Brit.J.Psychiat. (1977),130,105—Il
Is Psychoanalysis
a Science? A Reply to Slater By NORMAN
KELK
In three recent articles, Slater (1972, 1973, 1975) has made certain claims concerning the nature of science, especially as it applies to psychiatry. Most recently (Slater, 1975), he
for the practising scientist to use this criterion to delimit the set of all scientific theories and
has applied
as if Popper
his criteria
for assessing
science
then use some other criterion for deciding which theory
to
psychoanalysis, and has found it seriously lacking. In this article Slater's criticisms of psychoanalysis are used as a foil to attack his criteria for science. It is argued that his method ological criteria are extremely conservative and would be likely to cause the demise of scientific activity if at all seriously applied. Further, it is argued that psychoanalysis is a science on any reasonable application of Slater's criteria. SCIENCE
(i)
Its
theories
must
be
falsifiable
to be (Slater,
produce
(2)The theory must have rules of cone spondence for operationalizingitsconcepts (Slater, 1975).
(@)Theremustbe clearanddefiniteconse that can be deduced 1975).
from the theory
(@)It mustbe able ultimatelyto fit into
a reductionist (Slater, 1972).
The falsifiability
or
emergentist
it appears
to be a
Discovery (Popper, 1972) he seems to believe that his criterioncan be applied to make very finediscriminations between competing theories. If the criterion is to be taken in this sense, then two major objections can be raised to it. The first is an empirical one concerning the nature of scientists. Scientists do not use this criterion. No practising scientist will ever back down from a theoretical position only because of falsifying evidence. He will normally attempt to
1973; Popper, 1972).
quences (Slater,
However,
the criterion
eclipse experiment in 1919 as a ground for rejecting Newtonian theory in favour of Rela tivistic Mechanics. Also, in his discussion of ‘¿ Degreesof Testability' in Logic of Scientific
AND NON-SCIENCE
of knowledge
support.
did intend
guide to the practising scientist. He comments (Popper, 1957) on how he saw the famous
Slater has suggested that the following criteria are necessary for an area called a science:
he should
metaphysics
criterion was first proposed
by Popper (1972). Popper believes it is charac teristic of scientific activity that it progresses by means of making bold conjectures that
commit the scientist to some view of the world, followed by attempts to refute this view. It is clear that this method is intended to be used as a criterion for distinguishing between science and non-science. But is it intended to be used by the practising scientist in deciding which theory to pursue? It would be possible
ad hoc modifications
of his theory,
blame hisinstruments,or even argue that there was something wrong with the world (Kuhn, 1962).
Kuhn
and
many
authors
who
have
followedhim have produced many examples of thisin widely diversefieldsof science. Slater
(i973)
himself
does
this.
He
says:
‘¿ Popper's work still stands, when all the criticisms are heeded to which it has been subjected. The point has been justly made, by Kuhn and others, that scientists are various and conform to no invariable pattern in the way they work. We cannot deny that they are rooted in the ideologies of their era and their society, brainwashed by their teachers, blinded by prejudices, hogtied by obsessions, beguiled by will-o'-the-wisps, and at times even tempted to cheat and to lie. These lapses cause no more than eddies in a river. The curiosity of the scientist about the world, his rejection of authority and appeal to fact, lead to an information flow. Conjecture and refutation
are integral
to the flow, polarities
necessarily
105
2A
This
One
I@ 1111111111 II@ UI@ I@I III@ III@I@I I@ 1111111 II@I J2JY-CKS- 9KFJ
io6
IS PSYCHOANALYSIS
A SCIENCE?
engendered by the curiosity and appeaL They are, in fact, higher order effects, and their interaction appertains
to science and not to scientists.'
A REPLY
TO SLATER
agree with this as a general claim, I do not agree with certain assumptions which Slater (1975)
appears
to
have
made
concerning
the
rules of correspondence. The assumptions are concerning what constitutes the field of study that the rules of correspondence are a part of for the philosopher of science. It is a plea, not the theory; that they are themselves testable in an argument, for us to see the world differently, conjunction with the theory; and that if a to ignore certain types of data, or to re-assess prediction of the theory is falsified, it is an their significance. This is certainly not a illegitimate move to change the rules of correspondence. practising falsifier talking; this is a man deeply embedded in and committed to a falsificationist It is frequently the case that the rules of ideology, attempting to brainwash his readers. correspondence are not part of the theory being The second objection that can be raised to tested. For example, Galileo is popularly sup the falsificationist doctrine is that it would posed to have used a telescope to prove his inevitably lead to the demise of science if at all theories of planetary motion. The telescope rigorously followed. Thus, it is not only a poor ‘¿ depends'for its operation on the laws of optics. description of science, it is a poor prescription These laws were not even formulated when for science. If falsification were to be applied Galileo used his telescope for the proof of his at all rigorously, all theories could be abandoned theories, and even today a theory of what is before any work could be done on them. All seen through a telescope is incomplete (Feyera theories start their productive life, and finish it, bend, 1965). This is quite common in all walks with falsifying instances present. For example, of science. Thus, the rules of correspondence it was not until the early twentieth century that need not be part of the theory which they are Newtonian theory could predict the flight of involved in operationalizing. heavier than air objects. So, since the time of Furthermore, it is not always so that the Newton scientists had been unable to explain rules of correspondence can be (scientifically) the birds that flew past their windows. Yet they tested. For example, the rules of correspondence involved with Galileo's telescope were not test accepted the theory because they recognized and acted upon other criteria (such as elegance, able at that time. Much modern science in the beauty, capacity to unify a number of ‘¿ different' physical, biological and social spheres depends fields of knowledge and so on), and because they on mathematics, which Slater says is not a intuitively recognized that the flight of birds science (Slater, 1973), and which therefore was a phenomenon that was likely to be cannot be scientifically tested. Also, many rules eventually explained by Newtonian theory. of correspondence are chosen simply because Some neo-Popperians such as Lakatos (1970) they produce data which do not falsify the have attempted to solve this problem by deve theory. For example, electrical research is often loping a model of science such that falsifying done on the so-called super-conductors rather data can be ignored at certain stages of theory than on ‘¿ normalmetals' simply because it gives development. However, they have been unable data closer to the hypothetical perfect conductor to develop any rules for determining when the of the theory. My third point regarding rules of corre falsifying data should be acted upon (Feyera bend, 1970). In the absence of such a rule, the spondence has been demonstrated in the course falsification criterion is useless, because a scien of the above discussion. Changes of rules of tist can never know when to use it. It is rather correspondence are often employed when falsify like showing a beginner parachutist where the ing data are collected. The complex research npcord is, but not telling him when to use it that was conducted to try to measure the vis cosity of the ether around the turn of this or what its function is. Slater's second criterion for science is that century involved frequent modifications of each theory must have rules of correspondence procedure, each one designed to detect an which operationalize its concepts. Although I increasingly complex and etherial ether. Yet it
This
quotation
is an ad hoc definition
by Slater
107
NORMAN KELK
was not until many such results had been reported, vast difficulties had been encountered with other parts of the theory, and an alter native theory was available, that the ether theory was abandoned. The general point arising from questioning these assumptions is that the rules of corre spondence need not be clearly and permanently stated at the start of a scientific enterprise and may be abandoned or modified without en dangering the theory. This considerably weakens Slater's rule of correspondence requirement. Slater's third criterion is acceptable with two qualifications. Firstly, it is not a necessary requirement that any particular type of de ductive process should be used. That is, axio
Slater's major objections His objections are: (i)
It
has
no
to psychoanalysis.
correspondence
rules
(Slater,
‘¿ 975). (2) It has no clear consequences
(Slater, 1975).
(@)It is aboutendopsychic processes, and
these are not susceptible to scientific research (Slater, 1975). Concerning the first of these objections, I find it hard to do more than simply deny Slater's and Nagel's (i@@@)claims. In Slater's article itself he proposes several possible correspondence rules. These include the rules governing the analyst and the analysand in the analytic situation, certain kinds of behaviour in the public world, therapeutic effects and so on. It is not being asserted here that these would lead matization or the use of mathematical processes and so on are not required. A theory can be a to confirmation of some aspects of Freudian scientific one if it confines itself to the use of theory, it is simply being asserted that these arc possible operationalizations that Slater men common canons of logic applied to natural language constructions. This is the case in tions. Further, there are such phenomena as many sciences in the natural, biological, and amnesias, slips of the tongue, and dreams, which social spheres. Secondly, it is not necessary arise directly from the theory as rules of corre that there should be a central group of axioms spondence for the unconscious. In fact, psy or accepted theorems from which all deductions choanalytic theory is littered with rules of must be made. It must be possible at any time correspondence. The fact that these have been to drop parts of the theory, to introduce new sparsely used in validation studies is not a ad hoc hypotheses, or to use sub-sets of the problem with the theory. The small usage to theorems of the theory to argue to new con which these rules of correspondence have been clusions. This means that it may be difficult, if put may have many explanations. For example, not impossible, to tell what are the ‘¿ central' it may in part be due to the organization of the views of a particular science. Different scientists analytic movement (Ellenberger, 1970; Roasen, 1969). Certainly, this is not something that can may disagree about what parts of a theory to drop or which to work on more intensively, in rule psychoanalytic theory out of court as a order to adjust the theory to some problem. scientific theory. This frequently happens in all fields of science, In the first section of this paper the general including the most formalized areas. requirement that a theory should have rules of I will not discuss Slater's final requirement. correspondence was discussed. The modifica Freud never spoke of any entities whose space tions mentioned in that section have sufficiently time location could not be given some physicalist weakened the correspondence rule requirement description.
Psychoanalysis
is thus
able
to fit
into some type of reductionist or emergentist system of knowledge. As Slater (1972) has made only very general claims concerning the nature of emergentist and reductionist metaphysics, there seems little possibility of making any detailed response in this most complex area. I will now
PsYcH0ANuxsIs apply the above
remarks
to
to allow
psychoanalytic
theory
to be considered
scientific. However, if any strong interpretation of this requirement were demanded, many of the theories of the physical and natural sciences could not be considered to be scientific. Concerning the second objection to psycho analytic theory, I am again in the position of having to deny the claims of Slater (i@@) and Nagel (1959). Again, in Slater's articles he proposes many consequences of psychoanalytic
108
IS PSYCHOANALYSIS
theory which could be followed Several of these are mentioned
A SCIENCE?
up empirically. in the section
entitled ‘¿ Psychoanalysis and Psychobiology' (Slater, 1975). Slater comments on several areas of psychoanalytic theory which he thinks should be abandoned. The reason they should be abandoned is, presumably, because they do have consequences which are not confirmed by the data. It appears that Slater wants to have his cake and eat it too; to show that the theory is not susceptible to disproof and also to disprove it. Thus there is a contradiction embedded in Slater's paper, and as Slater (i@7@) himself has pointed out, with a contradiction ‘¿ onecan “¿ prove― or “¿ explain― anything one likes'. In the first section of this paper I have dis cussed the general requirement that a theory must have consequences. I have argued that Slater holds this criterion too firmly and that it must be relaxed if it is not to exclude many of the physical sciences. Yet when it is relaxed psychoanalysis qualifies as a science too. Slater's third objection to psychoanalytic theory is that it is concerned with endopsychic processes which are not susceptible to scientific research. Slater apparently holds strong views concerning the subject matter of science. He says: ‘¿ (Freud) never became aware of the fact that the knowledge we can get of the endopsychic world, either our own or that of others, is of a different kind from the knowledge we can gain of the external world. Our private worlds are indeed private; and scientific knowledge is knowledge of a public world, shared by or open to all.'
A REPLY TO SLATER
gation that are to be regarded as scientific, must be public. Although he does not clearly define what he means by ‘¿ public', the following quotations
are suggestive:
‘¿ We might say that it is quite airight for a theory to be built up on unobservables, such as protons, neutrons and electrons, or on unconscious entities, but there must be a rule of correspondence by which the unobservables are rigidly linked with observables....' ‘¿ Psychic realities cannot be perceived directly through the senses, but can only be indirectly experienced in the self; they are inaccessible to the methods used in the physical and biological scienc& The first of these quotations relates the notion of ‘¿ public'to correspondence rules. As pre viously mentioned, psychoanalytic theory satis fies any reasonable correspondence rule criterion. The second quotation is rather curious. Surely Slater intended to say that psychic realities can be perceived directly in the self. And might it not be claimed that this form of knowledge
is in some
way even
more
reliable
than knowledge obtained by the senses? But I will not attempt to press this controversial view. Taking Slater's quotation at its face value, the first half of it is strictly false: psychic realities can be known via the correspondence rules that psychoanalytic theory provides. The second half of the quotation would appear to be false too: because the only definition that Slater has given of ‘¿ public'is in terms of correspondence rules, and psychoanalytic theory shares these with the physical and biological sciences. Thus These quotations embody a claim that there the physical and biological sciences are not are certain phenomena that science cannot different in this respect from psychoanalytic investigate. What kind of claim is this? It is theory. certainly not what Slater would call a ‘¿ scientific' A final example will perhaps clarify the claim claim, because he asserts that there is no that endopsychic phenomena are susceptible to scientific investigation. There is a certain astro (possible) body of scientific knowledge about these phenomena. He also claims that all physical phenomenon known as ‘¿ blackholes'. Black holes are collapsed stars whose gravita previous attempts to investigate these pheno tional field is of such intensity that nothing, not mena have violated common canons of scientific even light, can escape from it. It clearly follows practice. Thus, he is giving a highly restrictive that no information can be obtained about what judgement about the subject matter of science goes on inside the black holes. Yet physicists in the context of a total lack of scientific have produced a great deal of useful theory evidence concerning this subject matter. about these phenomena, which has increased Slater's claim embodies a methodological knowledge about the behaviour of gravitation. prescription. It asserts that methods of investi
NORMAN KELK
Is this area of physics to be rejected on the same grounds as Slater uses to reject the investigation of endo-psychic phenomena? @
DESCRIPTION, PRESCRIPTION ALIENATED SCIENTIST
Slater's endeavour to rule psychoanalysis ‘¿ out of court' is based on a misunderstanding of the significance of the work of philosophers of science such as Popper
(1972) and Kuhn
In his original work (Popper to develop a theory about involved
in deciding
which
(1962).
(1972) attempted the logical steps
theory
to investigate
further. Popper (1957) appears to have been greatly impressed by the apparent refutation of Newtonian theory by the eclipse experiment on the bending of light rays in 1919. What Popper saw was the refutation of a highly successful tradition by means of a single observation. On the basis of this perception Popper developed his falsification theory of science. Recent work by many people has revealed that what Popper saw did not really occur. The 1919
ficance
experiment
had
perhaps
as much
signi
as the final straw that broke the camel's
back, but even this much is doubtful. Had the experiment not supported Einstein it is highly unlikely that his theory would have been abandoned.
Rather,
the
instruments
would
have been doubted, the experiment would have been repeated when possible, ad hoc hypotheses would have been introduced, and so on. Similar things had happened before to Einstein's theory (Easlea, 1973). What status, then, can be attributed to Popper's falsifiabiity criterion? Firstly, as a description of a scientific decision-making pro cess it must be considered false. That is, as a theory of the history of science, Popper's logic of science is unacceptable. Secondly, as a doctrine of scientific procedure which has been widely adopted by many scientists its status is best regarded as a mythical or ideological account of scientific activity which has been adopted by a particularcommunity. It is merelyan accountofwhat scientists who accept the criterion, would liketo think occurs as science
progresses.
109
Like many theories that refer to human behaviour, Popper's is likely to generate self fulifiling prophesies. Scientists will try to behave likegood Popperiansshould.They will selectively perceive their scientific activity and make their perceptions conform to the ideology. The many scientists who have claimed to be inductivists are examples of this. But even ifPopper'saccountwere acceptable as an account of what really happened in some greatscientific event,would itfollowthat it should be accepted as a prescription for future science?As mentioned earlierthere is no purely scientific means of answering this question. What can be done is to determine what are the likelyconsequencesof adopting such a criterion, and then to make a decision concerningthe desirability of such a criterion. To do this requires that information be available about how scientists behave under particular conditions: thatis,thatan acceptable account of thehistory ofsciencebe available. Also,the effectsof all the availablemethodological alternatives shouldbe similarly considered. Slater hasnotdone thisinhisarticles. He has acceptedPopper'saccountofthelogicofscience as being in some sensedescriptively true of scienceand prescriptively desirable forscience. He has dismissed Kuhn's work as constituting no more than ‘¿ eddies in a river' (Slater, ‘¿ 975). What this metaphor means is not clear; yet it is apparent that he wishesto rule out Kuhn's prescriptions
as primary
methodological
rules
(Kuhn, 1970a,I970b).And thereareavailable further methodologicalprescriptions which Slaterhas not considered(Lakatos,1970; Feyerabend,ig68,197ob). From theabovediscussion itcan be seenthat one of the reasonswhy Slaterhas such a poor databaseforhisprescriptions isthathe accepts falsification as a true description of scientific activity. Presumablyhe thinksof himselfas a falsificationist. I believethat Slateris not a falsificationist. If an extremely rigorous, thorough and extensive study of the genetics ofschizophrenia were to be publishedrejecting Slater's viewson thissubject I am quitecertain thathe would notrushintoprintdenyingthose ideaswhich he has heldformuch ofhiscareer. Likeallgood scientists, he would reject thenew
IS PSYCHOANALYSISA SCIENCE? A REPLY TO SLATER
110
data on any of a wide range of grounds accelerate his own research programme.
and
Presumably
the
generate their ideas are relevant to other workers in the field (Watson, 1968)? Another implication Why then, has Slater adopted an incorrect ofthisquotationisthatitisreally onlythedata view of his own behaviour? I believe that it is that count in science, and perhaps also the theory because he believes that it is possible to say on which the data are based. Any human something about science on the basis of data aspectsof the scientists involvedare to be that are gathered while ignoring the ways in ignored. which scientists behave. For example, he says: It can thus be seen that the scientific institu tions in which Slaterisembedded, and their ‘¿ Conjectureand refutation are integral to the flow, major means of communication,the mono polarities necessarily engendered by the curiosity graph, both systematically ignorethe human (of scientists) and the appeal (to facts). They are, in fact, higher order effects, and their interaction aspectsof scientific activity. I do not wish to appertains to science and not to scientists' (Slater, make any judgement here about the effects of 1973). thisupon scienceitself. However, itseffects on ofscience areclear: by alienating Note that Slaterregardsfalsiflability as the thephilosophy single, most importantcriterion ofscience. Yet the scientist from his own activity it creates myths about theway in which scienceisprac in the above quotation he asserts that the most tisedand leadsscientists to adopt viewsabout important thing that can be said about science sciencethat are clearlyuntrue of theirown can be made clearwithoutmentioningscientists. behaviour.This in turn leadsto the It isclearthatthisislogically possible, but in scientific calledphilosophies of view ofalltheevidenceavailable in thehistory developmentofideologies science, which are falsely thought to be true and philosophy of science literature concerning reflections ofthepractice ofscience. the effects of scientists on scientific decision making this would appear to be highly unlikely. REFERENCES something
can
be said
about
EAst.x@, B. (‘973) Liberation and the Ainu of Science. London:
logicof sciencewithoutmentioningscientists, Chatto and Windus. but highly restrictive methodological rules such Euzi@iBsaosa, H. F. (1970) as those which Slater proposes should not be imposed solely on the basis of the logic of science (Lakatos, 1966).
The Discovery of the Unconscious: The History and Evolution of Dynamic [email protected]: Allen Lane, The Penguin Press. Faaiu@sa@o, P. K. (1965) Problems of empiricism. In Beyond the Edge of Certainty. (ed. Colodny, R. G.).
Further cluesas to the originsof Slater's incorrect
views
concerning
his own
scientific
Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall Inc.
—¿
‘¿detailed A account of how the problem was originally envisaged, what false starts were made, how it was re-envisaged, how a genuine start was
really made, etc, is not germane to the interests of the reader involved with similar problems. They
wish to be shown, in the shortest possible compass, what the territory is that has to be cleared, and how
clear itis, inorderthattheycangeton withtheir own work' (Slater, 1973). Here,
Slater is defining
the logic of science
as
(1968)
How
to
be
a
good
empiricist—a
plea
for
tolerance in matters epistemological. In The Philoso phy of Science.(ed. Warnock, G. J.) London: Oxford University Press.
practiceare evidentin his discussion of the scientific paper.He states: —¿
(Ig7oa)
Consolations
and Musgrave, —¿
(Ig7ob)
for
the
specialist.
In
Lakatos
q.v., 197—23o.
Against
method.
Minnesota
Studies
in
the
Philosophyof Science,4, 17—130. KUHN, T. S. (197oa, first published 1962). The Structure of Scien:@ficRevolutions. Chicago and London: University
of Chicago Press.
—¿
(197ob)
Logic
of
discovery
or
psychology
of
research?
In Lakatos and Musgrave, q.v., 1—23. —¿
(197oc)
Reflections
Musgrave,
on
my
critics.
In
Lakatos
and
q.v., 23 1—78.
LAx@vros,I. (i@66) History of science and its rational
the whole of science. He is making a highly reconstructions. Boston Studies in the Philosophy of generalclaim about what allscientists should Science, 8, 91—136. be interested iniftheywishtobe good scientists. research programmes. In Lakatos and Musgrave, It constitutes a denial of the possibility of ever q.v., 91—196. learning how to develop good ideas. Surely the ways in which workers in a fieldof study of Knowledge.London: Cambridge University Pr@. —¿
(‘970)
—¿
&
Falsification
Musgrave,
and
A.
(eds.)
the
methodology
(1970)
Criticism
of
and
scientific
the
Growth
NORMAN NAGEL, E. (:959)
theory.
Methodological
SLATER, E. (1972)
issues in psychoanalytic
(ed. Hook, S.). New York: New York University
first
published
Discovery. London: ROASEN, P. (1969)
Kelk,
:g@)
The
Logic
of
Scientific
Animal:
The Story of Freud
Knopf.
B.A., B.Soc.Wk.(Hon.), Social
The
psychiatrist
in the
and
in
logic
—¿
of a science:
search
and
of
a
the
science:
II.
sociology
(i97@)
The
psychiatrist
in
search
of
a
science:
of
III.
The depth psychologies. British Journal of Psychiatry, The Double Helix:
A Personal Account
of the Discovery of the Structure of DNA. Weidenflebland Nicolson.
Worker at Avoca Clinic for Family
Department of Paediatrics, Prince of Wales Hospital, Randwick, Sydney 2031 (Received 12Apr21 1976)
in search
science. BritishJournalof Psychiatry,122, 625—36. 126,205—24. WATSON, J. D. (1968)
Hutchinson.
Brother
Tausk. New York:
Norman
in
(i@@)
Developments
POPPER,K. R. (1957) Philosophy of science: a personal
(1972,
psychiatrist
Psychiatry, 121, 591—8. —¿
report.In British Philosophy in theMid-Century. (ed. Mace, C. A.). London: George Allen and Unwin.
The
I. Early thinkers at the Maudsley. BritishJournal of
Psychoanalysis, Scientific Method and Philosophy,
Press. Cited in Slater, 1975, q.v.
—¿
III
KELK
London:
and Child Psychiatry,
Is Psychoanalysis
a Science? A Reply to Slater By NORMAN
KELK
In three recent articles, Slater (1972, 1973, 1975) has made certain claims concerning the nature of science, especially as it applies to psychiatry. Most recently (Slater, 1975), he
for the practising scientist to use this criterion to delimit the set of all scientific theories and
has applied
as if Popper
his criteria
for assessing
science
then use some other criterion for deciding which theory
to
psychoanalysis, and has found it seriously lacking. In this article Slater's criticisms of psychoanalysis are used as a foil to attack his criteria for science. It is argued that his method ological criteria are extremely conservative and would be likely to cause the demise of scientific activity if at all seriously applied. Further, it is argued that psychoanalysis is a science on any reasonable application of Slater's criteria. SCIENCE
(i)
Its
theories
must
be
falsifiable
to be (Slater,
produce
(2)The theory must have rules of cone spondence for operationalizingitsconcepts (Slater, 1975).
(@)Theremustbe clearanddefiniteconse that can be deduced 1975).
from the theory
(@)It mustbe able ultimatelyto fit into
a reductionist (Slater, 1972).
The falsifiability
or
emergentist
it appears
to be a
Discovery (Popper, 1972) he seems to believe that his criterioncan be applied to make very finediscriminations between competing theories. If the criterion is to be taken in this sense, then two major objections can be raised to it. The first is an empirical one concerning the nature of scientists. Scientists do not use this criterion. No practising scientist will ever back down from a theoretical position only because of falsifying evidence. He will normally attempt to
1973; Popper, 1972).
quences (Slater,
However,
the criterion
eclipse experiment in 1919 as a ground for rejecting Newtonian theory in favour of Rela tivistic Mechanics. Also, in his discussion of ‘¿ Degreesof Testability' in Logic of Scientific
AND NON-SCIENCE
of knowledge
support.
did intend
guide to the practising scientist. He comments (Popper, 1957) on how he saw the famous
Slater has suggested that the following criteria are necessary for an area called a science:
he should
metaphysics
criterion was first proposed
by Popper (1972). Popper believes it is charac teristic of scientific activity that it progresses by means of making bold conjectures that
commit the scientist to some view of the world, followed by attempts to refute this view. It is clear that this method is intended to be used as a criterion for distinguishing between science and non-science. But is it intended to be used by the practising scientist in deciding which theory to pursue? It would be possible
ad hoc modifications
of his theory,
blame hisinstruments,or even argue that there was something wrong with the world (Kuhn, 1962).
Kuhn
and
many
authors
who
have
followedhim have produced many examples of thisin widely diversefieldsof science. Slater
(i973)
himself
does
this.
He
says:
‘¿ Popper's work still stands, when all the criticisms are heeded to which it has been subjected. The point has been justly made, by Kuhn and others, that scientists are various and conform to no invariable pattern in the way they work. We cannot deny that they are rooted in the ideologies of their era and their society, brainwashed by their teachers, blinded by prejudices, hogtied by obsessions, beguiled by will-o'-the-wisps, and at times even tempted to cheat and to lie. These lapses cause no more than eddies in a river. The curiosity of the scientist about the world, his rejection of authority and appeal to fact, lead to an information flow. Conjecture and refutation
are integral
to the flow, polarities
necessarily
105
2A
This
One
I@ 1111111111 II@ UI@ I@I III@ III@I@I I@ 1111111 II@I J2JY-CKS- 9KFJ
io6
IS PSYCHOANALYSIS
A SCIENCE?
engendered by the curiosity and appeaL They are, in fact, higher order effects, and their interaction appertains
to science and not to scientists.'
A REPLY
TO SLATER
agree with this as a general claim, I do not agree with certain assumptions which Slater (1975)
appears
to
have
made
concerning
the
rules of correspondence. The assumptions are concerning what constitutes the field of study that the rules of correspondence are a part of for the philosopher of science. It is a plea, not the theory; that they are themselves testable in an argument, for us to see the world differently, conjunction with the theory; and that if a to ignore certain types of data, or to re-assess prediction of the theory is falsified, it is an their significance. This is certainly not a illegitimate move to change the rules of correspondence. practising falsifier talking; this is a man deeply embedded in and committed to a falsificationist It is frequently the case that the rules of ideology, attempting to brainwash his readers. correspondence are not part of the theory being The second objection that can be raised to tested. For example, Galileo is popularly sup the falsificationist doctrine is that it would posed to have used a telescope to prove his inevitably lead to the demise of science if at all theories of planetary motion. The telescope rigorously followed. Thus, it is not only a poor ‘¿ depends'for its operation on the laws of optics. description of science, it is a poor prescription These laws were not even formulated when for science. If falsification were to be applied Galileo used his telescope for the proof of his at all rigorously, all theories could be abandoned theories, and even today a theory of what is before any work could be done on them. All seen through a telescope is incomplete (Feyera theories start their productive life, and finish it, bend, 1965). This is quite common in all walks with falsifying instances present. For example, of science. Thus, the rules of correspondence it was not until the early twentieth century that need not be part of the theory which they are Newtonian theory could predict the flight of involved in operationalizing. heavier than air objects. So, since the time of Furthermore, it is not always so that the Newton scientists had been unable to explain rules of correspondence can be (scientifically) the birds that flew past their windows. Yet they tested. For example, the rules of correspondence involved with Galileo's telescope were not test accepted the theory because they recognized and acted upon other criteria (such as elegance, able at that time. Much modern science in the beauty, capacity to unify a number of ‘¿ different' physical, biological and social spheres depends fields of knowledge and so on), and because they on mathematics, which Slater says is not a intuitively recognized that the flight of birds science (Slater, 1973), and which therefore was a phenomenon that was likely to be cannot be scientifically tested. Also, many rules eventually explained by Newtonian theory. of correspondence are chosen simply because Some neo-Popperians such as Lakatos (1970) they produce data which do not falsify the have attempted to solve this problem by deve theory. For example, electrical research is often loping a model of science such that falsifying done on the so-called super-conductors rather data can be ignored at certain stages of theory than on ‘¿ normalmetals' simply because it gives development. However, they have been unable data closer to the hypothetical perfect conductor to develop any rules for determining when the of the theory. My third point regarding rules of corre falsifying data should be acted upon (Feyera bend, 1970). In the absence of such a rule, the spondence has been demonstrated in the course falsification criterion is useless, because a scien of the above discussion. Changes of rules of tist can never know when to use it. It is rather correspondence are often employed when falsify like showing a beginner parachutist where the ing data are collected. The complex research npcord is, but not telling him when to use it that was conducted to try to measure the vis cosity of the ether around the turn of this or what its function is. Slater's second criterion for science is that century involved frequent modifications of each theory must have rules of correspondence procedure, each one designed to detect an which operationalize its concepts. Although I increasingly complex and etherial ether. Yet it
This
quotation
is an ad hoc definition
by Slater
107
NORMAN KELK
was not until many such results had been reported, vast difficulties had been encountered with other parts of the theory, and an alter native theory was available, that the ether theory was abandoned. The general point arising from questioning these assumptions is that the rules of corre spondence need not be clearly and permanently stated at the start of a scientific enterprise and may be abandoned or modified without en dangering the theory. This considerably weakens Slater's rule of correspondence requirement. Slater's third criterion is acceptable with two qualifications. Firstly, it is not a necessary requirement that any particular type of de ductive process should be used. That is, axio
Slater's major objections His objections are: (i)
It
has
no
to psychoanalysis.
correspondence
rules
(Slater,
‘¿ 975). (2) It has no clear consequences
(Slater, 1975).
(@)It is aboutendopsychic processes, and
these are not susceptible to scientific research (Slater, 1975). Concerning the first of these objections, I find it hard to do more than simply deny Slater's and Nagel's (i@@@)claims. In Slater's article itself he proposes several possible correspondence rules. These include the rules governing the analyst and the analysand in the analytic situation, certain kinds of behaviour in the public world, therapeutic effects and so on. It is not being asserted here that these would lead matization or the use of mathematical processes and so on are not required. A theory can be a to confirmation of some aspects of Freudian scientific one if it confines itself to the use of theory, it is simply being asserted that these arc possible operationalizations that Slater men common canons of logic applied to natural language constructions. This is the case in tions. Further, there are such phenomena as many sciences in the natural, biological, and amnesias, slips of the tongue, and dreams, which social spheres. Secondly, it is not necessary arise directly from the theory as rules of corre that there should be a central group of axioms spondence for the unconscious. In fact, psy or accepted theorems from which all deductions choanalytic theory is littered with rules of must be made. It must be possible at any time correspondence. The fact that these have been to drop parts of the theory, to introduce new sparsely used in validation studies is not a ad hoc hypotheses, or to use sub-sets of the problem with the theory. The small usage to theorems of the theory to argue to new con which these rules of correspondence have been clusions. This means that it may be difficult, if put may have many explanations. For example, not impossible, to tell what are the ‘¿ central' it may in part be due to the organization of the views of a particular science. Different scientists analytic movement (Ellenberger, 1970; Roasen, 1969). Certainly, this is not something that can may disagree about what parts of a theory to drop or which to work on more intensively, in rule psychoanalytic theory out of court as a order to adjust the theory to some problem. scientific theory. This frequently happens in all fields of science, In the first section of this paper the general including the most formalized areas. requirement that a theory should have rules of I will not discuss Slater's final requirement. correspondence was discussed. The modifica Freud never spoke of any entities whose space tions mentioned in that section have sufficiently time location could not be given some physicalist weakened the correspondence rule requirement description.
Psychoanalysis
is thus
able
to fit
into some type of reductionist or emergentist system of knowledge. As Slater (1972) has made only very general claims concerning the nature of emergentist and reductionist metaphysics, there seems little possibility of making any detailed response in this most complex area. I will now
PsYcH0ANuxsIs apply the above
remarks
to
to allow
psychoanalytic
theory
to be considered
scientific. However, if any strong interpretation of this requirement were demanded, many of the theories of the physical and natural sciences could not be considered to be scientific. Concerning the second objection to psycho analytic theory, I am again in the position of having to deny the claims of Slater (i@@) and Nagel (1959). Again, in Slater's articles he proposes many consequences of psychoanalytic
108
IS PSYCHOANALYSIS
theory which could be followed Several of these are mentioned
A SCIENCE?
up empirically. in the section
entitled ‘¿ Psychoanalysis and Psychobiology' (Slater, 1975). Slater comments on several areas of psychoanalytic theory which he thinks should be abandoned. The reason they should be abandoned is, presumably, because they do have consequences which are not confirmed by the data. It appears that Slater wants to have his cake and eat it too; to show that the theory is not susceptible to disproof and also to disprove it. Thus there is a contradiction embedded in Slater's paper, and as Slater (i@7@) himself has pointed out, with a contradiction ‘¿ onecan “¿ prove― or “¿ explain― anything one likes'. In the first section of this paper I have dis cussed the general requirement that a theory must have consequences. I have argued that Slater holds this criterion too firmly and that it must be relaxed if it is not to exclude many of the physical sciences. Yet when it is relaxed psychoanalysis qualifies as a science too. Slater's third objection to psychoanalytic theory is that it is concerned with endopsychic processes which are not susceptible to scientific research. Slater apparently holds strong views concerning the subject matter of science. He says: ‘¿ (Freud) never became aware of the fact that the knowledge we can get of the endopsychic world, either our own or that of others, is of a different kind from the knowledge we can gain of the external world. Our private worlds are indeed private; and scientific knowledge is knowledge of a public world, shared by or open to all.'
A REPLY TO SLATER
gation that are to be regarded as scientific, must be public. Although he does not clearly define what he means by ‘¿ public', the following quotations
are suggestive:
‘¿ We might say that it is quite airight for a theory to be built up on unobservables, such as protons, neutrons and electrons, or on unconscious entities, but there must be a rule of correspondence by which the unobservables are rigidly linked with observables....' ‘¿ Psychic realities cannot be perceived directly through the senses, but can only be indirectly experienced in the self; they are inaccessible to the methods used in the physical and biological scienc& The first of these quotations relates the notion of ‘¿ public'to correspondence rules. As pre viously mentioned, psychoanalytic theory satis fies any reasonable correspondence rule criterion. The second quotation is rather curious. Surely Slater intended to say that psychic realities can be perceived directly in the self. And might it not be claimed that this form of knowledge
is in some
way even
more
reliable
than knowledge obtained by the senses? But I will not attempt to press this controversial view. Taking Slater's quotation at its face value, the first half of it is strictly false: psychic realities can be known via the correspondence rules that psychoanalytic theory provides. The second half of the quotation would appear to be false too: because the only definition that Slater has given of ‘¿ public'is in terms of correspondence rules, and psychoanalytic theory shares these with the physical and biological sciences. Thus These quotations embody a claim that there the physical and biological sciences are not are certain phenomena that science cannot different in this respect from psychoanalytic investigate. What kind of claim is this? It is theory. certainly not what Slater would call a ‘¿ scientific' A final example will perhaps clarify the claim claim, because he asserts that there is no that endopsychic phenomena are susceptible to scientific investigation. There is a certain astro (possible) body of scientific knowledge about these phenomena. He also claims that all physical phenomenon known as ‘¿ blackholes'. Black holes are collapsed stars whose gravita previous attempts to investigate these pheno tional field is of such intensity that nothing, not mena have violated common canons of scientific even light, can escape from it. It clearly follows practice. Thus, he is giving a highly restrictive that no information can be obtained about what judgement about the subject matter of science goes on inside the black holes. Yet physicists in the context of a total lack of scientific have produced a great deal of useful theory evidence concerning this subject matter. about these phenomena, which has increased Slater's claim embodies a methodological knowledge about the behaviour of gravitation. prescription. It asserts that methods of investi
NORMAN KELK
Is this area of physics to be rejected on the same grounds as Slater uses to reject the investigation of endo-psychic phenomena? @
DESCRIPTION, PRESCRIPTION ALIENATED SCIENTIST
Slater's endeavour to rule psychoanalysis ‘¿ out of court' is based on a misunderstanding of the significance of the work of philosophers of science such as Popper
(1972) and Kuhn
In his original work (Popper to develop a theory about involved
in deciding
which
(1962).
(1972) attempted the logical steps
theory
to investigate
further. Popper (1957) appears to have been greatly impressed by the apparent refutation of Newtonian theory by the eclipse experiment on the bending of light rays in 1919. What Popper saw was the refutation of a highly successful tradition by means of a single observation. On the basis of this perception Popper developed his falsification theory of science. Recent work by many people has revealed that what Popper saw did not really occur. The 1919
ficance
experiment
had
perhaps
as much
signi
as the final straw that broke the camel's
back, but even this much is doubtful. Had the experiment not supported Einstein it is highly unlikely that his theory would have been abandoned.
Rather,
the
instruments
would
have been doubted, the experiment would have been repeated when possible, ad hoc hypotheses would have been introduced, and so on. Similar things had happened before to Einstein's theory (Easlea, 1973). What status, then, can be attributed to Popper's falsifiabiity criterion? Firstly, as a description of a scientific decision-making pro cess it must be considered false. That is, as a theory of the history of science, Popper's logic of science is unacceptable. Secondly, as a doctrine of scientific procedure which has been widely adopted by many scientists its status is best regarded as a mythical or ideological account of scientific activity which has been adopted by a particularcommunity. It is merelyan accountofwhat scientists who accept the criterion, would liketo think occurs as science
progresses.
109
Like many theories that refer to human behaviour, Popper's is likely to generate self fulifiling prophesies. Scientists will try to behave likegood Popperiansshould.They will selectively perceive their scientific activity and make their perceptions conform to the ideology. The many scientists who have claimed to be inductivists are examples of this. But even ifPopper'saccountwere acceptable as an account of what really happened in some greatscientific event,would itfollowthat it should be accepted as a prescription for future science?As mentioned earlierthere is no purely scientific means of answering this question. What can be done is to determine what are the likelyconsequencesof adopting such a criterion, and then to make a decision concerningthe desirability of such a criterion. To do this requires that information be available about how scientists behave under particular conditions: thatis,thatan acceptable account of thehistory ofsciencebe available. Also,the effectsof all the availablemethodological alternatives shouldbe similarly considered. Slater hasnotdone thisinhisarticles. He has acceptedPopper'saccountofthelogicofscience as being in some sensedescriptively true of scienceand prescriptively desirable forscience. He has dismissed Kuhn's work as constituting no more than ‘¿ eddies in a river' (Slater, ‘¿ 975). What this metaphor means is not clear; yet it is apparent that he wishesto rule out Kuhn's prescriptions
as primary
methodological
rules
(Kuhn, 1970a,I970b).And thereareavailable further methodologicalprescriptions which Slaterhas not considered(Lakatos,1970; Feyerabend,ig68,197ob). From theabovediscussion itcan be seenthat one of the reasonswhy Slaterhas such a poor databaseforhisprescriptions isthathe accepts falsification as a true description of scientific activity. Presumablyhe thinksof himselfas a falsificationist. I believethat Slateris not a falsificationist. If an extremely rigorous, thorough and extensive study of the genetics ofschizophrenia were to be publishedrejecting Slater's viewson thissubject I am quitecertain thathe would notrushintoprintdenyingthose ideaswhich he has heldformuch ofhiscareer. Likeallgood scientists, he would reject thenew
IS PSYCHOANALYSISA SCIENCE? A REPLY TO SLATER
110
data on any of a wide range of grounds accelerate his own research programme.
and
Presumably
the
generate their ideas are relevant to other workers in the field (Watson, 1968)? Another implication Why then, has Slater adopted an incorrect ofthisquotationisthatitisreally onlythedata view of his own behaviour? I believe that it is that count in science, and perhaps also the theory because he believes that it is possible to say on which the data are based. Any human something about science on the basis of data aspectsof the scientists involvedare to be that are gathered while ignoring the ways in ignored. which scientists behave. For example, he says: It can thus be seen that the scientific institu tions in which Slaterisembedded, and their ‘¿ Conjectureand refutation are integral to the flow, major means of communication,the mono polarities necessarily engendered by the curiosity graph, both systematically ignorethe human (of scientists) and the appeal (to facts). They are, in fact, higher order effects, and their interaction aspectsof scientific activity. I do not wish to appertains to science and not to scientists' (Slater, make any judgement here about the effects of 1973). thisupon scienceitself. However, itseffects on ofscience areclear: by alienating Note that Slaterregardsfalsiflability as the thephilosophy single, most importantcriterion ofscience. Yet the scientist from his own activity it creates myths about theway in which scienceisprac in the above quotation he asserts that the most tisedand leadsscientists to adopt viewsabout important thing that can be said about science sciencethat are clearlyuntrue of theirown can be made clearwithoutmentioningscientists. behaviour.This in turn leadsto the It isclearthatthisislogically possible, but in scientific calledphilosophies of view ofalltheevidenceavailable in thehistory developmentofideologies science, which are falsely thought to be true and philosophy of science literature concerning reflections ofthepractice ofscience. the effects of scientists on scientific decision making this would appear to be highly unlikely. REFERENCES something
can
be said
about
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views
concerning
his own
scientific
Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall Inc.
—¿
‘¿detailed A account of how the problem was originally envisaged, what false starts were made, how it was re-envisaged, how a genuine start was
really made, etc, is not germane to the interests of the reader involved with similar problems. They
wish to be shown, in the shortest possible compass, what the territory is that has to be cleared, and how
clear itis, inorderthattheycangeton withtheir own work' (Slater, 1973). Here,
Slater is defining
the logic of science
as
(1968)
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to
be
a
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(Ig7oa)
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the
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q.v., 197—23o.
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—¿
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(197oc)
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—¿
&
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