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Response
Moral reasoning in disaster scenarios Andrew Shortridge In the midst of a calamitous disaster, a person might act in a way that would otherwise be considered uncharacteristic or extraordinary. Behaviours of this sort may be morally justifiable. We might suppose, for example, that our duty to aid others is reduced during a disaster. Perhaps, it is even permissible to save oneself rather than a family member or close friend. Satoshi Kodama explores the question of morality during disasters, focusing on tsunamitendenko, the practice whereby individuals save themselves rather than assist others during a tsunami.1 He argues that encouraging individuals to save themselves, and discouraging them from taking risks to save others, may well help to save lives during disasters, and is a laudable social policy. In what follows, I focus on the issue of moral reasoning in disaster scenarios, offering critical comments on Kodama’s analysis in a spirit of constructive elucidation. Our prereflective sentiments may suggest to us that extraordinary behaviour may be morally justifiable in disaster scenarios. This is not surprising, since it seems that the action that is justified is often sensitive to the circumstances in which we are called upon to act. Many maintain that we have a duty of ‘easy rescue’, to aid imperilled strangers when provision of that aid costs us little. It is less clear whether we must aid a stranger if our aiding is at great cost. Where we can aid either a stranger or a family member, it seems ( prereflectively) that we have greater moral obligation to aid our kin. Different circumstances call for different actions. It is reasonable to expect that any satisfactory ethical analysis would clarify the relationship between actions and circumstances. Tsunami-tendenko prioritises selfpreservation over provision of aid in times of disaster. Kodama addresses the charge that the maxim of self-preservation that is central to the practice is egoistic and immoral, arguing that the tsunamitendenko maxim can be justified by indirect consequentialism: ‘It is consequentialist because the purpose of tsunami-tendenko is to maximize the number of lives saved. Correspondence to Andrew Shortridge, Faculty of Arts, Monash University, Clayton, VIC 3800, Australia; [email protected] 780
It is indirect because the rule of action individuals are expected to follow is not one of maximizing the number of lives one can directly save, but of saving one’s own life to collectively maximize the total number of lives saved’.1
I raise two concerns about Kodama’s appeal to indirect consequentialism as a suitable moral justification of tsunamitendenko. (Aspects of Kodama’s utilitarian analysis of tsunami-tendenko are also discussed by Atsushi Asai and Justin Oakley).2 3 First, I suggest that Kodama’s defence of tsunami-tendenko by appeal to a form of indirect consequentialism is unnecessary, since a plausible justification can be given, which appeals directly to consequentialist considerations. Second, I ask whether Kodama intends to defend an ethic of indirect consequentialism in general or only in catastrophic circumstances. It is unclear whether the suggestion is that there is a single moral theory —indirect consequentialism—according to which extraordinary actions are sometimes justifiable, or whether in certain circumstances, we ought to set aside our ordinary moral framework and adopt an indirect consequentialist perspective, according to which tsunami-tendenko is justified. How is tsunami-tendenko justified by indirect consequentialism? The consequence that is sought is the greatest number of lives saved in a tsunami. The agent who practices tsunami-tendenko is not said to aim at this outcome directly, but instead follows a rule, obedience to which is the best way to save the greatest number of lives. The rule is that the agent seeks to save her own life and makes no attempt to rescue others. This rule leads agents to avoid situations where two people die in a failed rescue attempt, the outcome being called tomo-daore.i This pursuit of the desired consequence, through the following of a rule, is said to be indirect, and I take it that the maxim and the moral theory that Kodama develops are forms of rule consequentialism.4 However, it seems possible that tsunami-tendenko might be adequately justified by direct consequentialism.
i
Kodama reports that tragic deaths in attempted rescues were not uncommon during the tsunami of March 2011.1
Where seeking to save another puts the rescuer in grave danger, the direct consequentialist seeks to maximise the number of lives saved in the most effective way. Given the dangers, she recognises that the consequentialist maxim to save as many as possible will be best met by having each person save himself or herself rather than have anyone run great risks in seeking to save another. Given the extreme uncertainty and the low likelihood for successful rescue of others during a tsunami, it may be that selfpreservation is the most reliable way to obey the maxim to which Kodama’s indirect rule refers, the maxim that is directly consequentialist: ‘save the greatest number possible’. I maintain that this direct consequentialist justification of tsunami-tendenko is even supported by Kodama’s characterisation of what he calls the ‘tsunami dilemma’. In that dilemma, each of two individuals has a choice: either practice self-preservation or attempt to assist the other. Self-preservation makes the agent’s own survival likely while rendering assistance makes the agent’s own survival unlikely. Thus, when both agents render aid, the likely outcome in the tsunami dilemma is that two people die. When both agents focus on their own survival, the likely outcome is that two people survive. Given the additional and plausible assumption that each agent is aware of the risk inherent in attempting rescue, the defence of tsunami-tendenko on direct consequentialist grounds seems strengthened. Understanding the risk, each agent seeks to maximise the number of lives they can save: each agent recognises that realistically that number is one. Let me move now to a more abstract criticism of Kodama’s argument. There are at least two ways in which ethical analysis could justify extraordinary action in disaster scenarios. The less radical possibility is that one comprehensive moral theory—whether rights-based, consequentialist or otherwise—explains how difficult circumstances justify extraordinary action. For example, perhaps in times of great calamity, certain extraordinary actions can be permissibly taken, which ordinarily would be forbidden, with it understood that a single moral theory provides justification for both ordinary and extraordinary actions. A more radical possibility for justifying extraordinary action is that calamitous scenarios make certain actions permissible because in such situations the moral theory that justifies our actions changes. For instance, we might treat rights as a foundational moral theory
Shortridge A. J Med Ethics September 2015 Vol 41 No 9
Downloaded from http://jme.bmj.com/ on November 15, 2015 - Published by group.bmj.com
Response ordinarily, while believing we ought to reason as consequentialists during a catastrophe.ii On such an account, there are two moral theories to which we may appeal in justifying our actions: one is appealed to in ordinary circumstances and the other in times of disaster. Kodama defends tsunami-tendenko by appeal to indirect consequentialism, but it is unclear whether he thinks that we ought to practice indirect consequentialism in ordinary as well as extraordinary situations. Suppose that the act of selfpreservation in disasters is justified by some variety of consequentialism though ordinary day-to-day activities ought to be justified by appeal to some nonconsequentialist theory. Only during a disaster can we legitimately reason as consequentialists, and morality would have a sort of dual character. Kodama is silent on this possibility though it seems compatible with his analysis. (He does argue that emergency workers should not practice tsunami-tendenko, but it does not follow that consequentialist reasoning is only permissible in disasters or only permissible for certain individuals in disasters, since consequentialist justifications of professional obligations could be offered.) Let me highlight two concerns about the possibility that morality has a dual character. One reason to be suspicious of this idea might arise if we hold that an ethical theory should be comprehensive in its scope and structure, so that all our actions have a unified source of justification. In the treatment that I have sketched, the distinct moral theories that guide our actions are
ii
These moral theories are examples only. I take no stance on whether morality actually possesses this dual character, or what the true moral theory or theories might be.
Shortridge A. J Med Ethics September 2015 Vol 41 No 9
non-competing, since only one theory ever applies, as determined by whether or not the circumstances are extraordinary. If we hold strongly to the idea that an ethical theory should be comprehensive, however, then the fact that the moral maxims that are appealed to in ordinary and extraordinary situations are exclusive and not in conflict may provide little comfort. Simply by introducing two sources of justification, we might be led to ask which of the two is the fundamental moral theory. If, for example, consequentialism justifies our actions in disasters, and we believe that adequate ethical theorising requires that there be a single comprehensive theory, then perhaps we should simply be consequentialists all the time. A second concern relies not on the comprehensive scope that we might reasonably expect a moral theory to possess, but rather on the epistemic limitations of agents. If moral justification were sensitive to circumstance then borderline cases might arise where it is unclear whether the threshold has been reached, which makes extraordinary moral justifications permissible—just how disastrous must the situation be before consequentialism can be appealed to? Perhaps, there is no simple answer to questions of this sort. Jeffrey Reiman has suggested as much in his advocacy for the application of both utilitarian and Kantian standards in the conduct of war: ‘No formula or magic number will tell us when we confront a moral calamity and thus when utilitarian considerations begin to overtake Kantian ones’.5 To address concerns about borderline cases, it may be useful to return to questions of social policy and moral education, through which individuals would learn to exercise their judgement and improve their ability to reason under conditions of uncertainty.1 3
It seems plausible to suppose that extraordinary situations may justify extraordinary action. The severity of disasters might suggest that extraordinary actions are permissible, and that the moral theory by which justifications of action are made alters according to the circumstance in which action is taken. Normative ethical concerns about the nature and scope of ethical theory and the reasoning capacities of individuals can be raised in order to cast light on matters of applied ethics, in order to identify what actions are appropriate in a disaster and to illuminate the justification for those actions. Competing interests None declared. Provenance and peer review Not commissioned; externally peer reviewed.
To cite Shortridge A. J Med Ethics 2015;41:780–781. Received 7 July 2014 Revised 10 February 2015 Accepted 13 May 2015 Published Online First 5 June 2015 J Med Ethics 2015;41:780–781. doi:10.1136/medethics-2014-102352
REFERENCES 1 2 3 4
5
Kodama S. Tsunami-tendenko and morality in disasters. J Med Ethics 2015;41:361–3. Asai A. Tsunami-tendenko and morality in disasters. J Med Ethics 2015;41:365–6. Oakley J. Can self-preservation be virtuous in disaster situations? J Med Ethics 2015;41:364–5. Smart JJC. An outline of a system of utilitarian ethics. In: Smart JJC, Williams B. Utilitarianism, for and against. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1973:9. Reiman J. Ethics for calamities: How strict is the moral rule against targeting non-combatants? In: Wertheimer R, ed. Empowering our military conscience: transforming just war theory and military moral education. Farnham, UK: Ashgate Publishing, 2010:93–106.
781
Downloaded from http://jme.bmj.com/ on November 15, 2015 - Published by group.bmj.com
Moral reasoning in disaster scenarios Andrew Shortridge J Med Ethics 2015 41: 780-781 originally published online June 5, 2015
doi: 10.1136/medethics-2014-102352 Updated information and services can be found at: http://jme.bmj.com/content/41/9/780
These include:
References Email alerting service
This article cites 3 articles, 3 of which you can access for free at: http://jme.bmj.com/content/41/9/780#BIBL Receive free email alerts when new articles cite this article. Sign up in the box at the top right corner of the online article.
Notes
To request permissions go to: http://group.bmj.com/group/rights-licensing/permissions To order reprints go to: http://journals.bmj.com/cgi/reprintform To subscribe to BMJ go to: http://group.bmj.com/subscribe/
Response
Moral reasoning in disaster scenarios Andrew Shortridge In the midst of a calamitous disaster, a person might act in a way that would otherwise be considered uncharacteristic or extraordinary. Behaviours of this sort may be morally justifiable. We might suppose, for example, that our duty to aid others is reduced during a disaster. Perhaps, it is even permissible to save oneself rather than a family member or close friend. Satoshi Kodama explores the question of morality during disasters, focusing on tsunamitendenko, the practice whereby individuals save themselves rather than assist others during a tsunami.1 He argues that encouraging individuals to save themselves, and discouraging them from taking risks to save others, may well help to save lives during disasters, and is a laudable social policy. In what follows, I focus on the issue of moral reasoning in disaster scenarios, offering critical comments on Kodama’s analysis in a spirit of constructive elucidation. Our prereflective sentiments may suggest to us that extraordinary behaviour may be morally justifiable in disaster scenarios. This is not surprising, since it seems that the action that is justified is often sensitive to the circumstances in which we are called upon to act. Many maintain that we have a duty of ‘easy rescue’, to aid imperilled strangers when provision of that aid costs us little. It is less clear whether we must aid a stranger if our aiding is at great cost. Where we can aid either a stranger or a family member, it seems ( prereflectively) that we have greater moral obligation to aid our kin. Different circumstances call for different actions. It is reasonable to expect that any satisfactory ethical analysis would clarify the relationship between actions and circumstances. Tsunami-tendenko prioritises selfpreservation over provision of aid in times of disaster. Kodama addresses the charge that the maxim of self-preservation that is central to the practice is egoistic and immoral, arguing that the tsunamitendenko maxim can be justified by indirect consequentialism: ‘It is consequentialist because the purpose of tsunami-tendenko is to maximize the number of lives saved. Correspondence to Andrew Shortridge, Faculty of Arts, Monash University, Clayton, VIC 3800, Australia; [email protected] 780
It is indirect because the rule of action individuals are expected to follow is not one of maximizing the number of lives one can directly save, but of saving one’s own life to collectively maximize the total number of lives saved’.1
I raise two concerns about Kodama’s appeal to indirect consequentialism as a suitable moral justification of tsunamitendenko. (Aspects of Kodama’s utilitarian analysis of tsunami-tendenko are also discussed by Atsushi Asai and Justin Oakley).2 3 First, I suggest that Kodama’s defence of tsunami-tendenko by appeal to a form of indirect consequentialism is unnecessary, since a plausible justification can be given, which appeals directly to consequentialist considerations. Second, I ask whether Kodama intends to defend an ethic of indirect consequentialism in general or only in catastrophic circumstances. It is unclear whether the suggestion is that there is a single moral theory —indirect consequentialism—according to which extraordinary actions are sometimes justifiable, or whether in certain circumstances, we ought to set aside our ordinary moral framework and adopt an indirect consequentialist perspective, according to which tsunami-tendenko is justified. How is tsunami-tendenko justified by indirect consequentialism? The consequence that is sought is the greatest number of lives saved in a tsunami. The agent who practices tsunami-tendenko is not said to aim at this outcome directly, but instead follows a rule, obedience to which is the best way to save the greatest number of lives. The rule is that the agent seeks to save her own life and makes no attempt to rescue others. This rule leads agents to avoid situations where two people die in a failed rescue attempt, the outcome being called tomo-daore.i This pursuit of the desired consequence, through the following of a rule, is said to be indirect, and I take it that the maxim and the moral theory that Kodama develops are forms of rule consequentialism.4 However, it seems possible that tsunami-tendenko might be adequately justified by direct consequentialism.
i
Kodama reports that tragic deaths in attempted rescues were not uncommon during the tsunami of March 2011.1
Where seeking to save another puts the rescuer in grave danger, the direct consequentialist seeks to maximise the number of lives saved in the most effective way. Given the dangers, she recognises that the consequentialist maxim to save as many as possible will be best met by having each person save himself or herself rather than have anyone run great risks in seeking to save another. Given the extreme uncertainty and the low likelihood for successful rescue of others during a tsunami, it may be that selfpreservation is the most reliable way to obey the maxim to which Kodama’s indirect rule refers, the maxim that is directly consequentialist: ‘save the greatest number possible’. I maintain that this direct consequentialist justification of tsunami-tendenko is even supported by Kodama’s characterisation of what he calls the ‘tsunami dilemma’. In that dilemma, each of two individuals has a choice: either practice self-preservation or attempt to assist the other. Self-preservation makes the agent’s own survival likely while rendering assistance makes the agent’s own survival unlikely. Thus, when both agents render aid, the likely outcome in the tsunami dilemma is that two people die. When both agents focus on their own survival, the likely outcome is that two people survive. Given the additional and plausible assumption that each agent is aware of the risk inherent in attempting rescue, the defence of tsunami-tendenko on direct consequentialist grounds seems strengthened. Understanding the risk, each agent seeks to maximise the number of lives they can save: each agent recognises that realistically that number is one. Let me move now to a more abstract criticism of Kodama’s argument. There are at least two ways in which ethical analysis could justify extraordinary action in disaster scenarios. The less radical possibility is that one comprehensive moral theory—whether rights-based, consequentialist or otherwise—explains how difficult circumstances justify extraordinary action. For example, perhaps in times of great calamity, certain extraordinary actions can be permissibly taken, which ordinarily would be forbidden, with it understood that a single moral theory provides justification for both ordinary and extraordinary actions. A more radical possibility for justifying extraordinary action is that calamitous scenarios make certain actions permissible because in such situations the moral theory that justifies our actions changes. For instance, we might treat rights as a foundational moral theory
Shortridge A. J Med Ethics September 2015 Vol 41 No 9
Downloaded from http://jme.bmj.com/ on November 15, 2015 - Published by group.bmj.com
Response ordinarily, while believing we ought to reason as consequentialists during a catastrophe.ii On such an account, there are two moral theories to which we may appeal in justifying our actions: one is appealed to in ordinary circumstances and the other in times of disaster. Kodama defends tsunami-tendenko by appeal to indirect consequentialism, but it is unclear whether he thinks that we ought to practice indirect consequentialism in ordinary as well as extraordinary situations. Suppose that the act of selfpreservation in disasters is justified by some variety of consequentialism though ordinary day-to-day activities ought to be justified by appeal to some nonconsequentialist theory. Only during a disaster can we legitimately reason as consequentialists, and morality would have a sort of dual character. Kodama is silent on this possibility though it seems compatible with his analysis. (He does argue that emergency workers should not practice tsunami-tendenko, but it does not follow that consequentialist reasoning is only permissible in disasters or only permissible for certain individuals in disasters, since consequentialist justifications of professional obligations could be offered.) Let me highlight two concerns about the possibility that morality has a dual character. One reason to be suspicious of this idea might arise if we hold that an ethical theory should be comprehensive in its scope and structure, so that all our actions have a unified source of justification. In the treatment that I have sketched, the distinct moral theories that guide our actions are
ii
These moral theories are examples only. I take no stance on whether morality actually possesses this dual character, or what the true moral theory or theories might be.
Shortridge A. J Med Ethics September 2015 Vol 41 No 9
non-competing, since only one theory ever applies, as determined by whether or not the circumstances are extraordinary. If we hold strongly to the idea that an ethical theory should be comprehensive, however, then the fact that the moral maxims that are appealed to in ordinary and extraordinary situations are exclusive and not in conflict may provide little comfort. Simply by introducing two sources of justification, we might be led to ask which of the two is the fundamental moral theory. If, for example, consequentialism justifies our actions in disasters, and we believe that adequate ethical theorising requires that there be a single comprehensive theory, then perhaps we should simply be consequentialists all the time. A second concern relies not on the comprehensive scope that we might reasonably expect a moral theory to possess, but rather on the epistemic limitations of agents. If moral justification were sensitive to circumstance then borderline cases might arise where it is unclear whether the threshold has been reached, which makes extraordinary moral justifications permissible—just how disastrous must the situation be before consequentialism can be appealed to? Perhaps, there is no simple answer to questions of this sort. Jeffrey Reiman has suggested as much in his advocacy for the application of both utilitarian and Kantian standards in the conduct of war: ‘No formula or magic number will tell us when we confront a moral calamity and thus when utilitarian considerations begin to overtake Kantian ones’.5 To address concerns about borderline cases, it may be useful to return to questions of social policy and moral education, through which individuals would learn to exercise their judgement and improve their ability to reason under conditions of uncertainty.1 3
It seems plausible to suppose that extraordinary situations may justify extraordinary action. The severity of disasters might suggest that extraordinary actions are permissible, and that the moral theory by which justifications of action are made alters according to the circumstance in which action is taken. Normative ethical concerns about the nature and scope of ethical theory and the reasoning capacities of individuals can be raised in order to cast light on matters of applied ethics, in order to identify what actions are appropriate in a disaster and to illuminate the justification for those actions. Competing interests None declared. Provenance and peer review Not commissioned; externally peer reviewed.
To cite Shortridge A. J Med Ethics 2015;41:780–781. Received 7 July 2014 Revised 10 February 2015 Accepted 13 May 2015 Published Online First 5 June 2015 J Med Ethics 2015;41:780–781. doi:10.1136/medethics-2014-102352
REFERENCES 1 2 3 4
5
Kodama S. Tsunami-tendenko and morality in disasters. J Med Ethics 2015;41:361–3. Asai A. Tsunami-tendenko and morality in disasters. J Med Ethics 2015;41:365–6. Oakley J. Can self-preservation be virtuous in disaster situations? J Med Ethics 2015;41:364–5. Smart JJC. An outline of a system of utilitarian ethics. In: Smart JJC, Williams B. Utilitarianism, for and against. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1973:9. Reiman J. Ethics for calamities: How strict is the moral rule against targeting non-combatants? In: Wertheimer R, ed. Empowering our military conscience: transforming just war theory and military moral education. Farnham, UK: Ashgate Publishing, 2010:93–106.
781
Downloaded from http://jme.bmj.com/ on November 15, 2015 - Published by group.bmj.com
Moral reasoning in disaster scenarios Andrew Shortridge J Med Ethics 2015 41: 780-781 originally published online June 5, 2015
doi: 10.1136/medethics-2014-102352 Updated information and services can be found at: http://jme.bmj.com/content/41/9/780
These include:
References Email alerting service
This article cites 3 articles, 3 of which you can access for free at: http://jme.bmj.com/content/41/9/780#BIBL Receive free email alerts when new articles cite this article. Sign up in the box at the top right corner of the online article.
Notes
To request permissions go to: http://group.bmj.com/group/rights-licensing/permissions To order reprints go to: http://journals.bmj.com/cgi/reprintform To subscribe to BMJ go to: http://group.bmj.com/subscribe/
