced together to form an account of a past event (Roediger & Karpicke, 2005). Often information is collated in a manner that is consistent with a person’s pre-existing beliefs (Davis & Loftus, 2009) and, in the (likely) event of missing information within the memory, people may make inferences on the basis of expectations and beliefs to “fill in the gaps”, yielding memory errors (Hirt, 1990). Cognitive dissonance is one mechanism that has been proposed to account for a wide range of distorted or false beliefs, from misremembering prior attitudes (Goethals & Reckman, 1973; Scoboria et al., 2013) to false memories of abuse and alien abduction (de Rivera, 1997; Neuman &
Baumeister, 1996). To our knowledge, however, there has been no direct empirical test of the relationship between the two phenomena; that was the purpose of our study.
DISSONANCE AROUSAL AND REDUCTION In his theory of cognitive dissonance, Festinger (1957) proposed that people strive for cognitive consistency. If, however, a person holds two or more elements of knowledge (or cognitions) that are relevant to each other but inconsistent (e.g., an attitude and counterattitudinal behaviour), he or she may experience a state of aversive arousal called “dissonance”, which motivates a person to restore consonance among the cognitions. One
Address correspondence to: Dario N. Rodriguez, Department of Psychology, University of Dayton, 300 College Park, Dayton, OH 45469, USA. E-mail: [email protected] We would like to thank Nicholas Bonomo and Marita Salwierz for their help in data collection.
© 2014 Taylor & Francis
Downloaded by [134.117.10.200] at 01:01 05 May 2015
204
RODRIGUEZ AND STRANGE
method by which one can accomplish this goal is to change one’s behaviour so that it matches one’s attitudes (Dickerson, Thibodeau, Aronson, & Miller, 2006). However, social factors often make behaviour change difficult, impossible or undesirable. In such situations, people may rely on alternative strategies to reduce dissonance. When made aware that they have chosen to engage in a counterattitudinal behaviour, people often shift their attitudes1 to match their behaviour (Festinger & Carlsmith, 1959). For example, undergraduates who experience dissonance from choosing to write an essay supporting a tuition increase in an induced-compliance paradigm (a counterattitudinal behaviour) often shift their attitudes to be more favourable towards a tuition increase than those who are forced to write the same essay (and do not experience dissonance: E. Harmon-Jones, Gerdjikov, & Harmon-Jones, 2008). Similarly, those who experience dissonance from suffering to obtain an underwhelming reward routinely shift their attitudes to be more favourable towards that reward than those who did not suffer (and did not experience dissonance: Aronson & Mills, 1959). Some may attempt to minimise the importance of their inconsistency in light of their other redeeming qualities (Joule & Martinie, 2008; Simon, Greenberg, & Brehm, 1995; Steele & Liu, 1983), whereas others attempt to deny responsibility for their counterattitudinal behaviour (Gosling, Denizeau, & Oberlé, 2006). Finally, people may “add consonant cognitions” (or rationalise) regarding their behaviour, effectively restoring a more favourable ratio of consonant to dissonant cognitions (Brehm, 1956). People often have a wide range of dissonance-reducing modes at their disposal, but frequently employ the one made available to them first, to the exclusion of others (Gosling et al., 2006; Götz-Marchand, Götz, & Irle, 1974). Given the myriad situations in which dissonance processes are found, recent work has focused on understanding the origins of cognitive dissonance and its relations to other aspects of social cognition and behaviour regulation (Gawronski, 2012; E. Harmon-Jones, Amodio, & HarmonJones, 2009; Proulx, Inzlicht, & Harmon-Jones, 2012). Overall, these approaches have regarded 1 A full discussion of attitude formation is beyond the scope of this paper. However, interested readers may wish to consult Bodenhausen and Gawronski (2013) and Cunningham and Zelazo (2007) for perspectives on how and when attitudes are formed.
dissonance arousal and reduction (or inconsistency compensation, generally) as fundamental, evolutionarily adaptive processes that are related to a wide range of social and cognitive judgments (e.g., impression formation, prejudice). We wondered whether they also might underlie memory distortion.
COGNITIVE CONSISTENCY AND MEMORY DISTORTION Psychologists have long acknowledged that people might alter, distort or even fabricate memories to support their notions of a consistent self (Bartlett, 1932; James, 1890/1950). Although most classic models of memory do not include a motivational component (e.g., Jacoby, 1991; Mandler, 1980; Tulving, 1983), there have been some attempts to integrate the processes underlying autobiographical memory with the principles of motivated cognition (e.g., Conway, 2005; Hirt, 1990; Ross, 1989; Sanitioso, Kunda, & Fong, 1990). These models regard the drive for consistency as a fundamental component of memory construction that can result in memory errors. Specifically, they posit that people may misremember prior events and attitudes in ways that promote cognitive consistency in the present. These drives for consistency in memory construction appear tantamount to the drive for cognitive consistency posited in Festinger’s (1957) cognitive dissonance theory. However, no study has provided a direct test of this relationship. Numerous studies have examined memory distortion as the product of related attitude-change mechanisms (e.g., persuasion: McIntyre, Lord, Lewis, & Frye, 2004), showing that people (mis) remember information as consistent with their current attitudes, even if their attitudes have been experimentally influenced (Levine, 1997; McFarland & Ross, 1987; Ross, McFarland, & Fletcher, 1981). Some have used cognitive dissonance to explain these patterns of memory distortion (e.g., Goethals & Reckman, 1973; Scheier & Carver, 1980). However, methodological issues preclude inferences regarding whether true memory distortion actually occurred, or whether dissonance is the mechanism responsible for the observed memory distortion. For example, Goethals and Reckman (1973) found that participants misremembered their prior attitudes in accordance with currently held attitudes, but they manipulated participants’ attitudes via minority influence rather than an induced-compliance method, leaving open the
Downloaded by [134.117.10.200] at 01:01 05 May 2015
DISSONANCE AND FALSE MEMORIES
possibility that attitudes were shifted not by dissonance, but by persuasion. Using an induced-compliance paradigm, Scheier and Carver (1980) found that participants who chose to write a counterattitudinal essay evaluated their behaviour (strength of the arguments used) differently from those who were forced to write an essay. However, they did not actually assess participants’ prior attitudes, nor did they assess participants’ actual memories for how they behaved or their prior attitudes. Similarly, the choice-supportive bias (in which people may misremember traits of chosen items more favourably than rejected items) is often interpreted in terms of cognitive dissonance (e.g., Benney & Henkel, 2006), though these studies lack the manipulation of decision difficulty that is critical to identifying dissonance as the operating mech‐ anism (see Brehm, 1956; E. Harmon-Jones & Harmon-Jones, 2007). Taken together, the idea that dissonance might affect memory distortion is plausible; indeed, it is often treated as established (e.g., Stice, 1992). However, the relationship has not actually been demonstrated empirically.
205
instruction). Participants who did not experience dissonance, however, were not expected to experience memory distortion.
METHOD Participants We recruited 144 undergraduates and randomly assigned them to a 2 (Choice: Low vs. High) × 2 (Order: Attitude first vs. Responsibility first) between-subjects design. Fifteen participants failed to appear for the laboratory session and eight across the four conditions were eliminated because they refused to write the counterattitudinal essay. Thus our analyses focus on 121 participants (77.7% female) who were 18–57 years of age (M = 20.51, SD = 5.51). Sample size (N = 120) was determined via power analysis based on effect sizes reported in recent research employing similar induced-compliance paradigms (Gosling et al., 2006; E. Harmon-Jones et al., 2008), a power estimate of .80, and α = .05.
THE PRESENT STUDY Materials and procedure The primary goal of the present study was to empirically establish the link between cognitive dissonance and memory distortion. In a traditional induced-compliance paradigm, undergraduate participants either chose or were forced to write a counterattitudinal essay (i.e., supporting a tuition increase). They were then afforded the opportunity to reduce dissonance via attitude change or denial of responsibility by way of a question-order manipulation embedded in a post-essay survey. Finally, we tested participants’ memories for their experimental instructions and their initial attitudes (assessed in an online survey two days before the laboratory session). We predicted that participants who chose to write the counterattitudinal essay would experience cognitive dissonance and attempt to reduce it via the mode made available to them first, whereas those forced to write the essay would not experience dissonance. Additionally, we predicted that mode of dissonance reduction would predict the nature of participants’ memory distortion, such that those who reduced dissonance via attitude shift would report distorted memories for previous attitudes, whereas those who reduced dissonance via denial of responsibility would report distorted memories for their experimental instructions (i.e., misremember receiving an “absolving”
Participants completed an online questionnaire regarding their attitudes towards several school policies two days before the experimental session (see Table 1). Embedded in this questionnaire were three target items assessing participants’ attitudes towards a tuition increase (i.e., the Raise, Benefit and Strain items). Participants rated their agreement with each statement on 11-point Likerttype scales (1 = strongly disagree, 11 = strongly agree). Two days later, participants came to the laboratory in small groups. After obtaining consent, the experimenter (blind to the study’s hypotheses) handed participants an instruction sheet stating that a (fake) college committee was interested in students’ opinions regarding a potential 10% increase in tuition for the next school year. The experimenter explained that the committee was having students who write persuasive essays containing strong and forceful arguments either for or against the tuition increase. After this information came the Choice manipulation. In the Low choice condition, the instructions said that the participant had been randomly assigned to write an essay in favour of the tuition increase. In the High choice condition, the instructions said that the committee
206
RODRIGUEZ AND STRANGE
Downloaded by [134.117.10.200] at 01:01 05 May 2015
TABLE 1 Dependent measures School-related items Students should be required to register for 12 or more credit hours to be considered full time. Students’ lab/technology fees are determined fairly. I benefit from the lab/technology fees. Campus security is effective at minimising crime at [school]. The new building is a worthwhile investment. The new building will benefit me as a [school] student. Tuition should be raised by 10% for the upcoming school year.* A 10% increase in tuition would ultimately benefit me as a [school] student.* A 10% increase in tuition places too much strain on me as a [school] student.*a [School’s] disciplinary procedures for academic dishonesty are fair. Students should be allowed to take reference books outside of the library. Items sold in the cafeteria are priced fairly. [School] facilities are kept clean. Overall, I am satisfied with my experience as a [school] student. Responsibility items I feel I had the choice to write arguments in favour of a 10% increase in tuition. I feel personally responsible for what I have written. I feel personally responsible for having agreed to participate in this study. Forced-choice memory items Options What instructions were you given regarding The instructions said I was randomly assigned to write this type of essay. which essay you wrote? The instructions said I was free to choose to write this type of essay. What did the statement you signed say The statement said I was randomly assigned to write this type of essay. regarding the essay you wrote? The statement said I voluntarily chose to write this type of essay. Note: Target tuition items are marked with a *. School-related items and Responsibility items were answered on an 11-point Likert-type scale (1 = strongly disagree, 11 = strongly agree). a Reverse-scored.
had finished collecting essays opposing the tuition increase and was now collecting essays supporting the tuition increase. However, writing an essay supporting a tuition increase was completely voluntary. The experimenter provided participants with a piece of paper and an envelope in which to place their essays when finished. Participants read their instruction sheet, signed a statement reinforcing the Choice manipulation at the bottom of the instructions, wrote their essays and sealed them in their envelopes. Participants were given 10 minutes to write their essays. Experimenters then gave participants a postessay questionnaire containing the Order manipulation. The questionnaire contained six 11-point Likert-type items affording the two modes of dissonance reduction (i.e., attitude change and denial of responsibility); participants were instructed to rate their true attitudes on these items. In the Attitude first condition, participants first rated their agreement with the three target tuition items they completed two days prior, followed by three items concerning their feelings of personal responsibility for their actions (i.e., Argument, Written and Participate: see Table 1). In the Responsibility first condition, the three
responsibility items appeared before the three attitude items. These items were adapted from those used by Gosling et al. (2006) and E. Harmon-Jones et al. (2008). The experimenter then handed participants our memory questionnaire. The first 14 items of this questionnaire were exactly the same as the prestudy online questionnaire—participants were instructed to think back to the initial online survey, and answer the items as they did at that time. The remainder of the questionnaire included two forced-choice items assessing participants’ memory for the instruction they received and the statement they signed (i.e., Instruction and Statement: see Table 1). The experimenter then probed for suspicion, distributed a written debriefing and dismissed the participants. We have reported all manipulations and dependent measures of the experiment.
RESULTS Preparation of attitude data Participants’ initial attitudes towards a tuition increase were comparably unfavourable across
DISSONANCE AND FALSE MEMORIES
207
TABLE 2 Hierarchical regression analyses for the prediction of attitude-shift and memory-shift indices Raise (A) Predictor Choice manipulation Order manipulation Choice × Order (R2 change)
β
t
.240 .078 −.083 (.070*)
2.691 .872 −.928
Benefit (A) p .008 .385 .355
β
t
p
β
t
p
.322 .009 .027 (.105*)
3.682 .098 .305
