Implicit Theories of Change and Stability Moderate Effects of Subjective Distance on the Remembered Self.

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research-article2015

PSPXXX10.1177/0146167215591571Personality and Social Psychology BulletinWard and Wilson

Article

Implicit Theories of Change and Stability Moderate Effects of Subjective Distance on the Remembered Self

Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin 2015, Vol. 41(9) 1167–1179 © 2015 by the Society for Personality and Social Psychology, Inc Reprints and permissions: sagepub.com/journalsPermissions.nav DOI: 10.1177/0146167215591571 pspb.sagepub.com

Cindy L. P. Ward1 and Anne E. Wilson1

Abstract Temporal self-appraisal theory suggests that people can regulate current self-view by recalling former selves in ways that flatter present identity. People critique their subjectively distant (but not recent) former selves, creating the illusion of improvement over time. However, this revisionist strategy might not apply to everyone: People with fixed (entity) beliefs may not benefit from critiquing even distant selves. In three studies, we found that implicit theories of change and stability moderate the effects of subjective distance on the remembered self. In all studies, participants rated past selves portrayed as subjectively close or distant (controlling calendar time). Incremental theorists (but not entity theorists) were more critical of their subjectively distant (but not recent) past attributes. We found the same pattern when measuring existing implicit theories (Studies 1, 2) or manipulating them (Study 3). The present research is the first to integrate temporal self-appraisal theory and the implicit theories literature. Keywords temporal self-appraisal, lay theories, implicit theories, memory revision, subjective time Received January 29, 2014; revision accepted May 22, 2015 Happiness is nothing more than good health and a bad memory. —Albert Schweitzer

Personal memories are a cornerstone of identity (McAdams, 1993; Wilson, Gunn, & Ross, 2009). Yet how someone perceives “who they are in the present” is largely influenced by who they thought they were in the past and what connections they draw between past and present selves (Albert, 1977; Conway & Pleydell-Pearce, 2000; Ross, 1989; Wilson & Ross, 2003). However, memories of former selves and events are ephemeral and subject to revision (Bluck & Levine, 1998; Loftus, 1996; Wilson & Ross, 2003). Because of memory malleability, people may sometimes construct a preferred appraisal of the past in the service of current identity, allowing them to view themselves in a desirable light. Temporal self-appraisal (TSA) theory (Ross & Wilson, 2002; Wilson & Ross, 2001) demonstrates how people often shift their appraisals of former selves in ways that help foster current positive self-regard. Specifically, people downplay subjectively distant (but not recent) past selves to highlight perceptions of improvement over time. When past selves seem recent, they are likely to be seen as having direct implications for current identity and be praised as highly as the

present; however, when a past self seems distant, it is viewed as holding fewer implications for present self and may be contrasted with the present instead. Because people often prefer to perceive a trajectory of constant improvement (Carver & Scheier, 1990), they can retrospectively downgrade an earlier self to create the illusion of continual improvement. Past research has demonstrated this pattern of retrospection (Wilson & Ross, 2001). Supporting the contention that this self-appraisal process is motivated by a desire to promote a favorable current self-view, evidence suggests that people downplay the past more for self than for others, and more when the attribute is personally important than unimportant (Wilson & Ross, 2001, Studies 4 and 5). However, other research suggests that not everyone holds the same beliefs about how people change over time (Dweck & Leggett, 1988; Ross, 1989). For instance, Carol Dweck and her colleagues (Chiu, Hong, & Dweck, 1997; Dweck, Chiu, & Hong, 1995a, 1995b; Dweck, Hong, & Chiu, 1993; 1

Wilfrid Laurier University, Waterloo, Ontario, Canada

Corresponding Author: Cindy L. P. Ward, Department of Psychology, Wilfrid Laurier University, 75 University Avenue West, Waterloo, Ontario, Canada N2L 3C5. Email: [email protected]

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Molden, Plaks, & Dweck, 2006; Plaks, Levy, & Dweck, 2009) have documented that people tend to hold either an implicit theory of change or of stability. Incremental theorists believe that core attributes are malleable and can be changed over time; entity theorists believe that core attributes are fixed and not much can be done to change them. Research on implicit theories of stability and change (Dweck et al., 1995a; Dweck & Leggett, 1988; Hong, Chiu, Dweck, Lin, & Wan, 1999) suggests that these theories function like knowledge structures (Chiu, Hong, & Dweck, 1997; Dweck et al., 1993; Plaks et al., 2009) such that people chronically lean toward using their preferred theory as a lens through which they interpret themselves and the world around them (Dweck et al., 1995a). A substantial amount of research has shown that these theories can be a powerful determinant of people’s social perception (Levy, Plaks, Hong, Chiu, & Dweck, 2001; McConnell, 2001; Molden et al., 2006), goals (Dweck et al., 1995a), motivation and self-regulation strategies (Dweck, 1999; Grant & Dweck, 2003; McFarland & Buehler, 2012), and many other outcomes (Burnette & Finkel, 2012; Chiu, Dweck, Tong, & Fu, 1997; Chiu, Hong, & Dweck, 1997; Kammrath & Dweck, 2006; Nussbaum & Dweck, 2008). Despite the large literature on the effects of implicit theories of change and stability, surprisingly little is known about the role of these implicit theories in people’s retrospective appraisals of themselves over time. Given that people’s memories are often biased by their present beliefs and goals (Ross, 1989; Ross & Wilson, 2000), it seems plausible that Dweck’s implicit theories of stability and change would play a pivotal role in how people remember and construct their identities over time. Specifically, incremental theorists (who believe attributes are changeable) may be particularly inclined to downplay subjectively distant former selves to create the appearance of self-improvement over time. However, entity theorists (who believe the core self is fixed) may be hesitant to criticize even distant past selves: If their attributes are stable, then casting aspersions on earlier selves could taint the present self with a similarly unflattering light. The current research examines how people’s implicit theories about change and stability may alter the TSA strategies people use in revising their memories of former selves. Although TSA theory has demonstrated that people have a tendency to retrospectively deplore the qualities of distant past selves (Wilson & Ross, 2001), we contend that implicit theories about the fixed or malleable nature of those attributes could meaningfully alter this pattern of retrospection in ways that have not yet been explored either in the literature on implicit theories (Plaks et al., 2009) or TSA theory (Peetz & Wilson, 2008).

Overview of the Present Research The goal of the present research is to examine the relationship between implicit theories (Dweck et al., 1995a; Dweck & Leggett, 1988) and how people view their personal attributes

over time: specifically, to determine whether endorsement of either an incremental (malleable) or entity (fixed) implicit theory is related to the derogation of past selves as predicted by TSA theory (Ross & Wilson, 2000; Wilson & Ross, 2001). The present research integrates these two theories by investigating implicit theories (both as individual differences and manipulated) as a moderator of people’s temporal appraisals of subjectively close and distant past selves across different domains.

Study 1 The goal of Study 1 was to examine the relationship between implicit theories and TSA past derogation tendencies; specifically, to determine whether participants’ personal endorsement of either a more incremental (malleable) or entity (fixed) implicit theory is related to how participants appraise their own past attributes. Because implicit theories have been shown to be domain specific (Chiu, Dweck, Tong, & Fu, 1997; Dweck et al., 1995a), we matched implicit theories to the attributes being evaluated. In the first study, we examined implicit theories of morality and assessed people’s ratings of their past moral attributes. People tend to be more critical of a distant past self than a recent past self (Wilson & Ross, 2001), and research shows that the subjective feeling of temporal distance can be more powerful than actual clock or calendar time (Ross & Wilson, 2002; Wilson & Ross, 2003). Thus, we subtly manipulated participants’ feelings of subjective temporal distance from a past self by leading them to think of the same past point in time (the beginning of term; approximately 10 weeks earlier) as either subjectively close or subjectively distant by altering the verbal description of that point in time (as in Wilson & Ross, 2001). An added benefit of manipulating subjective time (rather than actual months or years) is that calendar time—and real changes that might, in fact, accrue over time—is held constant. This allows us to disentangle illusory improvements from veridical ones. We hypothesized that incremental theorists (of morality) should downplay their subjectively distant past moral attributes but not their recent past moral attributes as the recent past may still hold implications for their current identity. In contrast, because entity theorists (of morality) hold the belief that their core moral selves do not change over time (Dweck & Leggett, 1988; Miller, Burgoon, & Hall, 2007; Plaks et al., 2009), we expect that entity theorists would hesitate to criticize any past moral attributes, close or distant, since doing so could be experienced as a direct attack on their core self.

Method Participants. One hundred twenty-three predominantly first year undergraduates (Mage = 18.6, SD = 1.1; 72 female, 48 male, 3 undisclosed) from a Canadian university were recruited to participate in an online study for course credit.1


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Ward and Wilson Because no gender effects were found in any study, gender is not included in the analyses reported. Measures Present and past moral attributes. First, all participants rated themselves, “relative to other people of your current age,” as they are now, within the past 2 weeks (i.e., the present), on a scale ranging from 1 (much less than most) to 11 (much more than most). Items included “how trustworthy are you now?” “how honest are you now?” and “to what extent do you live by your moral principles now?” Next, participants were asked to rate themselves on the same attributes as they were at a past point in time (the beginning of term; approximately 10 weeks earlier). Wilson and Ross (2001) demonstrated that the same point in time can be made to feel either psychologically close or far away simply by altering the phrasing of recall instructions. Half of the participants were asked to rate themselves as they were “all the way back at the beginning of the term” (distant past condition) and the other half were asked to rate themselves as they were “in the recent past, at the beginning of the term.” Participants’ moral attribute appraisals were averaged for present self (Cronbach’s α = .75) and past self (Cronbach’s α = .72). Higher numbers indicate more favorable evaluations. Subjective temporal distance. As a manipulation check, participants were asked to indicate their perceived subjective temporal distance from the beginning of the term: “Sometimes points in time in the past feel very far away, other times they feel very close, almost like yesterday. How far away does the beginning of term FEEL to you?” Participants reported their subjective distance from 1 (almost like yesterday) to 11 (distant past). Implicit theories. Participants completed a three-item implicit theory of morality measure (Dweck et al., 1995a), which has previously been shown to have high test–retest reliability (Hong et al., 1999). Participants indicated their agreement from 1 (strongly disagree) and 6 (strongly agree) with three statements: “My moral character is something basic about me and I can’t change it much,” “Whether I am responsible and sincere or not is deeply ingrained in my personality. It cannot be changed very much,” and “There is not much that can be done to change my moral traits (e.g., conscientiousness, uprightness, and honesty).” Items were reverse scored so that higher numbers indicate a more incremental (morality is malleable) perspective (Cronbach’s α = .83).2 Procedure. Participants completed the questionnaire package online in a single session. Participants rated present attributes first (as a baseline) and then were randomly assigned to evaluate a past self described as either subjectively recent or distant. Finally, they completed the subjective distance manipulation check, the implicit theories measure, and a demographics section consisting of age, gender, and ethnicity.

Table 1. Means and Standard Deviations for Implicit Theories Measures. Implicit theories Study 1—Moral domain Study 2—Moral domain Study 2—General person domain Study 3—Moral domain

M

SD

3.48 3.86 3.44 3.56

1.11 1.28 1.07 1.52

Note. 1 (strongly disagree) to 6 (strongly agree) scale. Higher scores indicate a greater endorsement of incremental theory.

Results and Discussion The main question of interest was whether entity and incremental theorists differed in their self-appraisals of distant past moral attributes versus recent past moral attributes. We predicted that both incremental and entity theorists would evaluate their close past moral attributes favorably because the recent past often still reflects on current identity (Ross & Wilson, 2000; Wilson & Ross, 2001). More importantly, we hypothesized that only incremental theorists (and not entity theorists) would downplay distant past selves as a means of highlighting self-improvement over time. Preliminary analyses. Implicit theories were measured at the end of the study (primarily to reduce possible demand characteristics that could be elicited by measuring them upfront); thus, we wanted to ensure that implicit theory scores were not affected by the manipulation of subjective distance. Implicit theories did not differ by condition, F(1, 121) = .50, p = .48. Means and standard deviations of implicit theories measures are included in Table 1. Manipulation check. We examined whether the subtle subjective distance manipulation (varying a few words in the description of the past point in time 10 weeks prior) affected subjective perceptions of distance. As expected, participants felt somewhat further away from the past when it was described as distant (M = 6.46, SD = 2.85) than when it was portrayed as recent (M = 5.74, SD = 3.03), F(1, 121) = 1.85, p = .18, η2 = .02; however, results did not reach significance.3 Since this measure came after additional past self-ratings, the effect of the manipulation may have dissipated somewhat when the manipulation check was assessed. Despite the equivocal manipulation check, we next tested the effect of the manipulation on the primary dependent variable (DV): past self-ratings of morality. Do implicit theories moderate the effect of subjective distance on past self-appraisals? Recall that we predicted that participants in the distant condition would be more critical of past selves than those in the recent condition but only when they held an incremental implicit theory (rather than an entity theory).


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8

Adjusted means for past aributes

Appraisals of current selves were measured prior to the distance manipulation, so we did not expect these evaluations to vary by condition. Our analysis strategy was to examine in multiple regression the interaction between distance condition and the continuous measure of implicit theories on participants’ appraisals of past selves, controlling for present self-appraisals as a baseline. However, prior to conducting the central analyses, we first sought to ensure that present self-appraisals did not vary by condition. A Condition (close past vs. distant past) × Implicit Theories multiple regression analysis with present moral self-appraisal as the DV established that neither the main effects nor the interaction was significant (ts < 1.12, ps > .26). Additional preliminary analyses revealed that participants’ ratings of their present and past moral attributes were highly correlated, r(123) = .76, p < .001, and overall (across conditions), participants appraised their past moral attributes (Mpast = 7.55, SD = 1.36) less favorably than their present moral attributes (Mpresent = 7.91, SD = 1.34), t(122) = 3.99, p < .001; Cohen’s d = .27. Next, to test our main hypothesis, we conducted a Distance Condition × Implicit Theories multiple regression analysis controlling for present self-appraisal. Baseline ratings of present moral attributes were standardized and entered at Step 1, and implicit theories of morality (the continuous independent variable) was centered as recommended by Aiken and West (1991) and entered in Step 2 along with subjective distance condition (close past vs. distant past) effect coded −1 and +1, respectively. In Step 3, we entered the interaction term: Distance Condition × Implicit Theory. No main effects for either the distance condition or implicit theory emerged (βs < −.02, ps > .77): As predicted, we found a significant interaction (b = −.16, β = −.12, p = .045, 95% confidence interval [CI] = [−.32, −.01]) suggesting that implicit theories moderate the effect of subjective distance on past self-appraisals. Effect size attributable to the addition of the interaction: Cohen’s f2 = .02. We examined simple slopes in each condition at 1 standard deviation (SD) above and below the mean for the implicit theories variable (see Figure 1 for interaction pattern). We expected that participants in the distant condition would be more critical of past selves when they held a more incremental theory (defined at 1 SD above the mean) than when they held a more entity theory (1 SD below the mean). Although simple effects fell short of significance, the overall pattern revealed, as expected, that incremental theorists were more critical of past selves in the distant past condition than the close past condition, b = −.41, β = −.14, p = .10, 95% CI = [−.90, .09] (this predicted difference was significant as a one-tailed test), whereas entity theorists did not differ by condition, b = .30, β = .10, p = .22, 95% CI = [−.18, .79]. Further, the reversal in the direction of slopes across conditions suggested that in the distant condition, past self-appraisals became more negative for those with a more incremental theory, b = −.15, β = −.12, p = .17, 95% CI = [−.37, .07], whereas in the close condition incremental theorists tended to be somewhat more

Close Past

Slope: β = .13, p = .14

7.9

Distant Past

7.8 7.7 7.6

β = -.14, p = .10

β = .10, p = .22

7.5 7.4

Slope: β = -.12, p = .17

7.3 7.2 Enty Theory

Incremental Theory

Figure 1. Study 1: Ratings of past moral attributes (student sample) controlling for present ratings.

positive than entity theorists, b = .17, β = −.13, p = .14, 95% CI = [−.06, .39].

Discussion TSA theory (Wilson & Ross, 2001) suggests that people can shift perceptions of former selves in ways that flatter or enhance the present self. According to this theory, the past will be downplayed when it feels sufficiently distant, but the recent past may still hold direct implications for current selfregard hence will not be critiqued. The findings from the current study suggest that although this prediction from TSA theory may hold for some people, others may find no selfenhancement value in derogating even a distant past self. Specifically, implicit theories seem to be an important moderator for how people depict their distant past selves. Indeed, only incremental theorists, who believe they can change and develop, and not entity theorists, who believe their core self remains stable, rated the distant past less favorably than the close past.

Study 2 The goal of Study 2 was to replicate the findings of Study 1 with a more diverse sample of participants and to extend findings beyond the domain of morality. We retained the measure of implicit theories of morality (Dweck et al., 1995a) and added a general person implicit theory measure capturing beliefs about how malleable or fixed people’s personality and core attributes tend to be (Dweck, 1999). We asked people to evaluate their past and present self both on moral attributes and on a number of positive personal characteristics (attributes drawn from Anderson, 1968) that people may consider to reflect aspects of their personality without focusing on any specific personality dimension per se. Because implicit theories tend to be domain specific (Chiu, Dweck, Tong, & Fu, 1997; Dweck et al., 1995a), we used moral implicit theories to predict moral past self-appraisals


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Ward and Wilson and general person theories to predict personality selfappraisals. Once again, we predicted that to maintain a high level of current self-regard, both incremental and entity theorists would evaluate their close past moral and personality attributes favorably but that only incremental theorists would retrospectively downplay their distant past moral and personality attributes.

Method Participants. One hundred twenty-two community participants (92 female, 25 male, 5 undisclosed; Mage = 26.7, SD = 10.21, ranging from 15 to 65 years of age) were recruited via psychology websites (e.g., In-Mind [http://www.in-mind. org/content/online-research] and Psychological Research on the Net [http://psych.hanover.edu/Research/exponnet.html]) as well as a local community trade forum (Kijiji) to participate in an online study for an opportunity to be entered into a draw for a $50 Amazon gift certificate. Measures Present and past attributes. Questionnaires and procedure were similar to Study 1; however, additional moral attributes were included, and general personality attributes were added. The four additional morality attributes were honorable/virtuous, ethical, truthful, and conscientious (Cronbach’s α = .88 for present attributes; α = .90 for past attributes). Moral domain items were interspersed with five general personality attributes: “how well do you adapt to new situations?” “how good-natured are you?” “how socially skilled are you?” “how self-disciplined are you?” and “how open-minded are you?”(Cronbach’s α = .67 for present attributes; α = .70 for past attributes). As in Study 1, participants first rated their present attributes and then rated themselves on the same attributes at a past point in time (the beginning of the year; approximately 16 weeks earlier). Half of the participants were asked to rate themselves “all the way back at the beginning of the year” (distant past condition) and the other half were asked to rate themselves “in the recent past, at the beginning of the year” (recent past condition). Subjective distance. As a manipulation check, we again measured subjective distance as in Study 1; participants first reported their feelings of subjective temporal distance from the past (the beginning of the year) by dragging a tab on a slider bar anchored at end points 0 (almost like yesterday) and 100 (distant past). In addition, we included a second conceptually similar measure of felt connection to past self; participants rated the overlap between past and present self using a pictorial scale (adaptation of Aron, Aron, & Smollan, 1992; Ersner-Hershfield, Garton, Ballard, Samanez-Larkin, & Knutson, 2009). Participants were asked to think about themselves as represented by a circle indicating “present self” and then to think about their “past self” (the self they

were at the beginning of the year) represented by a second circle. They indicated via eight pictorial choices ranging from 1 (no overlap) to 8 (full overlap) how much their past self (from the beginning of the year) “overlaps” with their present self. Implicit theories. Implicit theories can be domain specific (Dweck et al., 1995a) and, as such, are captured by different items specific to the domain of interest. Participants completed the morality implicit theories scale as in Study 1 (Cronbach’s α = .80), as well as 10 general person/personality domain items (Dweck, 1999) that include “I am a certain kind of person, and there is not much that can be done to really change that” [reverse scored] and “I can always change my personality” (Cronbach’s α = .93). Items were recorded such that higher numbers in both domains indicate endorsement of an incremental theory.

Results and Discussion We expected implicit theories in both the moral and personality domain to moderate TSA strategies whereby only incremental theorists (and not entity theorists) would downplay the subjectively distant past (but not the recent past). Preliminary analyses. Implicit theories of morality did not differ by distance condition, F(1, 120) = .81, p = .37, nor did general person implicit theories, F(1, 120) = .03, p = .87. Manipulation check. Similar to Study 1, we examined whether the manipulation of subjective distance affected subjective perceptions of distance from past self (at the beginning of the year). Subjective temporal distance and subjective overlap were correlated, r(111) = −.28, p = .004, but not so highly that it was clear they tapped the same construct; as a result, we examine each separately. As expected, participants felt further away from the past when it was made to feel distant (M = 60.48, SD = 28.51) than when it was made to feel close (M = 52.08, SD = 30.68), F(1, 117) = 2.39, but this effect did not reach significance, p = .125, η2 = .02. In addition, participants felt less overlap with their past selves in the subjectively distant condition (M = 5.08, SD = 2.22) than in the subjectively close condition (M = 6.05, SD = 1.92), F(1, 111) = 6.23, p = .014, η2 = .05.4 Do implicit theories moderate the effect of subjective distance on past self-appraisals? Morality domain. As in Study 1, we conducted multiple regression analyses to assess the Condition × Implicit Theory interaction term as a predictor of past moral self-appraisals controlling for present moral self-appraisals as a baseline. We first sought to ensure that present moral self-appraisals did not differ by condition. As in Study 1, a Condition (close past vs. distant past) × Morality Implicit Theories multiple regression analysis with present moral self-appraisal as the


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7.7

7.8

Close Past

Slope: β = .04, p = .56

8 β = .01, p = .85

7.6 β = -.31, p < .001

7.4 Close Past

7.2 7

Distant Past



8.2

7.5 7.3 7.1

β = .15, p = .12 β = -.22, p = .025

6.9 6.7

Slope: β = -.22, p = .06

Slope: β = -.28, p < .001

6.8

Distant Past

Slope: β = .16, p = .07

6.5 Enty Theory

Incremental Theory

Enty Theory

Incremental Theory

Figure 2. Study 2: Ratings of past moral attributes (community sample) controlling for present ratings.

Figure 3. Study 2: Ratings of past personality attributes (community sample) controlling for present ratings.

DV established that neither the main effect of condition nor the interaction was significant (ts < .47, ps > .64). A marginal main effect of implicit theory indicates that entity theorists rated their present moral attributes at the outset somewhat more favorably than incremental theorists, b = −.19, β = −.16, p = .08, 95% CI = [−.41, .03]. Additional preliminary analyses revealed that, as expected, participants’ ratings of their present and past moral attributes were highly correlated, r(122) = .79, p < .001, and overall (across conditions), participants appraised their past moral attributes (Mpast = 7.61, SD = 1.71) more unfavorably than their present moral attributes (Mpresent = 7.98, SD = 1.55), t(121) = 3.79, p < .001; Cohen’s d = .13. Next, as in Study 1, we tested our main hypotheses with a Condition (effect coded −1, +1) × Morality Implicit Theories multiple regression analysis controlling for present moral self-appraisal.5 Regression analysis revealed a significant main effect of condition (close past vs. distant past) indicating that moral attributes were rated less favorably when described as distant than as close, b = −.26, β = −.15, p = .005, 95% CI = [−.43, −.08]. Also, a main effect of implicit theories indicated that incremental theorists rated their past moral attributes less favorably than entity theorists, b = −.16, β = −.12, p = .02, 95% CI = [−.30, −.02]. More pertinent to our hypotheses, and consistent with Study 1, a significant Condition × Implicit Theories interaction emerged again, b = −.22, β = −.16, p = .002, 95% CI = [−.36, −.08]. Effect size attributable to the addition of the interaction: Cohen’s f 2 = .03. We broke down the interaction by examining the effects of condition at 1 SD above and below the mean for the implicit theories variable (see Figure 2 for interaction pattern). As expected, incremental theorists (1 SD above the mean) rated their past moral attributes significantly less favorably in the distant past condition than in the close past condition, b = −1.07, β = −.31, p < .001, 95% CI = [−1.56, −.57]. Entity theorists, defined at 1 SD below the mean, did not differ across conditions (p = .85). Furthermore,

incremental theorists made significantly more negative selfappraisals in the distant condition than did entity theorists, b = −.38, β= −.28, p < .001, 95% CI = [−.59, −.17], whereas incremental and entity theorists did not differ in their selfappraisals in the close condition (p = .56). General person domain. As in the morality domain, multiple regression analyses confirmed that present personality self-appraisals did not differ by condition. Neither the main effect of condition nor the interaction reached significance (ts < 1.40, ps > .16). A main effect of implicit theory indicates that incremental theorists rated their present attributes more favorably than entity theorists, b = .42, β = .30, p = .001, 95% CI = [.17, .67]. Additional preliminary analyses revealed that participants’ ratings of their present and past personality attributes were highly correlated, r(121) = .67, p = .01, and overall (across conditions), participants appraised their past personality attributes (Mpast = 6.93, SD = 1.55) less favorably than their present attributes (Mpresent = 7.24, SD = 1.54); t(121) = 2.56, p = .01, Cohen’s d = .20. Next, to test our main hypotheses, we conducted a Condition (effect coded −1, +1) × General Person Implicit Theories multiple regression analyses controlling for present personality self-appraisals. Again, regression analyses revealed the predicted interaction, b = −.27, β = −.19, p = .009, 95% CI = [−.47, −.07], suggesting that general person implicit theories moderate the effect of subjective distance on past personality self-appraisals. No main effects for either the distance condition or implicit theory emerged (βs < −.03, ps > .62). Effect size attributable to the addition of the interaction: Cohen’s f 2 = .03. Next, we broke down the interaction by examining the effects of condition at 1 SD above and below the mean for the implicit theories variable (see Figure 3 for interaction pattern). As expected, incremental theorists were more critical of past selves in the distant past condition than in the close past condition, b = −.67, β = −.22, p = .025, 95%


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Ward and Wilson CI = [−1.26, −.09], whereas entity theorists did not differ by condition (p = .12). Finally, across conditions, simple slopes revealed that incremental theorists made marginally more negative self-appraisals in the distant condition than did entity theorists, b = −.31, β= −.22, p = .06, 95% CI = [−.63, .01], whereas there was a marginal tendency for incremental theorists to rate their close past selves more favorably than entity theorists, b = 22, β = .16, p = .07, 95% CI = [−.02, .47]. Domain specificity. It has been found in previous research that implicit theories can be and are often domain specific (Chiu, Dweck, Tong, & Fu, 1997; Dweck et al., 1995a). One might expect, though, that some domains may be closely related. In the present study, we found that implicit theories of morality and general person implicit theories were highly correlated, r(122) = .55, p < .001, which came as no surprise. When we substituted one implicit theory for the other in the main analyses, it was found that implicit theories of morality interacted with condition to predict past personality selfappraisals, b = −.16, β = −.13, p = .05, 95% CI = [−.32, .001], and that general person implicit theories interacted with condition to predict past self-appraisals in the moral domain, b = −.27, β = −.17, p = .002, 95% CI = −.44, −.10]. This is some evidence against complete domain-specificity given the two overlapping domains. More importantly, however, when both theories were entered into a regression analyses simultaneously, only the most pertinent domain’s interaction with distance condition predicted the outcomes in that domain. For example, in the moral domain, only the Condition × Moral Theories interaction (and not the Condition × General Theories interaction) emerged significant, b = −.19, β = −.14, p = .024, 95% CI = [−.35, −.03]. In the general person domain, only the Condition × General Theories interaction (and not the Condition × Moral Theories interaction) emerged significant, b = −.26, β = −.18, p = .031, 95% CI = [−.49, −.02]. The findings from this study in the moral and general person domains with a more diverse public sample replicate the findings of Study 1 with the student sample and provide a clearer and stronger relation to predicted outcomes: Incremental theorists, who believe they can change and develop, remembered their subjectively distant past (but not close past) moral and personality attributes significantly more negatively than entity theorists did. Given that all participants remembered a self from 16 weeks prior and only the description (as a recent or long ago time) changed, it is not plausible that results reflect actual superior improvement on the part of incremental theorists. Rather, results appear to highlight differing revisionist tendencies on the part of incremental and entity theorists.

Study 3 Studies 1 and 2 demonstrated that individual differences in people’s chronic implicit theories predicted how they revised

their appraisals of past selves. Implicit theories of morality moderated the effect of subjective distance on past moral self-appraisals, and general person implicit theories played the same role for retrospective personality self-appraisals. Although chronic individual differences in implicit theories are consequential and important to examine, Studies 1 and 2 do not establish the causal effect of implicit theories on remembered selves. Accordingly, the goal of Study 3 was to examine causality by manipulating implicit theories of change and stability. Although people tend to chronically endorse either an entity or incremental theory, shifts in the dominant theory can be temporarily induced in experimental settings (Hong et al., 1999; Molden et al., 2006; Plaks & Stecher, 2007). One common manipulation provides participants with a bogus research article describing certain personal dimensions as either fixed or malleable. We adapted this standard manipulation (Molden et al., 2006) to reflect the morality domain. We presented participants with bogus Psychology Today articles describing research depicting morality as either a fixed and stable system (e.g., once a thief, always a thief) which reflects the entity perspective or depicting morality as a malleable system that can change and develop (e.g., turn over a new leaf) which reflects the incremental perspective. If the effects found in Studies 1 and 2 can be obtained by temporarily activating either theory, then this would provide evidence of the causal role of implicit theories in how people remember a past self.

Method Participants. One hundred seventy-six American residents below the age of 30 participated in this study via Amazon’s Mechanical Turk in exchange for $1.25. Eighteen participants failed the attention check in the survey, 14 participants failed the implicit theory manipulation check (i.e., summarizing article theme), and 4 participants did not complete the dependent measure, leaving 139 participants in the final sample (64 female, 74 male, 1 unknown; Mage = 24.55, SD = 3.39, ranging from 17 to 29 years of age). We opted to solicit only young adult participants for this study as a pilot test revealed that only younger adult participants were significantly swayed by an implicit theory of morality manipulation. Given that core attitudes and beliefs are less susceptible to persuasion and alteration in older adulthood, we chose to focus on the group whose beliefs were most likely to be altered by a brief persuasive message (Glenn, 1980; Sears, 1975). Measures Present moral attributes. Similar to Studies 1 and 2, participants rated themselves on moral attributes (trustworthy, honest, truthful, ethical, and living by moral principles) where higher numbers indicate more favorable self-ratings (Cronbach’s α = .89).


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Implicit theory induction. Introduced as a separate psychology study (and a task meant to serve as a break between Parts 1 and 2 of the first study), participants were asked to read a research article ostensibly from a popular psychology magazine, Psychology Today. Based on previous implicit theory manipulation studies (e.g., Molden et al., 2006; Plaks & Stecher, 2007), the articles were constructed to consistently support either an entity view (i.e., people’s morality is fixed and stable) or an incremental view (i.e., people’s morality is malleable and can change and grow). Participants were randomly assigned to one of the two versions. The entity version, titled “Morality, Like Plaster, Is Stable Over Time,” presented longitudinal genetic and behavioral research suggesting that basic moral characteristics are stable, despite effort and experience. The incremental version, titled “Morality Is Changeable and Can Be Developed,” presented the same research design but suggested instead that basic moral characteristics are environmentally driven and can fluctuate a great deal over a person’s life span. After reading the article, participants rated their understanding and provided a summary of the main theme of the article. Past moral attributes. All participants rated themselves as they were at a past point in time (the beginning of summer; approximately 12 weeks earlier; Cronbach’s α = .92). As in Studies 1 and 2, the same point in the past was described as either subjectively close or distant in time. Procedure. Participants completed the study online. Participants were first informed that they would be participating in two short psychology studies where the first study, a “personal attributes task,” would be broken down into two parts and the second study, “comments on a recent research article,” would serve as a break between Parts 1 and 2 of the attributes task. Participants completed demographics and then rated themselves on their current moral attributes. Next, participants were asked to “switch gears” and complete study 2, which would provide a break between the two parts of Study 1. At this point, they were randomly assigned to read either the bogus entity or incremental Psychology Today article and answer questions about it. They were then switched back to Study 1, and all participants were asked to rate themselves in the past on the same moral attributes: as they were “all the way back at the beginning of summer” (distant past condition) or as they were “in the recent past, at the beginning of summer” (recent past condition). Finally, participants completed the implicit theories of morality items from the Dweck (1999) self-theories scale as noted in Studies 1 and 2 as a check of the implicit theories manipulation.

Results and Discussion Implicit theory induction check. To test the effects of the implicit theory manipulation, we conducted a 2 (implicit

theories condition: entity vs. incremental) × 2 (distance condition: close vs. distant) ANOVA with participants’ selfreported implicit theories assessed at the end of the study as the DV. Those who read that morality changed over time appeared to endorse a somewhat more incremental implicit theory of morality (M = 3.83, SD = 1.49) than those who read that morality is fixed (M = 3.51, SD = 1.45), but this effect did not reach significance, F(1, 134) = 1.98, p = .16, η2 = .02. The interaction was not significant, but an unexpected main effect of subjective distance, F(1, 134) = 5.36, p = .02, η2 = .04, indicated that those in the distant condition endorsed the incremental perspective (M = 3.93, SD = 1.32) more than those in the close condition (M = 3.41, SD = 1.61). Given that our manipulation check for implicit theories of morality came after participants had a chance to reflect on either a close or distant past, it is not unexpected that thinking of the past as distant (rather than close) might also induce one to consider the many ways in which they have changed. How do implicit theories of morality alter remembered moral selves? In this study, we sought to examine the causal effect of implicit theories (manipulated instead of measured) and subjective time condition on past self-appraisals. Present self-appraisals were measured as a baseline prior to manipulations and should not vary by experimental condition. To assess this expectation, we conducted a 2 (implicit theories condition: entity vs. incremental) × 2 (distance condition: close vs. distant) ANOVA with present moral self-appraisal as the DV. None of the main effects or interaction reached significance (Fs < 1.19, ps > .28). As in Studies 1 and 2, tests of our main hypothesis control for present self-ratings as a baseline. Additional preliminary analyses again revealed that participants’ ratings of their present and past moral attributes were highly correlated, r(139) = .86, p < .001, and overall (across conditions), participants appraised their past moral attributes less favorably (Mpast = 8.33, SD = 1.56) than their present (Mpresent = 8.55, SD = 1.46); t(138) = 3.30, p = .001, Cohen’s d = .15. To test our main hypothesis, we conducted a 2 (implicit theory induction condition: entity vs. incremental) × 2 (distance condition: close vs. distant) ANCOVA with past moral self-appraisals as the DV controlling for present self-appraisals. No main effects for either the distance condition or implicit theory emerged (Fs < .77, ps > .38). Replicating our findings from Studies 1 and 2, we found a significant interaction, F(1, 134) = 3.95, p = .049, η2 = .03 (see Table 2 for the means and standard deviations). An analysis of simple effects supports our main hypothesis: Those induced with the incremental perspective rated the distant past significantly less positively than those in the close condition, F(1, 134) = 4.18, p = .043, η2 = .03. Furthermore, the distant past in the incremental condition was rated marginally lower than in the entity condition, F(1, 134) = 3.31, p = .07, η2 = .02. No other simple effects emerged.


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Ward and Wilson Table 2. Study 3: Adjusted Means for Past Moral Attributes (Controlling for Present Moral Attributes). Manipulated implicit theory Incremental Entity

51Study morality

Close past condition

Distant past condition

M (SD)

M (SD)

42Study general

8.48a (1.59) 8.30a (1.73)

8.09b (1.45) 8.45a (1.36)

32Study morality

Note. Different subscripts within a row indicate a significant difference.

Study 23morality 1 Overall

Study 51 morality

0 -0.5

0.25

1

Study 42 general

Figure 5. Meta-analysis forest plot showing the effect sizes and confidence intervals for the distance condition among entity theorists.

Study 32 morality Study 23 morality

Note. Individual contrasts (Hedges’ g) shown in gray. Overall random effects model effect size and confidence interval are shown at the bottom in black.

Overall 1

0 -1.25

0.25

-0.5

Figure 4. Meta-analysis forest plot showing the effect sizes and confidence intervals for the distance condition among incremental theorists. Note. Individual contrasts (Hedges’ g) shown in gray. Overall random effects model effect size and confidence interval are shown at the bottom in black.

Overall, the results of Study 3 replicate the findings from Studies 1 and 2 and suggest a causal relationship between implicit theories and how people appraise their past selves.

Meta-Analysis of the Experiments We performed a meta-analysis across studies on the central effect of distance condition among incremental theorists (1 SD above the mean, or manipulated). We used the program Comprehensive Meta-Analysis (Version 2; Borenstein, Hedges, Higgins, & Rothstein, 2005), as suggested by Cumming (2014). Sample ns and t-values for the simple effects were used to calculate the effect sizes. The meta-analysis used a random effects model, weighted by sample size, to calculate the overall effect size and 95% CIs. The overall effect of distance condition among incremental theorists was significant, z = −4.58, p < .001, standardized difference in means Hedges’ d+ = −.485, 95% CI = [−.69, −.28]. The forest plot of the meta-analysis may be viewed in Figure 4. The same meta-analysis was conducted on the effect of distance condition among entity theorists. The overall effect of distance condition among entity theorists was marginal,

z = 1.88, p = .06, standardized difference in means Hedges’ d+ = .18, 95% CI = [−.01, .37]. The forest plot of the metaanalysis may be viewed in Figure 5. Although our hypotheses focused on incremental theorists, this additional meta-analysis on the simple effect for entity theorists might serve to prompt further research investigating memory revision processes among people with a fixed mind-set.

General Discussion As creatures endowed with highly developed memory systems, and the capacity for foresight as well as hindsight, the temporal dimension of our lives seems of paramount interest and relevance. Notions of stability versus change in personality, tapped by the entity and incremental theories, relate to our fundamental temporality as human beings and our universal preoccupation with this issue. (Kruglanski, 1995, p. 303)

TSA theory suggests that people tend to downplay their past as a means for downward temporal comparison which helps to boost current self-regard. While the recent past may still hold direct implications for current self identity, the distant past is less likely to affect current self-regard and may instead be contrasted, such that an inferior past makes the present seem more impressive (Conway & Pleydell-Pearce, 2000; Wilson & Ross, 2001). The purpose of the present research was to examine an important boundary condition to this memory revision phenomenon. Incremental theorists (who believe attributes are malleable) demonstrated the TSA effect, criticizing the subjectively distant (relative to the close) past, whereas entity theorists (who generally believe their attributes are fixed) did not. Implicit theories of change and stability (Dweck, 1999; Dweck & Leggett, 1988) moderated the effects of subjective distance


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on memory revision (TSA; Wilson & Ross, 2001). In Studies 1 and 2, we assessed individual differences in implicit theories (of students and the general public) in the domains of morality and personality and found that only incremental theorists retrospectively downplayed the subjectively distant (but not subjectively close) past. In Study 3, we established the causal role of implicit theories by temporarily manipulating them; again, only those induced with incremental theory disparaged their distant (but not close) past. For incremental theorists, retrospectively downgrading a distant past may allow them to achieve an “illusion” of continual improvement—boosting present self-regard while remaining within the constraints of reality in the present (Kunda, 1990). Revising the past to achieve a sense of improvement may be more effective than continually enhancing the present in an ever-improving trajectory. Entity theorists were unable to flatter themselves in this way: likely because they believe that their attributes, at core (or perhaps, more generally), remain fixed over time. Thus, they might not derive a benefit from criticizing even a distant former self as those attributes could still reflect on a current, yet unchanging self. Could it be that the incremental theorists in our samples downplayed their distant past because this reflected actual change over time? It is conceivable that in real life, incremental theorists may notice improvements, or perhaps actually improve more over time. However, this explanation cannot account for the current findings for two reasons: First, we found the distant past-derogation pattern even among those temporarily induced with incremental theory; a temporary adoption of an incremental mind-set suggests that participants could not have really changed more over time. Second, subjective distance was manipulated in all three studies where the same point in time (from 10 to 16 weeks in the past) was made to feel either close or distant. Incremental theorists only derogated the past when it felt distant, arguing against the notion that the appraisals reflect actual change. Thus, our systematic differences have to be, at least in part, due to illusion. The replication of this general pattern for incremental theorists across all three studies strengthens our confidence in our hypotheses. We have no reason to presume that entity theorists do not share the motivation to view the self in a positive light; we simply predicted that, unlike incremental theorists, they would not rely on derogating the distant past as a way to flatter the present. Since entity theorists hold a notion that their core attributes are generally fixed and stable, they may be inclined to praise their distant past selves, which could serve as a positive reflection on their enduring qualities as they know themselves to be. While our findings are consistent with our expectation that an entity theorist’s distant past self would not be derogated, some of our findings for entity theorists suggest an unexpected alternate pattern. In the moral domain of Study 1 and the personality domain of Study 2, entity theorists appeared to show a tendency to enhance their distant past relative to their close past (the opposite pattern of

incremental theorists). The overall effect of distance condition among entity theorists was marginal. These effects for entity theorists were not predicted, thus must be interpreted cautiously; however, this information may serve future researchers who wish to investigate further. One possible explanation for the apparent enhancement of a distant past self is that entity theorists might achieve selfenhancement in the present by focusing on (or creating) the glory days of their past, given that they believe they are generally the same person now as they have been over time. Indeed, they may even feel that earlier performances are more diagnostic than their current ones for determining true ability (Butler, 2000). Consistent with this possibility, McFarland and Buehler (2012) found that, when motivated to repair a negative mood, entity theorists focus on a better past. Just as incremental theorists could alter their distant past downward, entity theorists might benefit more by altering their distant past upward to highlight their central good qualities that enduringly apply to current identity. Future research could further uncover how entity theorists interpret their past selves and the implications this has for present identity. We interpret our findings in line with TSA theory, proposing a motivated revision of the past (Wilson & Ross, 2001). Might construal level theory (Trope & Liberman, 2010), which describes how psychologically distant stimuli are represented in abstract whereas psychologically close stimuli are viewed concretely, account for current interaction patterns? It is not clear why an incremental theorist would be especially negative when in an abstract frame of mind, suggesting that this purely cognitive account may not explain this phenomenon. We contend that TSA theory and construal level theory can produce different effects consistent with the conditions most pertinent to their theoretical framework (e.g., Wilson, Buehler, Lawford, Schmidt, & Yong, 2012). Although patterns of memory revision are theoretically significant in their own right, such strategies can also have important downstream implications. For instance, it can be important at times to recognize one’s flaws: for instance, when approaching self-improvement opportunities and challenges after failure. Indeed, Dweck and her colleagues have decades of research documenting that incremental theorists display less learned helplessness in failure or challenge situations than entity theorists (Dweck et al., 1995a, 1995b; Dweck & Leggett, 1988). The current research suggests that one mechanism might be that incremental theorists disconnect from former selves during memory reconstruction. If they can non-defensively acknowledge the failure by “putting in the past,” they may be more able to move on without past failures threatening present identity or motivation. If someone is not willing to recognize past flaws, even in the distant past, they are unlikely to seek strategies for improvement. Research demonstrates that entity theorists get defensive when presented with negative feedback (Nussbaum & Dweck, 2008) and have difficulty learning from past mistakes. Again, an unwillingness to acknowledge their failings even in the


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Ward and Wilson distant past might limit entity theorists’ ability to productively learn from past mistakes. These processes should be investigated in future research, as they could help to account for the psychological role of temporal identity in task motivation, persistence, and helplessness. The results of the present research advance theory and suggest new directions of research both within TSA theory (Peetz & Wilson, 2008; Wilson & Ross, 2001, 2003) and the implicit theories literature (Dweck & Leggett, 1988; Dweck et al., 1995a, 1995b) by contributing to a more complex understanding of how people reconstruct their personal histories over time. The findings are an important contribution to TSA theory such that implicit theories present boundary constraints for distant-derogation effects. Indeed, across four sets of analyses, we only found a main effect of subjective distance condition in one sample (Study 2, morality domain). Notably, in our samples, participants’ average endorsement of implicit theories fell almost exactly at the scale midpoint (people were as likely to endorse entity and incremental theories). Only in Study 2’s morality domain did people show a tendency toward more incremental theories. This suggests that the main effects of subjective distance found by Wilson and Ross (2001) may have been partly contingent upon their choice of attributes—They had college students rate themselves on traits (maturity, self-reliance, common sense, etc.) that may be especially likely to be viewed as changeable by young adults. It also highlights the importance of considering domain and boundary conditions for these effects; had we not included implicit theories as a moderator in the current studies (but only the subjective distance manipulation), our results would have appeared to be failed replications of the original findings. Instead, we demonstrated a more nuanced replication of past findings and add to the understanding of mechanism and limiting factors. Furthermore, this work adds significantly to implicit theories research by uncovering differences in how entity and incremental theorists construct their temporal selves, a topic for which surprisingly little is known despite implicit theories’ clear relevance to the temporal dimension of self (Kruglanski, 1995). Although this work demonstrates one important way that these two theories inform one another, there is considerable potential for future research to enhance our theoretical understanding of both perspectives and to add nuance and complexity to our understanding of the mechanisms involved in memory, temporal identity, motivation and behavior.

Funding

Acknowledgments

Supplemental Material

We are grateful to Sarah Nutter, AnGie Yong, Hanna McCabeBennett, and Kathryn Schuett for help with data collection.

The online supplemental material is available at http://pspb. sagepub.com/supplemental.

Declaration of Conflicting Interests

References

The author(s) declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.

Aiken, L. S., & West, S. G. (1991). Multiple regression: Testing and interpreting interactions. Thousand Oaks, CA: SAGE.

The author(s) disclosed receipt of the following financial support for the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article: This research was supported by Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada Grant 410-2009-0690 (to second author), Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada doctoral scholarship (to first author), and Canada Research Chairs Program (to second author).

Notes 1. Given that we had no existing effect sizes from which to calculate power, we included roughly 30 per condition (recommended by Van Voorhis & Morgan, 2007) in all three studies. 2. It is worth mentioning that although the three-item measure does not offer participants the opportunity to endorse the incremental theory directly, Dweck and colleagues have substantial evidence indicating that those who disagree with the entity theory also directly endorse the incremental theory (Dweck, Chiu, & Hong, 1995a, 1995b). 3. A full regression analyses on subjective distance, taking into account both of the independent variables, revealed a similar result for condition (close vs. distant), b = 7.866, β = .13, p = .153, CI = [−2.98, 18.71]. There was no interaction between subjective distance and implicit theories of morality. Unexpectedly, a main effect of implicit theories of morality emerged, suggesting that incremental theorists felt subjectively closer to their past overall, b = −.48, β = −.18, p = .045, 95% CI = [−.95, −.01]. Of note, an effect of implicit theories on subjective distance was not found in either the morality or personality domain of Study 2. 4. As in Study 1, a full regression analyses on subjective distance, taking into account all of the independent variables (distance condition, implicit theories of morality and also of personality), revealed a similar result for condition (close vs. distant), b = 7.86, β = .13, p = .15, 95% CI = [−2.80, 18.71]. No other main effects or the interaction emerged as significant, β< .09, ps > .39. Similarly, a full regression for the overlapping circles measure yielded a similar result, b = −.96, β= −.23, p = .013, 95% CI = [−1.71, −.21], indicating that in the distant condition, participants felt less overlap with their past self. No other main effects or interactions emerged significant, β< −.20, ps > −.14. Regression results of the two-way interactions remained 5. consistent when age was controlled for in both the moral (b = −.98, β= −.49, p = .037, 95% CI = [−1.90, −.06]), and general person domains, b = −1.22, β = −.52, p = .031, 95% CI = [−2.33, −.11]. When included as a factor, age did not moderate any of the effects.


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Changing theories of change: strategic shifting in implicit theory endorsement.

The far-reaching effects of believing people can change: implicit theories of personality shape stress, health, and achievement during adolescence.

Implicit theories about willpower predict the activation of a rest goal following self-control exertion.

Teachers' implicit "theories" of children's intelligence.

Implicit theories about willpower predict self-regulation and grades in everyday life.

Value stability and change during self-chosen life transitions: self-selection versus socialization effects.

Implicit theories of smoking and association with current smoking status.

Transition to motherhood and the self: measurement, stability, and change.

Effects of food deprivation on subjective effects and self-administration of marijuana in humans.

The Syntax of Defection and Cooperation: The Effects of the Implicit Sentences Nice Act Versus Act Nice on Behavior Change.

Implicit theories of writing and their impact on students' response to a SRSD intervention.

The interactive effect of subjective age and subjective distance-to-death on psychological distress of older adults.

Subjective age and perceived distance-to-death moderate the association between posttraumatic stress symptoms and posttraumatic growth among older adults.

Effects of learning duration on implicit transfer.

Academic and emotional functioning in middle school: the role of implicit theories.

The effects of spatial contextual familiarity on remembered scenes, episodic memories, and imagined future events.

Energetics of shuttle runs: the effects of distance and change of direction.

The effects of anti-vaccine conspiracy theories on vaccination intentions.

Assessment of implicit self-esteem in bipolar manic and euthymic patients using the implicit association test.

Moderate Contrast in the Evaluation of Paintings Is Liked More but Remembered Less than High Contrast.

Counting distance: Effects of egocentric distance on numerical perception.

spiritual self-representations.

The effects of verbal cueing on implicit hand maps.

Utilizing topology to generate and test theories of change.