Psychology and Aging 2013, Vol. 28, No. 4, 984-995

© 2013 American Psychological Association 0882-7974/13/$12.00 DOI: l0.1037/a0034266

Memory for Reputational Trait Information: Is Social-Emotional Infonnation Processing Less Flexible in Old Age? Raoul Bell, Trang Giang, Iris Mund, and Axel Büchner Heinrich-Heine-University, Düsseldorf How do younger and older adults remember reputational trait information about other people? In the present study, trustworthy-looking and untrustworthy-looking faces were paired with cooperation or cheating in a cooperation game. In a surprise source-memory test, participants were asked to rate the likability of the faces, and were required to remember whether the faces were associated with negative or positive outcomes. The social expectations of younger and older adults were clearly affected by a priori facial trustworthiness. Facial trustworthiness was associated with high cooperation-game investments, high likability ratings, and a tendency toward guessing that a face belonged to a cooperator instead of a cheater in both age groups. Consistent with previous results showing that emotional memory is spared from age-related decline, memory for the association between faces and emotional reputational infonnation was well preserved in older adults. However, younger adults used a flexible encoding strategy to remember the social interaction partners. Source-memory was best for information that violated their (positive) expectations. Older adults, in contrast, showed a uniform memory bias for negative social information; their memory performance was not modulated by their expectations. This fmding suggests that older adults are less likely to adjust their encoding strategies to their social expectations than younger adults. This may be in line with older adults' motivational goals to avoid risks in social interactions. Keywords: emotional context memory, emotional incongruence, negativity effect, reciprocal altruism, social cognition

A growing body of research examines the interplay between cognition and emotion in old age (Kensinger, 2009). The interest in this area is, in part, motivated by the observation that many facets of socioemotional processing are relatively well preserved in older adults, even as cognitive aging is characterized by a general decline in cognitive capabilities (Carstensen & Löckenhoff, 2003). In line with this trend, memory deficits are among the most prevalent problems in old age, but emotional memory tasks often show age invariance (e.g., Schnitzspahn, Horn, Bayen, & Kliegel, 2012). The most pronounced age differences in memory have been observed in associative memory tasks (e.g., NavehBenjamin, Guez, Kilb, & Reedy, 2004). One example for this age-related associative memory deficit is that older adults perform less well in source-memory tasks than younger adults. Even when older adults are able to remember whether an item was presented or not, they are less likely than young adults to remember the context in which the item was presented (e.g., Bayen & Mumane, 1996; Bell, Büchner, & Mund, 2008; Boywitt, Kuhlmann, &

Meiser, 2012). We found it interesting that several results suggest that emotional associative memory is comparably well preserved in older adults. For instance, memory for the association between an item and a negative or positive verbal label is age-invariant, while at the same time, memory for the association between an item and perceptual or schematic information is clearly impaired in old age (May, Rahhal, Berry, & Leighton, 2005; Rahhal, May, & Hasher, 2002). In one experiment (Rahhal et al., 2002), faces were presented together with verbal information that was presented in a male or female voice. Participants were informed that all persons described by the female voice were good, whereas the persons described by the male voice were evil. When memory for the perceptual information (i.e., the voice) was tested, the older adults performed worse than the younger adults. However, when asked to identify the person's character (good or evil), older adults performed just as well as the younger adults. A possible interpretation of this result is that older adults are more motivated to leam affective information or "place higher informational priorities on affective or valuerich material relative to perceptual material than do young adults" (Rahhal et al., 2002, p. 105). The comparably well-preserved memory for this type of infonnation could also be linked to the fact that remembering emotional context information (e.g., whether a person was good or bad) relies on different brain structures than remembering nonemotional context information (e.g., whether a face was paired with a male or female voice). Patients with damage in hippocampal areas—who show pronounced deficits in nonemotional associative memory tasks—can still remember whether a person is good or bad, even when they have no recollection of the

Raoul Bell, Trang Giang, Iris Mund, and Axel Buchner, Department of Experimental Psychology, Heinrich-Heine-University, Düsseldorf, Düsseldorf, Germany. The research reported in this article was supported by a grant from the Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft (BE 4311/1-1). Correspondence concerning this article should be addressed to Raoul Bell, Institut für Experimentelle Psychologie, Heinrich-Heine-Universität Düsseldorf, Universitätsstraße I, Gebäude 23.02 und 23.03, 40225 Düsseldorf, Germany. E-mail: [email protected]

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EMOTIONAL INCONGRUITY AND AGING episodes that have led to the emotional categorization (Johnson, Kim, & Risse, 1985; Todorov & Olson, 2008). However, the leaming of these emotional associations is clearly impaired when the amygdala is affected by the brain damage (Todorov & Olson, 2008). The study of Todorov and Olson also comprised a comparison of younger and older adults, suggesting that implicit memory for affective information (reputational behavior descriptions) was relatively unaffected by aging. The remembering of emotional details of events may be less affected by the aging process than the remembering of nonemotional details because the amygdala and other parts of the limbic system that are associated with emotional memory (e.g., the orbitofrontal cortex) are relatively spared in normal aging (Kensinger, 2009). However, finding that memory for emotional aspects of a stimulus is comparably well-preserved in old age does not mean that there are no age-related changes in emotional information processing. The central claim of socioemotional selectivity theory (Carstensen, Fung, & Charles, 2003) is that older people approaching the end of life "pay more attention to the emotional aspects of situations, prioritize emotion-focused over problem-focused coping strategies, and prefer emotionally gratifying social contacts over contacts with novel social partners" (Löckenhoff & Carstensen, 2004, p. 1396). These changes are thought to have an adaptive function, aiming at increasing the older adults' wellbeing. According to socioemotional selectivity theory, younger adults should show a negativity bias when processing emotional information, whereas older adults should show a preference for the processing of positive information or a decreased preference for the processing of negative information (Carstensen et al., 2003; Spaniol, Voss, & Grady, 2008). However, a recent meta-analysis (Murphy & Isaacowitz, 2008) concluded that older adults do not generally show a decreased negativity preference compared with younger adults. This meta-analysis also found that younger adults do not always remember negative events better than positive ones. Recently, it has been argued that a rigid focus on negative information would not make much sense from a functional perspective because it would be incompatible with the need to fiexibly adapt information processing to the demands of the situation (Rothermund, Voss, & Wentura, 2008; Wentura, Voss, & Rothermund, 2009). Indeed, an inflexible focus on negative information is often seen as a cause of emotional disorders such as depression or phobia (Matbews & MacLeod, 2005). To prevent getting trapped in a negativity spiral, the processing of threats and opportunities has to be balanced. Therefore, the human mind comprises mechanisms of emotional counterregulation that draw attention to information that is incongruent with currently activated approach or avoidance tendencies (Rothermund et al., 2008). Unjustified expectations—both positive and negative—lead to maladaptive behavior. Attending to and remembering information that violates negative or positive expectations is important because it requires a change in behavior, and a refinement of the mental model that has led to the unjustified expectations. In line with this argument, it is known that younger adults have a strong tendency to attend to, and remember, information that violates positive or negative expectations (Cook, Marsh, & Hicks, 2003; Ehrenberg & Klauer, 2005; Rothermund et al., 2008). In the present study, we examined memory for reputational trait information. In a social-exchange game, participants interacted with partners whose faces were presented. Half of the partners

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cooperated, and the other half cheated. Then a surprise sourcememory test followed. The faces were shown again, intermixed with new faces. The participants were required to indicate whether they had seen the face during the cooperation game or not. If a face was classified as "seen," participants were also required to indicate whether the face belonged to a cooperator or to a cheater. We were primarily interested in memory for the face-trait associations, that is, memory for the context in which the faces were encountered. Remembering that a face was associated with cooperation or cheating is an important requirement for reciprocal socialexchange strategies that reward cooperation and punish cheating (Bell, Büchner, & Musch, 2010; Büchner, Bell, Mehl, & Musch, 2009). Based on theories in evolutionary psychology that emphasize the importance of cheater detection for the maintenance of cooperation in groups and societies (Cosmides & Tooby, 1992), it was initially hypothesized that memory for faces of cheaters should be enhanced compared with memory for cooperators because a bias toward remembering cheaters could be beneficial for avoiding risks in social interactions (Büchner et al., 2009; Chiappe et al., 2004; Mealey, Daood, & Krage, 1996; Oda, 1997). Early studies focused on old-new face recognition (i.e., on how well people were able to recognize the face of a cheater as old), and found inconsistent results, which were, nevertheless, interpreted as evidence for a cheater bias in face memory (Mealey et al, 1996; Oda, 1997). However, these studies were criticized for methodological problems, and more carefully controlled studies have shown that there was no cheater advantage in old-new recognition (Barclay & Lalumière, 2006; Mehl & Buchner, 2008). Furthermore, it was argued that source memory for faces of cheaters and cooperators (i.e., memory for the association between a face and cheating or cooperative behavior), rather than old-new recognition, is relevant for reciprocal cooperation because source memory enables the individuals to adjust their behavior to the outcomes of previous interactions (Büchner et al., 2009). There are several studies showing a source-memory advantage for faces of cheaters (Büchner et al., 2009; Chiappe et al., 2004), but the evidence is not quite consistent (Bell et al., 2010; Singer, Kiebel, Winston, Dolan, & Frith, 2004). One reason for the inconsistency seems to be that source memory for reputational information is influenced by the participants' expectations. There are now a number of studies (Barclay, 2008; Bell, Büchner, Kroneisen, & Giang, 2012; Bell et al., 2010; Chang & Sanfey, 2009; Kroneisen & Bell, 2013; Suzuki & Suga, 2010; Volstorf, Rieskamp, & Stevens, 2011) suggesting that younger adults use a flexible memorization strategy that takes into account the relative likelihood of cheating and cooperation in a given situation. They preferentially encode and remember information that violates a previously held expectation. If cooperative behavior is expected, either because it is encountered more often than cheating (Barclay, 2008; Bell et al., 2010; Volstorf et al, 2011), or because the faces look trustworthy (Bell, Büchner, Kroneisen et al., 2012; Suzuki & Suga, 2010), source memory for faces of cheaters (i.e., memory for the association between a face and cheating) is enhanced. However, if cheating is expected, participants are better at remembering that a face has been associated with cooperative behavior. It is plausible to assume that this bias toward encoding expectancy-incongment information represents a particularly efficient encoding strategy because more effort is invested in encoding context information that cannot be validly

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BELL, GIANG, MUND, AND BUCHNER

reconstructed, based on expectancy-congruent guessing at retrieval (Cook et al, 2003; Ehrenberg & Klauer, 2005). However, expectancy violation alone does not seem to be the whole story. In many studies, the source-memory advantage for unexpected information was asymmetric in that memory for negative behaviors that violated positive expectations was particularly good, whereas the memory advantage for positive behaviors that violated negative expectations was less strong, and sometimes absent (Bell, Büchner, Kroneisen et al., 2012; Kroneisen & Bell, 2013; Suzuki & Suga, 2010). Hence, in the present study, we expected to replicate the findings of previous studies that young adults show a memory advantage for unexpected behaviors, particularly for negative behaviors violating positive expectations. With respect to the older adults, the following research questions were raised. 1. Do older adults show poorer memory than younger adults for reputational trait information? As mentioned above, considerable evidence supports the idea that associative memory is particularly impaired in old age. However, other results show that memory for the association between an item and an emotional experience is relatively unaffected by aging (Rahhal et al., 2002; Todorov & Olson, 2008), suggesting that older adults may be as good as younger adults at remembering the association between a face and the emotional situation (cheating, cooperation) in which it was encountered. Examining potential problems of older adults in remembering reputational information seems important because a deficit in remembering reputational face-trait associations would make older adults particularly vulnerable to social exploitation, and might even hinder the development of beneficial reciprocal relationships in old age. 2. Do older adults show an advantage for expectancyincongruent information? Younger adults preferentially remember cheating or cooperative behavior, depending on which of these violates their expectations, although expectancy-incongruent cheating is remembered best. Is memory for socioemotional information equally fiexible in old age? Studies examining impression formation in social judgment tasks suggest that there might be age-related changes in the use of expectancy-congruent and -incongruent social information. First, older adults tend to assign more weight to negative than to positive information when evaluating morality traits (Hess, Bolstad, Woodbum, & Auman, 1999; Hess & Kotter-Grühn, 2011; Hess & Pullen, 1994). Second, older adults are less likely than younger adults to adjust their reputational evaluations to situational goals (Hess & Kotter-Grühn, 2011), or to revise an initial negative moral evaluation in the light of inconsistent positive information (Hess et al., 1999; Hess & Pullen, 1994). In view of these results, it seems possible that older adults are less likely than younger adults to fiexibly adjust their encoding strategies to their social expectations.

Method

ies. The data of 10 participants (four younger, and six older adults) were excluded because the dementia screening test (Kalbe et al., 2004) did not indicate age-appropriate cognitive functioning. The remaining sample consisted of 93 younger adults (78 women) ranging in age between 18 and 33 years (M = 22.06, SD = 2.72) and 91 older adults (57 women) ranging in age between 62 and 90 years (M = 70.58, SD = 5.32). The score in the Beck Depression Inventory (Beck, Steer, & Brown, 1996; Hautzinger, Keller, & Kühner, 2006) did not differ between groups, /(182) = 1.56, p = .'l2,T\j = .01, showing that any differences in emotional memory cannot be attributed to age-related differences in the prevalence of depression. Younger adults had more years of education than older adults, i(182) = 6.02, p < .01, T^^ = .17, but older adults performed better on a vocabulary test (Lehrl, 1989) that was used as a measure of crystallized intelligence, i(182) = —10.12, p < .01, Tip = .36. The scores of the dementia screening test did not differ between the age groups, r(182) = 0.87, p = .39, ir)^ < .01. The descriptive data of the tests are given in Table 1. Older adults were paid for participation, younger adults could decide whether they wanted to be paid or whether they wanted to participate for course credit.

Materials Sixty-four faces were selected based on an independent norming study, in which 35 younger adults and 26 older adults rated the trustworthiness of 240 faces taken from the Center for Vital Longevity Face Database (Minear & Park, 2004). Thirty-two of these faces had received high trustworthiness ratings by both age groups, and 32 were associated with low trustworthiness ratings (see Table 2). Half of the male and female faces of each category were young (18-39 years of age, M = 25.59, SD = 6.27), and the other half, old (62-88 years of age, M = 70.75, SD = 7.61).

Procedure A cooperation game served as the incidental encoding phase. The cooperation game was very similar to that used in previous studies examining source memory for cooperators and cheaters (Bell, Büchner, Kroneisen et al., 2012; Bell et al., 2010; Giang, Bell, & Buchner, 2012). In each round of the cooperation game, participants saw silhouettes representing themselves, and the faces of their interaction partners (see Figure 1). Each participant was informed that he or she had to invest money into a joint business venture with the partner shown on the screen. The participant first decided whether to invest 15 cents or 30 cents by pressing an appropriately labeled button (2 cm in diameter) on a response box.

Table 1 Mean Scores in Beck's Depression Inventory (BDI), the Vocabulary Test (MWT-A), and the Dementia Screening Test (DemTect) as a Function of Age Group

Participants Younger adults

Ninety-seven younger adults and 97 older adults participated. Younger adults were Heinrich-Heine University students recruited on campus. The older adults were recruited through advertisements in local newspapers, and from a pool of healthy communitydwelling adults who had participated in previous (unrelated) stud-

Older adults

Measure

Mean

(SD)

Mean

(SD)

Beck's Depression Inventory (BDI) Vocabulary Test (MWT-A) Dementia Screening (DemTect)

8.68 28.80 16.99

(7.23) (3.69) (1.36)

7.05 33.35 16.79

(6.90) (2.22) (1.71)

EMOTIONAL INCONGRUITY AND AGING

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Table 2

Trustworthiness Ratings for the Faces Presented in the Experiment That Were Obtained in an Independent Norming Study as a Function of Age Group (Younger vs. Older), Facial Trustworthiness (Trustworthy vs. Untrustworthy), and Age of Face (Younger vs. Older) Tmstworthy faces Younger faces

Untmstworthy faces

Older faces

Younger faces

Older faces

Mean

Participants

M

(SE)

M

(SE)

M

(SE)

M

(SE)

M

{SE)

Younger Older Mean

4.15 4.07 4.11

(0.09) (0.09) (0.08)

4.13 4.08 4.10

(0.09) (0.09) (0.08)

2.39 2.37 2.38

(0.09) (0.09) (0.08)

2.61 2.57 2.59

(0.09) (0.09) (0.08)

3.32 3.27

(0.04) (0.04)

Note. Trustworthiness was assessed on a scale ranging from 1 (hardly trustworthy) to 6 {very trustworthy).

An arrow displaying the selected amount appeared at the upper right comer of the silhouette representing the participant and moved toward the center of the screen. If the partner was a cooperator, he or she invested just as much as the participant (i.e., 15 cents or 30 cents, depending on the participant's investment). The corresponding amount appeared at the upper left comer of the partner's face. Then the two investments were added up, and the sum of investment appeared at the center of the screen. A bonus was added that was always 1/3 of the sum of investments. The bonus was added to the investments, and the total sum was split up between the two interactants. Both received half of the total sum, regardless of what they had invested. The corresponding amounts of money were displayed in two arrows starting at the center of the screen, moving to the participant's silhouette or the partner's face.

respectively. If the partner was cooperative, the transaction resulted in a gain for both interactants. For instance, if each interactant invested 30 cents, the sum of investments was 60 cents, the bonus was 20 cents, the total sum was 80 cents, and both interactants received 40 cents in return. Thus, both interactants gained 10 cents. However, some of the partners failed to reciprocate, and invested nothing (0 cents). Thus, if a participant had invested 30 cents, the sum of investments was 30 cents, the bonus was 10 cents, and the total sum was 40 cents. In consequence, the participant received less than he or she had invested (20 cents), and lost 10 cents. The partner, in contrast, made a huge profit (20 cents) because he or she benefitted from the investment of the participant while avoiding the costs associated with investing into the game. After the transaction was completed, each participant started the

Account Balance: 550 Cents

Account Balance: 550 Cents

Loss: - 1 0 Cents New Account Balance: 540 Cents

Cain: + 2 0 Cents New Account Balance 570 Cents

Your partner cheated. She has invested nothing and has made a gain at your expense. Because of her cheating you loose 10 cents.

Figure I. Screenshot of the cooperation game. The silhouette on the left side represents the participant. The face on the right side belongs to a cheating partner (the faces were randomly assigned to the conditions). The numhers in the upper arrows refer to the investments of the participant and the partner (30 cents and 0 cents, respectively). In the center of the screen, the sum of investments (30 cents), the honus (10 cents), and the total sum (40 cents) are shown. The numbers in the lower arrows show the participant's and the partner's shares of the total sum (20 cents). The transaction results in a financial loss to the participant (10 cents), and a gain to the cheating partner (20 cents). Photograph was taken from the Center for Vital Longevity Face Database.

BELL, GIANG, MUND, AND BUCHNER

988

next trial by pressing the continue button on the response box. All participants knew that they played for real money, and had agreed to be paid out the amount scored at the end of the experiment. In the cooperation game, participants saw 16 faces with low a priori facial trustworthiness, and 16 faces with high a priori facial trustworthiness. Half of the faces in each category were associated with cooperation, and the other half were associated with cheating. The faces were randomly assigned to the conditions with the restriction that age of the faces (younger vs. older), and sex of the faces (male vs. female) were counterbalanced across conditions. The order of presentation was randomly determined for each participant. In an immediate source-memory test, participants saw the 32 old faces intermixed with 32 new faces, half of which looked trustworthy, and half of which looked untrustworthy. Again, age and sex of the faces were counterbalanced across conditions. The faces were shown one after another. For each face, participants' task was first to rate the likability of the face on a scale ranging from 1 (not likable at all) to 6 (extremely likable) by pressing buttons labeled with the numbers on the response box. Then, participants were required to indicate, by pressing one of two buttons on the response box, whether they had "seen" the face before or whether they had "not seen" the face before ("old" and "new" were avoided so that participants did not have to call a young face "old"). After participants had indicated that they had "seen" the face before, they were also asked whether the person "was cheating and did not invest anything into the cooperation game" or whether the person "cooperated and invested as much as you [the participant] did." Participants went on to subsequent faces by pressing the continue button on the response box.

Design The design was a 2 X 2 X 2 design with facial trustworthiness (trustworthy vs. untrustworthy), and stimulus character (cheater vs. cooperator) as within-subject factors, and age group (younger vs. older) as a between-subjects factor. The dependent variables were game-phase investments, test-phase likability ratings, old-new recognition, and source memory. A multivariate approach was used for all general linear model within-subject comparisons. In the present application, all multivariate test criteria correspond to the same (exact) F statistic, which is reported. Partial eta square Tip is reported as a measure of effect size. The level of a was set to .05. Source memory was assessed using the multinomial sourcemonitoring measurement model explicated below. Given a total sample size of A^ = 184, 64 stimuli, and a = .05, even a very small incongruence effect of w = 0.03 (an effect of 0.1 would be small in terms of the conventions suggested by Cohen, 1988) could be detected with sufficient probability of 1 - ß = .95 (Faul, Erdfelder, Lang, & Buchner, 2007).

Results

F(l, 182) = 567.98, p < .01, vtj = .76, on the game investments (see Table 3). Both older and younger participants invested more into the social dilemma game when the faces looked trustworthy than when the faces looked untrustworthy. Mean investments did not differ between younger and older adults, F( 1, 182) = 1.11, p = .29, T)p < .01. The interaction between facial trustworthiness and age group was not significant, F(l, 182) = 0.08,p = .77, T\j < .01.

Viewing Time A 2 X 2 X 2 MANOVA with facial trustworthiness (trustworthy vs. untrustworthy), stimulus character (cheater vs. cooperator), and age group (young vs. old) as independent variables, and median game-phase viewing time as the dependent variable revealed no main effects of facial trustworthiness, F(l, 182) = 0.11, p = .74, Ti¿ < .01, and stimulus character, F(l, 182) = 2.27,p = .66, TI^ < .01. The interaction between facial trustworthiness and stimulus character was also not significant, F(l, 182) = 0.39, p < .54, TI^ < .01. Older adults took longer to initiate the next trial than younger adults, F(l, 182) = 122.36,p < .01, TI^ = .40. This difference was more pronounced when the partner had cheated than when the partner was cooperative, F(l, 182) = 10.74, p < .01, TI^ = .06. This finding could indicate that older adults focused more strongly on cheaters at encoding, but note that encoding times were not strongly related to memory in previous studies (Bell & Büchner, 2010). There was no three-way interaction between facial trustworthiness, stimulus character, and age group, F(l, 182) < 0.01, p = .96, Ti^ < .01.

Likability Ratings A 2 X 2 X 2 MANOVA with facial trustworthiness (trustworthy vs. untrustworthy), stimulus character (cheater vs. cooperator), and age group (young vs. old) as independent variables, and likability ratings as the dependent variable revealed that the trustworthy faces were rated as more likable than untrustworthy faces, F(l, 182) = 1068.53, p < .01, Ti^ = .85 (see Table 4). Faces associated with cheating were rated as less likable than faces associated with cooperation, F(l, 182) = 83.45,p < .01, TI^ = .31. The interaction between facial trustworthiness and stimulus character was not significant, F(l, 182) = 0.04, p = .84, TI^ < .01. Mean likability ratings did not differ between younger and older participants, F(l, 182) = 0.06, p = .81, Ti^ < .01. The interaction between facial trustworthiness and age group was significant, F(l, 182) = 10.60, p < .01, Tip = .06. Both younger and older adults rated trustworthy faces as more likable than untrustworthy faces (F(l, 92) = 722.78,

Table 3 Mean Cooperation-Game Investments as a Function of Age Group (Younger vs. Older) and Facial Trustworthiness (Trustworthy vs. Untrustworthy) Tmstworthy faces

Game Investments A 2 X 2 MANOVA with facial trustworthiness (trustworthy vs. untrustworthy) and age group (young vs. old) as independent variables, and game investments as the dependent variable revealed a significant main effect of facial trustworthiness.

Untrustworthy faces

Mean

Participants

M

(SE)

M

(SE)

M

(SE)

Younger Older Mean

23.43 23.74 23.58

(0.34) (0.34) (0.24)

17.59 18.04 17.82

(0.27) (0.27) (0.19)

20.51 20.89

(0.25) (0.26)

EMOTIONAL INCONGRUITY AND AGING

989

Table 4 Mean Test-Phase Likability Ratings as a Function of Age Group (Younger vs. Older), Facial Trustworthiness (Trustworthy vs. Untrustworthy), and Stimulus Character (Cheater vs. Cooperator) Trustworthy faces Cheater

Untrustworthy faces

Cooperator

Cheater

Cooperator

Mean

Participants

M

(SE)

M

(SE)

M

(SE)

M

(SE)

M

(SE)

Younger Older Mean

3.11 3.63 3.70

(0.07) (0.07) (0.05)

4.03 3.83 3.93

(0.07) (0.07) (0.05)

2.08 2.21 2.15

(0.06) (0.06) (0.04)

2.31 2.46 2.39

(0.06) (0.06) (0.04)

3.05 3.03

(0.05) (0.05)

p < .01, Ti^ = .89, and f ( l , 90) = 390.04, p < .01, -q^ = .81, respectively), but the difference was somewhat more pronounced in younger adults. The difference in likability ratings between cheaters and cooperators was equally pronounced in both younger and older adults, as there was no interaction between stimulus character and age group, f ( l , 182) = 0.09, p = .76, T)^ < .01. The three-way interaction between facial trustworthiness, stimulus character, and age group was not significant, F(l, 182) = 0.56, p = .46, Ti^< .01.

Oid-New Recognition We used P^ the sensitivity measure of the two-high threshold model (Snodgrass & Corwin, 1988) to analyze old-new recognition memory (see Table 5). A 2 X 2 X 2 MANOVA on the sensitivity measure showed that faces with low a priori facial trustworthiness were better recognized than faces with high a priori facial trustworthiness, F(l, 182) = 24.91,p < .01, TJ^ < .12. This finding is consistent with previous observations untrustworthy faces are better recognized than trustworthy faces (Rule, Slepian, & Ambady, 2012). This finding could be attributed to the attention-grabbing effect of threatening visual features of the faces, or it could be explained by assuming that less average faces with more distinctive features tend to be evaluated more negatively, and at the same time remembered better, than more average faces (Deffenbacher, Vetter, Johanson, & O'Toole, 1998; Potter, Corneille, Ruys, & Rhodes, 2007). In the present study, we were more interested in the effects of behavioral untrustworthiness on memory. There was no main effect of stimulus character on old-new face recognition, F(l, 182) = 0.16, p = .69, -q^ < .01, but there was an interaction between a priori facial trustworthiness and stimulus character, F(l, 182) = 4.92, p = .03, ti^ = .03. Highly trustworthy faces were better recognized when they were associated with cheating than when they were associated with coopera-

tion, and this pattern was reversed for faces with low a priori trustworthiness. Younger adults had better recognition memory for the faces than older adults, F(l, 182) = 11.78,p < .01, T]], = .06. The interaction between facial trustworthiness and age group was not significant, F(l, 182) = 1.23, p = .27, ff^ < .01, but there was an interaction between stimulus character and age group, F(l, 182) = 5.04, p = .03, T|p = .03. Consistent with previous studies (Bell, Büchner, Erdfelder et al., 2012; Bell, Buchner, Kroneisen et al., 2012; Buchner et al., 2009; Giang et al., 2012), younger adults remembered faces of cooperators as well as those of cheaters, F(l, 182) = 1.49, p = .23, i\j = .02. Older adults, in contrast, showed a cheater advantage in old-new face recognition, F(l, 182) = 4.10,p < .05, T]p = .04. There was no three-way interaction between facial trustworthiness, stimulus character, and age group F(l, 182) = 0.07, p = .79,-n¿< .01.

Source Memory It is well known that (ad hoc) source-memory measures such as the conditional source-identification measure have the disadvantage that they confound source memory with guessing biases (Bayen, Mumane, & Erdfelder, 1996; Broder & Meiser, 2007). When examining the infiuence of expectations on source memory, it is important to use a source-memory measure that avoids this problem, because expectations infiuence people's choices in source-memory paradigms through expectancy-congruent guessing (Bayen & Kuhlmann, 2011; Bell, Büchner, Kroneisen et al, 2012; Marsh, Cook, & Hicks, 2006; Nash, Bryer, & Schlaghecken, 2010; Spaniol & Bayen, 2002). Untrustworthy faces might be classified as "cheaters" rather than as "cooperators," independently of whether they were actually paired with cheating behavior or not. However, if source classification is stochastically independent of what happened in the encoding phase, this classification perfor-

Table 5 Old-New Recognition Accuracy fPJ as a Function of Age Group (Younger vs. Older), A Priori Facial Trustworthiness (Trustworthy vs. Untrustworthy), and Stimulus Character (Cheater vs. Cooperator) Trustworthy faces Cheater

Untrustworthy faces

Cooperator

Cheater

Cooperator

Mean

Participants

M

(SE)

M

(SE)

M

(SE)

M

(SE)

M

(SE)

Younger Older Mean

0.73 0.65 0.69

(0.02) (0.02) (0.02)

0.73 0.61 0.67

(0.02) (0.02) (0.02)

0.76 0.70 0.73

(0.02) (0.02) (0.02)

0.79 0.70 0.75

(0.02) (0.02) (0.01)

0.75 0.67

(0.02) (0.02)

990

BELL, GIANG, MUND, AND BUCHNER

manee cannot be considered to result from source memory. Instead, it is plausible that it is determined by guessing processes. One solution to this problem is to use the source-monitoring measurement model of Bayen et al. (1996) to evaluate sourcememory data. This approach has the advantage that it has been shown empirically in validation studies that source memory and guessing can be measured independently of each other using this model (Bayen et al., 1996). Furthermore, the model has been applied successfully in previous studies to examine the effects of schema congmency on guessing and source-memory (Bayen & Kuhlmann, 2011 ; Bell, Büchner, Kroneisen et al., 2012; Bell et al., 2010; Buchner et al., 2009; Ehrenberg & Klauer, 2005; Spaniol & Bayen, 2002). To obtain parameter estimates and to perform goodness-of-fit tests, we used multiTree (Moshagen, 2010). Goodness-of-fit tests were based on the log-likelihood ratio statistic G^ which is asymptotically x^ distributed (for an introduction into multinomial modeling, see Batchelder & Riefer, 1999; Erdfelder et al., 2009; Riefer & Batchelder, 1988). The source-memory measurement model is displayed in Figure 2. To illustrate, the model incorporates the assumption that a cheater face is recognized with probability £>cheaf If participants

recognize the faces correctly, they may also remember the cheating behavior associated with the face with the conditional probability ¿Cheat' i" which case the face is correctly classified as a cheater. With the complementary probability l-dcheac the cheating context is not remembered. In this case, the cheating context is guessed correctly with probability gcheat- With probability 1 - gcheaf i' is incorrectly guessed that the face belongs to a cooperator. With probability 1 - öcheat- 'he face is not recognized as old. However, it may still be guessed, with probability b, that the face is old. Then it has to be guessed whether the face belonged to a cheater (with probability gcheat) or 'o a cooperator (with probability 1 — Reheat)With probability 1 - b, participants guess that the face is new. Complementary processes are assumed to occur when participants encounter the face of a cooperator, or a new face. We use different parameters for estimating old-new recognition and source memory for cheaters and cooperators, respectively, because the probability of remembering a cooperator face, and the probability of remembering the cooperative behavior might differ from the probability of remembering the face of a cheater, and the probability of remembering the cheating, respectively. However, the probability

Cheater

(—^

"Cooperator" "Cheater" ^ffChMt

-KJ-

Cooperator /—N_-.—— ^Chcït •"'v_^'~ •^'

^ — ^

"-O

"^

/—N

l-?Cheat " V j -

"Cooperator" "Cheater" "Cooperator" "New"

New •-O Figure 2. The source-monitoring measurement model of Bayen et al. (1996). The rounded rectangles on the left side represent the different types of stimulus faces in the source-memory test (cheater, cooperator, and new). The rectangles on the right side represent the participants' answers. The letters along the lines represent the probabilities with which certain cognitive states occur: D = the probability of detecting a face correctly as "old" or "new"; i/ = the conditional probability of correctly remembering whether a face was associated with cheating or cooperation; g = the probability of guessing that a face was associated with cheating; b = the probability of guessing that a face was "old."

EMOTIONAL INCONGRUITY AND AGING

of guessing that a face belongs to a cheater is assumed to be equal for all types of faces. To examine the effects of expectancy violation on younger and older adults' source memory, we needed four versions of this model because we needed separate trees for each age group (younger and older adults) and for each type of face (trustworthy and untrustworthy). To obtain an identifiable base model, we set the probability of recognizing a new face as "new" to be equal to the mean probability of recognizing an old face as "old," DN^W = (^cheat + ^coopV^. This is the standard assumption of two-high threshold models of signal detection (Snodgrass & Corwin, 1988) and is empirically justified by the mirror effect (Glanzer, Adams, Iverson, & Kim, 1993). Furthermore, for younger adults, the parameters for the old-new recognition of cheater faces and cooperator faces were set to be equal, Dcheat ~ ^coop- This restriction is justified, based on the analysis of the old-new recognition data reported above. The base model that includes these restrictions fit the data well, G\2) = 3.81, p = .15. We start by analyzing the guessing processes. This guessing bias is a good indicator of participants' expectations toward these faces. It has been shown in previous studies that untrustworthy-looking faces are associated with a bias toward guessing that the face belongs to a cheater rather than to a cooperator (Bell, Büchner, Kroneisen et al, 2012; Nash et al., 2010). This hypothesis can be evaluated by testing whether imposing the restriction that the guessing bias g does not differ between trustworthy-looking and untrustworthy-looking faces leads to a significant increase in model misfit (expressed in the goodness-of-fit statistic G^). As predicted, both younger adults, AG^(l) = 21.02, p < .01, and older adults, ^G\l) = 42.28, p < .01, had a higher probability of guessing that the face belonged to a cheater (rather than to a cooperator) when the face looked untrustworthy than when the face looked trustworthy (see Figure 3). The guessing biases did not differ between the two age groups, AG^(2) = 1.62, p = .44. The source-memory parameters that were estimated using the multinomial measurement model are displayed in Figure 4. RepGuessing Bias Trastvrorthy Faces Untrustworthy Faces

Younger Paitte^>ants

Older Particô>ants

Figure 3. Probability estimate for model parameter g representing the process of guessing that a face belonged to a cheater (and not to a cooperator) as a function of age group (younger vs. older) and facial trustworthiness (trustworthy vs. untrustworthy). The error bars represent .95 confidence intervals.

991 Source Memory

• Cheater D Cooperator

0.7 0,6

B 0.5

I 0.3

I

0,2

Trustworthy Untrustworthy Faces Faces Younger Participants

Trustworthy tJntrustworthy Faces Older Partidpants

Figure 4. Probability estimate for model parameter d representing source memory (the conditional probability of correctly remembering the source of a correctly recognized face) as a function of age group (younger vs. older), facial trustworthiness (trustworthy vs. untrustworthy), and stimulus character (cheater vs. cooperator). The error bars represent .95 confidence intervals.

Heating previous studies (Bell, Büchner, Kroneisen et al., 2012; Kroneisen & Bell, 2013; Suzuki & Suga, 2010), younger adults showed an asymmetric expectancy-violation effect. When the faces looked trustworthy, cheating was better remembered than cooperation, AG^(l) = 4.61, p = .03. However, this sourcememory advantage for faces of cheaters was not found (and was even descriptively reversed) for untrustworthy-looking faces, AG^(l) = 0.05, p = .83. Older adults, in contrast, showed a source-memory advantage for cheater faces over cooperator faces, regardless of whether the faces looked trustworthy, AG^(l) = 11.35,p < .01, or untrustworthy, AG^(l) = 5.19,p = .02. Source memory for trustworthy-looking cooperator faces was even estimated to be zero, which means that older adults' answers in this condition were entirely determined by guessing. Source memory was comparably well retained in older adults. When the source-memory parameters of the older and younger participants were compared directly, source memory did not differ between age groups for trustworthy-looking faces associated with cheating, AG^(l) = 0.78, p = .38, and for trustworthy faces associated with cooperation, AG^(l) = 0.47, p = .50. Source memory for untrustworthy-looking cheaters was descriptively even somewhat enhanced in older adults compared with younger adults, although not significantly so, AG^(l) = 0.73, p = .39. The only stimuli for which the younger adults had significantly better source memory than the older adults were the untrustworthylooking partners that unexpectedly cooperated, AG^(l) = 6.41, p = .01.

Discussion Although we were most interested in differences between the age groups, we would like to start the discussion by drawing

992

BELL, GIANG, MUND, AND BUCHNER

attention to the similarities in social and emotional processing between the age groups that are apparent in the results. First, the behavior in the cooperation game did not differ between younger and older adults. Second, there was no main effect of age on the likability ratings, indicating that younger and older participants did not differ in their general positive or negative evaluations of the faces. Third, although a priori facial tmstworthiness had a more pronounced effect on younger than older adults' ratings of the faces, both younger adults' and older adults' evaluations were drastically affected by the a priori trustworthiness of the faces, which is consistent with previous evidence showing that the impression of trustworthiness is highly correlated with the general positive or negative evaluation of a face (Todorov, 2008; Todorov, Said, Engel, & Oosterhof, 2008). Fourth, younger and older adults were equal in how they adjusted their likability judgments to the interactants' behaviors in the cooperation game, which indicates that implicit memory for the positive or negative encounters with these faces did not differ between the two age groups (consistent with Todorov & Olson, 2008). Fifth, and finally, when source memory was absent, both younger and older adults showed a tendency toward guessing that trustworthy-looking faces had previously been paired with cooperation, and that untrustworthy-looking faces had previously been associated with cheating, and these guessing biases did not differ between the two age groups. Thus, both age groups relied on facial cues when judging whether a particular face was likely to be associated with cooperation or not. Note, however, that the comparably small age differences in the emotional evaluation of the faces might, at least in part, be due to the fact that we deliberately selected faces for which no age differences in trustworthiness ratings were obtained in a previous norming study. Our main interest was to examine source memory for the association between a face and the reputational information that could be acquired in the cooperation game. A priori it was unclear whether older adults' source memory would be severely impaired or not. On the one hand, older adults' memory performance is typically characterized by a deficit in learning and remembering new associations between stimuli (e.g., Naveh-Benjamin et al., 2004). On the other hand, memory for socioemotional contexts has been found to be an exception to this rule (May et al., 2005; Rahhai et al., 2002). The present results are consistent with the latter studies. Older adults had surprisingly good source memory for the reputational information. Source memory did not differ between the two age groups for trustworthy-looking cheaters, trustwonhylooking cooperators, or untrustworthy-looking cheaters. The only exception to this pattem occurred when an untrustworthy-looking face was paired with cooperation. This pattem of findings suggests that memory for the association of a face with reputational information might be less impaired in old age than other forms of associative memory. Similar results have been previously attributed to motivational differences between older and younger adults. It has been proposed that older adults direct available cognitive resources to the socioemotional components of their tasks. As a consequence, memory for the socioemotional aspects of an encoding episode is comparatively well retained (May et al., 2005; Rahhai et al., 2002). Another reason for the absence of the usual age-related deficit in memory might be that the teaming of associations between a stimulus and a specific emotional response is mediated by different brain structures than those associative memory tasks that show

age-related performance declines (Johnson et al., 1985; Todorov & Olson, 2008). Previous experiments in which faces were paired with emotionally valent reputational information have shown that people generally fail to recollect the specific details of the original episodes, but instead remember the associations between the faces and specific emotional reactions (Bell, Büchner, Erdfelder et al., 2012). Functional imaging studies have shown that these forms of emotional memories do not depend on the same hippocampal brain structures that are responsible for the encoding and retrieving of associations between nonemotional stimuli, but instead rely on emotion-processing brain regions such as the amygdala (Singer et al., 2004). Patients with damage in some parts of the hippocampal system may be plagued by a number of memory deficits, but they sometimes have surprisingly good memory for the association between stimuli such as faces and approach/avoidance reactions, even when they have no conscious recollection of the leaming episode that led to these preferences or aversions (Johnson et al., 1985; Todorov & Olson, 2008). It seems thus possible that the brain circuits responsible for emotional memory might be subject to age-related changes to a lesser degree than the brain circuits tiiat are responsible for the leaming of nonemotional associations (Kensinger, 2009). An interesting question was whether older adults' memory for the reputational information would be fiexibly modulated by the expectations elicited by the faces. Previous studies have found that, contrary to what had originally been assumed, younger adults do not focus only on cheating. Instead, they flexibly adapt their encoding strategies to the demands of the situation (Barclay, 2008; Bell, Büchner, Kroneisen et al., 2012; Bell et al., 2010; Chang & Sanfey, 2009; Kroneisen & Bell, 2013; Volstorfet al., 2011). The source-memory advantage for cheaters was found reliably only when cooperation was expected. If, in contrast, cheating was expected, then the source-memory advantage was abolished. Some studies found that the effect was even reversed, that is, that cooperators were better remembered than cheaters when cheating was expected. However, the expectancy-violation effect was asytnmetric in most studies (Bell, Büchner, Kroneisen et al., 2012; Kroneisen & Bell, 2013; Suzuki & Suga, 2010). For instance, Suzuki and Suga (2010) used faces with high and low trustworthiness that were associated with faimess or selfishness in a social dilemma game. There was a source-memory advantage for faces of cheaters when the faces looked trustworthy, but faces of cheaters and cooperators were remembered about equally well when the faces looked untrustworthy. The performance of our younger participants replicates this pattem. They remembered trustworthylooking cheaters better than trustworthy-looking cooperators. No such difference was observed when the faces looked untrustworthy; at a descriptive level, the negativity advantage was reversed. Although the analyses of the game investments, likability ratings, and guessing strategies suggest that the facial trustworthiness manipulation had marked effects on older adults' social expectations, older adults did not show the same expectancy-violation effect on source memory that was observed in the younger adults. Instead, older adults showed an unconditional source-memory advantage for the faces of cheaters that was not modulated by the a priori tmstworthiness of the faces. This might suggest that older adults' emotional source memory is less fiexible than that of younger person's, because older adults do not adapt their encoding

EMOTIONAL INCONGRUITY AND AGING

strategies to their expectations. This finding fits with previous results suggesting that the processing of reputational information is less fiexible in older people, and is characterized by a negativity bias. For instance, older adults seem to be less likely than younger adults to modify an initial negative evaluation of others in the light of positive information (Hess et al., 1999; Hess & Pullen, 1994). It seems possible to attribute this finding to a decreased adaptability of the emotional system in old age. Older adults may be less able than younger adults to adjust their encoding strategies to their changing expectations. However, there is also evidence suggesting that the decreased use of inconsistent positive information is restricted to the moral domain (Hess et al., 1999). Therefore, it would be interesting for future studies to examine whether older adults' reduced fiexibility in dealing with emotional information is also present in other types of counterregulatory affective processing (Rothermund et al., 2008; Wentura et al., 2009). It is possible that the age-related differences in source memory observed here are due to motivational differences between younger and older adults. Although the finding that older people focused on negative reputational information is clearly inconsistent with the positivity bias postulated by socioemotional selectivity theory (Carstensen et al., 2003; Spaniol et al, 2008), it could be linked with the finding that older adults are more selective in their social relationships, and less motivated to establish new relationships with people outside their familiar social network (Carstensen et al., 2003). As noted previously (Bell, Büchner, Kroneisen et al., 2012), focusing on expectancy-incongruent information might be an optimal strategy for (younger) individuals trying to gain information about unfamiliar social partners. Focusing on cheaters may appear less fiexible but may still be an optimal strategy for (older) individuals whose primary goal is to avoid emotional risks in social interactions (Carstensen et al., 2003). Thus, although the bias toward remembering cheaters (regardless of initial impression) is less fiexible than focusing on expectancy-incongruent information, this less fiexible processing style may constitute an adaptation to the changed motivational goals of older adults, and may not necessarily lead to negative consequences for older adults' well-being. Future studies could focus on the question of how fiexibility in social information processing is linked with older and younger adults' satisfaction with existing social relationships, and with their motivation to establish new relationships with other people outside their familiar networks. A recent neuroimaging study (Castle et al., 2012) showed that older adults differentiate less between trustworthy- and untrustworthy-looking faces, and show less negative "gut feelings" to untrustworthy-looking faces than younger adults. These age differences were also refiected in the activation pattem of the anterior insula in response to facial trustworthiness. It was speculated that this reduced fiexibility in the processing of trust-related information may make older adults more vulnerable to deception. However, another neuroimaging study demonstrated that older adults showed a stronger decline in initial trust than did younger adults when the partner was associated with untrustworthy decisions in a repeated cooperation game. This phenomenon was associated with an increased activation in the anterior cingulate in response to unfair behavior (Fett, Gromann, Giampietro, Shergill, & Krabbendam, in press). The increased vigilance of older adults against known cheaters observed in the present study could be interpreted as evidence that older adults' may have developed

993

protective mechanisms that help them to cope with their increased risk of social exploitation. In summary, the present study examined age differences in memory for reputational trait information. The results confirm previous observations that memory for the association between a face and an emotional outcome is comparably well-retained in old age. However, whereas younger adults used a fiexible encoding strategy that took into account their negative or positive expectations toward the stimulus faces, older adults focused selectively on cheating. This finding suggests that the processing of reputational information may become less fiexible as a function of age, turning into a uniformly intense processing of negative social information. This less fiexible processing style may be in line with older adults' motivational goals of avoiding risks in social interactions.

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Received January 31, 2013 Revision received June 19, 2013 Accepted July 16, 2013

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