Idioms and mental imagery: the metaphorical motivation for idiomatic meaning.

Cognition, 3ei(1990) 35-68

san

orical motivation

F?AYMOND W. GIBBS JR. JENNIFER E. O’BRIEN University of California, Santa Cruz Received Februaxy 6, 1989, final revision accepted January 16, 1990

Abstract Gibbs, W.W., Jr. and Q’Wrien, J.E., 1990. Idioms and mental imagery: The metaphorical vation for idiomatic meaning. Cognition, 36: 3543.

moti-

We conducted three experiments to investigate the mental images associated with idiomatic phrases in English. Our hypothesis was that people should have strong conventional images for many idioms and that the regularity in people’s knowledge of their images for idioms is due to the conceptual metaphors motivating the figurative meanings of idioms. In the first study, subjects were asked to fcrm and describe their mental images for different idiomatic expressions. Subjects were then asked a series of detailed questions about their images regarding the causes and effects of different events within their images. We found high consistency in subjects’ images of idioms with similar figurative meanings despite differences in their surface forms (e.g., spill the beans and let the cat out of the bag). Subjects’ responses to detailed questions about their images also showed a high degree of similarity in their answers. Further examination of subjects’ imagery protocols supports the idea that the conventional images and knowledge associated with idioms are constrained by the conceptual metaphors (e g., the MIND IS A CONTAINEI? and IDEAS ARE ENTITIES) which motivate the figurative meanings of idioms. The results of two control studies showed that the conventional images associated with idioms are not solely based on their figurative meanings (Experiment 2) and that the images associated with literal phrases (e.g., spill the peas) were quite varied and unlikely to be constrained by conceptual metaphor (Experiment 3)* These findings support the view that idioms are not “dead” metaphors with their

*Preparation of this article was supported by Grant MH42980 from the National Institute of Mental Health and by a Faculty Research Grant from the University of California, Santa Cruz. We thank two anonymous reviewers for their helpful comments on an earlier version of this paper. Reprint requests may be sent to: Raymond W. Gibbs Jr., Program in Experimental Psychology, Clark Kerr Hall, University of California,

Santa Cruz, CA 95064, U.S.A.

0010-0277/90/$10.70 0 1990 Elsevier Science Publishers B.V.

ibbs Jr. and J.

‘Brien

determined. Rather, the meanings of many idioms tacit knowledge of the conceptual metaphors undere figurative phrases.

a:

s thousands

of idiomatic expressions whose meanings

various ways from their literal interpretations, such as spill the beans, button your lips, blow off steam, lose your marbles, and shoot the itional theories of idiomaticity assume that idioms once had origins. but have lost their metaphoricity over time and now ’ metaphors with their figurativ eanings being directly stipuental lexicon (Aitchison, 1987; oke-Rose, 1958; Chomsky, z, 1973; Long & Summers, ; Ccaper, 1986;Cruse, 1986; Fraser, 197 ; MGkkai, 1972; Strassler, 1982; Weinre 1969). Idioms are thought to be noncompositional since the figurative meanmgs of these phrases are not functions of the meanings of their individual parts (Chomsky , 1965, 198(l). earning the meanings of idioms requires that speakers form arbitrary links dioms and their nonliteral meanings to recognize that spill the beans = “to reveal a secret”, button your lips = “to keep a secret”, lose your marbles = “to crazy”, and so on. e link between an idiom and its figurative meaning is comvast number of idioms that roughly mean the same thing. he language doesn’t have a unique figurative interpretation vidual words, there are many idioms that refer to a single concept example, American speakers may use spill the beans, let the cat out of the bag, blow the lid off, or blow the whistle to convey the idea of “revealing or exposing a secret”. According to the traditional view of idioms, articular reason why each of these different phrases means “to t”. Again, the link between an idiom and its figurative meaning nd can not be predicted from the meanings of its individual diverge

uistic and psycholinguistic research has taken issue with the belief in the traditional view of idiomaticity. This work has individual words in many idioms systematicslly contribute to urative interpretations of these phrases (Villmore, ‘Connor, 1988; Gibbs & Nayak, 1989; Lakoff, 1987; Lindne Langacker, 1986; Nunberg, 1978; Wasow, Sag, & Nunberg, 1982). For example, speakers know that spill the beans is analyzable since beans refers to an idea or secret and spilling refers to the act of revealing the secret. People’s

Idioms and mental imagery

37

intuitions about the analyzability of idioms play an important role in determining these phrases’ syntactic productivity (Gibbs & Kayak, IWj, iexicai flexibility (Gibbs, Nayak, Bolton, & Keppel, 1989), and ease of comprehension (Gibbs, Nayak, & Cutting, 1989). These empirical studies suggest that the meanings of idioms can be partially motivated in hat speakers recognize some relationship between the words in idioms and heir overall figurative interpretations. The aim of this article is to provide evidence supporting the idea that the figurative meanings of idioms are motivated and not entirely arbitrary (Lakoff, 1987). Our hypothesis was that the meanings of many idioms are partially motivated by different conceptual metaphors which map information from one conceptual or source domain (e.g., knowledge about spilling of beans) to a target domain (e.g., knowledge of revealing secrets). We will show that conceptual metaphors provide coherence to different idioms with similar figurative meanings (e.g., spill the bei,3, let the cat out of the bag, blow the lid off, and so on). Although linguistic analyses of the historical roots of idioms reveal information about their metaphorical origins, our interest was to demonstrate that speakers have tacit knowledge of the metaphorical basis for idioms. This tacit knowledge is most easily uncovered through a detailed examination of speakers’ mental images for idioms. Even though there have been empirical studies on the role of mental imagery in the comprehension and memory for idioms or “dead” metaphors (IIarris, Lahey, & Marsalek, 1980; Marschark, Katz, & Paivio, 1983; Riechmann 6r Coste, 1980), no research has specifically analyzed the contents of speakers’ mental images for idioms and attempted to show how such images provide a link between an idiom and its figurative meaning. Consider the idiom spilE the beams. Try to form a mental image for this phrase and then ask yourself the following questions (Lakoff, 1987). Where are the beans before they are spilled? How big is the container? Are the beans cooked or uncooked? Is the spilling accidental or intentional? Where are the beans once they’ve been spilled? Are the beans in a nice, neat pile? Where are the beans supposed to be? A.fter the beans are spilled, are they ost speakers can form mental images for idioms like .r;pillthe beans and answer these questions about their Imental images -without diffictiky. Even people without a conscious image of this phrase can answer these questions. Although there is some variation in people’s images for spill the beans, speakers generally report that the container for the beans is about the size of a human head, the beans were supposed to be kept in that container, the spilling appears to be accidental, the spilled beans are rarely in a neat pile, and are not easy to retrieve.

for spill the beans is remarkable. Tradi‘s i rity of reasons for why people should have such ovi s of idi ti nor why there is such specific knowlstrong conventional images for id hypothesis, first articulated by Lakoff edge associated with these images. for idioms is (1987), was that people’s understanding of their mental i nd target dostrongly constrained by conceptual mappings between so associated with spill the beans are motivated eddy, 1979; Lakoff, 1987; Lakoff & Johnson, at the MIND IS A S which are communicated by taking ideas out of the mind, putting them into words, and sending them to other people. We understand the mind (the target domain) as being like a container (the source domain) and ideas (the target domain) as being like different physical entities (the source domain) such as food, plants, or money (Lakoff & Johnson, 1980). Most of the conventional images for spill the beans show that the container is about the size of the human head, that the beans correspond to the information or ideas which are supposed to be kept in the container, but which are accidentally let out through spilling. Thus, people’s image for the phrase spiil the beans, their knowledge of the image, along wit the CONDUIT metaphor, provide a motivated link between the idiom and -&meaning “to reveal a secret” (Lakoff, 1987). Spill the beans doesn’t meaIa “to reveal a secret” by accident because our tacit understanding of metaphorical mappings between different source and target s motivates why this phrase means what it does. ents we report investigated the conventional images and people have when asked to form mental images of idioms. asked subjects to form mental images for idioms and then queried them about what they knew about their images. Our expectations were that people would have fairly consistent images for idioms and that there would be a good deal of regularity in people’s knowledge about their images for idioms with similar figurative meanings. For example, even though spill the beans and let the cat out ofthe bag differ in lexical make-up and .talk about different physical events, the similarity in their figurative meanings is not arbitrary, but is motivated by these qhraser;’ sharing of similar conceptual metaphors. We examined this possibility in Experiment 1. Experiment 2 tested the alternative possibility that the regularity in people’s conventional images for idioms is solely due to their figurative meanings (e.g., “to reveal a secret”). Experiment 3 investigated whether people have conceptual metaphors motivating conventional images for literal phrases (e.g., spill the peas). must be noted that our use of the term mental image is not limited to the kinds of visual mental images often studied by cognitive psychologists (cf.


39

Kosslyn, 1980,1983; Shepard & Cooper, 1982). Following Lakoff (1987) and Johnson (1987), we refer to the images subjects have of idioms as c81tventional images which are unconscious, automatic, and independent of modality. Conventional images are most closely related to the images people have of prototypical members of categories (Rosch, 1975). Although we asked subjects to consciously form mental images for idioms, we do not require that subjects consciously manipulate these images as is typically done in mental rotation and scanning experiments. rthermore, research with congenitally blind people has shown that a good deal of mental imagery is kinesthetic, depicting many aspects of functioning in space, such as orientation, motion, shape judgments, and so on (Kerr, 1983; Marmor & Zaback, 1976; Zimler & Keenan, 1983). 0ur particular interest was not just in people’s images of objects per se, but in the actions that constituted people’s images of spilling beans, blowing lids off, and so on, as well as people’s insights into the causes tind consequences of these actions. As we shall report, many of the general image schemas that motivate people’s specific mental images for idioms also have a kinesthetic nature. For this reason, one can think of the mental images studied here as being similar to mental models (cf. Johnson-Laird, 1983). It should also be understood that we do not propose any algorithm for how people construct their mental images for idioms. We simply wished to investigate the products of spe:akers’ mental images for idioms as a way of discovering the knowledge and information that potentially motivate the figurative meanings of idiomatic phrases in English.

In Experiment 1 subjects were presented with an idiomatic phrase, asked to define it, and then to form a mental image of the expression. Subjects were then asked to verbally describe their mental image for that phrase in as great as detail as possible. once subjects had given their protocol for their mental image of an idiom, they were asked a series of questions about their image. The results of a pilot study indicated that subjects possessed a good deal of ~~nowlzdgz abut spt cific aspects of their mental images for idioms. Subjects’ introspective reports suggested that their mental images for idioms -were not static, but contained dynamic actions in which events occurred over time. Subjects were specifically aware of different physical characteristics of the objects, the causes behind events, the intentionality of events (i.e., whether or not some causal agent intentionally performed an act), the manner in which certain actions occurred, the consequences of the events, and the possibility of reversing the actions described. We therefore queried subjects

R. W. Gibbs Jr. and J. E. O’Brien

about the causation, intentionality, manner, consequences, and reversibility of the events described in their mental images. Although subjects do not eeificaUy form mental images regarding, say, the cause or intentionality of an action, people have knowledge about their mental images and can reliably determine the causes and consequences of the actions that they report for their mental images of idioms. ur expectation was that subjects would give consistent responses to these questions for each idiom belonging to a particular group (i.e., having a similar meaning). Although subjects would offer different images for each idiom (e.g., splill the beans and let the cat out of the bag), their responses to the specific questions would vary little for idioms with similar figurative meanings (e.g., revealing secrets). Thus, subjects might report having images of beans spilling for spill the beans but not for let the cat out of the bag. However, their beliefs about the causation of the actions (e.g., spilling beans and letting cats out), the manner in which these actions were performed5 and the consequences of these action,c qheuld L2 be consistent for idioms that share similar figurative meanings. We expected a high degree of consistency in subjects’ understanding of their mental images for idioms with similar meanings because of the small set of conceptual metaphors that link idioms to their figurative interpretations. Subjects’ descriptions of their mental images for idioms and their knowledge of these images should reflect the constraints conceptual metaphors impose on the link between idiomatic phrases and their nonliteral meanings. For example, when imagining idioms that refer to the idea of secrets, conceptual metaphors should constrain people’s intuitions e cause of beans spilling and cats being let out of bags, the intentionality of these actions, the manner in which these actions take place, and their consequences. If people’s tacit knowledge of idioms is not structured by different conceptual metaphors, there should be little consistency in subjects’ responses to questions about the causes and consequences of actions within their mental images of idioms with similar nonliteral interpretations. thod Subjects wenty-four University of Caiifornia, Santa Cruz undergraduates particiects to fulfill a course requirement. All subjects were native terials and design Twenty-five idioms were selected from oatner, Gates, and Makkai (1975) ong and Summers (1979). Five idioms expressed figurative meanings


41

about anger, 5 about exerting control or authority, 5 about secretiveness, 5 about insanity, and 5 about revelation. These five groups of idioms are shown in Table 1. The six probe questions were designed to reveal subjects’ beliefs about the causes of actions in their mental images (Causation - “What caused the action to happen?“), the intentionality of the actions (Intentionality - ‘“Was the action done intentionally?“), the manner in which the actions were performed (Manner - ““Howwas the action performed?“), the consequences of the acTable 1.

List of stimulus materials -__ ---_____-

___ _ -----

.___~_.

---

.__-__ __~__

Experiment 1

Experiment 3

Anger blow yaw stack hit the ceiling lose your cool foam at the mouth flip your lid

(blow your tire) (hit the table) (lose your wa&?t) (foam at the top) (flip your coin)

Exerting controllauthority crack the whip !ay down the law call the shots wear the pants keep the ball rolling

(crack the glass) (lay down the tile) (call the police) (wear the scarf) (keep the ball steady)

Secretiveness keep it under your hat button your lips hold your tongue behind one’s back keep in the dark

(keep it under your bed) (button your shirt) (hold your arm) (behind one’s chair) (keep in the garage)

Insanity go off your rocker lose your marbles go to pieces lose your grip bounce off the walls

(go off your path) (lose your hair) (go io church) (lose your keys) (bounce 0iiiht:hOi)

Revelation spill the beans let the cat out of the bag blow the whistle blow the lid off loose lips

(spill the peas) (let the cat out of the house) (blow the bubble) (blow the water off) (loose teeth)

42

tion (Consequence - ”

hat happens as a result of the action?“), the conse-

quences of not performing the action (Negative Consequence - “What would en if the action didn’t happen?“), and the reversibility of the action ersibility - “Is it difficult to reverse the action?“). Each of these probe questions were tailored to the specific mental image that subjects described. For example, when subjects reported that their image for spill &e beans was of a bunch of beans spilling out of a pot onto a floor, they would later be asked “Is it difficult to get the beans back into the pot?” for the Reversibility probe question. Procedure

Individual subjects were seated at a small table facing the experimenter. The subjects were first informed of the general experimental task. Each subject was then given an idiomatic phrase to verbally define. Once the subject had defined what the idiom meant, he or she was instructed to form a detailed mental image for the ;Jhrase and to verbally describe it as accurately as possible. Following Uris, the experimenter asked each of the six probe questions. The subjects were instructed to answer these questions in as detailed and accurate a manner as possible. After responding to the final probe question for an idiom, the experimenter went on to the next phrase and the entire process was repeated. The 25 idioms were presented in a random order for each subject. The probe questions were asked in an invariant order - Causaanner, Consequence, Negative Consequence, and ReAll of the subjects’ protocols and responses to the probe questions en down verbatim by the experimenter. The experiment took approximately one hour to complete. Results and discussion

We were most interested in the degree of similarity in subjects’ mental images for idioms with similar figurative meanings. The protocols for each subject were accordingly analyzed in the following manner. First, each subject’s description of their mental images -*as analyzed for its general characteristics. For example, when a subject reported that his or her image for blow your stack was of a person’s head exploding violently upward, this was scored as “some force causes the top of a container to release pressure violently”. Second, the different general characteristics for people’s mental images for each idiom were tallied across subjects. We then determined the most frequent characteristics across the five idioms within each group of phrases. This gave us a general image schema for each of the five groups of idioms. Each of the subjects’ protocols v~as scored by three independent judges, two of

Idioms and meml

imagery

43

whom were unaware of the experimental hypotheses. Initially, the judges agreed over 90% of the time as to whether subjects’ reported mental images matched a particular general image schema. Subsequent discussion among the judges produced complete agreement. The best method for assessing inter-subject variability in subjects’ responses was to compute the proportion of each subject’s total responses that conformed to the response that was most frequent across subjects. This proportion was obtained by collapsing across idioms within each idiom group for each subject. For example, for the general image schema in a g&n idiom group (e.g., Anger), each subject provided five responses (one for each idiom). If four of the five responses conformed to the most frequent response across subjects, the proportion for that subject would be 80%. This provided a single number for each subject representing the degree to which each subject’s reported image conformed to the general schema. The proportion of total responses across all subjects and all idioms within each idiom group that conformed to a general image schema is shown in Table 2 (under Experiment 0 These data indicate that subjects had very similar schemas underlying their mental images for idioms with similar figurative meanings. On average 75% of subjects’ mental images for the different idioms collapsed across the different idiom groups described similar general images (ranging from 56% to 85%), a proportion that is significantly different from chance, t(23) = 1.79, p < .05, with a very conservative null hypothesis of .50 which assumes that subjects could only give two possible responses even though subjects’ mental images could potentially be unlimited in number. These general schemas for subjects’ images were not simply representative of the idioms’ figurative meanings, but captured more specific aspects of the events within an image. For example, idioms such as flip your !id and hit the ceiling both figuratively mean “to get angry”, but subjects specifically imagined for these phrases some force causing a container to release pressure in a violent manner. The fact that 80% of all subjects’ mental images for the different Anger idioms conformed to this general schema is remarkable. There is nothing in the surface forms of these different idioms to tightly constrain the images subjects reported. After all, lids can be flipped and ceilings can be hit in a wide variety of ways, caused by many different circumstances. But subjects’ protocols revealed little variation in the general events that took place in their images for idioms with similar meanings. Traditional theories of idiomaticity have no way to explain why people should have such consistent images for idioms. According to traditional views of idioms, people establish arbitrary links between an idiom and its figurative meanings and should not have any particularly consistent insights into the events specified by each idiom.

ibbs Jr. and J.

Table 2.

Proportions of mm frequent response for idioms (Experiment I), their ururive dejkitions (Experiment 2), and literal control phrases (Experiment 3) Experiment Question

1

2

3

.80

.54

84 .87 .86 57 .54 .54

.38 SO .79 .08 .08 .75

.34 .lI .57 .51 .06 .06 .49

Something is done to impose order To exert control or authority Action is intentional Astion is performed with force Something positive is accomplished A negative situation arises, a goal is not accomplished The action is difficult to reverse

.75 .74 .98 .81 .83 .77

46 .21 .88 .71 .50 46

.42 .12 .83 44 .59 .50

.50

.79

.49

Something is contained or hidden To keep a secret, to deceive Action is intentional Object will stay kept Object is contained Object is exposed The action is not difficult to reverse

.85 .91 .99 .65 .96 .95 .80

.50 .17 .88 .54 .13 .38 46

.46 .05 .89 .56 .07 .ll .61

A scene where there is a loss of control A stressful situation Action is not intentional Action is performed with force (control is lost all at once) Stability (mental or physical) is lost Stability is maintained The action is difficult to reverse

.79 .67 .95 .50

.21 .33 .75 .33

.12 .04 46 .41

.68 .68 .80

.38 .29 .79

.15 .14 .57

Some container is opened or tipped over and its contents are forcefully revealed Pressure or a pressureful situation Action is intentional Action is performed with force

.56

.OO

.18

.70 .70 .73

.29 .92 .50

.09 .65 .46

Most frequent response

A tgt?r

General Image: Causation: Intentionality: Manner: Consequences: Negative Consequences: Reversibility:

Some force causes a container to release pressure violently Stress/anger/frustration Action is not intentional Action is oerabrmed with force Anger/pressure is released Build-up of pressure. explosion The action is difficult to reverse

CormA

General Image: Causation: Intentionality: Manner: Consequences: Negative Consequence: Reversibility: Secretiveness

General Image: Causation: Intentionality: anner: Consequence: Negative Consequence: Reversibility: InsQnity

General Image: Causation: Intentionality: Manner: Consequences: Negative Consequence: Reversiblity: Revelation

General Image: Causation: Intentionality: Manner:


45

Table 2 (continued) Proportions of most f r'%y"Uh u4 response ~#oridioms (Experiment I), their figurative definitions (Experiment 2), and literal control phrases (Experiment 3) Experiment Question Revelution (continued) Consequence: Negative Consequence: Reversibility:


1

2

3

Substance that should be contained is released or revealed Substance remains contained The action is difficutt to reverse

.86

.21

.1-l

.83 .86

.25 58

.06 -51

The variability between idiom groups was analyzed in an identical manner to that described above, except that we now computed conformity proportions for each idiom group for subjects’ images and their responses to the probe questions for each group collapsing across subjects and idioms. Because we had no theoretical predictions about differences in conformity proportions among subjects’ reported images and probe questions, the proportions for each of these were averaged to yield a single proportion for each idiom group. An analysis of these inter-group proportions indicated no significant variability across the different idiom groups (71% for Anger, 77% for Cantrol, 87% for Secretiveness, 72% for Insanity, and 75% for Revelation). owever, the conformity within the Control, Secretiveness, and Revelation groups were each significantly greater than chance (again assuming a null hypothesis probability of .SQ), &(23) = 1.94,2.70, and 1.79 respectively with p < .05 for each comparison, while the Anger and Insanity groups were each marginally greater than chance, ~(23) = 1.49 and 1.55, both ps c JO. Subjects’ general image schemas for idioms with similar meanings only reveals part of what they understood about their mental images. More specific information is seen in subjects’ answers to the probe questions. The probe question data provided information about subjects’ knowledge of their mental images. These data were of two forms. Some probe questions simply required a binary response (e.g., “‘y s, the action was intentional”). Other probe questions could elicit open-ended responses, as was the case for Causation questions, and these were scored in the same manner as were subjects’ image protocols. Once again, we were interested in the most frequent responses subjects gave to each probe question collapsing across the five idioms in each group. These means are presented for each idiom group in Table 2 (under Experiment 1).

Overall, subjects reported highly consistent responses to the different probe questions about their mental images for idioms. Across the five i groups, subjectsgave similar responses 77% of the time to the Caus probes, 90% to the Intentionality probes, 71% to the Manner probes, 72% to the Consequence probes, 75% to the Negative Consequence probes, and 70% of the time to the Reversibility probes. The proportions for the Causation, Intentionality, and Negative Consequence probes were statistically significant with ts(23) = 1.94, 3.02, and 1.79 respectively and p < .05 for each comparison. while the proportions for the Manner and Consequence probes were marginally reliable, ~(23) = 1.49 and 1.56 with ps < .lO. These statistical analyses vastly underestimate the true reliability of subjects’ responses to the open-ended Causation, Consequence, and Negative Consequence that these questions could have been answerad in an unlimited ays. Once again, traditional theories of idiomaticity provide no explanation of this regulatity in people’s knowledge about their mental images for idioms. The probe question data provide very specific information about the causes and effects of the events within subjects’ images of idioms. These data are particularly useful for showing how our understanding of idioms is motivated by different conceptual metaphors. Consider the most frequent responses to the probe questions for the Anger idioms. When imagining Anger idioms subjects know that pressure (i.e., stress or frustration) causes the action, that one has little control over the pressure once it builds, its violent release is ‘onaily (e.g., the blowing of the stack) and that once the release as t e (i.e., once the ceiling has been hit, the lid flipped, the stack blown), it is difficult to reverse the action. Each of these responses are based on people’s folk conceptions of heated fluid or vapor building up and escaping from containers (ones that our subjects most frequently reported to be the size of a person’s head). We see that the metaphorical mapping of a source domain (e.g., heated fluid in a container) into target domains (e.g., the anger emotion) motivates why people have consistent mental images, and specific knowledge about these images, for different idioms about anger. The Anger idioms are uctured by two b c conceptual metaphors - the and ANGER IS S A CONt of the more metaphor (Reddy, 1979), and the ANGER IS HEAT metaphor comes from the common folk theory that the physiological effects of anger are increased body heat, increased internal pressure, and agitation (Kovecses, 1986; Lakoff, 1987). AS anger increases j so do its physiological effects. V?e use our understanding of the physiological effects of the emotion as a source domain by which to understand and talk about a target domain, namely the emotion


47

itself. Thus, we refer to the HEAT OF A FLUID IN A CONTAINER as the source domain and to ANGER as the target domain. This permits many metaphorical entailments that are reflected in the language used to talk about anger. For instance, we know that when fluids get hot and begin to boil, the fluid goes upward. So, when the intensity of anger increases, the fluid rises as seen in the expressions His pent-up anger welled up inside him. My anger kept building up inside me, and We got a rise out of him (Lakoff, 1987). When anger builds beyond the point at which a person can control it, we imagine that the fluid or heat escapes violently from the container holding it. This is exactly the kind of image that subjects had for Anger idioms such as flip your lid, blow your stack, foam at the mouth, and so on. When subjects imagined foam at the mouth they reported that the person’s face was red from the heat of anger. Subjects’ images for blow your stack andflip your lid often consisted of a person’s head blowing up from internal pressure with steam coming out the top of the head as the top violently blew off. For hit the ceiling people reported images of an angry person with a red face and clenched jaw flying up and hitting the ceiling with their head while steam blasted out from their heels. To lose your cool also suggested to subjects’ images of an angry person with a red face and steam coming out of their ears and collar or an angry person with a red face that is literally melting. Our claim is that the high degree of consistency in subjects’ imagery protocols and responses to the probe qrestisns reflects the constraints that conceptual metaphors provide for our understanding of experiences such as getting angry. The mapping of information from different source and target domains limits our conceptualization of anger and motivates why we have the idiomatic expressions we do to talk about anger. The results from the other groups of idioms also provide evidence for the role of conceptual metaphor in subjects’ imagining of idioms. For Secretiveness idioms, two conceptual metaphors, THE MIND IS A CONTAINER and IDEAS ARE ENTITIES, dominate subjects’ descriptions of their mental images for ph r a scs such as kc”q it under your hat, button your lips, keep it in the dark, and so on. Subjects imagined containers such as boxes, hats, mouths, hands clasped together, all shut tight and holding different objects that were secrets, such as small animals, and messages written on pieces of paper. The same set of conceptual metaphors underlie subjects’ mental images for the Revelation idioms. Here the containers were boxes, pots, tea kettles, and large cans, most of which were the size of a human head. The secrets were seen as beans or cats accidentally coming out of these containers. For blow the whistle the secret is a sound that blasts out of the whistle container --_--e One subject even imagined beans accidentally coming out of a person’s mouth when imagining spill the beans.

48


for Insanity idioms were structured by two MIND IS A CONTAINER and MIND IS A taphors were evident in subjects’ reports of a into puzzle-like pieces because of stress and in subjects’ ontainers cracking up under pressure. Sanity is seen CAN BE LOST or insanity as an INVISIBLE ed lose your grip they described images of ple off a tree branch or the edge of a cliff that was desperately being held on to. This same force provoked one’s marbles to spill out of a container, scattering all over a floor. For go ofs your rocker, subjects reported people being violently pushed out of rocking chairs by an invisible force that was too much to withstand. Once a person had let go of their grip, fallen out of their chair, or lost their marbles, it was impossible to recover what had been lost (i.e., their grip, the marbles, getting back into the chair). Subje 5 also described images for bounce off the walls of e force causing people to fling themselves around a rubber room ncontrollably off the walls. Finally, subjects reported images for Control idioms that were motivated by CONTROL IS A POSSESSION and CONTROL IS AN INVISIBLE FORCE metaphors. The person with control owned the pants, tne whip, the law book, the ball, and was in a position to call the shots. Each of these objects were used forcefully, and intentionally, to impose order as when the law book was slammed down on a desk, the whip cracked violently, or the call for shooting was made loudly. Sometimes the controlling agent is an invisible force that keeps the ball rolling in a particular direction and manner ental images people had for idioms within each group were strucy a very small set of conceptual metaphors where things in a target domain (i.e., anger, secrets, insanity, and control) were mapped into a source domain (i.e., people’s knowledge of containers, heat, and physical forces like gravity). Our subjects did not construct a wide range of mental images for idioms where, for example, the spilling of beans could be attributed to numerous causes with all sorts of possible consequences. Instead, subjects had remarkably consistent and particular images of the events described in different idioms with similar figurative meanings. Traditional theories of idiomaticity have nc way of explaining why people have such consistent knowledge about their mental images of idioms. Most theoretical accounts of idioms assume that these phrases are “dead” metaphors and that speakers must learn arbitrary associations between idioms and their respective figurative meanings. But the results of Experiment 1 cast serious doubt on this classical view of le have very consistent mental images for idioms and their knowledge of these images suggests the active role of conceptual metaphors

Idioms rind mental imagery

49

in motivating the figurative meanings of idioms. People_ tacitly know that certain idioms have the meanings they do because of the continuing influence that conceptual metaphors have on their mental images for these expressions. And it is these conceptual metaphors that motivate the links b&veen idioms and their nonliteral meanings. The verbal questioning procedure used in Experiment 1 introduces the possibility of experimenter expectancy effects on subjects’ responses. For instance, subjects’ responses to the probe questions might have been influenced by the experimenter’s tone of voice, posture, facial expressions, and other subtle nonverbal cues. To ensure that the effects we observed in Experiment 1 were due to subjects’ own mental images for idioms, and not to any subtle cues provided by the experimenter, we conducted a control study using a uniform, written format. Subjects in this study were presented a booklet containing all the stimulus materials. The first page contained a single idiom and the subjects were asked to forPtl a mental ilmage for the idiom and then briefly write down their description of it. Following this, the subjects turned the page and then read three scenarios that included descriptions of possible images for the idiom they had just read. One passage described the general mental image most frequently noted by subjects in Experiment 1 as illustrated by the followin story (No-Violation condition). Jim’; parents were comi,lg for dinner at his new apartment and he wanted it to be a very special occaci~~ He purchased a new crock pot and set about cooking a complicatc;l stew. He was not paying close enough attention and the pot got too hot. While he was in another room, the top of the pot blew off with force and steam and stew got out and flew everywhere, Jim had a hard time putting the lid back on because of the heat.

This story captures all the essential parts of the general image that subjects in Experiment 1 reported for their mental imag: of the idiom blow the la’doff ( i.e., same container is forcefully opened or tipped over and its contents exposed). The other two passages violated a different aspect of the general image schema for a particular idiom by changing what subjects most frcVWF=JL~ "ither tb__ts CalJsBtion_, Ip_ftm_h~p_quently reported in Experiment 1I AGgti&QaAaG ality, Manner, Consequences, Negative Consequences, or Reversibility of their mental image for that idiom. For example, the following passages respectively violate the Causation and Manner of the actions for the idiom blow the lid ofl (Violations A and I3 conditions). Jim’s parents were coming for dinner at his new apartment and he wanted it to be a very special occasion. He purchased a new crock pot and set about cooking a complicated stew. He was not paying close enough attention and the pot got

too close to the edge of the stove. While he was in another room the pot fell off the edge and the top blew off with force. Steam and stew got out and flew everywhere. Jim had a hard time putting the lid back on because of the heat. for dinner at his new apartment and he wanted it to Jim’s parents were c He purchased a new crock pot and set about cooking be a very special occ was not paying close enough attention and the pot got a complicated stew. too hot. While he was in another room, the top of the pot toppled off and steam and stew got out and flew everywhere. Jim had a hard time putting the lid back on because of the heat. l

e first story, the cause (Causation) of the top coming off the pot was violated in that the top fell off when the pot fell off the edge of the stove instead of the top blowing off due to internal pressure. In the second passage, nner in which the top of the pot came off was violated because the the pled off instead of blowing off in a violent, for&u1 manner. top The subjects’ task in this control study was to read all three passages and rate each one, on a ‘I-point scale, as to how similar it was to their own mental image for that particular idiom. To shorten the overall length of this study, one idiom from each of the five categories was eliminated from the stimuli. Furthermore, although :he passages following each idiom included one scenario that captured the general image schema reported by subjects in Experiment 1 (the No-Violation condition), only two types of violations were ir of passages that followed each idiom (the Violation A nditions). The particular violations that followed a specific ly determined. Across all the idioms in this experiment, there were equal numbers of passages that violated people’s beliefs about the Causation, Intentionality, Manner, Consequences, Negative Consequences, and Reversibility of the events described in the general images for the different idioms. Twenty-four University of California, Santa Cruz undergraduates participated as subjects in this control study. We expected that subjects should generally give higher ratings to passages that maintained the general image for each idiom in Experiment 1 (the No-Violation condition) and should eke lower ratings for passages that violated some key aspect of the general i&g; schema for an idiom (the Violation A and B conditions). The mean ratings for this control study are shown in Table 3. High ratings indicate that subjects viewed the passages for a particular cond.ition as corresponding more closely to their own mental images for the idioms within a category. A two-way analysis of variance on these means indicated a significant -main effect of violation type across subjects, F(2, 46) = 49.37, p c ,001, across items, F(2, 30) = 18.05, p < .OOl, and by minP;’ (4, 54) = 13.22, p r’ .OOl.


Table 3.

51

Mean ratings for controlstudy in ExperimentI Category of idiom Violation

Anger

Control

Secretiveness

Insanity

Revelation

No violation Violation A Violation B

3.97 2.61 2.20

3.76 2.71 2.89

3.98 2.81 3.33

3.84 3.28 2.84

3.94 2.89 3.29

The main effect of Idiom Type (i.e., Anger, Control, Secretiveness, Insanity, and Revelation) was not significant, both Fs < 1. The interaction between Violation and Idiom Type was statistically reliable across subjects, F(8, 184) = 4.68, p C .OOl, but not across items F(S, 30) c 1, nor by minF’. Further analvsis of the individual means using Newman-Keuls tests showed that subjects raied No-Violation passages as being more similar to their own mental images for the idioms than were the different Violation passages for each category of idiom, p < .05 for all comparisons. These data indicate that subjects formed mental images similar to the general images found in Experiment 1 even when no interviewer was present. It is highly unlikely, then, that the consistent findings of Experilment 1 were due to any subtle influence of the interviewer in eliciting subjects’ responses about their mental images for idioms.

The second experiment addressed the possibility that the source of uniformity in subjects’ mental images-and responses to the probe questions in Experiment 1 was solely due to subjects’ knowledge of the figurative meanings of e-7 if this -were the case, subjects sho-&l _A~___~ LA -115L* rr..ant:**e idioms. IGDl,U,lrm cv .L* LILG YIUlrGqGi”sslvpls in a similar fashion as they did for idioms when they are asked to form mental ---_ images for literal paraphrases of the ii~iop~~’figiii_aiive E,eaiiings. Subjects iz Experiment 2 were presented with paraphrases of the idioms used as stimuli in the first study and were asked t!o form mental images for these phrases (e.g., “to reveal a secret,” “to get angry,” “to go crazy,” and so on)+ These paraphrases were essentially the definitions of the idioms provided by subjects ST*-~ :uerr~~ &II? abese ~~pre&oc~, in Experiment 1. After describing +k=d* ell&U Zlbirba iulapti k-r the subjects were asked the same series of probe questions given to participants in Experiment 1. We did not expect-subjects in the present study to

form as vivid mental images for the paraphrase expressions as subjects did for idioms. onetheless, the alternative hypothesis that subjects’ mental images for idioms were based solely on their figurative meanings would predict that people should give as consistent, similar responses to the probe questions about their images as was found in Experiment 1. Our expectation was that subjects’ responses to the probe questions about the cause, intentionality, manner, and consequences of the actions described in their mental images for paraphrases of idioms would be significantly more variable than found in the data from the first study. Method

Subjects Twenty-four University of California, Santa Cruz undergraduates participated as subjects either for payment or to fulfill a course requirement. Al? subjects were native speakers of English. None of the subjects participated

rials for Experiment 2 were the five figurative definitions for the five groups of idioms used in Experiment 1. These definitions were “to get angry, ” “to exert control or authority”, “to keep a secret”, “to get crazy”, e were concerned that the paraphrases adequately “to meanings of idioms. For instance, the definition ese “to get angry” is meant to correspond to the phrases blow your stack, hit the ceiling, lose your cool, foam at the mouth, and j?ip your lid. One could argue that these idioms refer not to getting angry but to losing your temper or losing control of your anger. Other research has, in fact, suggested that idioms with similar figurative meanings represent different p-arts of a temporally struc(e.g., the emotion prototype for anger) so these idioms, ilarity in meaning, might be thought to have different pragof use (Nayak & Gibbs, 1990). Nevertheless, subjects in Experiment 1 defined the idioms corresponding to each group as having the ed here and other data (Gibbs & Nayak, 1989) and idiom oatner et al., 1975; Long & Summers, 1979) support this. Consequently the paraphrases used in Experiment 2 were the best definitions for each group of idioms and adequately allowed us to examine whether subjects’ mental____.images _----‘c)_ - for _ _ _ icli~n~s in the first study wp.re based solely on the meanings of these figurative expressions. he six probe questions used in Experiment 1 were also employed in Experiment 2.


53

Procedure The procedure for Experiment 2 was identical to that employed in Experiment 1. Results and discussion

The data from this study were analyzed in the same &manneras described in Experiment 1. We were most interested in discovering how frequently subjects gave imagery protocols and responses to t e probe questions that were similar to those obtained when subjects heard idioms (Experiment 1). As in Experiment 1, we generalized from subjects’ specific images for the paraphrases and computed the number of responses that fit the general image for each paraphrase. Once again, two independent judges scored subjects’ protocols and agreed on over PO% of all classifications. Subsequent discussion between the judges produced complete agreement as to whether subjects’ reported mental images matched a particular general image schema. Table 2 presents the proportions of subjects’ responses that were similar to those most frequently given by subjects in Experiment 1. Across the five figurative definitions only 34% of subjects’ mental images were similar to the general images for the idioms obtained in Experiment 1 (75%), a highly statistically significant difference, t(23) = 2.85, p < .Ol. Furthermore, the conformity of subjects’ general mental images to each figurative definition was significantly lower than found in Experiment 1 with idiom phrases (54% vs. 80% fdr Anger, 46% vs. 75% for Control, 50% vs. 85% for Secretiveness, 21% vs. 79% for Insanity, and 0% vs. 56% for Revelation), ts(23) = 1.92,2.06,2.59,4.02, and 4.22 respectively with p < .05 for each comparison. These results clearly indicated that the dominant mental images for the idiomatic phrases were not being constructed solely on the basis of the figurative meanings of these expressions. Although subjects reported very consistent images for each group of idioms in Experiment 1, a .particularly remarkable finding given the diversity of idioms in each group, _ _._A_! images for simple paraphrases of these idioms were highly subjects? menrar l

inconsistent and varied. Examination of subjects’ responses to the probe questions also showed significantly more variation than was found in Experiment 1 where subjects were probed about their images for idioms. These data are also shown in Table 2 (under Experiment 2). Across the different figurative definitions, subjects gave similar responses 28% of the time to the Causation probes, 79% of the time to the Intentionality probes, 57% of the time to the Manner probes, 26% of the time to the Consequence probes, 29% of the time to the Negative Consequence probes, and 67% of the time to the Reversibility

54


probes.

e proportions was lower than was found to similar ques-

1, significantly so for the Causation, Consequence, and tions in Negative Consequence probes, ~(23) = 3.39,3.19, and 3.19 respectively with p < A5 for each comparison. A second analysis considered subjects’ reported mental images for the different figurative definitions separately from Experiment 1. Table 4 presents the most frequent mental images and responses to the probe questions for each figurative definition. Collapsing across the general images and probe questions, there was little evidence of variability between the different idiom (57% for Anger, 63% for Control, 53% for Secretiveness, 48% for sanity, and 54% for Revelation). None of these conformity proportions were significantly different from chance (with a null hypothesis probability of SO). Closer analysis of the specific responses to the probe questions for each figurative definition showed important differences from the responses obtained in Experiment 1. The comparisons of interest here were between the most frequent responses to the probe questions about subjects’ images for idioms (shown in Table 2) and the most frequent responses to the probe questions for the figurative definitions (shown in Table 4). Consider subjects’ responses to questions about their mental images for the Secretiveness idioms and their images for the figurative definition “to keep a secret”. Although most of the subjects thought that the action in their images of idioms such as keep it under yolcr hat and buttonyour lips were not difficult to reverse, the most frequent response to the Reversibility question figurative definition “to keep a secret” was that tire actions were to reverse. Similarly, the most frequent response to the Causation question for Anger idioms in Experiment 1 was that siress or pressure was the cause of the actions in subjects’ images f(Bridioms such as blow your stack and flip your lid. But subjects were mostly unsure of the cause of any action when probed about their images for “to get angry”. possible alternative explanation of the data in Experiment 2 periment 1 needs to be considered. The greater variability in subjects’ responses to the probe questions in Experiment 2 relative to Experiment 1 y be due to the ud,e of only one question per category in Experiment 2. the first study, -9, 1-Jem were five instances (or idioms) in each category this repetition could have led to more consistent responses from subjects. addressed this problem by doing a separate analysis of the data in Experiment 1 that included only the first-encountered idiom for each category for each subject. These data are presented in Table 5. An examination of these proportions both for the general images and responses to the probe questions for each category of idioms indicate very similar findings to that obtained in Experiment 1 overall. Thus, 81% of subups


Table 4.

Proportions of most frequent responses for “to get

angcy

55

” (Experiment 2)

Question


Anger General Image: Causation: Intentionality: Manner: Consequences: Negative Consequences: Reversibility:

An angry person No specific cause known Action is not intentional Action is performed with force Emotional or physical pain Normalcy, calmness, no anger The action is difficult to reverse

-71 .42 SO .79 .33 SO .75

Control General Image: Causation: Intentionahty: Manner: Consequences: Negative Consequences: Reversibility:

Something or someone is being controlled To organize, to prevent chaos Action is intentional Action is performed with force Order, success, something is accomplished Disorder, nothing is accomplished The action is difficult to reverse

.63 33 .88 .71 54 54 .79

Secretiveness Generai Imrige: Causation: IntentionaliYy: Manner: Consequences: Negative Consequences:

A person who has a secret To avoid hurting someone Action is intentional Secret will stay kept Secret is kept, pressure builds Secret is out, anger, upheaval

.67 .25 .88 54 .38 SO

A person who is crazy A stressful situation Action is not intentional Action is performed with force (control is lost at once) Non-normalcy Eventually will go crazy, remain crazy The action is difficult to reverse

.42 .33 .75 .33

One person tells a secret to another

.67 .38 .92 .50 .29 .33 .58

Insanity General Image: Causation: Intentionality: Manner: Consequences: Negative Consequences: Reversibility: Revelation General Image: Causation: Intentionality: Manner: Consequences: Negative Consequences: Reversibility:

Tn PV intvmse . ..*.--

*_ intimnrv ._.__..._WJ

Action is ntentional Action is performed all at once More intimacy is achieved Less intimacy The actiorh is difficult to reverse

.42 .42 .79

Table 5.

frequent responses to first-encountered idiom in each category for Experiment 1 Proportion

of mast

Category of idiom _ __ -_- -. Question

Anger

Control

Secretiveness

Insanity

Revelation

General Image: Causation: Intentionality: Manner: Consequences: Negative Consequences: Reversibility:

.79 .83 .88 1.00 .58 .58 .63

.92 .88 1.00 .96 .75 .fl .63

.75 .83 .96 .54 .67 .92 .67

.83 .67 1.00 .46 .83 .79 .79

.75 .42 .71 .88 .92 .83 .79

jects’ general mental images for the first-encountered idiom across the different categories described similar general images compared to 75% across all the idioms within each group in Experiment 1. A comparison of the responses to the probe questions for the first-encountered idioms in each category also reveal a very similar set gs to that found in Experiment 1 (Causation - 73% vs. 77%, Intent - 91% vs. 90%, Manner - 77% vs. 71%, Consequences - 75% vs. 72%) Negative Consequences - 77% vs. 75%) and 73% vs. 70%). Therefore, it appears quite unlikely that the ncy in subjects’ mental images and responses to the probe periment 1 relative to Experiment 2 is due simply to the s of stimuli items in each study. data from Experiment 2 sug ted that subjects were not simply forming their mental images of idioms in periment I and responding to the probe question about those images sole1 the basis of these phrases’ figurative meanings. These findings lend further support to the hypothesis that people’s men al images for idioms are constrained by conceptual metaphors that form part of the link between an idiom and its figuratrve meaning.

Conventional images do not merely play a role in idiomatic language, but are also central to our use and understanding of simple literal sentences (Lakoff, easily form mental i ges for literal sentences such as John ry ckimbed the tree. ut is is unlikely that one’s image for

kdkms and mental

imagery

57

John hit the ball would include John hltiizg a beachball with a pizza platter, or John driving a large truck over a tennis ball. Most people would imagi that John hit something like a baseball with a bat or a tennis ball with a racket. Thus, people tend to form images for literal sentence expressions on their understanding of basic-level prototypes (cf. Rosch, 1975). The purpose of Experiment 3 was to compare the mental images formed for literal phrases with those formed for idiomatic expressions (Experiment 1). One could argue that the higher degree of consistency in subjects’ mentec,l images for phrases should be the same whether or not these phrases are literal or idiomatic. There may be no necessity for postulating the existence of conceptual metaphors to structure the images that people specifically have for idiomatic expressions. Rather, people form their mental images for idioms solely on the basis of their knowledge of basic-level prototypes for the objects and actions depicted in idiomatic phrases such as spill the beans, frip your lid, c-r&k the whip, and so on. We agree that there should be a great deal od consistency in the content of images for literal statements, such as hit the bail, or spill the peas. People’s knowledge of basic-level prototypes clearly influences the kinds of mental images formed for both literal and idiomatic phrases. However, the hypothesis we examined in Experiment 3 was that subjects should exhibit more consistent mental images and have more reliable responses to the probe questions when presented with idioms than they wouid when asked to imagine literal phrases. The mental images associated with literal phrases should be more variable than was found for idioms (Experiment 1) because the meanings of literal phrases are not as directly motivated by conceptual metaphors as they are for idioms. People’s knowledge about their mental images for literal phrases, such as spill the peas, should be less definite and more variable than was the case for corresponding idiomatic expressions, such as spill Ehebeduzs. In Experiment 3, we presented subjects with literal phrases corresponding to the idioms given to subjects in Experiment 1. Once again, subjects were asked to describe their mental images for these phrases and to answer various probe questions about their knowledge of their images. It should be noted that the literal phrases corresponding to each idiom within an idiom group (e.g., secretiveness idioms) were not similar in meaning Nevertheless, we were specifically interested in whether or not subjects would respond similarly to questions about their images for these groups of literal phrases as they did for the five groups of idioms. Thus, even though spill the peas and let the cat out of the house are not similar in meaning in the way that spill the beans and let the cut out of the bag are, it is still important to probe subjects’ mental images for literal phrases to see if their images are constrained in a similar

periment 1). as were people’s images for idio mages for literal phrases should not be uniform ent groups of lite al phrases were not motivated by conceptual metaphors linking the idioms in the five groups to their respective figurative meanings.

Subjects alifornia, Santa Cruz undergraduates particienty-four pated as subjects either for payment or to fulfill a course requirement. All subjects were native speakers of English. None of the subjects participated in Experiment 1 or 2. feriuls and desigr~

Each idiom in Experiment 1 was transformed into a literal phrase by substituting the final noun with a word that eliminated the phrase’s figura-t;ue meaning (e.g., hit the ceiling was changed to hit the table). The 25 literal phrases are listed in Table 1 next to their idiomatic counterparts. The six questions probing the subjects’ knowledge of their images were identical to those used in Experiments 1 and 2. Procedure

rocedure for Experiment 3 was identical to that employed in Experiments 1 and 2. Results and dkcussion

a for this experiment were analyzed in exactly the same manner as e for Experiments 1 and 2. We were most interested, again, in discovw frequently subjects gave imagery protocols and responses to the ions that were similar to those obtained when subjects heard eriment 1). Three independent judges agreed on over 90% of aii the classifications of subjects’ reported mental images. Subsequent discussion produced complete agreement as to whether subjects’ mental images matched a particular general image schema. Table 2 presents the proportions of subjects responses that were similar to those given by subjects in the first study. Across the different groups of stimuli in Experiment 3 compared to Experiment 1, there was strong evidence that subjects’ mental images and responses to the probe questions for literal phrases were -much less consistent than was


59

found for the corresponding idioms in Experiment 1(30% vs. 75% for Anger, 48% vs. 77% for Control, 39% vs. 87% for Secretiveness, 27% vs. 72% for Insanity, and 29% vs. 75% for Revelation). Each of these differences in proportitins between Experiments 3 and 1 were statisticaily significant, ts(23) = 3.12,2.08,3. ,3.12, and 3.19 respectively, withp < .U5 for each comparison. For the general mental images reported, collapsing across the different groups of literal phrases, only 30% of the subjects’ total responses had similar general images to the most frequent general images for the idiom phrases obtained in Experiment 1 (75%), a highly significant difference, t(23) = 2.92, p < .Ol (a similar difference is found when compared to the average proportion of similar images to the first-encountered idioms in Experiment 1, t(23) = 2.92, p c .Ol). The poor consistency in subjects’ general images for the different groups of literal phrases may not seem surprising given that expressions such as spill the peas and let the cat out of the house have little to do with one another. But this stands in marked contrast with the general images for the five groups of idioms in Experiment f that overall share very similar characteristics. We know from Experiment 2 that the similarity in people’s general images for idioms with similar meanings is not due to their figurative meanings. It appears, then, that the difference in subjects’ mental images for idioms and literal phrases is best attributed to the constraining influence of conceptual metaphors that link idioms with their figurative meanings. People taci&- recognize that idiomatic meanings are motivated by diEerent cd;nceptual metaphors and this knowledge affects the mental images constructed for idioms. As we originally expected, subjects were also much less consistent in their responses to the probe questions about their images of literal phrases than was found in Experiment 1 with idioms. Across the different idiom groups, subjects gave similar responses 80% of the time to the Causation probes, 4PY .O of the time to the Manner 62% of the time to the Intentionality probes, -.._ probes, 20% of the time to the Consequence probes, 17% of the time to the Negative Consequence probes, and 53% of the time to the Reversibility probes). Each of these proportions was lower than found in Experiment 1 when subjects responded to questions about their images for idiom phrilses, +antly so for the Causation, Consequence, Negative CcasequeFCe, and ibility probes, ts(23) = 4.84, 3.61, and 3.61 respectively, with p < -05 for each comparison. Subjects’ knowledge of their images for liteTa phrases was clearly iess uniform and detailed than was the case-for idiomatic 3xpressions. Closer analysis of the specific responses to the probe questions for each group of literal phrases indicated important differences “with the responses

60

Table 6.

. W. Gibbs Jr. and J. E. O’Brien

Proportions of most frequent responses for literal phrases (Experiment 3) Question Anger General Image:


.34

Causation: Intentionality: Manner: Consequences: Negative Consequences: Reversibility:

Some force causes a substance to be released from a container Anger/frustration Action is not intentional Action is performed without force Decision is made Normalcy, nothing The action is not difficult to reverse

COW01 General Image: Causation: Intentionality: Manner: Consequences: Negative Consequences: Reversibility:

Some act is performed to impose order It’s a job. told to do it Action is intentional Action is performed with force Improvement over old situation Nothing is changed The action is not difficult to reverse

.42 .13 .g3 44 65 .64 .49*

Secretiveness General Image: Causation: Intentionality: Manner: Consequences: Negative Consequences: Reversibility:

Somethicg is contained or hidden To protect object Action is intentional Object will stay in place Looks nice Object is somewhere else The action is not difficult to reverse

.4,6 .ll ;!39 .56 .21 .30 .61

Imariit) Genera’ Image: Causation: Intentionality: Manner: Consequences: Negative Consequences: Reversibility:

Something is lost Forgetfulness, inattention Action is intentional Action is performed without force Time delay No delay The action is difficult to reverse

.43 .17 .51 .43 .16 .43 .57

Some container is opened and its contents revealed For fun or play Action is intentional Action is performed with force Succeed in performing action No change The action is difficult to reverse

.45

Revelation General Image: Causation: Intentionality: Manner: Consequences: Negative Consequences: Reversibility:

*Two subjects were unsure as to the reversibility of the action and consequently of subjects agreeing with this judgment is less than 50%.

.ll 51 51 .12 .38 51

.25 .65 .46 .61 .59 .51 the proportion


61

obtained in Experiment 1. Table 6 presents the most frequent mental images and respor lses to the probe questions of each group of literal phrases. Collapsing acrossboth the general images and probe questions, there were no significant differences between the conformity proportions for the five groups of stimuli (35 for Anger, 51% for Control, 45% for Secretiveness, 39% for Insanity, and 50% for Revelation). None of these conformity proportions differed significantlv from chance (with a null hypothesis of 50). However, the comparison of interest, once again, was between these data and the most frequent images and responses to the probe questions obtained for idioms in Experiment 1. Consider, for example, subjects’ r-sponses to Intentionality probes for their images of literal controls for the rIns&nityidioms. These data showed that most subjects viewed the actions in their images as being performed intentionally. But when subjects imagined Irsanity idioms in Experiment I, they

view&d

the

actinne VA13

;FB III.

their LAhVII

lmaees lAlAU6VO

?e

f&U

!-kee “VCU~

ee&x~meed

y

v.

A.“I

&.AVU

raairrtant;/rnnllsr UIIAAICVAICIVIAUUJ

(over 95%). This difference in subjects’ responses makes sense given that tanhnr TMV that the conceptual rneruyalvl 1lVu XVW WaA A IS AN INVISTBLE FORCE motivates the )meanings of Insanity idioms, such as go to pieces and bounce off iize walls, but not literal phrases such as go! to chrrrch and bounce off thefloor. A similar difference can be seei: in the subjects responses to the Negative Consequence probes for their images of the Anger idioms and the corresponding literal versions of these expressions. Subjects suggested that there would be a very definite consequence if the action did not take place for the Anger idioms (e.g., hit the ceiling), but not for the literal phrases (e.g., hit the table). The data from Experiment 3 suggest, then, that subjects formed different kinds of mental images for literal phrases than for idiomatic expressions. Subjects were more consistent in their beliefs about their images for idiomatic =n ~+a*~1 phrases th,,, 11LtiIu1 versions because the meanings of idioms are motivated by specific metaphorical mappings of different source and target domains. These conceptual metaphors provided tighter constraints on the formation of mental images for idioms and allowed for greater consistency in subjects’ knowledge of their mental images for these figurative expressions.

The aim of this research was to suggest a motivated account for why many idioms have the figurative meanings they do. Following Lakoff (1987), we explored people’s mental images for idioms to see if conventional images and metaphors provide a motivating link between an idiom and its figurative

acit knowledge of the metaphor= revealed through a detailed examinafigurative phrases. We specifically ioms with similar figurative meanut of the bug) were constrained by uence people’s intuitions and unders lend support to the idea that people’s otivated by conventional images end showed that subjects have consistent general images for idioms h similar figurative Imeanings.At the same time, &bjects have specific kno dge about the details of their m.ental images for idioms. This knowledge was revealed in subjects’ responses to probe questions about the causes and effects of the actions that occurred in their dynamic images for idiomatic expressions. We suggested that much of people’s knowlonstrained by different concepD IS A CONTAINER, IDEAS IS A POSSESSION) form part ve meaning (e.g., the link beconstrain people’s understand!ing of the events within their conventional images for idioms. Experiments 2 and 3 considered alternative hypotheses regarding people’s images of idioms. Experiment 2 showed that subjects do not solely use their of the figurati meanings of the idioms when they form mental ese phrases. nowing the figurative meaning of an idiom does not by itself account for why people have such systematic know1 of their images of idioms. The data from Experiment 3 indicated that le were much less consistem in their mental images for literal rases than for idioms and do not possess the same degree of knot/ledge out their images for lit phrases as they do for idiomatic expressions. do not mean to suggest by the results of Experiments 2 and 3 that people use their knti;v!edge of conceptual metaphors only to make sense of idiomatic phrases. One could alternatively argue th 4 metaphors the MIND IS A PRESSURIZED CONT elicited when subjects form a mental image for “to get ;dngry”. Nothing in our study itself prevents this from occurring. Nevertheless, the lack of consistency in subjects’ mental images and responses to the probe questions in Experiment 2 suggests that conceptual metaphors were not instantiated to constrain subjects’ mental images Although anger is often conceptualized as heat in a pressurizeil container, an idea that could come to mind when anger

idioms and mental imagery

63

or “to get angry” is mentioned, this conceptual mapping is most clearly elicited in the presence of specific source and target information as when speak-

ers refer to the explosion of anger by expressions such as or elicitation of conceptual metaphors s IS SS-URIZED CONTAINER strongly nts n their mental images for idioms but wot for simple paraphrases of their figurative definitions. A similar point can be made regarding the results of Experiment 3. There are clearly many literal expressions that are motivated by conceptual metaphors (e.g., Hi9 anger kept building up inside him, We got a rise out of him). However, conceptual metaphors do not apparently motivate the meanings of the literal cant:ol phrases used in Experiment 3, such as spill the peas, in the same way that conceptual metaphczrs

motivate the figurative meanings of idiomatic phrases, such as spifl the b~rans. For this reason, subjects’ descriptions of their mental images for literal phrases and their answers to the probe questions aJ,out these expressions in Experiment 3 were much more varied. The rc=u 3 1~0~ of additional analyses of the first-encountered idioms in Experiment 1 indicated that the greater variability in subjects’ mental images and responses to the probe questions in Experiments 2 and 3 was not simply due to the smaller number of items used in each category in these latter two studies. Although conceptual metaphors don’t exist simply for the interpretation of idioms, the resul?s of our studies show that people’s mental images for idioms were constrained by various conceptual metaphors that provide part of the link between an idiom and its figurative meaning. Traditional theories of idiomaticity provide no reason why people should have consistent images for idioms. According to this view, the figurative meanings of idioms are arbitrarily determined. Although some idioms may have once had metaphorical origins, their metaphoricity has been lost over time ard idioms are only “dead” Lnetaphors with their figurative meanings being ar;itr-arily stipulated in each speaker’s mental lexicon. For example, the idiomatic phrase How your SPK&has an arbitrarily stipulated meaning “to get angry”. Because idioms are noncompositional, speakers should have few intuitions about how the words in blow your stack relate to this phrase’s figurative meaning or why the idiom means what it does. But speakers’ intuitions that a certain idiom “makes sense” (i.e., that it makes sense for blow your stack to mean “to get angry”) are based on the independently existing elements in our conceptual system that link an idiom to its figurative meaning (Lakoff, 1 conceptual metaphors . stack is specifically motivated by t CONTAINER, and ANGER IS EAT IN A PRESSU . Each of these met2 horic;ll mappings of source and target domains exist independently in cur conceptual system and function to structure many

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aspects of our thought, reasoning, and imagination (Lakoff, 1987; Johnson, 19$7). Speakers who understand the figurative meanings of idioms normally arious conceptual metaphors that allow them to. have tacit knowle g angry” or “revealing secrets” through particular refer to ideas such ng of a source domain on to a target &main (e.g., “anger” and beans on to “secrets”). Although most heated gas or steam on recognize the metaphorical mot ation that links eople do not cons6 ioms with their respective figurative meanings, our an sis of people’s s that indep tly existing conceptual make sense ways they often do. any linguists and psychologists might accept that there is some motivated and their figurative meanings without seeing the need for postulating anyth conceptual metaphor. Even if the controls in Experiments 2 and 3 eliminated the independent roles of figurative and literal meanings in motivating su ects’ images for idioms, the combinetion of literal (“spill beans”) and figu tive (“reveal secret”) meanings might operate to produce the mental images that subjects reported for idioms in Experiment 11. o not see this possibility as a viable explanation of the present findo;t generally, there is just no way that some combination of an idiom’s literal and figurative meanings can by themselves converge to produce the same kind of genera: images and the highly consistent responses to the probe questions tha were observed for each ca.tegory of idiom in Experiment 1. Consider the evelation idioms spill the beans, let the cat out of the bag, blow ow do the literal meanings of the words spill, let out, combine with the idea of “reveal”, and the words hems, cats, and lids combine with the notion of “secrets” to people with such specific knowledge about the causation, intentionality, manner, consequences, and reversibility of people’s mental images for these different idioms? There is nothing in the relationship between spilling and “revealing” or beans and “secrets” to specify that pressure is the cause UTthe action in people’s mental images for spill the beans or that the action is intentional, performed with force, and difficult to reverse. Furthermore, nothing in the link between the literal words and the figurative meanings of these phrases specifically suggest that the container for the beans, the cat, or the pot with a lid to all be rally about the size of a human head. tly, though, any relationship between the literal and figurat not be seen as a simple correlation between word meanraction between twc different conceptual domains v here one domain (e.g., revelation of secrets) is being structured in terms of the spilling of beans, letting cats out of bags, and so on). Talking


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about one domain of experience in terms of another in all of the idiom categories we have examined is accomplished through conceptual metaphors, IND IS A CONTAINER and IDEAS ARE PHYSICAL ENTITIES, where there is a unidirectional mapping of information from a source to a target domain. Thus, secrets are conceptualized in terms cats, but not the other way around. It is this unidirectional m parate domains (the defining feature conceptual metaphor) that constrains people’s mental images for idioms a provides a motivated reason for why idioms mean what they do. The combination of an idiom’s literal and figurative meanings alone is clearly insufficient by itself to limit subjects’ mental images for idiomatic phrases. Other critics have argued that if there is a conceptual mapping between, say, our knowledge of anger and our understanding of heat in pressurized GER IS HEAT IN A PRESSURIZED CONTAINER), then e other idioms besides flip your lid, blow your stack, get so on that reflect this type of conceptual metaphor (Ortonv, 1988). The fact that sensible metaphorical combinations, such as blow yor~r lid, do not exist suggests one argument that the systematicity in idioms lies at the lexical, not conceptual, level (Ortony, 1983). We take issue with the argument that the lack of certain convent expressions for different conceptual metaphors casts doubt on the dent existence of such conceptual mappings. It turns out that speakers often view many idioms as retaining their figurative meaPtings when novel l~~xical items are substituted (Gibbs, Nayak, Bolton, & Keppel, 1989). For ex people do not believe that changing let the cat out of the bag to let the of the sack severely disrupts its idiomatic interpretation. Thus, the ft.3 that let the cat out of the sack or blow your lid don’t presently exist as i dent idioms in the langu e does3 mean that such idioms are not potentially e meaningfulness of such novel idioms testifies to meaningfui to spe&ei.si the systematicity of the conceptual metaphors motivating the figurative meanings of these figurative phrases. Our argument that the meanings of idioms are partially motivated eptual metaphor certainly doesn’t accoun ventional images and c any idioms are not well motivate by conceptual aspects of idiomaticity. __---1w.a .mpn..V‘. metaphor (e.g., kick the bucket) and speakers do not have w4-f~rmpr’ tal images for some idioms (e.g., make the scene). Furthermi)re, the p--esent findings showing that people’s mental images for some idioms are constrained by conceptual metaphors does not imply that the meanings of idioms should be predictable (cf. Lakoff, 1987). But the meanings of many idioms can be motivated so that an idiom’s figurative meaning “makes sense”. Although we do not predict that there should be hems, as opposed to peas, in spill the

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R. W. Gibbs Jr. and .I.E. O’Brien

beans, the use of buns makes sense given that beans are hard to retrieve al metaphors MIND IS A CONENTITIES provide a sensible link ur knowledge of spilling beans and the idea of revealing secrets. It may simply be a convention of the language that speakers use beans rather than peas to talk of “revealing secret”. This point does not detract from our general argument that the consistency in people’s mental images for different idioms with similar figurative meanings is partially due to the metaphorical mappings between diverse domains (e.g., minds and containers, ideas and food) that motivate why many idioms mean what they do. ccount of idioms we ave described also fits in nicely with other on the syntactic beha or of idioms (cf. Lakoff, 1987). Some idioms ev are syntactically productive because their parts can be rearranged without disruption of these figurative meanings (e.g., lay down the law can be passivized into the law was laid down). However, other idioms are syntactically fro;Len because they lose their nonliteral interpretations when syntactically altered (e.g., John kick4 the bucket cannot be changed into the bucket was kicked by John). Gibbs and Nayak (1989) observed that idioms whose parts e independent contributions to their overall figurative meanings were more syntactically productive than idioms whose parts do not have independent meanings. Speakers’ beliefs about the analyzability of idioms plays an determining the syntactic flexibility of idioms (also see important role eppel, 1989). The fact that speakers have knowledge, for example, t lid in blow the lid off *ras a referent in both a e image) and in a target domain (the MIND IS metaphor) provides one reason why people view blow the alyzable and syntactically productive B Speakers’ abilities to form detailed mental images for idioms and to answer various questions tapping into their knowledge of their images may directly relate to the grammatic rsatility of idioms. do not believe that our evidence on speakers’ mental imagery for idioms specifically implies that people normally form mental images during idiom comprehension. Although there is psycholinguistic evidence suggesting imagery plays some role in text processing for concrete sentences (C)‘Neil aivio, 1975; Paivio & Begg, 1971). other research ind that understanding high-imagery sentences slows down processing s, Eddy, & Schwanenflugel, 1980) and that reading times are longer for subjects with strong imagery abilities than for low imagers (Denis, 1982, 1988). It is unlikely that people construct mental images for idioms during normal processing given that idioms are comprehended so rapidly (Gibbs, 1980, 1985, 1986; Gibbs a Gonzales, 1985; Swinney & Cutler, 1979). Young children and non-

l


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native speakers of a language may actively form mental images for idioms as a way of making sense of such phrases. But experienced speakers easily understand the figurative meanings of idioms without necessarily forming mental images. In a similar fashion, we don’t believe our results suggest that listeners actively instantiate different conceptual metanhors when comprehending idioms. Speakers’ familiarity with-idioms alldws them to recognize their figurative meanings without any awareness that different conceptual domains are metaphorically mapped to motivate the meanings of these stock phrases.

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Normative data for idiomatic expressions.

The meaning of smoking for patients with mental disorder.

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Memory distortion for traumatic events: the role of mental imagery.

Relationship between mental imagery and sporting performance.

Meaning, memory structure, and mental processes.

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Imagery, concreteness, and meaningfulness as determiners of the emotionality of words when meaning is controlled.

Editorial: The Metaphorical Brain.

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Editorial: Mental Imagery in Clinical Disorders.

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Seeking and experiencing meaning: exploring the role of meaning in promoting mental adjustment and eudaimonic well-being in cancer patients.

Visual mental imagery in psychopathology--implications for the maintenance and treatment of depression.

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Body image, visual working memory and visual mental imagery.