Imagination and dissociation in hypnotic responding.

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International Journal of Clinical and Experimental Hypnosis Publication details, including instructions for authors and subscription information: http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/nhyp20

Imagination and Dissociation in Hypnotic Responding Kenneth S. Bowers

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University of Waterloo , Waterloo, Ontario, Canada Published online: 31 Jan 2008.

To cite this article: Kenneth S. Bowers (1992) Imagination and Dissociation in Hypnotic Responding, International Journal of Clinical and Experimental Hypnosis, 40:4, 253-275, DOI: 10.1080/00207149208409661 To link to this article: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00207149208409661

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IMAGINATION AND DISSOCIATION IN HYPNOTIC RESPONDING’ KENNETH S. Downloaded by [Moskow State Univ Bibliote] at 11:07 12 November 2013

University of Waterloo, Waterloo. Ontario, Canada

Abstract: A neodissociative model of mind is better equipped than a social-psychological model to deal with the complexities of hypnosis, and of human behavior generally. It recognizes, as Coe’s (1992) model does not, that behavior can be more automatically activated than strategically enacted. In particular, Coe’s emphasis on human behavior as purposeful and godl directed does not distinguish between goal-directed behavior that serves a purpose, and goal-directed behavior that is performed on purpose. It is this distinction that permits goal-directed behavior to be dissociated From a person’s conscious plans and intentions. In addition to offering a critique of Coe’s “limited process” view of hypnosis, 4 main points are made in the interest of developing a slightly modified, neodissociation view of hypnosis. First, it is argued that goal-directed fantasies are more limited in their ability to mediate hypnotic responding than is commonly appreciated; as well, they do not seem to account for the nonvolitional quality of hypnotic responding. Second, it is argued that hypnotic ability is not unidimensional, with compliance and social inHuence more apt to account for the low than for the high hypnotizable’s responsiveness to suggestion. Third, compared to low hypnotizables, the hypnotic responsiveness of high hypnotizables seems more likely to result from dissociated control. In other words, for high hypnotizables, hypnotic suggestions may often directly activate subsystems of cognitive control. Consequently, the need for executive initiative and effort to produce hypnotically suggested behavior is minimized, and such responses are therefore experienced as nonvolitional. Fourth and finally, while goal-directed fantasies typically accompany hypnotically suggested responses, they are in many cases more a marker of dissociated control than a mediator of suggested effects.

Hypnosis has always attracted people who regard it as somehow “spebeyond ordinary cial,” in the sense that it is mysterious and uncanny understanding. Moreover, as Coe (1992)points out in his article, some of these people have considerable economic self-interest in convincing the public at large that hypnosis is special in this sense. The tendency of hypnosis to attract uncritical, self-interested zealots has not made legiti-

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Manuscript submitted November 1, 1991; find revision received June 19, 1992. ‘This article was written during a sabbatical year at Harvard University. ?he author would like to thank Erik Woody for his invaluable help in rethinking some issues that 1 had taken for granted, Robin Hargadon for letting me present some preliminary findings from her dissertation, and Patricia Bowers for her careful reading of, and helpful comments on. earlier drafts of this paper. ’Reprint requests should be addressed to Kenneth S. Bowers. Ph.D.. Department of Psychology, University of Waterloo, Waterloo, Ontario N2L X l . Canada.

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mate investigation of it any easier, as every serious worker in the field would surely agree. So, I should stress at the outset that Coe and I are of one mind on a critical point: hypnosis is a perfectly ordinary part of the human condition (Brown, 1991)-and, therefore, subject to scientific understanding. In this sense, there is nothing special about hypnosis. Coe argues against hypnosis as special, however, in quite another sense. In particular he dismisses the “special process” of dissociation as entirely unnecessary for a scientific account of hypnosis. According to Coe (1992). “social-psychologicalviews argue that hypnotic behavior is similar to other forms of social and psychological behavior . . [p. 2291.” Thus, “Hypnotic responsiveness is viewed as Ss’ purposeful, goal-directed strivings to present themselves as hypnotized [p. 2291.” Notice, however, that the word “purposeful” in the previous sentence does not distinguish between behavior that “serves a purpose,” and behavior that is enacted “on purpose” - that is, intentionally (cf. K. S. Bowers. 1991; K. S. Bowers & Davidson, 1991).Conflating these two notions of “purposeful” is problematic. To illustrate, eating to obese excess may be regarded as serving a purpose in some sense; but surely it stretches a point to argue that the obesity is intended. Pervin (1991) has also argued that some behavior can be regarded as “purposive and goal-directed but not as intentional or volitional. . . [and] that intention involves selection among goals and/or plans as opposed to a fixed action pattern directed toward some goal [p. 10, emphasis added].” Accordingly, I can agree with Coe that hypnotic responses represent goaldirected behavior. Unlike Coe, however, I want to argue that at least some hypnotic behavior is less intended (selected) than it is activated by the hypnotist’s suggestions. Moreover, I will develop the idea that, insofar as goal-directed behavior can be dissociated from one’s conscious plans and intentions, dissociation becomes an important concept in understanding hypnotic responsiveness. What follows, then, is a position that takes seriously the two quite distinct meanings of “purposeful” introduced above. Along the way, I will place both hypnosis and dissociation in a historical and conceptual context that will hopefully make both concepts seem less “special.”

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lnvolved lmugining and Hypnotic Responding More than 200 years ago, the Franklin Commission proposed in its famous report on animal magnetism that “Imagination without . . . magnetism produces convulsions, and . magnetism without imagination produces nothing [Franklin Commission, 1784, quoted in Tinterow, 19701.” Especially within the last 45 years, beginning with Arnold’s (1946) classic paper, this early emphasis on imagery, imaginative involvement, or absorption in fantasy-dominated thinking has been regarded as an important if not crucial factor in conceptualizing hypnotic phenomena (e.g., J. R. Hilgard, 1970/1979). For instance, it has been repeatedly

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demonstrated that, compared to low hypnotizable individuals, highs tend to report more vivid images and imaginings on standardized imagery tests (e.g., Coe, St. Jean, & Burger, 1980; Crawford, 1982; Sutcliffe, Perry, & Sheehan, 1970). Moreover, high hypnotizables seem prone to more unrealistic, fantasy-dominated experience in their every day life than their low hypnotizable counterparts (Lynn & Rhue, 1988; Spanos & McPeake, 1975; Tellegen & Atkinson, 1974). One understanding of the relationship between hypnosis and imagination argues that “imaginative involvement constitutes a generalized cognitive ability central to the performance of hypnotic tasks [Spanos & McPeake, 1974, p. 6891.” Thus, it is virtually de rigueur to invoke some relevant imagery or imagined state of affairs as part and parcel of a hypnotic suggestion. For instance, suggestions for hypnotic analgesia might mention that S’s hand and arm are made of wood or rubber. Subsequently, individuals who show significant reductions in pain often report having had such fantasies. It therefore seems eminently reasonable to assume that such imaginings mediated the hypnotic analgesia. In light of available evidence, however, this assumption has proved much less compelling than anticipated. The first clear indications that imaginative involvement in goal-directed fantasies did not mediate hypnotic responsiveness began appearing in the 1970s. Several investigators found that while hypnotic responding was ordinarily accompanied by goal-directed fantasies, instructed increases in goal-directed fantasies did not generate corresponding increases in Ss’ hypnotic responsiveness (Buckner & Coe, 1977; Lynn, Snodgrass, Rhue, & Hardaway, 1987; Spanos, 1971; Spanos & Barber, 1972). The argument WJS that if goal-directed fantasies were an important causal mechanism responsible for hypnotic responding, instructed increases in goal-directed fantasies should increase hypnotic responding. The failure to obtain this predicted outcome cast some doubt on the assumption that goal-directed fantasies mediate hypnotic responsiveness. Accordingly, advocates of a social-psychological model of hypnosis advanced a fallback interpretation of goal-directed fantasies. According to this view, Ss misattribute their hypnotic responses to goal-directed fantasies rather than to their own initiative and effort. In other words, Ss continue to make the same reasonable mistake that investigators of hypnosis have made for almost 50 years. For the person who is hypnotized, however, this misattribution importantly contributes to the illusion that hypnotic responses are enacted nonvolitionally (Buckner & Coe. 1977; Lynn e t al., 1987; Lynn, Rhue, & Weekes, 1990; Spanos & Gorassini, 1984). The effortless, nonvolitional quality of hypnotic responding is considered by most investigators to be an important feature of it (e.g., P. Bowers, 1982; Weitzenhoffer, 1978) that requires an explanation. The misattribution hypothesis seemed to satisfy this need.


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In sum, for the social-psychological view of hypnosis, the function of goal-directed fantasies shifted from something that helps to generate a hypnotic response to something that helps create the illusion that it is nonvolitionally enacted. In either case, however, various images and goaldirected fantasies are part and parcel of the hypnotized person’s overall cognitive strategy for deliberately and effortfully producing a hypnotic response that is nevertheless experienced as effortless and nonvolitional. Unfortunately, even this modified, fallback version of goal-directed fantasies is ill-equipped to deal with some crucial findings reported by Zamansky (1977) and his colleagues (Bartis & Zamansky, 1990; Zamansky & Clark, 1986). In all three of these investigations, Ss are presented with hypnotic suggestions and instructed to imagine a state of affairs that opposes or contradicts the suggested state of affairs. To illustrate, in Zamansky and Clark (1986), Ss received hypnotic suggestions that their dominant arm was rigid and impossible to bend. Prior to receiving this target suggestion, S was asked to practice bending the arm, and to note how bending the arm felt. After being administered the target suggestion, Ss were encouraged to remember how it felt to bend the arm, and to imagine vividly how it would feel to do so again. The Ss were also told to bend the non-dominant arm, and to apply this experience to resisting the target suggestion. Occasional reminders of this original suggestion were interspersed throughout. The results of this study (Zamansky & Clark, 1986) were quite clear. Most high hypnotizable Ss responded to the suggested rather than to the imagined state of affairs. This was true even though Ss reported “having had vivid and continuous contradictory cognitive experiences as they were attempting the target suggestions [p. 2081.” As well, Ss expressed considerable amazement when they were unable to resist the suggested state of affairs. Zamansky and Clark (1986)concluded that “despite popular opinion . . . it appears that it is not necessary for the good hypnotic S to be fully ‘absorbed’ or to be ‘imaginatively involved . . . in the direct suggestions of the hypnotist to perform these suggestions successfully [p. 2091.” Notice that the hllback position on goal-directed fantasies is also undermined by these findings: hypnotically suggested responses cannot readily be misattributed to an imagined state of affairs that directly contradicts the suggested state of &irs. Thus, the nonvolitional character of hypnotic responding must be due to something other than misattribution of hypnotic responses to accompanying goal-directed fantasies. I shall return to this problem in due course. For now, however, another of Zamansky‘s findings requires our consideration. Bartis and Zamansky (1990)followed up an earlier study (Spanos, Weekes, & de Groh, 1984) and manipulated whether the suggested effect and accompanying imaginings were congruent or incongruent. Basically, they replicated the Spanos et al. (1984) finding that high hypnotimble Ss



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responded to the suggestion regardless of whether the imagined state of affairs was congruent or incongruent with the suggestion.‘ In addition, however, Bartis and Zamansky (1990) found that low hypnotizable Ss were more responsive to hypnotic suggestion under congruent than they were under incongruent conditions. This finding suggests the possibility that high and low hypnotizable Ss differ in how they produce hypnotic responses - with imaginative involvement being more important for the limited hypnotic responsiveness of low hypnotizables than it is for the much greater responsiveness of highs. Clearly, this understanding implies a complete reversal of the conventional wisdom that superior powers of imaginative involvement and absorption are the main reasons for high hypnotizables’ superior hypnotic responsiveness. Hypnotic Ability is Not Unidimnsional

The possibility that high and low hypnotizable individuals have different routes to hypnotic responding is consistent with the factorial Complexity that virtually every factor analytic study of hypnotic ability finds (e.g., E. R. Hilgard, 1965; McConkey, Sheehan, & Law, 1980; Monteiro, Macdonald, & E. R. Hilgard, 1980). Despite the consistency of this finding, there has been a kind of implicit working assumption among most investigators (including the present author) that differences in hypnotic responsiveness are a matter of degree rather than of kind. The wellknown difficulty in finding reasonably high correlates of hypnotic ability (e.g., K. S. Bowers, 1976/1983), however, may well derive, at least in part, from the fact that hypnotic ability is not unidimensional, and that people who differ in hypnotic ability differ in how they generate responses to hypnotic suggestion. Woody, K. S. Bowers, and Oakman (1992) have recently argued that the factorial complexity of hypnotic ability complicates any attempt to understand why a specific individual responds in accordance with hypnotic suggestions, and/or how a specific hypnotic response to a particular item is mediated. Their analysis points to a fundamental ambiguity of standardized scales that was emphasized earlier by Tellegen (197811979). He argued that hypnotic ability may consist of at least two factors: ‘The Ss in both investigations may well have responded to the suggested rather than the imagined state of affairs because it was the clear intention of the hypnotist that they do so. The translation of such perceived intentions and expectations into suggested effects is well worth working out in detail (Kirsch, 1991; Sheehan. 1971). Whatever the outcome of that analysis, however, it is unlikely to threaten Zamansky‘s conclusion that involved imagining is less critical to an understanding of hypnotic responsiveness than is widely held. Moreover, from the fact that Ss in the Zamansky and Spanos investigations responded in accordance with the suggested rather than the imagined state of a i r s , it does not follow that “highly hypnotizable hypnotic subjects maintain [strategic] control over their behavior and thereby shape it to conform to the social impression they seek to convey [Spanos et al., 1984, p. lo].” Indeed, comments like this simply state a basic assumption of the socialpsychological position and are regularly invoked to “explain” virtually any conceivable empirical outcome.


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Factor one could be a genuine hypnotic responsivenessfactor, reflecting individual differences in the tendency to experience suggested events as real. Factor two could be a compliance dimension, reflecting individual variations in the tendency to comply overtly, regardless of one’s subjective experience, with perceived social demands associated with suggestions [Tellegen, 1978/1979, p. 2281. Consistent with a suggestion by Tellegen (1978/1979), Balthazard and Woody (1992) embarked on research that sought external indices of different factors of hypnotic responsiveness. They found that Tellegen’s Absorption Scale (TAS) (Tellegen & Atkinson, 1974)was especially useful for this purpose. As is well known, TAS correlates consistently, but modestly, with hypnotic ability (see de Groh, 1989; Nadon, Hoyt, Register, & Kihlstrom, 1991 for reviews). At least with the Harvard Croup Scale of Hypnotic Susceptibility (HGSHS) of Shor and E. C. Orne (1962), the correlations are seldom more than .30, and often lower. Balthazard and Woody (1992), however, found that Ss’ absorption scores correlated much higher with some of the difficult items of the scale than with easier items. Their “spectral analysis” demonstrated “that the strength of the relationship of absorption to hypnotic performance is related to the difficulty of the hypnotic performance [p. 271.” Indeed, they imply that absorption may be an excellent measure of “true” hypnotic ability - that is, the factor of hypnotic responsiveness more concerned with genuine, internal alterations in perception, cognition, and subjective experience than with behavioral compliance to external demand characteristics. Other investigations have also indicated that restricting the range of hypnotic ability to the most responsive individuals increases the correlation of hypnotic ability with other variables - for example, a questionnaire of “hypnotic-like” experiences (Shor, M. T. Orne, & O’Connell, 1962), and a composite measure of creativity in women (K. S. Bowers, 1971). Note that if hypnotic ability were unidimensional, restricting its range should decrease correlations of hypnotic responsiveness with such external variables. Accordingly, the force of these findings is that the hypnotic responsiveness of high hypnotizable individuals may be mediated by different underlying mechanisms than the responsiveness of low hypnotizables. As a supplement to these findings, Woody e t al. (1992) recently indicated that easy items on standardized scales of hypnotic ability are in fact far more related to social-psychological influences than K. S. Bowers (1983; K. S. Bowers, 1984a), for example, has previously allowed. In particular, I have often cited a paper by Moore (1964) to indicate that hypnotic ability is not the same thing as social influencibility. The basis for this conclusion is the low correlations Moore (1964) found between various measures of social influencibility and hypnotic ability. A re-examination of Moore’s (1964) paper (Woody e t al., 1992), however, indicated that a measure of social influencibility (responsiveness to the false feed-


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back of peer-group norms) correlates .66 with postural sway - one of the easiest items of the Stanford Hypnotic Susceptibility Scale, Form A (SHSS:A) of Weitzenhoffer and E. R. Hilgard (1959). Moreover, responsiveness to false norms loaded high on the same factor as did three relatively straightforward motor suggestions (postural sway, arm rigidity, and hands moving together). Thus, social influence and/or compliance factors may well contribute to responsiveness on easy items of standardized hypnotizability scales. Woody and Oakman (1991)recently presented additional findings indicating a correlation of .77 between the ease of passing an item on HGSHS and its degree of relationship to an external, nonhypnotic measure of social influence (suggestibility resulting from the ingestion of a nonalcoholic but alcoholic-tasting beverage). In other words, the greater the proportion of people who pass an HGSHS item, the higher the item's correlation with nonhypnotic social influence. This finding lends support to the notion that relatively easy items on standardized scales of hypnotic ability are strongly influenced by social psychological factors, which seem unlikely to engender responsiveness vis a vis more difficult items. If the above pattern of findings are confirmed in h t u r e research, it raises the possibility that a social psychological model of hypnosis applies reasonably well to Ss who are low to moderate in hypnotic ability (K. S. Bowers, 1991), but is progressively less relevant the more hypnotic ability increases to a level required to pass truly difficult suggestions, such as auditory hallucinations or anosmia to ammonia. On the other hand, the underlying mechanisms involved in experiencing such difficult suggestions may become less pertinent in explaining the responsiveness of individuals low in hypnotic ability. By the same token, high hypnotizables may well pass easy items for qualitatively different reasons than do low hypnotizables. As well, it is possible that difficult items are occasionally passed by people who simply comply with the demand characteristics inherent in the suggestions - especially when the demands are made very strong and unambiguous (Bates, 1992; Bates, Miller, Cross, & Brigham, 1988; Bowers I%Davidson, 1991; Wagstaff, 1991). The general thrust of the evidence, however, is beginning to clarlfy that hypnotic responsiveness is not unidimensional, and that there are qualitatively different processes that typically generate the hypnotic responding of individuals low and high in hypnotic ability (K. S. Bowers, 1991). At this point, however, an apparent conflict begins to emerge. On the one hand, Bartis and Zamansky's (1990) findings strongly suggest that involved imagining may be a more important mediator of hypnotic responding for low than for high hypnotizable Ss. On the other hand, the Balthazard and Woody (1992) findings - together with some earlier suggestive findings cited above - indicate that absorbed imagining is a much better correlate of more difficult items of a hypnosis scale, and of


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hypnotizability within a restricted range of high hypnotizable Ss. HOW can this apparent contradiction be reconciled? One possible explanation is that for high hypnotizables, involved imagining serves more as a marker of hypnotic responsiveness than as a mediator of it. Thus, deeply hypnotized Ss who are given typical suggestions for hypnotic analgesia - including suggestions that their arm and hand are made of rubber or wood - may report both reduced pain and that they vividly imagined their arm and hand as made out of rubber or wood. The fact that they report both effects, however, may mean that they are responding to two different and independent suggestions. By this understanding, the more hypnotically responsive Ss are. the more able they are to experience both suggested analgesia and the accompanying suggested imagery. Law hypnotizables, on the other hand, are less able to respond to either suggestion, though to the extent that they muster relevant imagery as part of a motivated effort to reduce pain, it may help them to mediate their relatively modest reductions in pain. The above proposal was clearly anticipated in a prescient paper by Coe and a colleague (Buckner & Coe, 1977). It seems fitting to quote him on this point, because his contribution to this special issue of ZJCEH is the ruison d’etre of the present paper: GDF (goal-directed fantasy] may simply be an artifact of hypnotic suggestions, that is, GDF-type imaginal processes may be observed during hypnosis because they are suggested in the suggestioni content. The present findings tend to support this notion in that high GDF content produces more GDF reports. The Ss with high susceptibility may merely be responding to GDF suggestions as they respond to other suggestions, thereby creating the false impression that GDF (another suggested response) is responsible for high suggestibility [Buckner & Coe, 1977, P. 341.

The above account makes sense of the fact that relevant goal-directed fantasies accompany but do not necessarily mediate the hypnotically suggested target behaviors of high hypnotizable Ss (cf. Kirsch, 1991). At the same time, however, the account leaves unexplained why some individuals are so hypnotically responsive both to target suggestions, and to suggestions for accompanying goal-directed fantasies. E. R. Hilgard’s (1973, 1977) neodissociation model of hypnosis is helpful in this regard. Accordingly, a critical synopsis of his model follows.

A Neodissociation Model of Hypnosis Re-Examined In ways that will soon become apparent, E. R. Hilgard’s neodissociative model takes the experience of nonvolition quite seriously as evidence of an underlying dissociative process. As well, E. R. Hilgard (1977) and others of a more traditional persuasion (e.g., J. R. Hilgard, 1970/1979; Sheehan, 1979)also regard imaginative involvement in the suggested state of affairs as an important basis for hypnotic responding. There is, however,



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a seldom-noted paradox in invoking both imaginative involvement and dissociation as central to an understanding of hypnosis (cf. Spiegel, 1990). Imaginative involvement implies that the presence, in consciousness, of various ideas, images, and goal-directed fantasies potentiates hypnotic responding. Dissociation, on the other hand, has historically implied that the absence, from consciousness, of influential ideas, images, and fantasies is somehow important for understanding hypnosis and various forms of dissociative disorders with which hypnosis has often been conceptually associated (K. S. Bowers, 1991; Erdelyi, 1985). This paradox has led to some confusions about the role of dissociation in hypnosis (and in psychopathology) that are important to address and clarify. The amnestic basis of dissociation. E. R. Hilgard (1977) proposed that amnesia or an amnesia-like barrier is one of two underlying mechanisms of dissociation. For example, in a paper on analgesia (E. R. Hilgard, Morgan, & Macdonald, 1975), some hypnotized Ss who demonstrated suggested reductions in pain to cold pressor retrospectively reported pain levels (via the hidden observer) that were appropriate to the stimulus intensity - thereby implying that the original analgesia resulted from amnesia for pain that was subsequently reversed. The authors are quite explicit on this point: “the concealment of pain that can be recovered through the automatic [i.e., hidden observer] reporting methods must be amnesic in nature [p. 2861.” In addition, Hilgard et al. (1975) argue that in “the hypnotized subject [there is] a genuine cognitive effort involved in conforming to the demands of the experiment. It is by no means a completely passive experience controlled by the hypnotist [p. 2861.” Hypnotically analgesic S s typically report, however, that the pain reductions they experienced are effortlessly rather than effortfully achieved. Consequently, though it is never explicitly stated, the effort involved in reducing pain, as well as the pain itself, must be subject to an amnestic process. My position is that the amnestic basis of dissociation is problematic, at least in the context of analgesia, for several reasons. First, the amnesia in the E. R. Hilgard et al. (1975) investigation is not suggested, so that spontaneous amnesia must be the presumed basis for hypnotic analgesia. Spontaneous amnesia, however, is quite rare - at least in the laboratory (E. R. Hilgard & Cooper, 1965) - and it is unclear how something rare can routinely account for something as relatively common as hypnotic analgesia. Secondly, E. R. Hilgard et al. (1975) recognize that the pain was never conscious in the first place, so “it differs from risual posthypnotic amnesia [p. 2881.” The difference, however, is not further specified. In fact, an internal analysis examining the relationship of amnesia scores and analgesia indicated that “the hypothesis that amnesia would predict the differential pain reports was not supported [p. 2871.” Third, the amnesia is highly selective: the pain and the cognitive effort involved to reduce it


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is hidden behind an amnesic barrier, but not the original suggestions for analgesia, nor the goal-directed fantasies that typically accompany the reductions in pain. In the absence of any specific suggestions for such selective amnesia, the reasons for it are not clear. Finally. according to E. R. Hilgard (1977). generating amnesia for experiences that would otherwise be quite salient takes considerable cognitive effort. Accordingly, the cognitive effort involved in generating amnesia for pain should interfere with the performance of a concomitant, secondary task that also requires considerable cognitive effort (cf. Stevenson, 1972). A recent investigation by Miller (1986; Miller & K. S. Bowers, in press; see K. S. Bowers, 1991, for a preliminary account), however, suggests that hypnotic analgesia does not impair performance of a competing cognitive task. On the other hand, reducing pain via a cognitivebehavioral intervention (Turk, Meichenbaum, & Cenest 1983)did impair performance on this task presumably because such interventions involve effortful strategies of pain control that divert cognitive resources from the competing task (Farthing, Venturino, & Brown, 1984; McCaul& Malott, 1984). Accordingly, if hypnotic analgesia involved strategic efforts to reduce pain and/or to produce amnesia for it, performance on the secondary task should be impaired. This did not occur - implying that hypnotic analgesia does not involve high level cognitive effort for which Ss are amnesic. The above concerns cast doubt on the amnestic basis for dissociation at least in the context of hypnotic analgesia. E. R. Hilgard (personal communication)s has recently concurred in this judgment. All in all, a dissociative account of nonvolitional hypnotic responding that depends on amnesia seems to work no better than the misattribution hypothesis does for a social-psychological model. Dissociated control. The second dissociative mechanism proposed by E. R. Hilgard (1977) fares much better. According to his neodissociative model of hypnosis, the experience of nonvolition is part and parcel of a hypnotic response: it reflects an alteration in the hierarchy of cognitive control that generates behavior. At the top of this control hierarchy are executive and monitoring functions, to which subsystems of control are ordinarily subservient. These lower subsystems of control typically enact strategic action sequences that are planned, initiated, and coordinated at the executive/monitoring level. For present purposes, control subsystems can be conveniently viewed as action or experience schemas that require little or no attention to be activated. Accordingly, they can also be more or less directly and automatically activated by ideas, thoughts, or images that do not themselves need to be fully represented in consciousness (cf. Bargh, 1989; Uleman, 1989). ‘E. R. Hilgard, personal communication, October. 1991.



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A fictional account of such unintended activation occurs in Wolfe’s (1987) recent novel, The Bonfire of the Vanities. Near the beginning of the book, the main character emerges from his opulent home on a dark and stormy night with the ostensible purpose of taking his dog for a walk. In fact, however, getting out of the house served another purpose: by calling his paramour from a public telephone booth, he hoped to avoid detection by his wife. Unfortunately, he mistakenly dials his wife’s telephone number rather than the intended one. His wife answers the phone and immediately discerns what her husband had tried to hide (viz., that he was having an affair). From this inadvertence nothing good but a wonderful novel follows. Misdialing a telephone number in this way may be an infrequent occurrence. When it happens, however, the familiarity of the person and his/ her telephone number is obviously a prerequisite. Presumably, thoughts of the person (perhaps in the “Bonfire” case, preoccupation with evading the wife’s detection) directly activate the associated telephone number (see Heckhausen & Beckmann, 1990; Norman, 1981; Reason, 1979 for a scientific treatment of such action slips). Clearly, we have here an illustration of a controlled action sequence - dialing a familiar seven-digit telephone number - that is dissociated from higher levels of control. Such dissociated control (K. S. Bowers, 1990, 1991; K. S. Bowers & Davidson, 1991) can generate behavior that has nothing to do with one’s plans, intentions, or goals, and, in rare instances, can completely subvert them - sometimes with truly tragic results (e.g., Raginsky, 1969). E. R. Hilgard’s (1973, 1977)model proposes that dissociated control can also occur when control subsystems are directly activated by suggestions administered to a hypnotized person. These suggestions are typically represented in conscious experience; so too are the suggested effects and accompanying goal-directed fantasies. Absent from consciousness, however, is the experience of volition that ordinarily connects behavior with its antecedents and anticipated consequences. The subjective experience of volition reflects executive control over behavior, which, according to E. R. Hilgard’s model, is bypassed when subsystems of control are directly activated by suggestion. Notice that the absence from consciousness of willful effort to produce the suggested state of affairs is not a result of amnesia. According to the model, executive effort is not involved in generating the suggested effect in the first place, so it is simply not subject to recall. In sum, E. R. Hilgard’s second, non-amnestic basis for dissociation reflects an alteration in the hierarchy of cognitive control, such that suggested effects are directly activated by hypnotic suggestion, thereby bypassing executive effort and control, and withal, the experience of volition.


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Resolving Some Perplexities This neodissociative model makes good sense out of the perplexity, mentioned earlier - namely, that hypnotically suggested effects are typically accompanied, but not necessarily mediated, by relevant goaldirected fantasies. The model suggests two distinct accounts of this state of affairs. First, as previously mentioned, the more hypnotizable individuals are, the more responsive they will be to suggestions for analgesia and for counter-pain imagery. In other words, each of these effects can be directly and independently activated by hypnotic suggestions - without counter-pain imagery mediating analgesia any more than analgesia mediates counter-pain imagery. Second, the more hypnotically suggested analgesia is directly activated via dissociated control, the more cognitive resources remain available for becoming imaginatively involved in counter-pain imagery and related cognitions (K. S. Bowers, 1992, in press). This proposal follows from concepts prevalent in cognitive psychology. Controlled or strategic processing of information constitutes a considerable drain on cognitive resources, whereas automatic processing does not (Posner & Snyder, 1975; Schneider & Shiffrin, 1977).6Accordingly, while cognitive strategies undoubtedly reduce pain (e.g., Marino, Gwynn, & Spanos. 1989;Turk et al., 1983), they do so at considerable cognitive cost (Farthing et al., 1984; McCaul & Malott, 1984). The dissociated control of pain, on the other hand, is achieved more or less automatically - that is, without the need for cognitive strategies and effort. Consequently, the cognitive costs of reducing pain via dissociated control are minimized, and the individual’s available pool of cognitive resources should remain relatively undiminished (Miller & K. S. Bowers, in press). These resources might then be devoted to imaginative involvement in goal-directed fantasies that are consistent with reducing pain. Such imaginative involvement may well have analgesic effects that add to or interact in complex ways with the analgesia due to dissociated control. To summarize, the above two proposals imply that the most hypnotically analgesic Ss will also report the most counter-pain imagery and %e clean distinction between controlled and automatic processing cannot be sustained, and is currently undergoing considerable rethinking (e.g., Bargh, 1989; Fiske, 1989; Posner C Rothbart, 1989; Uleman, 1989). Subtle but important distinctions, especially regarding automatic processing, are beginning to proliferate. Such distinctions mean that conscious processes can have unconscious. automatic effects, which in turn may involve more complexity than at first envisioned. My hunch is that some of these subtleties will begin to inform theorizing in hypnosis. For example, Lynn and Rhue (1991, p. 611) have recently raised the possibility that behavior can result from unconscious intentions and strategies. By the old hard and fDst distinction, an unconscious strategy would be M oxymoron. If the notion of unconscious intentions and strategies catches on, it will be interesting to see how and in what sense they differ from dissociated control.



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fantasy, and for one of two reasons ( a )the more hypnotizable individuals are, the more directly responsive they are to suggestion-activated increases in counter-pain imagery and, independently, to suggestion-activated decreases in pain; (b) the more hypnotizable individuals are, the more they can reduce pain via dissociated control, leaving relatively undiminished cognitive resources available for imaginative involvement in counter-pain goal-directed fantasies. In either case, counter-pain imagery and fantasy serve more as a marker for the dissociated control of pain than as a mediator of pain reduction.

Some Predictions and Some Evidence An important corollary (and prediction) of the neodissociative interpretation of hypnotic analgesia should be emphasized. Strategic efforts to reduce pain are subject to fatigue and distraction (McCaul & Malott, 1984). The dissociated control of pain, however, should be less vulnerable in this regard, because cognitive initiative and effort are largely bypassed. Consequently, in the face of distractions and/or protracted pain, dissociated control of the pain should be easier to maintain than active strategic attempts to reduce it. Even when pain is short in duration, hypnotic analgesia based on dissociated control should have measurably lower cognitive costs than strategic efforts to reduce it. The latter prediction has in fact been confirmed (K. S. Bowers, 1991; Miller, 1986; Miller & K. S. Bowers, in press). I have argued that imagery and involvement in goal-directed fantasies may well serve more as markers of dissociated control rather than as mediators of hypnotic responding. If this is true, then suggestions proscribing the use of imagery in the production of hypnotic analgesia should have relatively little impact on t h e extent of pain reduction. In other words, evidence for imageless analgesia would constitute’ support for dissociated control as an important basis for hypnotic responding. Preliminary findings by Hargadon in my laboratory lend support to this line of thinking. Each of 14 carefully selected high hypnotizable Ss was run in two counterbalanced conditions. In a standard analgesia condition, hypnotized Ss were administered suggestions to reduce pain and to employ goal-directed imaginings to this end (e.g., “it will be as if your hand is made of wood”). In an imageless analgesia condition, hypnotized Ss were enjoined to reduce pain without any accompanying imagery, and told “that if a thought or image does occur, just let it go, without allowing yourself to focus on it.” The results of the experiment did not unequivocally favor one condition over the other: exactly one-half of Ss reduced pain 65% more in the standard than in the imageless analgesia condition; the remaining Ss reduced pain 44% more in the imageless than in the standard analgesia

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condition. It is important, however, to assess these findings against a backdrop of conventional wisdom - namely, that involvement in contrapain imagery mediates hypnotically suggested analgesia. This was clearly not true for the seven Ss who demonstrated more imageless than standard analgesia; for the remaining seven Ss, contra-pain goal-directed fantasies may have added to or interacted with the dissociated control of pain. For present purposes, however, I want to focus on the post-experimental reports of some Ss who showed superior imageless analgesia. One of them, when asked to compare imageless with standard analgesia, said: Not imagining anything is easier than trying to imagine there is something there. It worked better. Much better, just blocking. Much easier than imagining. The difference was astonishing. . . . It was just much easier not to think of anything at all, because then not worried about the image fading in and out. . . . Just much easier and more enjoyable.

Another S said: It seemed the less I did anything, like concentrate, the easier it was more effective. . . . T h e second time, I was concentrating on do this, d o that. It works, but not as effectively as the time when I was letting everything pus by. So I think the best thing is to let everything pass by you and not even think about anything.

A third S said that during standard analgesia, I really had to concentrate . . . [whereas during imageless analgesia] 1 didn’t have to d o anything. . . . I w u just gone - I didn’t feel anything. It was incredible. I was really gone. [During standard analgesia] I really had to work at it. It worked as well, but I redly had to work at it.

The Ss’ verbal reports can, of course, be mistaken or misleading. But we are often asked by advocates of a social-psychologicalposition to credit hypnotized Ss’reports of cognitive strategies; surely, then, we should also take such Ss seriously when they report that strategy use (i.e., contrapain imagery) seemed less effective than just letting the suggested effect happen. In sum, Hargadon’s preliminary findings clearly imply not only that imageless analgesia is possible, but that for one-half her Ss, contrapain imagery may detract from, rather than add to, the effectiveness of hypnotic analgesia. Needless to say, these preliminary findings need to be replicated with a larger sample. Pekala (1991), however, has independently reported a finding congenial with Hargadon’s. He found that high hypnotizable Ss (N = 32)generate imagery during the course of being administered HGSHS, whereas a smaller group of highs (N = 12) do not. Pekala does not distinguish between imagery as a marker of dissociated control versus imagery as mediator of suggested effects, but his findings do support the notion that there may well be two distinct kinds of high hypnotizables - those who do and those who do not generate imagery in the course of being hypnotized. While the proportion of imageless to imagery-prone Ss


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(12/32) is much smaller in his study than in Hargadon’s, he was arguably somewhat less stringent in the criterion for selecting high hypnotizable Ss. Moreover, he did not give specific suggestions for imageless production of suggested effects. The more carefully selected a sample of high hypnotizable Ss, and the more they are encouraged to generate suggested effects sans accompanying goal-directed fantasies, the more evident dissociated control should be as an important means of generating hypnotically suggested responses.

A Reprise, and Some Concluding Remarks about Coeb Model of Hypnosis I have offered a somewhat modified version of E. R. Hilgard’s neodissociation model as a way of understanding the complexities of hypnosis. Its fundamental assumption is that subsystems of control - which are ordinarily responsive to high level executive initiative and control - are also vulnerable to being activated by thoughts and ideas that may or may not be well represented in consciousness. In the case of hypnosis, however, the suggested state of affairs is typically well represented in conscious experience, as is the suggested effect and accompanying goaldirected fantasies. It is the absence, from consciousness, of the experience of volition that characterizes hypnotic behavior. This absence reflects the fact that executive effort and control was minimally involved in the production of the behavior. The main difference between E. R. Hilgard’s neodissociation model of hypnosis, and my modified version of it, is the rejection of amnesia as intrinsic to dissociation. From Janet (1901, 1907/1965)on, dissociation has implied that various ideas, fantasies, or imaginings were - virtually by definition -consigned to a non-conscious status via some kind of amnestic process (see also Erdelyi, 1985, 1990). I am proposing, however, that dissociation is not intrinsically a matter of keeping things out of consciousness - whether by amnesia, or any other means. Rather, dissociation is primarily concerned with the fact that subsystems of control can be directly and automatically activated, instead of being governed by high level executive control. To be sure, these activated subsystems can result in behavior, ideas, images, and fantasies that do not attract selective attention; or these behaviors and cognitions can be ego alien and threatening, and therefore subject to repression (K.S. Bowers, 1984b, 1987). In either case, the resulting thought and behavior will not be well represented in conscious experience. According to the current model, however, processes other than dissociation per se determine whether the products of dissociated control will be consciously represented (6.Frankel. 1990). In sum, a modified neodissociative model emphasizes that it is subsystems of control that are subject to dissociation. This is not to gainsay that ideas, thoughts, and fantasies can be both unconscious and influential; indeed, they can be automatically activated and unattended, while in turn

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automatically activating other thoughts and actions that may or may not become consciously represented. There is no question that a great deal remains to be specified in the above model. For example, the model assumes that relatively complex actiodexperience sequences can be unitized and activated more or less automatically. I think this is a reasonable assumption, in as much as “there is no agreement in the literature on whether there is an upper bound on the complexity of processes that may become automatic [Uleman, 1989, p. 4281.” On the other hand, it seems unlikely that a clean distinction between automatically activated and strategically enacted behavior can be maintained, so ultimately, gradations between these two extremes will be important to incorporate into our theorizing (cf. Uleman & Bargh, 1989). Even now, this possibility puts into perspective Coe’s (1992) comments regarding nonvolition. He avers that extraordinarily few people experience suggested effects as completely nonvolitional. “Thus, were the experience of nonvolition accepted as the criterion for making hypnosis special, ‘true’ hypnosis would be almost nonexistent in the general population [p. 2311.” Such an extreme criterion is not required, however, to identify the domain of hypnosis. Rather. it seems more reasonable to assume that some high hypnotizabies exemplify an extreme degree of dissociated control, with accompanying experiences of nonvolition being very salient. Other individuals demonstrate a graded admixture of automatic and strategic responding to hypnotic suggestions, with a corresponding amalgam of volitional and nonvolitional experience (P. Bowers, Laurence, & Hart, 1988). While I would be the first to admit that considerable work remains to be done by way of fleshing out a neodissociation model of hypnosis, Coe (1992) seems to be quite satisfied that a social-psychological view of it has virtually won the day. I think his confidence is premature. The basic metapsychological issue that distinguishes my position from Coe’s (1992) is this: the mind is simply more complex and more subject to multiple -and often competing -control processes than is evident in the social-psychological model. Indeed, even without respect to hypnosis, people often behave in ways that are puzzling to themselves -for example, in ways that are experienced as a breakdown of control, rather than an expression of it. As Lewicki (1986) has recently written: Consider, for example, situations that touch people to the quick or melt them into tears. People usually cannot control this kind of reaction. Sometimes they are even surprised and wonder why they have responded this way, because they consciously classify the situation as unrealistic, naive, or melodramatic. . . , but they still get tears in their eyes

. . . [p. 91.

In contrast to Coe’s (1992) emphasis on human behavior as inveterately purposive and goal-directed, the neodissociation model recognizes that



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automatic activation of control subsystems can subvert one’s conscious intentions and purposes rather than express them. Thus, the model corresponds very well to people’s everyday experience of conflict, of temptation and resistance, and of losing control (of one’s emotions, for instance). As the Biblical Paul laments, “I do not understand my own actions. For I do not do what I want, but I do the very thing I hate.” What could be more human than these everyday experiences of inner conflict and struggle for control - and how reasonable to assume that such experiences have something to do with the fact that underlying cognitive processes compete for expression in thought and behavior (cf. Baars, 1988). In the context of experimental investigations of hypnosis, suggested behavior can appear strategic, because it typically corresponds with the hypnotist’s suggestions. This correspondence, however, does not warrant a conclusion that hypnotized Ss strategically comply with the suggested state of d a i r s . Indeed, what is precisely at issue is the underlying basis for hypnotic responsiveness; so, the fact of hypnotic responsiveness does not entail a specific explanation of it (i.e., strategic compliance). In other words, the fact that people respond to hypnotic suggestions is not at one and the same time evidence that they “strategically guide their enactments . . . in order to convince themselves as well as the experimenter, that they are hypnotized [Spanos et al., 1984, p. 101.” Moreover, just because suggestions themselves are consciously represented does not necessarily mean that hypnotized s s enact suggested effects on purpose. Indeed, recent thinking in social cognition has made it increasingly clear that consciously represented information can have effects that are more automatically activated than strategically enacted (Bargh, 1989). I propose that hypnotic suggestions are one kind of consciously processed information that can more or less automatically activate suggested behavior. Nevertheless, it remains true that, insofar as suggested effects correspond to the hypnotist’s suggestion, they can be regarded - mistakenly in my view - as strategically enacted, pure and simple. Coe (1992) does not have many flattering things to say about the clinical enterprise, but the above comments suggest at least one way that clinicians have an empirical edge over researchers. Clinicians often use hypnosis to uncover and explore patient problems rather than to suggest specific behaviors. As a result, powerful and ill-controlled feelings of sadness, rage, etc. can sometimes emerge quite suddenly and unexpectedly (e.g., Ehrenreich, 1960;Watkins, 1971). While such expressions of affect may serve the purpose of advancing the patient‘s therapeutic goals, it seems far-fetched to view them as purposeful in the sense of being strategically and intentionally enacted. Hypnosis researchers, for their part, attempt to minimize the likelihood of such occurrences in experimental Ss (though every serious hypnosis researcher can informally report occasions when an experimental S de-

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fected from the laboratory agenda in ways that caused at least momentary concern). Limiting observation of hypnosis to controlled investigations of suggested behavior, however, risks the possibility that one’s conceptualization of the phenomenon will be overdetermined by the very constraints imposed to achieve experimental rigor. But a research program should probe hypnosis, not preempt it. I have argued this same point at length in the context of research in personality (K.S. Bowers, 1973), where situational accounts of it (Mischel, 1968)at one time threatened to undermine the very concept of personality (Carlson, 1971). It is consequently hard for me to read the social psychological literature on hypnosis without experiencing a sense of &jh uu. From my perspective, astute clinical observation has served as an important impetus to controlled investigations of hypnosis. In turn, formal research on hypnosis has served as an important corrective uis b vis the claims of clinicians. It is true that many of these claims have proved wanting. By the same token, it is by no means clear that the “limited process” model of hypnosis proffered by Coe will survive the growing appreciation of how complex human information processing is (e.g., Bars, 1988; Kihlstrom, 1984), and how these complexities create the possibility for multiple cognitive controls over human thought and behavior (E. R. Hilgard. 1977).

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Imagination und Dissoziation in der hypnotischen Reaktion Kenneth S. Bowers Abstrakt: Ein neodissoziiertes Modell des Verstandes ist besser ausgeriistet, mit den Kompliziertheiten der Hypnose und generellem, menschlichem Verhalten fertigzuwerden als ein sozial-psychologisches Modell. Es erkennt, da6 das Verhalten mehr automatisch aktiviert werden kann als sich strategisch abzuspielen, wfhrend C w s (1992) hlodell es nicht tut. Coes Betonung auf menschliches Verhalten als zweckvoll und zielgerichtet unterscheidet nicht zwischen zielgerichtetem Verhalten, das einem Zweck dient und zielgerichtetem Verhalten, das zuf Crund eines Zweckes durchgefiihrt wird. Es ist diese Unterscheidung, die es einem zielgerichteten Verhalten erlaubt, von bewuhten Planen und Vorhaben eines Menschen dissoziert zu sein. AuLr dem Angebot einer Kritik uber Coes Ansicht iiber den "begrenzten Prozess" der Hypnose, werden 4 hauptsachliche Punkte im Interesse der Entwicklung einer leicht modibierten, neodissoziierten Ansicht iiber Hypnose gemacht. Erstens wird diskutiert, dall zielgerichtete Phantasien in ihrer Fahipkeit, die hypnotische Reaktion zu vermitteln, begrenzter sind als gewbhnlich anerkannt; auBerdem scheinen sie nicht f i r die unwillkiirliche Qualittit der hypnotischen Reaktion verantwortlich zu sein. Zweitens wird diskutiert, daO die hypnotische Begabung nicht eindimensional ist, wobei Einwillipng und sozialer EinBu6 mehr dazu geeignet sind, fiir die Reaktionen auf Suggestionen bei schwach als fiir hoch Hypnotisierbare veranhvortlich zu sein. Drittens, im Vergleich zu schwach Hypnotisierbaren scheint die hypnotische Empninglichkeit bei hoch Hypnotisierbaren das Resultat der dissoziierten Kontrolle zu sein. Das heist, bei hoch Hypnotisierbaren m6gen hypnotische Suggestionen oft in direkter Weise untergeordnete Systeme der kognitiven K o n t d e aktivieren. As Folge davon wird die Notwendigkeit fiir Exekutivinitiative und Bemiihung, hypnotisch suggeriertes Verhalten zu produzieren, herabgesetzt, und solche Reaktionen werden daher als unwillkiirlich erlebt. Viertens und zum Schld, wiihrend es typisch fur zielgerichtete Phantasien ist, die hypnotisch suggerierten Reaktionen zu begleiten, sind sie in vielen Fallen mehr ein Merkmal der Dissoziationskontrolle als ein Vermittler der suggerierten Effekte.


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Kenneth S. Bowers Resumb: Un modble nbodissociatif de I'esprit est plus complet qu'un modble psychosocial et rend mieux compte de la complexitb de I'hypnose et du comportenent humain en general. Un modble nbodissociatif reconnait, contrairement au modble de Coe (1992), que les comportements peuvent &re plus actives automatiquement qu'accomplis de facon stratbgique. L'emphase particulibre que met Coe our I'arpect intentionnel et orient6 vers un but, des comportements, ne distingue pas entre les comportements orientes vers un but et sous tendus par un objectif, e t les comportements orientes vers un but exbcutbs intentionnellement. C'est cette distinction qui permet la dissociation entre les comportements orientbs et les plans et intentions conscients du sujet. En plus de prbsenter une critique du processus limit6 de Coe concernant I'hypnose, cet article dbveloppe 4 points amenant une vision I'egkrement modifiee d e la dodissociation. Premikrement, il est soutenu que les fantaisies orientbes vers un but, contrairement h ce qui est habituellement cru, ont une efficacitb plus limitbe de susciter la reponse hypnotique. Aussi, les fantaisies orientbes vers un but semblent inadbquates h contribuer h la qualit4 involontaire de la reponse hypnotique, contrairement A certaines idbes avancCes par les tenants du modele de I'hypnose issu de la psychologie sociale. Deuxiemement, il est avance que I'aptitude d 6 t r e hypnotise n'est pas unidimensionnelle et que les processus sous-jacents la reponse hypnotique des sujets faiblement et fortement hypnotisables seraient differents. La conformite, en particulier, jouerait plus chez les sujets faiblement hypnotisables que chez les sujets fortement hypnotisables. Troisihement, les reponses hypnotiques, A tout le moins pour certnins sujets fortement hypnotisables, semblent rbsulter d'un contr6le dissocik. Dans leur cas les suggestions hypnotiques activeraient directement des sous-systhnes de contr6le cognitif. 11 en rbsulte que I'effort et I'initiative d'exbcution sont minimises donnant ainsi une nature involontaire aux riponses. Q u a t r i h e m e n t et dernihrement, alors que les fantaisies orientbes vers un but accompagnent de facon typique les reponses suggbrees, elles sont, dans plusieurs cas, beaucoup plus un indicateur de contr6le dissocib qu'un initiateur des effets suggeres. Imaginacidn y disociacion en la respuesta hipnotica Kenneth S. Bowers Resumen: El modelo neodisociativo de la mente resulta mis apt0 que el modelo sociopsicologico para explicar las complejidades de la hipnosis y de la conducta humana en general. Reconoce, lo que no hace el modelo de Coe (1992), que la conducta puede ser m6s activada de un modo mls automltico, que establecida estrategicamente. Particularmente, el enfasis de Coe en concebir la conducta humana como intencionada y dirigida hacia una meta no permite hacer la distincidn entre la conducta dirigida H una meta que esti al servicio de un prop6sito y la conducta dirigida a una meta que es ejecutada a prop6sito. Es esta distincion lo que permite a la conducta dirigida a una meta estar disociada de 10s planes e intenciones concientes de una persona. AdemPs de criticar a Coe su concepci6n de la hipnosis como un "proceso limitado", se tratan cuatro puntos principales con el fin de desarrollar una 6ptica ligeramente modificada del modelo neodisociativo en hipn6sis. Primero: Se argumentaba que las fantasias dirigidas a un objetivo son m8s limitadas en su capacidad de mediar en la respuesta hipndtica de lo que se aprecia comunmente, asi como no parecen dar cuenta de la calidad no volicional de la respuesta hipnotica. Segundo se argument6 que la habilidad hipnbtica no es unidimensional siendo el consentimiento y la influencia social m8s apropiados para d a r cuente de la respuesta a la sugesti6n de 10s sujetos d e baja que de 10s sujetos de alta hipnotizabilidad. Tercero comparados con 10s de baja hipnotizabilidad, la respuesta hipndtica de 10s altomente hipnotizables, parece mhs probablemente ser el resultado de un control disociativo. En otras palabras, para 10s altamente hipnotizables, Ins sugestiones hipnoticas pueden a menudo activar directamente subsistemas de control cognitivo. Consecuentemente la necesidad de iniciativa y esfuerzo para producir una conductn hipnoticamente sugerida es minimizada y tales respuestas son experimentadas como no voluntarias. Cuarto y finalmente, mientras que Ins fantasias dirigidns acompahan las respuestas sugeridas hipnoticamente, en muchos C ~ S O Sson mds un marcidor del control disociado que un mediador de efectos sugeridos.

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