Behavioral Sciences and the Law Behav. Sci. Law 32: 104–120 (2014) Published online 9 February 2014 in Wiley Online Library (wileyonlinelibrary.com) DOI: 10.1002/bsl.2099
Mired in Miranda Misconceptions: A Study of Legally Involved Juveniles at Different Levels of Psychosocial Maturity Richard Rogers, Ph.D.*, Jennifer A. Steadham, M.S.†, Chelsea E. Fiduccia, M.S.†, Eric Y. Drogin, J.D., Ph.D.‡ and Emily V. Robinson, M.S.† The Supreme Court of the United States has long recognized that the vulnerabilities of juvenile offenders merit special protections due to deficits in experience and maturity. Appellate courts assume that Miranda warnings will inform juvenile suspects of their Miranda rights, and allow them to render knowing and intelligent waivers. This study examines Miranda misconceptions of legally involved juveniles (i.e., juvenile detainees and youth mandated to juvenile justice alternative education) at different levels of psychosocial maturity. These juveniles manifested an unexpectedly large frequency of erroneous Miranda beliefs; each group (low, middle, and high maturity) averaged a dozen or more misconceptions, thus overshadowing substantive differences between maturity groups. However, maturity played an important role in the immediate recall of a Miranda advisement. Alarmingly, both low- and middle-maturity groups displayed less than one-third immediate recall. The high-maturity group performed better, but still failed to recall almost half of the Miranda concepts. The overall findings are discussed with respect to juvenile Miranda comprehension and reasoning. Copyright # 2014 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
Juvenile detainees and offenders have long been considered a special class by the Supreme Court of the United States. In Haley v. Ohio (1948) and Gallegos v. Colorado (1962), the Court addressed the admissibility of statements made by juveniles in the absence of an interested adult or counsel and concluded that minor children require special protection against the stresses of interrogation. The landmark interrogation case of Miranda v. Arizona (1966) required adult detainees be informed of their procedural rights, including the right to counsel, prior to interrogation. The following year, this requirement was affirmed for juvenile detainees with In re Gault (1967). Beyond interrogation, several decisions address special consideration for juveniles in sentencing. In Roper v. Simmons (2005), the Court barred capital punishment for juveniles. Most recently, the Supreme Court held in Graham v. Florida (2010) and Miller v. Alabama (2012) that life in prison without the possibility of parole is not constitutional for minor children convicted of non-homicide (Graham) or homicide (Miller) offenses.
*Correspondence to: Richard Rogers, Department of Psychology, University of North Texas, 1155 Union Circle #311280, Denton, TX 76203-5017, U.S.A. E-mail: [email protected] † University of North Texas, Denton, TX ‡ Harvard Medical School, Boston, MA
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As described in Haley v. Ohio (1948), among the Supreme Court’s rationales for providing special consideration to juvenile detainees is the heightened likelihood of minor children bowing to police pressure and confessing involuntarily. Of primary importance in Haley’s case were the circumstances surrounding his written confession. It was obtained after five straight hours of questioning at night without him being informed of his right to counsel. Justice Frankfurter, in his concurring opinion, specifically stated that he believed “a youth is never capable of that free choice of action which, in the eyes of the law, makes a confession ‘voluntary’” (Haley, 1948, p. 603). With a narrower focus, the majority opinion affirmed that – under dire circumstances such as these – it was reasonable to believe that the 15-year-old’s confession was not made voluntarily, despite his stating so in writing. The majority held that the interrogation methods to which Haley was subjected violated his due process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment. The opinion concluded that “[f]ormulas of respect for constitutional safeguards cannot prevail over the facts of life which contradict them” (p. 601). Such “facts of life” may include such matters as juveniles’ lower levels of maturity or cognitive abilities, as compared with adults, which are believed to have direct bearing on their ability to waive constitutional rights. Despite the Court’s early instructions to treat juveniles with “special care” (Haley, 1948, p. 599) and its similar, subsequent guidance on this issue, trial judges tend to evaluate juvenile Miranda waivers much in the same way as adult waivers (Friedman, 2011; King, 2006). In Fare v. Michael C. (1979), the first Miranda case addressing juvenile waivers, the Court extended the “totality of the circumstances” to juvenile waivers. The majority opinion found “no persuasive reasons why any other approach is required where the question is whether a juvenile has waived his rights, as opposed to whether an adult has done so” (Fare, p. 725). In addition to considering variables such as age, experience, and education, the Court in Fare required that determinations regarding the validity of juvenile waivers consider their capacities to (a) comprehend the warnings, (b) understand their Fifth Amendment rights, and (c) appreciate the consequences of waiving those rights. More recently, in J.D.B. v. North Carolina (2011), the Supreme Court of the United States specified that the age of juvenile suspects be considered with reference to Miranda waivers. The Court contended that age was more than simply a chronological marker; it allows reasonable assumptions to be generated regarding custodial youths’ perceptions and decision-making.
Juvenile Miranda Warnings Important differences emerge when both the language and content of Miranda warnings are examined. Although many juvenile suspects are administered as general warnings (i.e., advisements intended for all ages), hundreds of American jurisdictions have developed juvenile Miranda warnings (i.e., youth-specific advisements). Surveys of juvenile Miranda warnings (Rogers, Blackwood, et al., 2012; Rogers et al., 2009) have revealed extensive heterogeneity in the length and comprehensibility of these advisements. Beneficent efforts to explain juvenile rights fully have paradoxically created potentially less comprehensible warnings because of their much greater length and more difficult reading levels than those found with general warnings (see Rogers, Blackwood, et al., 2012; Rogers, Hazelwood, Sewell, Harrison, & Shuman, 2008). For example, Rogers, Sewell, Drogin, and Fiduccia (2012) operationalized “long advisements” as warnings plus waivers that exceed 175 words. Using this benchmark, Copyright # 2014 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
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they found that more than a third (37.5%) of juvenile warnings were classified as long, in stark comparison to general warnings (9.9%). Juvenile advisements typically require an eighth grade reading level for good but not excellent understanding (i.e., Flesch– Kincaid grade estimates are set at ≥ 75% comprehension). As a complicating factor, juvenile offenders generally read at a level several years below their completed grade. For instance, state-wide data found that most juvenile detainees had “attained” at least an eighth grade education, yet read below the sixth grade level (median = 5.75; Texas Juvenile Justice Department, 2013). Juvenile Miranda warnings often include additional content domains that are not found in general advisements. For example, many warnings extend beyond the right to counsel to include a right to the presence of a parent, guardian, or even some other “interested adult” (Rogers, Blackwood, et al., 2012). It is an empirical question whether juvenile suspects misconstrue such statements as necessarily a choice between an attorney and an involved adult (Rogers & Drogin, in press). In addition, some juvenile warnings also admonish suspects that any disclosures may be used in their transfers to adult court.
Maturity and Miranda Reasoning As observed in J.D.B. v. North Carolina (2011), the Supreme Court of the United States has recognized that age and maturity might fundamentally affect Miranda abilities. Although the Court characterized various generally acknowledged differences between youths and adults as “commonsense propositions” that did not require social science documentation (p. 9, footnote 5), empirical research nonetheless does bear out the clear relationship between age and maturity on one hand and legal decision-making on the other. Focusing, in particular, on age as a benchmark for maturity, Viljoen, Zapf, and Roesch (2007) found striking differences between younger and older juvenile offenders with respect to understanding and appreciation of their Miranda rights (see also Viljoen & Roesch, 2005). Impaired recall of a Miranda warning increased dramatically as a function of younger age: 3.9% at 16–17 years, 29.4% at 14–15 years, and 42.0% at 11–13 years. Although much less striking,1 a similar pattern was observed for Miranda appreciation: 14.3%, 27.3%, and 33.3%, respectively. Steinberg (2000) examined psychosocial maturity with a very large sample of students (N = 810), including eighth graders, 10th graders, and 12th graders. These researchers found maturity to be the most powerful predictor of antisocial decision-making. Colwell et al. (2005) applied psychosocial maturity directly to Miranda abilities in a sample of 67 male juvenile offenders. As measured by the Psychosocial Maturity Inventory (PSMI; Greenberger & Sorenson, 1974), maturity was significantly correlated with Miranda appreciation with the responsibility subscale evidencing a moderately strong relationship (r = .47). Within the context of legal competencies, Grisso et al. (2003) conducted the most sophisticated study to date of detained and community youths’ responses to police interrogation in relationship to age. Even in a vignette study without the situational 1 These numbers represent the average percentage of impairment across the Function of Rights in Interrogation’s three subscales (see Viljoen et al., 2007, p. 10, table 1); individual subscales do not always yield a linear pattern.
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pressures of pre-interrogation, close to 60% of youths aged 11–13 years elected to confess. For adolescents as a whole, less than 50% chose to remain silent. Younger and less mature youths manifested obstacles to legal reasoning that included authority compliance and downplaying of negative consequences.
Miranda Misconceptions and the Current Study Grisso (1981) also evaluated common but critical misconceptions by juvenile offenders regarding their Miranda rights. Concerning the right to silence, 61.8% wrongly believed that they would be penalized for not talking and 55.3% inaccurately believed that the judge could revoke this right. The right to counsel was subjected to fewer misconceptions – the most troubling issue was that approximately 18% erroneously believed the defense counsel was obliged to report any inculpatory information to the court. In such instances, the advocacy role of counsel is essentially nullified. Rogers et al. (2010) recognized the need to evaluate Miranda misconceptions more systematically. Utilizing the Miranda Quiz (MQ), a 25-item questionnaire (see Rogers, Sewell, et al., 2012), they examined common misperceptions among adult detainees and compared these results with those of the educated public (i.e., college undergraduates). Disconcertingly, they found more than one-fourth of detainees (32.5%) and undergraduates (26.5%) were convinced that their silence would be used as incriminating evidence. Small but appreciable percentages of both groups (17.0% and 12.5%, respectively) did not fully appreciate the critical role of legal counsel, specifically the confidential provision of legal expertise. More recently, Rogers et al. (2013) confirmed that Miranda misconceptions were commonly found among members of the public. To extend this research to adolescent populations, Rogers and his colleagues created the Juvenile Miranda Quiz (JMQ; Rogers, 2010). As subsequently described, the JMQ simplifies the MQ language and adds juvenile-specific content. The current study is the first systematic investigation of Miranda misconceptions in a sample of legally involved youth (i.e., juvenile detention or a juvenile justice alternative education program). An important facet of this research was an examination of juveniles’ maturity in relationship to their Miranda misconceptions. Rather than relying on age as proxy, we chose to utilize the “sophistication-maturity” scale of the RiskSophistication-Treatment Inventory (RSTI; Salekin, 2004), which was designed specifically for juvenile offenders. Unlike other measures of maturity, this construct was validated specifically with juvenile offenders to cover such issues as autonomy, moral development, foresight, and the ability to delay gratification. As a secondary issue, the role of maturity was explored with respect to improved Miranda knowledge after receiving a Miranda warning.
METHOD Current data were collected over a 6-month period as part of programmatic research supported by the National Science Foundation (NSF) Law and Social Sciences Program (#0817689). These data and analyses are entirely original; they provided valuable data for developing the most recent NSF grant (#1219430) with a more complex research design. Copyright # 2014 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
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Sample The sample of 64 legally involved juveniles was collected at Denton County Juvenile Probation, which is a single site with multiple programs. The current study utilized youth involved in either juvenile detention (pre- or post-adjudication) or the Juvenile Justice Alternative Education Program (JJAEP). An innovative aspect of juvenile detention is its focus on acquiring social and life skills through the use of a behavioral management system. The JJAEP combines academics and counseling with a drillinstruction milieu.
Measures Juvenile Miranda Quiz The JMQ (Rogers, 2010) is a true–false questionnaire, which includes a simplification of the original 25-item MQ (Rogers, 2010) and adds 15 juvenile-specific questions to assess juveniles’ misconceptions about the arrest and interrogation process. For the MQ, items were simplified in terms of vocabulary and reading level. For instance, the word “retract” was replaced with “take back.” As a result, the grade level reduced from 7.7 to 6.3 using Flesch–Kincaid estimates. For the JMQ, additional questions were added to the right to silence and right to counsel components. For example, two of the four questions addressed issues recently raised by Berghuis v. Thompkins (2010): (a) the right to silence must be explicitly invoked; and (b) admissions following a Miranda warning may be considered – based on the totality of the circumstances – as an implicit waiver of Miranda rights. Benefiting from Grisso’s (1981) seminal juvenile Miranda research, three new components were added to the JMQ: permanence of Miranda rights, adversarial-police, and allegiance-attorney. As an example of the latter, one item queries whether defense counsel is obligated to divulge guilty information to the trial court. Using Miranda experts,2 independent ratings of the JMQ indicated a high level of the scoring of each item (intraclass correlation coefficient, ICC = 0.98) and content validity of the components (ICC = 0.95). Overall, the JMQ achieved its goal of brief sentences (M = 13.83 words, SD = 3.76) with a Flesch–Kincaid reading level being estimated at grade 5.5 for all 40 items, averaging 5.8 (SD = 2.40) per item.
Risk-Sophistication-Treatment Inventory The RSTI (Salekin, 2004) was developed as a semi-structured interview used to assess a juvenile offender’s dangerousness, maturity, and amenability to treatment. The sophistication-maturity scale has demonstrated convergent validity with emotional intelligence and cognitive development. For the current study, the 15-item sophistication-maturity scale was utilized. Because the RSTI questions are not specifically linked to individual scales, a two-step process was implemented. First, three authors of this article (R.R., J.A.S., C.E.F.) discussed and reached a consensus regarding which questions best assessed each rating on the sophistication-maturity scale. Secondly, the author of the RSTI (Salekin) reviewed the selected questions. He recommended two additional inquiries from the RSTI set of questions, which were subsequently included. The homogeneity of the RSTI sophistication-maturity scale will be addressed in the Results section. Copyright # 2014 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
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Miranda Recall Participants are asked to recall as much of the Miranda warning as possible. Their free recall is scored on the Miranda Comprehension Template (Rogers, Sewell, et al., 2012), which provides a standardized format for assessing the content associated with each of the five Miranda components. When tested on representative warnings (i.e., the Miranda Statements Scale), interrater reliability was excellent (see Rogers, Harrison, Shuman, Sewell, & Hazelwood, 2007).
Procedure Development of Representative Juvenile Warnings Three representative juvenile Miranda warnings were established to evaluate Miranda comprehension in legally involved juveniles. Although additional content (e.g., transfer to adult court, and right to parents/guardians) is sometimes found in juvenile warnings, we focused on the five main Miranda components that are almost always present: right to silence, risks of talking, right to counsel, free legal services, and continuing rights. Using 371 juvenile warnings obtained via two separate surveys (Rogers et al., 2009; Rogers, Blackwood et al., 2012), the first step was to disaggregate each juvenile warning into these five components. For the second step, we ascertained the length and reading level of each unique component. As the third step, two researchers reached a consensus about representative components at three levels of complexity. The primary focus for the three categories based on Flesch–Kincaid grade estimate was as follows: easy warnings (i.e., fourth grade and below); moderate warnings (i.e., seventh and eighth grade); and difficult warnings (i.e., 10th to 11th grades). Predictably, use of these grade categories dramatically influenced the length of the representative juvenile warnings. Consequently, representative warnings were characterized by the following levels of complexity as expressed in grade levels and word lengths: • Easy = grade 2.9 and 82 words • Moderate = grade 7.5 and 139 words • Difficult = grade 10.9 and 213 words. Inclusion and Exclusion Criteria. The goal was to maintain a very broad representation of legally involved youth. The only inclusion criterion involved fluency in English. Because the measures were orally administered, it was not necessary to consider reading ability. As this was a study of legally involved juveniles, no individuals aged 18 or older were invited to participate.
Recruitment and Consent In accordance with ethical approval from the University of North Texas Institutional Review Board, recruitment varied slightly for each program. At juvenile detention, parents were asked to provide written informed consent upon their child’s admission to the facility or during visitation. For the JJAEP, informed consent forms were provided to the parents to sign. With parental consent secured, juveniles were then informed about the study and given an opportunity to provide their own assent. Copyright # 2014 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
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Administration of Measures Participants were tested individually through each of five steps, in either visitation rooms (juvenile detention) or small offices (alternative education). First, participants’ baseline knowledge of Miranda warnings was assessed via free recall. Secondly, they were tested with the JMQ to assess misconceptions prior to hearing the representative warning. Thirdly, each participant received a randomly selected representative juvenile Miranda warning (i.e., easy, moderate, or difficult complexity) that was presented orally. Their immediate recall of the representative warning was assessed. For the fourth step, they were tested with the RSTI sophistication-maturity scale. Finally, their delayed recall of the representative warning was evaluated;2 the typical interval between immediate and delay recall averaged 15–25 minutes. The total time was approximately 1 hour for each participant. Participants were debriefed following administration and their questions were answered. Due to institutional guidelines, neither group was compensated for their involvement in the study. Researchers and Reliability Checks. Three doctoral students – each having previously conducted Miranda research with adult detainees – carried out the data collection. They had completed coursework and practicum in psychological assessment, and received additional training on the Miranda-relevant measures used in the current study. Interrater reliability estimates were calculated for seven cases, when two researchers were available for independent ratings. For the RSTI sophistication-maturity scale, the ICC was excellent at 0.95. Recall of the Miranda warnings was scored via the MCT format by summing the number of subcomponents remembered for each Miranda component. Raters obtained perfect agreement on baseline knowledge of Miranda (ICC = 1.00). For immediate recall, the M ICC for components = 0.95, with almost perfect agreement for the total score (ICC = 0.98). Similar results were found for delayed recall; the M ICC for components = 0.92, with nearly perfect agreement for the total score (ICC = 0.98).
RESULTS RSTI Sophistication-Maturity Scale The RSTI sophistication-maturity scale utilizes the same items and scoring as the original; it differs in that particular questions are anchored to specific ratings. In addition to the previously noted reliability check, the sophistication-maturity scale evidenced excellent scale homogeneity (α = .91; M inter-item correlation = .41), which compares favorably with α values using unanchored scoring for male (α = .76) and female (α = .73) juvenile offenders (see Salekin, 2004, p. 69, table 6.1). Based on these findings, use of the item-anchored RSTI sophistication-maturity scale is clearly warranted for categorizing the maturity of juvenile offenders. We classified the sample into three groups based on their relative levels of sophistication by dividing the total possible score (30) into approximate thirds. Consequently, the classification resulted in the following in terms of psychosocial maturity: low (0–10, n = 18), middle (11–19, n = 28), or high (20–30, n = 18). Salekin (2004) utilized 2 Miranda experts for the JMQ were: Eric Drogin, J.D., Ph.D., ABPP, Steven Erickson, J.D., Ph.D., L.L. M., Richard Rogers, Ph.D., ABPP, and Charles D. Weisselberg, J.D.
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percentages for establishing low (25%), middle (50%), or high (25%) categories; our approach yielded similar percentages (28.1%, 43.8%, and 28.1%, respectively).
Descriptive Data Participants, recruited from two programs at Denton County Juvenile Probation [either detention (n = 42) or JJAEP (n = 22)], were adolescents in the age range 13–17 years. As an initial consideration, background data were examined to see if the groups were sufficiently similar as to be combined for subsequent analyses. The groups (detention vs. JJAEP) differed on two categorical variables: gender [71.4% vs. 81.8% male; χ 2 (1, 64) = 16.00, p < .000] and ethnicity [χ 2 (4, 64) = 30.69, p < .000]; detention had more African Americans (26.2% vs. 4.6%) and Hispanic Americans (28.6% vs. 22.7%) than JJAEP. However, detention and JJAEP groups were very similar in terms of their backgrounds (age, education, and arrests) and the research variables of interest (maturity and Miranda misconceptions). In particular, similarities were observed for age (M = 15.50, SD = 1.19 vs. M = 15.00, SD = 1.41; F = 2.23, p = .14; d = 0.39), education (M = 8.38, SD = 1.01 vs. M = 8.23, SD = 1.57; F = 0.23, p = .64; d = 0.12), and number of arrests (M = 5.12, SD = 4.30 vs. M = 5.45, SD = 18.10; F = 0.01, p = .91; d = –0.03). Importantly, the two groups were virtually identical in terms of maturity (sophistication-maturity: M = 15.20, SD = 7.26 vs. M = 14.82, SD = 6.55; F = 0.04, p = .84; d = 0.05) and Miranda misconceptions (JMQ, M = 26.98, SD = 3.59 vs. M = 27.19, SD = 4.30; F = 0.14, p = .71; d = –0.05). Given these similarities, subsequent analyses combined the two groups. Demographic differences were also explored for the three maturity groups with consistently non-significant results (see Table 1). As an important observation, neither age nor educational level can be used as a proxy measure for maturity. A non-significant but linear trend was observed for years of education. It is possible that significant differences for maturity would emerge with a wider range of attained grades, yet education is unlikely to be useful for any precise assessment of maturity.
Differences in Miranda Recall for Maturity Groups Legally involved juveniles, irrespective of maturity, had a low baseline knowledge of Miranda warnings (see Table 2). Using percentages of correct recall, even the highmaturity group evidenced very little free recall for Miranda concepts, averaging less than 15%. Immediate Miranda recall, directly following an oral advisement, resulted in a dramatic increase in remembered concepts. However, these dramatic improvements were generally insufficient. The recall percentages for low- and middle-maturity groups failed to reach 33%; thus, two-thirds of the Miranda concepts were not remembered, even for a minute, following the Miranda advisement. Although the highmaturity group performed much better (Cohen’s d-values of –0.87 and –0.67), it still failed to meet the 50% benchmark. Contrary to expectations, decay (i.e., diminished recall) was not observed for low- and middle-maturity groups, who maintained similar levels after an interval of 15–25 minutes. However, the high-maturity group did experience a small decrement in delayed recall,3 thus yielding only a small and nonsignificant advantage over the other two maturity groups. 3 Due to an administration error during early data collection, 14 participants were presented with the warning a second time and asked for immediate recall, rather than delayed. Their data are excluded from Table 2.
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Table 1. Descriptive data and differences on background variables among low-, middle-, and high-maturity groups of legally involved juveniles Maturity groups Low (n = 18) Variable Age Education Arrests
Middle (n = 28)
High (n = 18)
M
SD
M
SD
M
SD
F
p
d1
d2
d3
14.89 7.89 8.11
1.41 1.41 19.67
15.50 8.36 3.79
1.17 1.03 4.12
15.50 8.72 4.61
1.30 1.23 4.79
1.48 2.19 0.88
.24 .12 .42
–0.52 0.33 –0.17
–0.45 –0.63 0.24
0.00 –0.32 –0.19
Note. For RSTI maturity groups, low = 0–10; middle = 11–19; high = 20–30. For effect sizes, logit d values are provided (d1 = low vs. middle; d2 = low vs. high; d3 = middle vs. high).
Table 2. Differences in percentages of Miranda recall between low-, middle-, and high-maturity groups of legally involved juveniles Maturity groups Low (n = 18) Recall Baseline Immediate Delayeda
Middle (n = 28)
High (n = 18)
M
SD
M
SD
M
SD
F
p
d1
d2
d3
8.24a 30.63a 32.61a
6.75 13.61 13.02
11.78ab 32.86a 33.47a
6.80 15.09 15.55
13.44b 42.91b 38.01a
5.98 14.73 15.25
3.01 3.75 0.53
.03 .01 .30
–0.54 –0.15 –0.06
–0.82 –0.87 –0.39
–0.24 –0.67 –0.29
Note. Baseline, immediate, and delayed recall scores represent percentages of total possible material. Means with common subscripts are not significantly different (α = 0.05) using Bonferroni for post hoc comparisons. For effect sizes: d1 = low vs. middle; d2 = low vs. high; d3 = middle vs. high. As directional hypotheses, p-values for baseline, immediate, and delayed analyses are one-tailed. a For delayed scores, analyses excluded 14 individuals who received the warning a second time (see footnote 3); low, n = 17; middle, n = 21; high, n = 12.
Differences in Miranda Misconceptions for Maturity Groups Maturity does produce an overall difference with respect to Miranda misconceptions, but these differences are not as large or as consistent as expected (see Table 3). With high JMQ scores reflecting fewer misconceptions, the low-maturity group averaged several more misconceptions than the other maturity groups, resulting in moderate to large effect sizes (d-values of –0.63 and –0.90). Of the Miranda components, “risks of talking” clearly performed as predicted, although the difference between the middleand high-maturity groups was small (d = –0.40) and non-significant. By contrast, “right to counsel” yielded a different pattern, with the largest difference (d = –0.80) occurring between the middle- and high-maturity groups. Unexpectedly, maturity mattered less for appreciation of the police’s adversarial role; the middle-maturity group had the fewest errors – approximately one – about one-half the number for the low- and high-maturity groups. Our next step was to conduct an item-level analysis (see Table 4) with the goal of identifying highly problematic misconceptions (i.e., ≥ 50% errors) and well-understood concepts (i.e., < 10% errors). Regarding the right to silence, most legally involved juveniles did not understand that they could only assert their right to silence by breaking Copyright # 2014 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
Behav. Sci. Law 32: 104–120 (2014) DOI: 10.1002/bsl
Copyright # 2014 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
1.97 1.05 1.77 1.30 0.94 1.56 1.45 0.19 1.58 1.21 12.95
Right to silence (6) Risks of talking (4) Right to counsel (6) Free legal services (3) Continuing legal rights (3) Miranda misperceptions (4) Police deception (3) Permanence of rights (2) Adversarial-police (5) Allegiance-attorney (4) Total score (40)
1.25 1.13 1.15 0.79 0.74 0.82 0.83 0.47 1.35 1.09 3.81
SD 1.89a 1.72a 1.72ab 1.44a 0.78a 1.83a 1.39a 0.11a 2.11a 1.47a 14.24a
M 1.32 1.32 0.89 0.62 0.73 0.51 0.78 0.32 1.41 1.28 3.78
SD
Low (n = 18)
2.29a 0.93b 2.15a 1.32a 1.04a 1.41a 1.43a 0.30a 1.04b 1.39a 13.38ab
M 1.18 0.98 1.29 0.94 0.71 0.97 0.79 0.61 1.04 1.10 3.91
SD
Middle (n = 28)
1.56a 0.56b 1.22b 1.11a 0.94a 1.50a 1.56a 0.11a 1.89ab 0.67a 11.11b
M 1.20 0.86 0.94 0.68 0.80 0.79 0.98 0.32 1.49 0.69 3.14
SD
High (n = 18)
1.99 5.81 3.87 0.82 0.66 1.55 0.20 1.20 4.58 3.32 3.49
F
.15 .01 .03 .45 .52 .22 .82 .31 .01 .04 .04
p
d2 0.26 1.04 0.55 0.51 –0.21 0.50 –0.19 0.00 0.15 0.84 0.90
d1 –0.32 0.70 –0.37 0.14 –0.36 0.51 –0.05 –0.37 0.84 0.07 0.22
0.61 0.40 0.80 0.25 0.13 –0.10 –0.15 0.37 –0.69 0.75 0.63
d3
Note. Means with common subscripts are not significantly different (α = .05) using Bonferroni for post hoc comparisons. For effect sizes, d1 = low vs. middle; d2 = low vs. high; d3 = middle vs. high. Due to missing data in the low-maturity group, n values for allegiance-attorney and total score are 17; due to missing data in the middle-maturity group, n values for right to counsel, continuing legal rights, Miranda misconceptions, and permanence of rights are 27, and n for total score is 26.
M
JMQ content scores (n items)
Total (N = 64)
Maturity groups
Table 3. Differences in Miranda misconceptions between low-, middle-, and high-maturity groups for legally involved juveniles
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Copyright # 2014 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. 33.3 16.7
20.3 25.0
61.1 11.1 72.2 27.8
64.1 10.9 54.7
Free legal services “Indigent defendants” means the same as “formally-indicted defendants” Without money, there is no reason to ask for a lawyer Your family pays if the court appoints you a lawyer
22.2 44.4 22.2 55.6 16.7 11.1
22.2 50.0 61.1 38.9
22.2 27.8 16.7 16.7 66.7 38.9
Low (n = 18)
47.6
32.8 37.5 28.1 50.8 14.1 12.5
Right to counsel Questioning stops when you ask for counsel If you ask for counsel, questioning can continue until counsel is present There is no opportunity to talk privately with counsel before the interrogation Saying “I want a lawyer” is the same as saying “I might want a lawyer.” Having a lawyer may reduce the likelihood of coercion Can ask for lawyer to be present while police ask questions*
Continuing legal rights Being told you can “withdraw your waiver” means you can reassert your Miranda rights. Days after a confession, you can still ask for counsel Any waiver of right to silence is permanent
15.6 26.6 42.2 20.3
32.8 21.9 14.1 21.9 71.9 34.4
Total (N = 64)
Risks of talking You can retract lies without hurting your case Statements made with unsigned Miranda waivers are protected Off-the record statements are protected What you say can be used as against you
Right to silence Right to silence = constitutional safeguard Silence can be used against you as evidence Longer silence = more criminal charges Silence can’t be used against you* Must tell cops you want to exercise your right to silence* If you say anything after being warned, court may conclude you gave up your right to silence*
Abbreviated JMQ items
14.3 25.0
63.0
60.7 14.3 57.1
46.4 39.3 39.3 51.9 17.9 17.9
21.4 17.9 42.9 10.7
42.9 28.6 21.4 28.6 71.4 35.7
Middle (n = 28)
Maturity groups
16.7 33.3
44.4
72.2 5.6 33.3
22.2 27.8 16.7 44.4 5.6 5.6
0.0 16.7 22.2 16.7
27.8 5.6 0.0 16.7 77.8 27.8
High (n = 18) 2
2.66 1.33
5.46
0.73 0.86 5.61
4.19 1.13 3.21 0.47 1.51 1.56
4.64 7.06 5.59 5.58
2.40 3.91 4.30 1.31 0.56 0.53
χ
.26 .51
.07
.70 .65 .06
.12 .57 .20 .79 .47 .46
.10 .03 .06 .06
.30 .14 .12 .52 .76 .77
p
0.60 –0.28
–0.81
0.01 –0.16 0.37
–0.61 0.12 –0.45 0.08 –0.05 –0.31
0.03 0.84 0.41 0.92
–0.53 –0.02 –0.17 –0.38 –0.12 0.08
d1
–0.10 –0.22
0.42
–0.29 0.57 0.54
0.61 0.29 0.65 0.17 0.72 0.72
n/a 0.05 0.53 –0.28
0.37 1.05 n/a 0.38 –0.19 0.20
d3
(Continues)
0.50 –0.50
–0.40
–0.28 0.41 0.91
0.00 0.40 0.19 0.25 0.67 0.41
n/a 0.89 0.94 0.64
–0.17 1.03 n/a 0.00 –0.31 0.28
d2
Table 4. Differences between legally involved juveniles with low, middle, and high maturity on specific Miranda misconceptions in their percentages of errors
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Copyright # 2014 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. 46.9 23.4 75.0 6.3 12.7 15.6 45.3 39.1 26.6 31.3 19.0 28.1 56.3 15.6 8 2
Police deception Legally wrong to pretend an eyewitness identifies you as the criminal If police lie, you can retract your statement Police are legally allowed to accuse you of crimes that never happened
Permanence of rights Rights expire after 24 hours* Police can change their mind about your rights*
Adversarial-police Better to ask police for advice than wait for lawyer* Police want to help teens, not convict them* During questioning, police are looking out for your best interests* You should talk to cops because they are the authorities* Parents are legally supposed to help the police*
Allegiance-attorney Lawyers tells judge if you are guilty* Lawyers don’t tell teenagers the truth* Lawyers hired by court must tell judge everything* Your lawyer is on the same side as the police* Number of ≥ 50% errors Number of ≤ 10% errors 29.4 27.8 55.6 27.8 12 3
22.2 66.7 61.1 33.3 27.8
5.6 5.6
27.8 38.9 72.2
0.0 27.8 61.1 94.4
Low (n = 18)
21.4 32.1 67.9 17.9 8 1
14.3 32.1 28.6 10.7 17.9
10.7 18.5
50.0 17.9 75.0
3.6 28.6 48.1 59.3
Middle (n = 28)
Maturity groups
5.6 22.2 38.9 0.0 7 10
11.1 44.4 33.3 44.4 55.6
0.0 11.1
61.1 16.7 77.8
0.0 11.1 66.7 72.2
High (n = 18) 2
3.41 0.54 3.74 5.46
0.91 5.28 5.22 6.98 7.39
2.17 1.69
4.21 3.34 0.15
1.31 2.12 1.67 6.79
χ
.18 .77 .15 .07
.63 .07 .07 .03 .03
.34 .43
.12 .19 .93
.52 .35 .43 .03
p
0.23 –0.11 -0.29 0.31
0.30 0.80 0.75 0.79 0.31
–0.39 –0.74
–0.53 0.59 –0.08
n/a –0.02 0.29 1.35
d1
1.07 0.17 0.37 n/a
0.46 0.51 0.63 –0.26 –0.65
n/a –0.41
–0.77 0.64 –0.17
n/a 0.62 –0.13 1.03
d2
0.84 0.28 0.66 n/a
0.16 –0.29 –0.12 –1.05 –0.96
n/a 0.33
–0.25 0.05 –0.09
n/a 0.64 –0.42 –0.32
d3
Note. For RSTI maturity groups, low = 0–10; middle = 11–19; high = 20–30. New items added to the JMQ are designated with an asterisk. For effect sizes, logit d values are provided (d1 = low vs. middle; d2 = low vs. high; d3 = middle vs. high). Items unique to the JMQ are denoted with asterisks. To facilitate interpretation, percentages ≥ 50% are bolded; percentages ≤ 10% are italicized.
1.6 23.4 57.1 73.0
Total (N = 64)
Miranda misperceptions Miranda rights apply only to guilty suspects All Miranda warnings are the same; no reason to listen to them Miranda rights don’t apply if not in custody Miranda still applies if detained by non-police (e.g., store security)
Abbreviated JMQ items Table 4. (Continued)
Table 4. (Continued)
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silence; the general trend revealed a larger percentage of errors with more maturity. For risks of talking, two of the four items were highly problematic for the low-maturity group, many of whom inaccurately believed that certain statements were protected. For the right to counsel, imprecision in making the request was a general concern. Interestingly, the high-maturity group was mostly aware that defense counsel could be present during questioning and that their presence might reduce police coercion. On the matter of free legal services, juveniles generally failed to understand difficult words – confusing indigent with indictment. Of particular concern, we found that the majority of those in the lowand middle-maturity groups did not believe that they had access to free legal services, but rather believed that their families would be burdened with attorney expenses. Beyond the Miranda components, nearly all the juveniles correctly understood that Miranda rights apply to all suspects, not simply those guilty of instant charges. In dramatic contrast, the large majority of juveniles failed to understand the applications of Miranda rights to non-custody situations or when detained by personnel other than police. Most juveniles wrongly believed that the police were prevented from engaging in deceptive practice during interrogation about eyewitness identification or fictitious charges. The general trend involved higher errors with more maturity. The JMQ examines three additional areas of concern relative to Miranda practice, based on Grisso’s research. The good news is that many juveniles understand the permanence of Miranda rights, especially the notion that these protections do not expire after a brief period. The bad news is that many juveniles are confused about both the adversarial role of police and the protected advocacy role of defense counsel. In particular, the low-maturity group wrongly believed that police perform a beneficent role at the time of their arrests. Regarding the allegiances of defense attorneys, comparatively few saw counsel as aligned with law enforcement rather than the court. However, troubling percentages of low- and middle-maturity groups inaccurately viewed attorney– client communications as compromised in cases of court-appointed counsel.
Ancillary Data on Miranda Warnings An important consideration for Miranda warnings is how the level of complexity of advisements can affect Miranda recall. To control for different levels of Miranda knowledge, an ANCOVA was conducted with baseline Miranda as the covariate. For immediate recall, the difficulty of the warning played a significant role, even after controlling for baseline knowledge [F(2,60) = 8.90, p < .001]. Notably, difficult warnings produced the lowest recall (adjusted M = 24.8%, SD = 2.7), with no significant difference between easy (adjusted M = 37.4%, SD = 3.0) and moderate (adjusted M = 42.2%, SD = 3.0, p = .24). As expected, the covariate of baseline knowledge was not a significant predictor on its own [F(1,60) = 2.22, p = .14].
DISCUSSION Miranda Misperceptions Legally involved juveniles, irrespective of their maturity levels, appear mired in Miranda misconceptions, with 82.8% exhibiting 10 or more erroneous beliefs that could potentially compromise their decisions regarding their Miranda rights. Although Copyright # 2014 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
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not formally tested in the current study, most of the JMQ Miranda misconceptions simply cannot be rectified by Miranda warnings. For example, most general (Rogers et al., 2008) and juvenile (Rogers, Blackwood, et al., 2012) warnings omit any specific information regarding the right to counsel, including privileged communications with counsel or the consequences of invoking this right (i.e., stop pre-interrogation questioning). As a further example, the Supreme Court of the United States held in Berghuis v. Thompkins (2010) that remaining silent did not confer the right to silence. Instead, suspects must actively communicate their right to silence. Perhaps because of its counterintuitive nature (i.e., the requirement of breaking silence to order to assert silence; see Rogers & Drogin, in press), most juvenile suspects in the current study failed to appreciate this core requirement. Using a benchmark (i.e., ≥ 50%) for high error rates, free legal services posed the greatest challenge among the five Miranda components. The term indigent is frequently confused with indicted, which can lead to much confusion about the availability of free legal services (e.g., the mistaken notion that such services become available only after indictment by a grand jury). In addition, the majority of juveniles (54.7%) wrongly believed that their families would ultimately foot the bill for legal costs, even when counsel is court-appointed. These percentages (see Table 4) far exceed the percentages found for adult offenders (18.8%; Rogers et al., 2010). This widespread misconception among juveniles is understandable in light of the family context in which parents and other involved adults often bear financial responsibility for children residing in their homes. Beyond Miranda components, general Miranda misperceptions may lead to devastatingly misinformed decisions. If juveniles wrongly believe certain non-Mirandized statements are “protected communications” (i.e., inadmissible as evidence), they may become much less concerned regarding any admissions of wrongdoing. For instance, 57.1% inaccurately believe that Miranda rights extend to non-custodial police interviews; an even greater percentage (73.0%) are mistakenly convinced they apply to non-police detainment (i.e., store security). The crucial issue is whether juveniles seriously misjudge the perils of admitting to any wrongdoing in certain, non-Mirandized interactions with persons in authority.
Maturity and Miranda Misperceptions On an aggregate level, the high-maturity group was very successful on 10 (or 25.0%) of the JMQ items. Although the benchmark for success was set at ≤ 10% errors, the highmaturity group performed much better on these items (M = 2.8%, range 0.0–5.6%). For example, the high-maturity group rarely failed on silence being used as evidence (5.6%) or resulting in additional charges (0.0%). Unexpectedly, juveniles with high maturity performed much better on these items than adult defendants (31.1% and 9.4%, respectively) and somewhat better than college undergraduates (26.3% and 2.5%, respectively; see Rogers et al., 2010). In contrast to results from the highmaturity group, very successful items were rarely found with the low- (3, or 12.0%) and middle-maturity (1, or 4.0%) groups. Interestingly, the low-maturity group performed the best on the permanence of Miranda rights. High failure rates (i.e., ≥ 50%) produced a different pattern of JMQ scores, with the low-maturity group manifesting a higher percentage (12, or 30.0%) than either the middle- (8, or 20.0%) or high-maturity (7, or 17.5%) groups. The low-maturity group Copyright # 2014 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
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was particularly vulnerable to seeing police as helping rather than convicting teens (66.7%) and looking out for their best interests (61.1%). These findings are generally consistent with Grisso et al. (2003), who found higher compliance with authority among younger, and presumably less mature, juveniles. Clearly, misconstruing law enforcement in a helpful role vitiates – if not nullifying outright – juveniles’ ability to understand the adversarial nature of the arrest and interrogation process. A fundamentally erroneous belief that police are not marshalling evidence towards a conviction may constitute valuable data regarding whether a knowing and intelligent waiver of Miranda rights was effectuated. In examining the JMQ content scores, maturity clearly affects Miranda misconceptions for two of the five Miranda components. The clearest pattern (see Table 3) is observed for risks of talking; the low-maturity group is failing close to two of the four items in contradistinction to middle- and high-maturity groups, which average less than one. Inspection of the effect sizes demonstrates moderate to large differences between lowmaturity and the other groups. In contrast, low- and middle-maturity groups have the most errors with right to counsel as compared with the high-maturity group (d2 = 0.55 and d3 = 0.80; see Table 3). These findings raise an interesting point: Miranda misconceptions differ systematically between maturity groups. Indeed, an examination of specific JMQ items (see Table 4) suggests that some misconceptions do not differ at all with maturity, whereas others may differ with level of maturity.
Maturity and Miranda Recall Although the primary focus was Miranda misconceptions, several dramatic findings involved Miranda recall. When tested for free recall (i.e., baseline knowledge), juveniles in the low-maturity group had virtually no memory of Miranda warnings (i.e., 8.24%; see Table 2). The other maturity groups performed only marginally better (i.e., averaging less than 15%). The myth that “everyone already knows their Miranda rights” (Rogers et al., 2010, p. 300) is strongly challenged by these data. Oral administrations of Miranda warnings do make a remarkable difference – nearly tripling recall – when tested immediately. Nonetheless, the crucial question is whether they make enough of a difference. On average, all maturity groups failed to recall even one-half of the Miranda warning, which includes the basic components and important details. Even more concerning, low- and middle-maturity groups were missing more the two-thirds of the Miranda content. When tested after a short interval (15–25 minutes), these groups maintained their recall, whereas the high-maturity group experienced a modest decrement. In general, do oral warnings afford adequate constitutional safeguards, especially to less mature juveniles arrestees?
Limitations and Concluding Remarks Juvenile Miranda research faces multiple challenges in gaining access to legally involved juveniles, obtaining parental consent and youth assent, and collecting data without interfering with programmatic interventions. Despite concerted efforts, one limitation of the current study was its sample size, which limited our analyses of maturity to three groups. Moreover, the study did not include cognitive measures for verbal intelligence and comprehension; their inclusion would have allowed an examination of the complex links among cognitive abilities, psychosocial maturity, and Miranda Copyright # 2014 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
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abilities. Finally, a retesting with the JMQ following the Miranda advisements would have allowed us to evaluate directly the ameliorative effects, if any, of the Miranda warning on serious misconceptions. The current study builds on juvenile Miranda research in providing a systematic method via the JMQ for evaluating Miranda misconceptions and their potential role in the adjudication of juvenile offenses. In many instances, erroneous beliefs may be peripheral to waiver decisions. In a very few instances, such errors may play an instrumental role, directly affecting the intelligent waiver of Miranda rights. In most cases, Miranda misconceptions will simply be a small but important piece of a comprehensive assessment, embracing the totality of the circumstances. The examination and subsequent consideration of psychosocial maturity has been hampered by lack of the forensically relevant instruments (FRI) tailored for juvenile offenders. Forensic practitioners have had few resources to assess psychosocial maturity. For example, the PSMI (Greenberger, Josselson, Knerr, & Knerr, 1975; Greenberger & Sorenson, 1974) has limited availability, and it was designed specifically as a research scale. The current study found the RSTI sophistication-maturity scale to be internally consistent with excellent interrater reliability using anchored ratings. With further validation, this scale may constitute an effective FRI intended specifically for the measurement of maturity in juvenile offenders. Issues of immaturity remain central to the juvenile Miranda-waiver evaluations. As highlighted by J.D.B. v. North Carolina (2011, p. 10), youth “characteristically lack the capacity to exercise mature judgment.” Our current findings underscore the importance of immaturity and maturity in addressing Miranda misconceptions that likely affect rational judgments. More fundamentally, low and medium levels of maturity had demonstrable effects on the immediate memory of a Miranda warning, with less than one-third accurately recalled. While these differences are likely mediated by cognitive abilities, immaturity appears to play a significant role in Miranda comprehension.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS This study was supported by grants (#0817689 and #1219430) from the National Science Foundation’s Law and Social Sciences Program to Richard Rogers as the principal investigator. Any opinions, findings, conclusions, or recommendations expressed in this material are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the National Science Foundation. We fully appreciate Dr. Randall T. Salekin’s assistance in identifying RST-I items associated with the sophistication-maturity subscale.
REFERENCES Berghuis v. Thompkins, 130 S. Ct. 2250 (2010). Cauffman, E., & Steinberg, L. (2000). (Im)maturity of judgment in adolescence: Why adolescents may be less culpable than adults. Behavioral Sciences & the Law, 18, 741–760. doi: 10.1002/bsl.416 Colwell, L. H., Cruise, K. R., Guy, L. S., McCoy, W. K., Fernandez, K., & Ross, H. H. (2005). The influence of psychosocial maturity on male juvenile offenders’ comprehension and understanding of the Miranda warning. Journal of the American Academy of Psychiatry and the Law, 33(4), 444–454. Fare v. Michael C., 442 U.S. 707 (1979). Friedman, B. E. (2011). Protecting truth: An argument for juvenile rights and a return to In re Gault. UCLA Law Review Discourse, 58, 165–188. Copyright # 2014 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
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Gallegos v. Colorado, 370 U.S. 49 (1962). Graham v. Florida, 130 S.Ct. 2011 (2010). Greenberger, E., & Sorenson, A. B. (1974). Toward a concept of psychosocial maturity. Journal of Youth and Adolescence, 3(4), 329–358. Greenberger, E., Josselson, R., Knerr, C., & Knerr, B. (1975). The measurement and structure of psychosocial maturity. Journal of Youth and Adolescence, 4, 127–143. Available from: http://www.springer.com/psychology/ child+%26+school+psychology/journal/10964 [January 17, 2013]. Grisso, T. (1981). Juveniles’ waiver of rights: Legal and psychological competence. New York: Plenum. Grisso, T., Steinberg, L., Woolard, J., Cauffman, E., Scott, E., Graham, S., … Schwartz, R. (2003). Juveniles’ competence to stand trial: A comparison of adolescents’ and adults’ capacities as trial defendants. Law and Human Behavior, 27(4), 333–363. doi: 10.1023/A:1024065015717 Haley v. Ohio, 332 U.S. 596 (1948). In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 87 S. Ct. 1428 (1967). J. D. B. v. North Carolina, 131 S.Ct. 2394 (2011). King, K. J. (2006). Waiving childhood goodbye: How juvenile courts fail to protect children from unknowing, unintelligent, and involuntary waivers of Miranda rights. Wisconsin Law Review, 2006, 431–477. Miller v. Alabama, 567 U. S. ____ (2012). Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). Rogers, R. (2010). The Juvenile Miranda Quiz. Unpublished measure, University of North Texas. Rogers, R., & Drogin, E. Y. (in press). Miranda challenges: Successfully navigating the legal and psychological issues. Chicago: ABA Publishing. Rogers, R., Blackwood, H. L., Fiduccia, C. E., Steadham, J. A., Drogin, E. Y., & Rogstad, J. E. (2012). Juvenile Miranda warnings: Perfunctory rituals or procedural safeguards? Criminal Justice and Behavior, 39, 229–249. doi: 10.1177/0093854811431934 Rogers, R., Fiduccia, C. E., Drogin, E. Y., Steadham, J. A., Clark, III, J. W., & Cramer, R. J. (2013). General knowledge and misknowledge of Miranda rights: Are effective Miranda advisements still necessary? Psychology, Public Policy, and Law, 19, 432–442. doi: 10.1037/a0033964 Rogers, R., Harrison, K. S., Shuman, D. W., Sewell, K. W., & Hazelwood, L. L. (2007). An analysis of Miranda warnings and waivers: Comprehension and coverage. Law and Human Behavior, 31, 177–192. doi: 10.1007/s10979-006-9054-8 Rogers, R., Hazelwood, L. L., Sewell, K. W., Blackwood, H. L., Rogstad, J. E., & Harrison, K. S. (2009). Development and initial validation of the Miranda Vocabulary Scale. Law and Human Behavior, 33, 381–392. doi: 10.1007/s10979-008-9159-3 Rogers, R. Hazelwood, L. L., Sewell, K. W., Harrison, K. S., & Shuman, D. W. (2008). The language of Miranda warnings in American jurisdictions: A replication and vocabulary analysis. Law and Human Behavior, 32, 124–136. doi: 10.1007/s10979-007-9091-y Rogers, R., Rogstad, J., Gillard, N., Drogin, E., Blackwood, H., & Shuman, D. (2010). “Everyone knows their Miranda rights”: Implicit assumptions and countervailing evidence. Psychology, Public Policy, and Law, 16(3), 300–318. doi: 10.1037/a0019316 Rogers, R., Sewell, K. W., Drogin, E. Y., & Fiduccia, C. E. (2012). Standardized Assessment of Miranda Abilities professional manual. Lutz, FL: Psychological Assessment Resources. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005). Salekin, R. T. (2004). Risk-Sophistication-Treatment Inventory (RSTI) professional manual. Lutz, FL: Psychological Assessment Resources. Texas Juvenile Justice Department. (2013). Commitment profile for new commitments. Available from: http://www.tjjd.texas.gov/research/profile.aspx [April 19, 2013]. Viljoen, J. L., & Roesch, R. (2005). Competence to waive interrogation rights and adjudicative competence in adolescent defendants: Cognitive development, attorney contact, and psychological symptoms. Law and Human Behavior, 29, 723–742. doi: 10.1007/s10979-005-7978-y Viljoen, J. L., Zapf, P., & Roesch, R. (2007). Adjudicative competence and comprehension of Miranda Rights in adolescent defendants: A comparison of legal standards. Behavioral Sciences & the Law, 25(1), 1–19. doi: 10.1002/bsl.714
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Mired in Miranda Misconceptions: A Study of Legally Involved Juveniles at Different Levels of Psychosocial Maturity Richard Rogers, Ph.D.*, Jennifer A. Steadham, M.S.†, Chelsea E. Fiduccia, M.S.†, Eric Y. Drogin, J.D., Ph.D.‡ and Emily V. Robinson, M.S.† The Supreme Court of the United States has long recognized that the vulnerabilities of juvenile offenders merit special protections due to deficits in experience and maturity. Appellate courts assume that Miranda warnings will inform juvenile suspects of their Miranda rights, and allow them to render knowing and intelligent waivers. This study examines Miranda misconceptions of legally involved juveniles (i.e., juvenile detainees and youth mandated to juvenile justice alternative education) at different levels of psychosocial maturity. These juveniles manifested an unexpectedly large frequency of erroneous Miranda beliefs; each group (low, middle, and high maturity) averaged a dozen or more misconceptions, thus overshadowing substantive differences between maturity groups. However, maturity played an important role in the immediate recall of a Miranda advisement. Alarmingly, both low- and middle-maturity groups displayed less than one-third immediate recall. The high-maturity group performed better, but still failed to recall almost half of the Miranda concepts. The overall findings are discussed with respect to juvenile Miranda comprehension and reasoning. Copyright # 2014 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
Juvenile detainees and offenders have long been considered a special class by the Supreme Court of the United States. In Haley v. Ohio (1948) and Gallegos v. Colorado (1962), the Court addressed the admissibility of statements made by juveniles in the absence of an interested adult or counsel and concluded that minor children require special protection against the stresses of interrogation. The landmark interrogation case of Miranda v. Arizona (1966) required adult detainees be informed of their procedural rights, including the right to counsel, prior to interrogation. The following year, this requirement was affirmed for juvenile detainees with In re Gault (1967). Beyond interrogation, several decisions address special consideration for juveniles in sentencing. In Roper v. Simmons (2005), the Court barred capital punishment for juveniles. Most recently, the Supreme Court held in Graham v. Florida (2010) and Miller v. Alabama (2012) that life in prison without the possibility of parole is not constitutional for minor children convicted of non-homicide (Graham) or homicide (Miller) offenses.
*Correspondence to: Richard Rogers, Department of Psychology, University of North Texas, 1155 Union Circle #311280, Denton, TX 76203-5017, U.S.A. E-mail: [email protected] † University of North Texas, Denton, TX ‡ Harvard Medical School, Boston, MA
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As described in Haley v. Ohio (1948), among the Supreme Court’s rationales for providing special consideration to juvenile detainees is the heightened likelihood of minor children bowing to police pressure and confessing involuntarily. Of primary importance in Haley’s case were the circumstances surrounding his written confession. It was obtained after five straight hours of questioning at night without him being informed of his right to counsel. Justice Frankfurter, in his concurring opinion, specifically stated that he believed “a youth is never capable of that free choice of action which, in the eyes of the law, makes a confession ‘voluntary’” (Haley, 1948, p. 603). With a narrower focus, the majority opinion affirmed that – under dire circumstances such as these – it was reasonable to believe that the 15-year-old’s confession was not made voluntarily, despite his stating so in writing. The majority held that the interrogation methods to which Haley was subjected violated his due process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment. The opinion concluded that “[f]ormulas of respect for constitutional safeguards cannot prevail over the facts of life which contradict them” (p. 601). Such “facts of life” may include such matters as juveniles’ lower levels of maturity or cognitive abilities, as compared with adults, which are believed to have direct bearing on their ability to waive constitutional rights. Despite the Court’s early instructions to treat juveniles with “special care” (Haley, 1948, p. 599) and its similar, subsequent guidance on this issue, trial judges tend to evaluate juvenile Miranda waivers much in the same way as adult waivers (Friedman, 2011; King, 2006). In Fare v. Michael C. (1979), the first Miranda case addressing juvenile waivers, the Court extended the “totality of the circumstances” to juvenile waivers. The majority opinion found “no persuasive reasons why any other approach is required where the question is whether a juvenile has waived his rights, as opposed to whether an adult has done so” (Fare, p. 725). In addition to considering variables such as age, experience, and education, the Court in Fare required that determinations regarding the validity of juvenile waivers consider their capacities to (a) comprehend the warnings, (b) understand their Fifth Amendment rights, and (c) appreciate the consequences of waiving those rights. More recently, in J.D.B. v. North Carolina (2011), the Supreme Court of the United States specified that the age of juvenile suspects be considered with reference to Miranda waivers. The Court contended that age was more than simply a chronological marker; it allows reasonable assumptions to be generated regarding custodial youths’ perceptions and decision-making.
Juvenile Miranda Warnings Important differences emerge when both the language and content of Miranda warnings are examined. Although many juvenile suspects are administered as general warnings (i.e., advisements intended for all ages), hundreds of American jurisdictions have developed juvenile Miranda warnings (i.e., youth-specific advisements). Surveys of juvenile Miranda warnings (Rogers, Blackwood, et al., 2012; Rogers et al., 2009) have revealed extensive heterogeneity in the length and comprehensibility of these advisements. Beneficent efforts to explain juvenile rights fully have paradoxically created potentially less comprehensible warnings because of their much greater length and more difficult reading levels than those found with general warnings (see Rogers, Blackwood, et al., 2012; Rogers, Hazelwood, Sewell, Harrison, & Shuman, 2008). For example, Rogers, Sewell, Drogin, and Fiduccia (2012) operationalized “long advisements” as warnings plus waivers that exceed 175 words. Using this benchmark, Copyright # 2014 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
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they found that more than a third (37.5%) of juvenile warnings were classified as long, in stark comparison to general warnings (9.9%). Juvenile advisements typically require an eighth grade reading level for good but not excellent understanding (i.e., Flesch– Kincaid grade estimates are set at ≥ 75% comprehension). As a complicating factor, juvenile offenders generally read at a level several years below their completed grade. For instance, state-wide data found that most juvenile detainees had “attained” at least an eighth grade education, yet read below the sixth grade level (median = 5.75; Texas Juvenile Justice Department, 2013). Juvenile Miranda warnings often include additional content domains that are not found in general advisements. For example, many warnings extend beyond the right to counsel to include a right to the presence of a parent, guardian, or even some other “interested adult” (Rogers, Blackwood, et al., 2012). It is an empirical question whether juvenile suspects misconstrue such statements as necessarily a choice between an attorney and an involved adult (Rogers & Drogin, in press). In addition, some juvenile warnings also admonish suspects that any disclosures may be used in their transfers to adult court.
Maturity and Miranda Reasoning As observed in J.D.B. v. North Carolina (2011), the Supreme Court of the United States has recognized that age and maturity might fundamentally affect Miranda abilities. Although the Court characterized various generally acknowledged differences between youths and adults as “commonsense propositions” that did not require social science documentation (p. 9, footnote 5), empirical research nonetheless does bear out the clear relationship between age and maturity on one hand and legal decision-making on the other. Focusing, in particular, on age as a benchmark for maturity, Viljoen, Zapf, and Roesch (2007) found striking differences between younger and older juvenile offenders with respect to understanding and appreciation of their Miranda rights (see also Viljoen & Roesch, 2005). Impaired recall of a Miranda warning increased dramatically as a function of younger age: 3.9% at 16–17 years, 29.4% at 14–15 years, and 42.0% at 11–13 years. Although much less striking,1 a similar pattern was observed for Miranda appreciation: 14.3%, 27.3%, and 33.3%, respectively. Steinberg (2000) examined psychosocial maturity with a very large sample of students (N = 810), including eighth graders, 10th graders, and 12th graders. These researchers found maturity to be the most powerful predictor of antisocial decision-making. Colwell et al. (2005) applied psychosocial maturity directly to Miranda abilities in a sample of 67 male juvenile offenders. As measured by the Psychosocial Maturity Inventory (PSMI; Greenberger & Sorenson, 1974), maturity was significantly correlated with Miranda appreciation with the responsibility subscale evidencing a moderately strong relationship (r = .47). Within the context of legal competencies, Grisso et al. (2003) conducted the most sophisticated study to date of detained and community youths’ responses to police interrogation in relationship to age. Even in a vignette study without the situational 1 These numbers represent the average percentage of impairment across the Function of Rights in Interrogation’s three subscales (see Viljoen et al., 2007, p. 10, table 1); individual subscales do not always yield a linear pattern.
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pressures of pre-interrogation, close to 60% of youths aged 11–13 years elected to confess. For adolescents as a whole, less than 50% chose to remain silent. Younger and less mature youths manifested obstacles to legal reasoning that included authority compliance and downplaying of negative consequences.
Miranda Misconceptions and the Current Study Grisso (1981) also evaluated common but critical misconceptions by juvenile offenders regarding their Miranda rights. Concerning the right to silence, 61.8% wrongly believed that they would be penalized for not talking and 55.3% inaccurately believed that the judge could revoke this right. The right to counsel was subjected to fewer misconceptions – the most troubling issue was that approximately 18% erroneously believed the defense counsel was obliged to report any inculpatory information to the court. In such instances, the advocacy role of counsel is essentially nullified. Rogers et al. (2010) recognized the need to evaluate Miranda misconceptions more systematically. Utilizing the Miranda Quiz (MQ), a 25-item questionnaire (see Rogers, Sewell, et al., 2012), they examined common misperceptions among adult detainees and compared these results with those of the educated public (i.e., college undergraduates). Disconcertingly, they found more than one-fourth of detainees (32.5%) and undergraduates (26.5%) were convinced that their silence would be used as incriminating evidence. Small but appreciable percentages of both groups (17.0% and 12.5%, respectively) did not fully appreciate the critical role of legal counsel, specifically the confidential provision of legal expertise. More recently, Rogers et al. (2013) confirmed that Miranda misconceptions were commonly found among members of the public. To extend this research to adolescent populations, Rogers and his colleagues created the Juvenile Miranda Quiz (JMQ; Rogers, 2010). As subsequently described, the JMQ simplifies the MQ language and adds juvenile-specific content. The current study is the first systematic investigation of Miranda misconceptions in a sample of legally involved youth (i.e., juvenile detention or a juvenile justice alternative education program). An important facet of this research was an examination of juveniles’ maturity in relationship to their Miranda misconceptions. Rather than relying on age as proxy, we chose to utilize the “sophistication-maturity” scale of the RiskSophistication-Treatment Inventory (RSTI; Salekin, 2004), which was designed specifically for juvenile offenders. Unlike other measures of maturity, this construct was validated specifically with juvenile offenders to cover such issues as autonomy, moral development, foresight, and the ability to delay gratification. As a secondary issue, the role of maturity was explored with respect to improved Miranda knowledge after receiving a Miranda warning.
METHOD Current data were collected over a 6-month period as part of programmatic research supported by the National Science Foundation (NSF) Law and Social Sciences Program (#0817689). These data and analyses are entirely original; they provided valuable data for developing the most recent NSF grant (#1219430) with a more complex research design. Copyright # 2014 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
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Sample The sample of 64 legally involved juveniles was collected at Denton County Juvenile Probation, which is a single site with multiple programs. The current study utilized youth involved in either juvenile detention (pre- or post-adjudication) or the Juvenile Justice Alternative Education Program (JJAEP). An innovative aspect of juvenile detention is its focus on acquiring social and life skills through the use of a behavioral management system. The JJAEP combines academics and counseling with a drillinstruction milieu.
Measures Juvenile Miranda Quiz The JMQ (Rogers, 2010) is a true–false questionnaire, which includes a simplification of the original 25-item MQ (Rogers, 2010) and adds 15 juvenile-specific questions to assess juveniles’ misconceptions about the arrest and interrogation process. For the MQ, items were simplified in terms of vocabulary and reading level. For instance, the word “retract” was replaced with “take back.” As a result, the grade level reduced from 7.7 to 6.3 using Flesch–Kincaid estimates. For the JMQ, additional questions were added to the right to silence and right to counsel components. For example, two of the four questions addressed issues recently raised by Berghuis v. Thompkins (2010): (a) the right to silence must be explicitly invoked; and (b) admissions following a Miranda warning may be considered – based on the totality of the circumstances – as an implicit waiver of Miranda rights. Benefiting from Grisso’s (1981) seminal juvenile Miranda research, three new components were added to the JMQ: permanence of Miranda rights, adversarial-police, and allegiance-attorney. As an example of the latter, one item queries whether defense counsel is obligated to divulge guilty information to the trial court. Using Miranda experts,2 independent ratings of the JMQ indicated a high level of the scoring of each item (intraclass correlation coefficient, ICC = 0.98) and content validity of the components (ICC = 0.95). Overall, the JMQ achieved its goal of brief sentences (M = 13.83 words, SD = 3.76) with a Flesch–Kincaid reading level being estimated at grade 5.5 for all 40 items, averaging 5.8 (SD = 2.40) per item.
Risk-Sophistication-Treatment Inventory The RSTI (Salekin, 2004) was developed as a semi-structured interview used to assess a juvenile offender’s dangerousness, maturity, and amenability to treatment. The sophistication-maturity scale has demonstrated convergent validity with emotional intelligence and cognitive development. For the current study, the 15-item sophistication-maturity scale was utilized. Because the RSTI questions are not specifically linked to individual scales, a two-step process was implemented. First, three authors of this article (R.R., J.A.S., C.E.F.) discussed and reached a consensus regarding which questions best assessed each rating on the sophistication-maturity scale. Secondly, the author of the RSTI (Salekin) reviewed the selected questions. He recommended two additional inquiries from the RSTI set of questions, which were subsequently included. The homogeneity of the RSTI sophistication-maturity scale will be addressed in the Results section. Copyright # 2014 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
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Miranda Recall Participants are asked to recall as much of the Miranda warning as possible. Their free recall is scored on the Miranda Comprehension Template (Rogers, Sewell, et al., 2012), which provides a standardized format for assessing the content associated with each of the five Miranda components. When tested on representative warnings (i.e., the Miranda Statements Scale), interrater reliability was excellent (see Rogers, Harrison, Shuman, Sewell, & Hazelwood, 2007).
Procedure Development of Representative Juvenile Warnings Three representative juvenile Miranda warnings were established to evaluate Miranda comprehension in legally involved juveniles. Although additional content (e.g., transfer to adult court, and right to parents/guardians) is sometimes found in juvenile warnings, we focused on the five main Miranda components that are almost always present: right to silence, risks of talking, right to counsel, free legal services, and continuing rights. Using 371 juvenile warnings obtained via two separate surveys (Rogers et al., 2009; Rogers, Blackwood et al., 2012), the first step was to disaggregate each juvenile warning into these five components. For the second step, we ascertained the length and reading level of each unique component. As the third step, two researchers reached a consensus about representative components at three levels of complexity. The primary focus for the three categories based on Flesch–Kincaid grade estimate was as follows: easy warnings (i.e., fourth grade and below); moderate warnings (i.e., seventh and eighth grade); and difficult warnings (i.e., 10th to 11th grades). Predictably, use of these grade categories dramatically influenced the length of the representative juvenile warnings. Consequently, representative warnings were characterized by the following levels of complexity as expressed in grade levels and word lengths: • Easy = grade 2.9 and 82 words • Moderate = grade 7.5 and 139 words • Difficult = grade 10.9 and 213 words. Inclusion and Exclusion Criteria. The goal was to maintain a very broad representation of legally involved youth. The only inclusion criterion involved fluency in English. Because the measures were orally administered, it was not necessary to consider reading ability. As this was a study of legally involved juveniles, no individuals aged 18 or older were invited to participate.
Recruitment and Consent In accordance with ethical approval from the University of North Texas Institutional Review Board, recruitment varied slightly for each program. At juvenile detention, parents were asked to provide written informed consent upon their child’s admission to the facility or during visitation. For the JJAEP, informed consent forms were provided to the parents to sign. With parental consent secured, juveniles were then informed about the study and given an opportunity to provide their own assent. Copyright # 2014 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
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Administration of Measures Participants were tested individually through each of five steps, in either visitation rooms (juvenile detention) or small offices (alternative education). First, participants’ baseline knowledge of Miranda warnings was assessed via free recall. Secondly, they were tested with the JMQ to assess misconceptions prior to hearing the representative warning. Thirdly, each participant received a randomly selected representative juvenile Miranda warning (i.e., easy, moderate, or difficult complexity) that was presented orally. Their immediate recall of the representative warning was assessed. For the fourth step, they were tested with the RSTI sophistication-maturity scale. Finally, their delayed recall of the representative warning was evaluated;2 the typical interval between immediate and delay recall averaged 15–25 minutes. The total time was approximately 1 hour for each participant. Participants were debriefed following administration and their questions were answered. Due to institutional guidelines, neither group was compensated for their involvement in the study. Researchers and Reliability Checks. Three doctoral students – each having previously conducted Miranda research with adult detainees – carried out the data collection. They had completed coursework and practicum in psychological assessment, and received additional training on the Miranda-relevant measures used in the current study. Interrater reliability estimates were calculated for seven cases, when two researchers were available for independent ratings. For the RSTI sophistication-maturity scale, the ICC was excellent at 0.95. Recall of the Miranda warnings was scored via the MCT format by summing the number of subcomponents remembered for each Miranda component. Raters obtained perfect agreement on baseline knowledge of Miranda (ICC = 1.00). For immediate recall, the M ICC for components = 0.95, with almost perfect agreement for the total score (ICC = 0.98). Similar results were found for delayed recall; the M ICC for components = 0.92, with nearly perfect agreement for the total score (ICC = 0.98).
RESULTS RSTI Sophistication-Maturity Scale The RSTI sophistication-maturity scale utilizes the same items and scoring as the original; it differs in that particular questions are anchored to specific ratings. In addition to the previously noted reliability check, the sophistication-maturity scale evidenced excellent scale homogeneity (α = .91; M inter-item correlation = .41), which compares favorably with α values using unanchored scoring for male (α = .76) and female (α = .73) juvenile offenders (see Salekin, 2004, p. 69, table 6.1). Based on these findings, use of the item-anchored RSTI sophistication-maturity scale is clearly warranted for categorizing the maturity of juvenile offenders. We classified the sample into three groups based on their relative levels of sophistication by dividing the total possible score (30) into approximate thirds. Consequently, the classification resulted in the following in terms of psychosocial maturity: low (0–10, n = 18), middle (11–19, n = 28), or high (20–30, n = 18). Salekin (2004) utilized 2 Miranda experts for the JMQ were: Eric Drogin, J.D., Ph.D., ABPP, Steven Erickson, J.D., Ph.D., L.L. M., Richard Rogers, Ph.D., ABPP, and Charles D. Weisselberg, J.D.
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percentages for establishing low (25%), middle (50%), or high (25%) categories; our approach yielded similar percentages (28.1%, 43.8%, and 28.1%, respectively).
Descriptive Data Participants, recruited from two programs at Denton County Juvenile Probation [either detention (n = 42) or JJAEP (n = 22)], were adolescents in the age range 13–17 years. As an initial consideration, background data were examined to see if the groups were sufficiently similar as to be combined for subsequent analyses. The groups (detention vs. JJAEP) differed on two categorical variables: gender [71.4% vs. 81.8% male; χ 2 (1, 64) = 16.00, p < .000] and ethnicity [χ 2 (4, 64) = 30.69, p < .000]; detention had more African Americans (26.2% vs. 4.6%) and Hispanic Americans (28.6% vs. 22.7%) than JJAEP. However, detention and JJAEP groups were very similar in terms of their backgrounds (age, education, and arrests) and the research variables of interest (maturity and Miranda misconceptions). In particular, similarities were observed for age (M = 15.50, SD = 1.19 vs. M = 15.00, SD = 1.41; F = 2.23, p = .14; d = 0.39), education (M = 8.38, SD = 1.01 vs. M = 8.23, SD = 1.57; F = 0.23, p = .64; d = 0.12), and number of arrests (M = 5.12, SD = 4.30 vs. M = 5.45, SD = 18.10; F = 0.01, p = .91; d = –0.03). Importantly, the two groups were virtually identical in terms of maturity (sophistication-maturity: M = 15.20, SD = 7.26 vs. M = 14.82, SD = 6.55; F = 0.04, p = .84; d = 0.05) and Miranda misconceptions (JMQ, M = 26.98, SD = 3.59 vs. M = 27.19, SD = 4.30; F = 0.14, p = .71; d = –0.05). Given these similarities, subsequent analyses combined the two groups. Demographic differences were also explored for the three maturity groups with consistently non-significant results (see Table 1). As an important observation, neither age nor educational level can be used as a proxy measure for maturity. A non-significant but linear trend was observed for years of education. It is possible that significant differences for maturity would emerge with a wider range of attained grades, yet education is unlikely to be useful for any precise assessment of maturity.
Differences in Miranda Recall for Maturity Groups Legally involved juveniles, irrespective of maturity, had a low baseline knowledge of Miranda warnings (see Table 2). Using percentages of correct recall, even the highmaturity group evidenced very little free recall for Miranda concepts, averaging less than 15%. Immediate Miranda recall, directly following an oral advisement, resulted in a dramatic increase in remembered concepts. However, these dramatic improvements were generally insufficient. The recall percentages for low- and middle-maturity groups failed to reach 33%; thus, two-thirds of the Miranda concepts were not remembered, even for a minute, following the Miranda advisement. Although the highmaturity group performed much better (Cohen’s d-values of –0.87 and –0.67), it still failed to meet the 50% benchmark. Contrary to expectations, decay (i.e., diminished recall) was not observed for low- and middle-maturity groups, who maintained similar levels after an interval of 15–25 minutes. However, the high-maturity group did experience a small decrement in delayed recall,3 thus yielding only a small and nonsignificant advantage over the other two maturity groups. 3 Due to an administration error during early data collection, 14 participants were presented with the warning a second time and asked for immediate recall, rather than delayed. Their data are excluded from Table 2.
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Table 1. Descriptive data and differences on background variables among low-, middle-, and high-maturity groups of legally involved juveniles Maturity groups Low (n = 18) Variable Age Education Arrests
Middle (n = 28)
High (n = 18)
M
SD
M
SD
M
SD
F
p
d1
d2
d3
14.89 7.89 8.11
1.41 1.41 19.67
15.50 8.36 3.79
1.17 1.03 4.12
15.50 8.72 4.61
1.30 1.23 4.79
1.48 2.19 0.88
.24 .12 .42
–0.52 0.33 –0.17
–0.45 –0.63 0.24
0.00 –0.32 –0.19
Note. For RSTI maturity groups, low = 0–10; middle = 11–19; high = 20–30. For effect sizes, logit d values are provided (d1 = low vs. middle; d2 = low vs. high; d3 = middle vs. high).
Table 2. Differences in percentages of Miranda recall between low-, middle-, and high-maturity groups of legally involved juveniles Maturity groups Low (n = 18) Recall Baseline Immediate Delayeda
Middle (n = 28)
High (n = 18)
M
SD
M
SD
M
SD
F
p
d1
d2
d3
8.24a 30.63a 32.61a
6.75 13.61 13.02
11.78ab 32.86a 33.47a
6.80 15.09 15.55
13.44b 42.91b 38.01a
5.98 14.73 15.25
3.01 3.75 0.53
.03 .01 .30
–0.54 –0.15 –0.06
–0.82 –0.87 –0.39
–0.24 –0.67 –0.29
Note. Baseline, immediate, and delayed recall scores represent percentages of total possible material. Means with common subscripts are not significantly different (α = 0.05) using Bonferroni for post hoc comparisons. For effect sizes: d1 = low vs. middle; d2 = low vs. high; d3 = middle vs. high. As directional hypotheses, p-values for baseline, immediate, and delayed analyses are one-tailed. a For delayed scores, analyses excluded 14 individuals who received the warning a second time (see footnote 3); low, n = 17; middle, n = 21; high, n = 12.
Differences in Miranda Misconceptions for Maturity Groups Maturity does produce an overall difference with respect to Miranda misconceptions, but these differences are not as large or as consistent as expected (see Table 3). With high JMQ scores reflecting fewer misconceptions, the low-maturity group averaged several more misconceptions than the other maturity groups, resulting in moderate to large effect sizes (d-values of –0.63 and –0.90). Of the Miranda components, “risks of talking” clearly performed as predicted, although the difference between the middleand high-maturity groups was small (d = –0.40) and non-significant. By contrast, “right to counsel” yielded a different pattern, with the largest difference (d = –0.80) occurring between the middle- and high-maturity groups. Unexpectedly, maturity mattered less for appreciation of the police’s adversarial role; the middle-maturity group had the fewest errors – approximately one – about one-half the number for the low- and high-maturity groups. Our next step was to conduct an item-level analysis (see Table 4) with the goal of identifying highly problematic misconceptions (i.e., ≥ 50% errors) and well-understood concepts (i.e., < 10% errors). Regarding the right to silence, most legally involved juveniles did not understand that they could only assert their right to silence by breaking Copyright # 2014 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
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Copyright # 2014 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
1.97 1.05 1.77 1.30 0.94 1.56 1.45 0.19 1.58 1.21 12.95
Right to silence (6) Risks of talking (4) Right to counsel (6) Free legal services (3) Continuing legal rights (3) Miranda misperceptions (4) Police deception (3) Permanence of rights (2) Adversarial-police (5) Allegiance-attorney (4) Total score (40)
1.25 1.13 1.15 0.79 0.74 0.82 0.83 0.47 1.35 1.09 3.81
SD 1.89a 1.72a 1.72ab 1.44a 0.78a 1.83a 1.39a 0.11a 2.11a 1.47a 14.24a
M 1.32 1.32 0.89 0.62 0.73 0.51 0.78 0.32 1.41 1.28 3.78
SD
Low (n = 18)
2.29a 0.93b 2.15a 1.32a 1.04a 1.41a 1.43a 0.30a 1.04b 1.39a 13.38ab
M 1.18 0.98 1.29 0.94 0.71 0.97 0.79 0.61 1.04 1.10 3.91
SD
Middle (n = 28)
1.56a 0.56b 1.22b 1.11a 0.94a 1.50a 1.56a 0.11a 1.89ab 0.67a 11.11b
M 1.20 0.86 0.94 0.68 0.80 0.79 0.98 0.32 1.49 0.69 3.14
SD
High (n = 18)
1.99 5.81 3.87 0.82 0.66 1.55 0.20 1.20 4.58 3.32 3.49
F
.15 .01 .03 .45 .52 .22 .82 .31 .01 .04 .04
p
d2 0.26 1.04 0.55 0.51 –0.21 0.50 –0.19 0.00 0.15 0.84 0.90
d1 –0.32 0.70 –0.37 0.14 –0.36 0.51 –0.05 –0.37 0.84 0.07 0.22
0.61 0.40 0.80 0.25 0.13 –0.10 –0.15 0.37 –0.69 0.75 0.63
d3
Note. Means with common subscripts are not significantly different (α = .05) using Bonferroni for post hoc comparisons. For effect sizes, d1 = low vs. middle; d2 = low vs. high; d3 = middle vs. high. Due to missing data in the low-maturity group, n values for allegiance-attorney and total score are 17; due to missing data in the middle-maturity group, n values for right to counsel, continuing legal rights, Miranda misconceptions, and permanence of rights are 27, and n for total score is 26.
M
JMQ content scores (n items)
Total (N = 64)
Maturity groups
Table 3. Differences in Miranda misconceptions between low-, middle-, and high-maturity groups for legally involved juveniles
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Copyright # 2014 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. 33.3 16.7
20.3 25.0
61.1 11.1 72.2 27.8
64.1 10.9 54.7
Free legal services “Indigent defendants” means the same as “formally-indicted defendants” Without money, there is no reason to ask for a lawyer Your family pays if the court appoints you a lawyer
22.2 44.4 22.2 55.6 16.7 11.1
22.2 50.0 61.1 38.9
22.2 27.8 16.7 16.7 66.7 38.9
Low (n = 18)
47.6
32.8 37.5 28.1 50.8 14.1 12.5
Right to counsel Questioning stops when you ask for counsel If you ask for counsel, questioning can continue until counsel is present There is no opportunity to talk privately with counsel before the interrogation Saying “I want a lawyer” is the same as saying “I might want a lawyer.” Having a lawyer may reduce the likelihood of coercion Can ask for lawyer to be present while police ask questions*
Continuing legal rights Being told you can “withdraw your waiver” means you can reassert your Miranda rights. Days after a confession, you can still ask for counsel Any waiver of right to silence is permanent
15.6 26.6 42.2 20.3
32.8 21.9 14.1 21.9 71.9 34.4
Total (N = 64)
Risks of talking You can retract lies without hurting your case Statements made with unsigned Miranda waivers are protected Off-the record statements are protected What you say can be used as against you
Right to silence Right to silence = constitutional safeguard Silence can be used against you as evidence Longer silence = more criminal charges Silence can’t be used against you* Must tell cops you want to exercise your right to silence* If you say anything after being warned, court may conclude you gave up your right to silence*
Abbreviated JMQ items
14.3 25.0
63.0
60.7 14.3 57.1
46.4 39.3 39.3 51.9 17.9 17.9
21.4 17.9 42.9 10.7
42.9 28.6 21.4 28.6 71.4 35.7
Middle (n = 28)
Maturity groups
16.7 33.3
44.4
72.2 5.6 33.3
22.2 27.8 16.7 44.4 5.6 5.6
0.0 16.7 22.2 16.7
27.8 5.6 0.0 16.7 77.8 27.8
High (n = 18) 2
2.66 1.33
5.46
0.73 0.86 5.61
4.19 1.13 3.21 0.47 1.51 1.56
4.64 7.06 5.59 5.58
2.40 3.91 4.30 1.31 0.56 0.53
χ
.26 .51
.07
.70 .65 .06
.12 .57 .20 .79 .47 .46
.10 .03 .06 .06
.30 .14 .12 .52 .76 .77
p
0.60 –0.28
–0.81
0.01 –0.16 0.37
–0.61 0.12 –0.45 0.08 –0.05 –0.31
0.03 0.84 0.41 0.92
–0.53 –0.02 –0.17 –0.38 –0.12 0.08
d1
–0.10 –0.22
0.42
–0.29 0.57 0.54
0.61 0.29 0.65 0.17 0.72 0.72
n/a 0.05 0.53 –0.28
0.37 1.05 n/a 0.38 –0.19 0.20
d3
(Continues)
0.50 –0.50
–0.40
–0.28 0.41 0.91
0.00 0.40 0.19 0.25 0.67 0.41
n/a 0.89 0.94 0.64
–0.17 1.03 n/a 0.00 –0.31 0.28
d2
Table 4. Differences between legally involved juveniles with low, middle, and high maturity on specific Miranda misconceptions in their percentages of errors
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Copyright # 2014 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. 46.9 23.4 75.0 6.3 12.7 15.6 45.3 39.1 26.6 31.3 19.0 28.1 56.3 15.6 8 2
Police deception Legally wrong to pretend an eyewitness identifies you as the criminal If police lie, you can retract your statement Police are legally allowed to accuse you of crimes that never happened
Permanence of rights Rights expire after 24 hours* Police can change their mind about your rights*
Adversarial-police Better to ask police for advice than wait for lawyer* Police want to help teens, not convict them* During questioning, police are looking out for your best interests* You should talk to cops because they are the authorities* Parents are legally supposed to help the police*
Allegiance-attorney Lawyers tells judge if you are guilty* Lawyers don’t tell teenagers the truth* Lawyers hired by court must tell judge everything* Your lawyer is on the same side as the police* Number of ≥ 50% errors Number of ≤ 10% errors 29.4 27.8 55.6 27.8 12 3
22.2 66.7 61.1 33.3 27.8
5.6 5.6
27.8 38.9 72.2
0.0 27.8 61.1 94.4
Low (n = 18)
21.4 32.1 67.9 17.9 8 1
14.3 32.1 28.6 10.7 17.9
10.7 18.5
50.0 17.9 75.0
3.6 28.6 48.1 59.3
Middle (n = 28)
Maturity groups
5.6 22.2 38.9 0.0 7 10
11.1 44.4 33.3 44.4 55.6
0.0 11.1
61.1 16.7 77.8
0.0 11.1 66.7 72.2
High (n = 18) 2
3.41 0.54 3.74 5.46
0.91 5.28 5.22 6.98 7.39
2.17 1.69
4.21 3.34 0.15
1.31 2.12 1.67 6.79
χ
.18 .77 .15 .07
.63 .07 .07 .03 .03
.34 .43
.12 .19 .93
.52 .35 .43 .03
p
0.23 –0.11 -0.29 0.31
0.30 0.80 0.75 0.79 0.31
–0.39 –0.74
–0.53 0.59 –0.08
n/a –0.02 0.29 1.35
d1
1.07 0.17 0.37 n/a
0.46 0.51 0.63 –0.26 –0.65
n/a –0.41
–0.77 0.64 –0.17
n/a 0.62 –0.13 1.03
d2
0.84 0.28 0.66 n/a
0.16 –0.29 –0.12 –1.05 –0.96
n/a 0.33
–0.25 0.05 –0.09
n/a 0.64 –0.42 –0.32
d3
Note. For RSTI maturity groups, low = 0–10; middle = 11–19; high = 20–30. New items added to the JMQ are designated with an asterisk. For effect sizes, logit d values are provided (d1 = low vs. middle; d2 = low vs. high; d3 = middle vs. high). Items unique to the JMQ are denoted with asterisks. To facilitate interpretation, percentages ≥ 50% are bolded; percentages ≤ 10% are italicized.
1.6 23.4 57.1 73.0
Total (N = 64)
Miranda misperceptions Miranda rights apply only to guilty suspects All Miranda warnings are the same; no reason to listen to them Miranda rights don’t apply if not in custody Miranda still applies if detained by non-police (e.g., store security)
Abbreviated JMQ items Table 4. (Continued)
Table 4. (Continued)
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silence; the general trend revealed a larger percentage of errors with more maturity. For risks of talking, two of the four items were highly problematic for the low-maturity group, many of whom inaccurately believed that certain statements were protected. For the right to counsel, imprecision in making the request was a general concern. Interestingly, the high-maturity group was mostly aware that defense counsel could be present during questioning and that their presence might reduce police coercion. On the matter of free legal services, juveniles generally failed to understand difficult words – confusing indigent with indictment. Of particular concern, we found that the majority of those in the lowand middle-maturity groups did not believe that they had access to free legal services, but rather believed that their families would be burdened with attorney expenses. Beyond the Miranda components, nearly all the juveniles correctly understood that Miranda rights apply to all suspects, not simply those guilty of instant charges. In dramatic contrast, the large majority of juveniles failed to understand the applications of Miranda rights to non-custody situations or when detained by personnel other than police. Most juveniles wrongly believed that the police were prevented from engaging in deceptive practice during interrogation about eyewitness identification or fictitious charges. The general trend involved higher errors with more maturity. The JMQ examines three additional areas of concern relative to Miranda practice, based on Grisso’s research. The good news is that many juveniles understand the permanence of Miranda rights, especially the notion that these protections do not expire after a brief period. The bad news is that many juveniles are confused about both the adversarial role of police and the protected advocacy role of defense counsel. In particular, the low-maturity group wrongly believed that police perform a beneficent role at the time of their arrests. Regarding the allegiances of defense attorneys, comparatively few saw counsel as aligned with law enforcement rather than the court. However, troubling percentages of low- and middle-maturity groups inaccurately viewed attorney– client communications as compromised in cases of court-appointed counsel.
Ancillary Data on Miranda Warnings An important consideration for Miranda warnings is how the level of complexity of advisements can affect Miranda recall. To control for different levels of Miranda knowledge, an ANCOVA was conducted with baseline Miranda as the covariate. For immediate recall, the difficulty of the warning played a significant role, even after controlling for baseline knowledge [F(2,60) = 8.90, p < .001]. Notably, difficult warnings produced the lowest recall (adjusted M = 24.8%, SD = 2.7), with no significant difference between easy (adjusted M = 37.4%, SD = 3.0) and moderate (adjusted M = 42.2%, SD = 3.0, p = .24). As expected, the covariate of baseline knowledge was not a significant predictor on its own [F(1,60) = 2.22, p = .14].
DISCUSSION Miranda Misperceptions Legally involved juveniles, irrespective of their maturity levels, appear mired in Miranda misconceptions, with 82.8% exhibiting 10 or more erroneous beliefs that could potentially compromise their decisions regarding their Miranda rights. Although Copyright # 2014 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
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not formally tested in the current study, most of the JMQ Miranda misconceptions simply cannot be rectified by Miranda warnings. For example, most general (Rogers et al., 2008) and juvenile (Rogers, Blackwood, et al., 2012) warnings omit any specific information regarding the right to counsel, including privileged communications with counsel or the consequences of invoking this right (i.e., stop pre-interrogation questioning). As a further example, the Supreme Court of the United States held in Berghuis v. Thompkins (2010) that remaining silent did not confer the right to silence. Instead, suspects must actively communicate their right to silence. Perhaps because of its counterintuitive nature (i.e., the requirement of breaking silence to order to assert silence; see Rogers & Drogin, in press), most juvenile suspects in the current study failed to appreciate this core requirement. Using a benchmark (i.e., ≥ 50%) for high error rates, free legal services posed the greatest challenge among the five Miranda components. The term indigent is frequently confused with indicted, which can lead to much confusion about the availability of free legal services (e.g., the mistaken notion that such services become available only after indictment by a grand jury). In addition, the majority of juveniles (54.7%) wrongly believed that their families would ultimately foot the bill for legal costs, even when counsel is court-appointed. These percentages (see Table 4) far exceed the percentages found for adult offenders (18.8%; Rogers et al., 2010). This widespread misconception among juveniles is understandable in light of the family context in which parents and other involved adults often bear financial responsibility for children residing in their homes. Beyond Miranda components, general Miranda misperceptions may lead to devastatingly misinformed decisions. If juveniles wrongly believe certain non-Mirandized statements are “protected communications” (i.e., inadmissible as evidence), they may become much less concerned regarding any admissions of wrongdoing. For instance, 57.1% inaccurately believe that Miranda rights extend to non-custodial police interviews; an even greater percentage (73.0%) are mistakenly convinced they apply to non-police detainment (i.e., store security). The crucial issue is whether juveniles seriously misjudge the perils of admitting to any wrongdoing in certain, non-Mirandized interactions with persons in authority.
Maturity and Miranda Misperceptions On an aggregate level, the high-maturity group was very successful on 10 (or 25.0%) of the JMQ items. Although the benchmark for success was set at ≤ 10% errors, the highmaturity group performed much better on these items (M = 2.8%, range 0.0–5.6%). For example, the high-maturity group rarely failed on silence being used as evidence (5.6%) or resulting in additional charges (0.0%). Unexpectedly, juveniles with high maturity performed much better on these items than adult defendants (31.1% and 9.4%, respectively) and somewhat better than college undergraduates (26.3% and 2.5%, respectively; see Rogers et al., 2010). In contrast to results from the highmaturity group, very successful items were rarely found with the low- (3, or 12.0%) and middle-maturity (1, or 4.0%) groups. Interestingly, the low-maturity group performed the best on the permanence of Miranda rights. High failure rates (i.e., ≥ 50%) produced a different pattern of JMQ scores, with the low-maturity group manifesting a higher percentage (12, or 30.0%) than either the middle- (8, or 20.0%) or high-maturity (7, or 17.5%) groups. The low-maturity group Copyright # 2014 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
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was particularly vulnerable to seeing police as helping rather than convicting teens (66.7%) and looking out for their best interests (61.1%). These findings are generally consistent with Grisso et al. (2003), who found higher compliance with authority among younger, and presumably less mature, juveniles. Clearly, misconstruing law enforcement in a helpful role vitiates – if not nullifying outright – juveniles’ ability to understand the adversarial nature of the arrest and interrogation process. A fundamentally erroneous belief that police are not marshalling evidence towards a conviction may constitute valuable data regarding whether a knowing and intelligent waiver of Miranda rights was effectuated. In examining the JMQ content scores, maturity clearly affects Miranda misconceptions for two of the five Miranda components. The clearest pattern (see Table 3) is observed for risks of talking; the low-maturity group is failing close to two of the four items in contradistinction to middle- and high-maturity groups, which average less than one. Inspection of the effect sizes demonstrates moderate to large differences between lowmaturity and the other groups. In contrast, low- and middle-maturity groups have the most errors with right to counsel as compared with the high-maturity group (d2 = 0.55 and d3 = 0.80; see Table 3). These findings raise an interesting point: Miranda misconceptions differ systematically between maturity groups. Indeed, an examination of specific JMQ items (see Table 4) suggests that some misconceptions do not differ at all with maturity, whereas others may differ with level of maturity.
Maturity and Miranda Recall Although the primary focus was Miranda misconceptions, several dramatic findings involved Miranda recall. When tested for free recall (i.e., baseline knowledge), juveniles in the low-maturity group had virtually no memory of Miranda warnings (i.e., 8.24%; see Table 2). The other maturity groups performed only marginally better (i.e., averaging less than 15%). The myth that “everyone already knows their Miranda rights” (Rogers et al., 2010, p. 300) is strongly challenged by these data. Oral administrations of Miranda warnings do make a remarkable difference – nearly tripling recall – when tested immediately. Nonetheless, the crucial question is whether they make enough of a difference. On average, all maturity groups failed to recall even one-half of the Miranda warning, which includes the basic components and important details. Even more concerning, low- and middle-maturity groups were missing more the two-thirds of the Miranda content. When tested after a short interval (15–25 minutes), these groups maintained their recall, whereas the high-maturity group experienced a modest decrement. In general, do oral warnings afford adequate constitutional safeguards, especially to less mature juveniles arrestees?
Limitations and Concluding Remarks Juvenile Miranda research faces multiple challenges in gaining access to legally involved juveniles, obtaining parental consent and youth assent, and collecting data without interfering with programmatic interventions. Despite concerted efforts, one limitation of the current study was its sample size, which limited our analyses of maturity to three groups. Moreover, the study did not include cognitive measures for verbal intelligence and comprehension; their inclusion would have allowed an examination of the complex links among cognitive abilities, psychosocial maturity, and Miranda Copyright # 2014 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
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abilities. Finally, a retesting with the JMQ following the Miranda advisements would have allowed us to evaluate directly the ameliorative effects, if any, of the Miranda warning on serious misconceptions. The current study builds on juvenile Miranda research in providing a systematic method via the JMQ for evaluating Miranda misconceptions and their potential role in the adjudication of juvenile offenses. In many instances, erroneous beliefs may be peripheral to waiver decisions. In a very few instances, such errors may play an instrumental role, directly affecting the intelligent waiver of Miranda rights. In most cases, Miranda misconceptions will simply be a small but important piece of a comprehensive assessment, embracing the totality of the circumstances. The examination and subsequent consideration of psychosocial maturity has been hampered by lack of the forensically relevant instruments (FRI) tailored for juvenile offenders. Forensic practitioners have had few resources to assess psychosocial maturity. For example, the PSMI (Greenberger, Josselson, Knerr, & Knerr, 1975; Greenberger & Sorenson, 1974) has limited availability, and it was designed specifically as a research scale. The current study found the RSTI sophistication-maturity scale to be internally consistent with excellent interrater reliability using anchored ratings. With further validation, this scale may constitute an effective FRI intended specifically for the measurement of maturity in juvenile offenders. Issues of immaturity remain central to the juvenile Miranda-waiver evaluations. As highlighted by J.D.B. v. North Carolina (2011, p. 10), youth “characteristically lack the capacity to exercise mature judgment.” Our current findings underscore the importance of immaturity and maturity in addressing Miranda misconceptions that likely affect rational judgments. More fundamentally, low and medium levels of maturity had demonstrable effects on the immediate memory of a Miranda warning, with less than one-third accurately recalled. While these differences are likely mediated by cognitive abilities, immaturity appears to play a significant role in Miranda comprehension.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS This study was supported by grants (#0817689 and #1219430) from the National Science Foundation’s Law and Social Sciences Program to Richard Rogers as the principal investigator. Any opinions, findings, conclusions, or recommendations expressed in this material are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the National Science Foundation. We fully appreciate Dr. Randall T. Salekin’s assistance in identifying RST-I items associated with the sophistication-maturity subscale.
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