OMEGA, Vol. 69(3) 249-270, 2014

PROBABILISTIC THINKING AND DEATH ANXIETY: A TERROR MANAGEMENT BASED STUDY

BERT HAYSLIP, JR, PH.D. ERIC R. SCHULER, M.S. KYLE S. PAGE, PH.D. KELLYE S. CARVER, M.S. University of North Texas, Denton

ABSTRACT

Terror Management Theory has been utilized to understand how death can change behavioral outcomes and social dynamics. One area that is not well researched is why individuals willingly engage in risky behavior that could accelerate their mortality. One method of distancing a potential life threatening outcome when engaging in risky behaviors is through stacking probability in favor of the event not occurring, termed probabilistic thinking. The present study examines the creation and psychometric properties of the Probabilistic Thinking scale in a sample of young, middle aged, and older adults (n = 472). The scale demonstrated adequate internal consistency reliability for each of the four subscales, excellent overall internal consistency, and good construct validity regarding relationships with measures of death anxiety. Reliable age and gender effects in probabilistic thinking were also observed. The relationship of probabilistic thinking as part of a cultural buffer against death anxiety is discussed, as well as its implications for Terror Management research.

249 Ó 2014, Baywood Publishing Co., Inc. doi: http://dx.doi.org/10.2190/OM.69.3.b http://baywood.com

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INTRODUCTION While of death is universal, it is through the cultural window of an individual society that individuals frame their views of death, afterlife, and religious rites involving the dead (Geertz, 1973; Kastenbaum, 2009b; Kearl, 1989). Most cultures have a stance on death, or a death ethos that impacts the day to day behaviors of its members through cultural norms (Hayslip, 2003). These are expressed via shared beliefs about reality to reduce the fear elicited by the awareness of self mortality and human frailty, and reflect the development of culture and world-views that give life order, meaning, and purpose as well as allowing persons to transcend death through the creation of and maintenance of a belief in an afterlife (Firestone, 1994; Greenberg & Arndt, 2012). Culture can therefore be viewed as a mechanism to provide individuals with a sense of purpose and meaning, wherein by prescribing to a cultural worldview, individuals can maintain the hope that the culture will continue even after they have died. When assaulted with thoughts of death, the individual’s cultural worldview is hypothesized to act as a buffer to protect the individual from death anxiety (Greenberg, Pyszczynski, & Solomon, 1986; Greenberg, Pyszczynski, Solomon, Rosenblatt, Veeder, Kirkland, et al., 1990; Rosenblatt, Greenberg, Solomon, Pyszczynski, & Lyon, 1989). Playing the Odds: An Everyday Phenomenon In the context of American culture’s emphasis on the likelihood of events happening to us (e.g., the odds of winning the lottery, the odds of being caught stealing or speeding, the odds of dying in an airplane crash or motor vehicle accident, the odds of surviving a potentially terminal illness), we explore here the viability of a measure to assess probabilistic thinking as a coping mechanism to fend off fears of death. This culturally approved and indeed encouraged stance toward our ultimate fate as human beings buoys us in the face of adversity and loss. Despite the present focus on probabilistic thinking as a defense against death, thinking probabilistically is an everyday occurrence for many of us. For example, we decide whether to take an umbrella to work based on the probability of rain. We decide to bet on a horse given the odds of that horse’s winning the race. Indeed, as DeSpelder and Strickland (2011) have pointed out (p. 8), “Deaths from car accidents, cancer, and heart disease don’t seem to interest us as much as death from plane crashes, roller coaster mishaps, or mountain lion attacks. Bizarre or dramatic exits grab our attention. Although the odds of dying from a heart attack are about 1 in 5, we seem more fascinated by death from bee stings (1 in 62,950), lightning (1 in 81,701) fireworks (1 in 479,992) (National Safety Council, 2009).” Indeed, though such death might be unlikely, the odds of dying from such causes are indeed 1 in 1, if one happens to be unlucky enough to be allergic to a bee sting or be outside during a thunderstorm. This profound statement regarding the odds of dying (being 1 in 1) was made by Kubler-Ross in a classic film on death and dying (To Die Today). In the book All of Us by Anderson (1996), she states “All of us die.

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It’s the one sure thing you and I have in common.” These statements underscore the need to think about death adaptively in a probabilistic manner. Terror Management Theory as a Framework for Understanding Probabilistic Thinking In the context of our focus on probabilistic thinking, an approach that embraces the role of culture in influencing fears surrounding death is Terror Management Theory (TMT; Greenberg et al., 1986), wherein TMT is based upon two primary assumptions: 1. that humans share many of the defense systems that are seen in other animals (e.g., fight or flight) which allow a species to continue to survive; and 2. humans are unique, in that we understand that one day our lives will end (Becker, 1973; Greenberg & Arndt, 2012; Greenberg et al., 1986). TMT further assumes that growing out of the awareness of our own impending mortality, a paralyzing existential fear is created (Greenberg & Arndt, 2012; Greenberg et al., 1986). In order to keep death anxiety at bay, individuals develop self esteem and create a cultural worldview that each serve as buffering systems to help reduce existential anxiety caused by death reminders via a process of either denying or repressing death (Hirschberger, Florian, Mikulinger, Goldenberg, & Pyszczynski, 2002; Rosenblatt et al., 1989). In the context of the present study, we argue that probabilistic thinking indeed reflects at least a component of this cultural worldview. Consistent with TMT, a third buffering system of close relationships has been suggested to additionally help reduce death anxiety (Mikulincer, Florian, Birnbaum, & Malishkovitz, 2003). The desire for increased social interactions, lower rejection sensitivity (Taubman-Ben-Ari, 2004; Taubman-Ben-Ari, Findler, & Mikulincer, 2002), and increased levels of perceived commitment in romantic relationships (Mikulincer & Florian, 2000) have been reported in individuals who have been reminded of their own death compared to individuals in a control group who had not been exposed to such reminders. Numerous studies also support the fact that when participants are reminded of their own mortality, they will become more steadfast in their cultural worldviews and will act more aggressively towards members of an out-group (Greenberg et al., 1990; Kugler & Cooper, 2010; Pyszczynski, Rothschild, & Abdollahi, 2008; Rosenblatt et al., 1989). The present study examines an additional potential death anxiety buffering defense: an individuals’ use of probability to distort reality and minimize the likelihood that a potentially deadly event will happen to them. We term this construct probabilistic thinking. Indeed, if the need to keep thoughts and reminders of death at bay shapes self esteem, the need for close relationships, and an affiliation with culture, why would individuals engage in behaviors that could potentially heighten their demise?

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From a Terror Management Theory perspective, risky behaviors are based in the extreme denial of mortality and the inadequate weighing of the potential gains and losses associated with engagement in such behavior (Taubman-Ben-Ari, Florian, & Mikulincer, 1999). Such gains and losses are not absolute, but relative to one another. In this sense, each individual will weigh the benefits and the potential dangers of an action, and if the gain is an increase in self-esteem from the result of the particular action, then the individual is likely to behave in a reckless manner, despite potential death concerns associated with such actions (Taubman-Ben-Ari et al., 1999). Engaging in risky behaviors is proposed to be caused by two primary motives; the desire to avoid or minimize potential losses and the need to maximize the potential gain that is associated with the behavior (Leith & Baumeister, 1996). This assumes that the individual would assess the probability of gains/losses for the high risk/high reward or a low risk/low reward option, which can be distorted by one’s current mood or affect. Affect can influence the degree that an individual will rationally assess the potential risks and rewards of a behavior given a stressful event, wherein rational thought is lost (Leith & Baumeister, 1996). Probability and Risky Behavior Attention to probability in the context of death is new. Indeed, the use of probability in influencing engagement in risky behavior has become commonplace in mortality salience research (Hirschberger et al., 2002; Landau & Greenberg, 2006; Landau, Solomon, Greenberg, Cohen, Pyszczynski, Arndt, et al., 2004; Miller & Mulligan, 2002; Popham, Kennison, & Bradly, 2011; Taubman-Ben-Ari, 2004; Taubman-Ben-Ari et al., 1999). In this respect, several studies have explored sensation seeking and risk taking engagement behavior assessed in the context of mortality salience priming (e.g., Popham et al., 2011). Popham et al. reported that individuals who had elevated levels of ageism had engaged in higher levels of risk taking behaviors and that made them feel invincible and strong. There is also evidence to support the interaction of mortality salience and gender in the likelihood of engaging in risky behavior (Hirschberger et al., 2002). Hirschberger et al. reported that in mortality salience primed high school students, there was an increased willingness to engage in risky behaviors (“would they accept drugs offered by another person in different situations”) in male but not in female participants. These findings were interpreted in terms of men finding an immediate release from the existential anxiety of death by engaging in a risky behavior; this could serve as a buffer against death if the risk was directly associated with their cultural worldview (Hirschberger et al., 2002). Taubman-Ben-Ari et al. (1999) found that when individuals were reminded of their own mortality, there was an increased engagement in reckless driving in a simulator if driving was a reflection of the individual’s self esteem compared to individuals who did not view driving in this manner or who were not primed

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(Taubman-Ben-Ari et al., 1999). Taubman-Ben-Ari (2004) gave participants a set of scenarios that involved the risky sexual conduct (e.g., willingness to “have sex on the first date without any contraception”) and were asked about the probability that they would engage in the behavior in the future. Individuals who were reminded of their own mortality had a higher willingness to engage in risky sexual behavior compared to participants who received a neutral control prime (Taubman-Ben-Ari, 2004). Miller and Mulligan (2002) explored risk taking behavior and locus of control (Rotter, 1966) in mortality primed individuals. Participants with high internal control were less likely to assess engage in risky behaviors and had an increase in the assessment of risky behavior compared to those in the control condition who received 15 true-or-false questions about watching television (Miller & Mulligan, 2002). In contrast, individuals with an external locus of control had a reduction in risk assessments and were more prone to engage in risk taking behavior when compared to similarly described individuals in the control condition (Miller & Mulligan, 2002). In the Miller and Mulligan study, risk taking behaviors were assessed in the form of 15 scenarios that described a potentially risky situation (e.g., “Midterms are over and it is about 3pm. When you walk into your house, two of your friends are there and they have just bought a 30-pack of beer. By 8:00 pm the 30-pack is gone and one of your friends says ‘let’s go to the bar’”). Persons were then asked what they would most likely do from a list of predetermined behavioral actions (such as “would you drive to the bar,” “would you call a sober friends,” etc.). Importantly, how participants assessed risk and the probability of adverse consequences was not accounted for in the Miller and Mulligan work. It is important to observe that in assessing risky behavior engagement, whether a participant would actually engage in risky behavior likely reflects the culturally prescribed predisposition to think probabilistically—defining future actions by weighing the potential likelihood of the rewards and the consequences of such actions. In this light, it is interesting that the National College Health Risk Behavior Survey, given to 4,069 undergraduates in 1995, indicated that more than a quarter of the participants had driven a motor vehicle after consuming alcohol, and had engaged in unhealthy practices (e.g., only 32.4% of men and 25.1% of women in the study reported using a condom always or most of the time; National College Health Risk Behavior Survey, 1995). This approach to how individuals evaluate decisions and estimate outcomes has been defined in numerical terms, that is, ratios or percentages that reflect the likelihood of the event actually impacting to them, i.e. probabilistic thinking (PT; Wright & Phillips, 1979). Probabilistic Thinking Defined Probabilistic thinking is defined as “the tendency to view the world in terms of uncertainty, ascribing different degrees of uncertainty to events, and the ability to express that uncertainty meaningfully either verbally or as a numerical probability”

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(Wright & Phillips, 1979, p. 295). Prior research has reported probabilistic thinking to reflect a culturally dependent cognitive style (Wright & Phillips, 1980) independent of individual personality traits. However, probabilistic thinking in the Wright and Phillips studies was measured via the use of factual information (e.g., asking if the Panama Canal or Suez canal is longer) and asking participants to gauge their confidence in selecting the correct answer in terms of a percentage (ranging from 50–100). Rationale for the Present Study Reflecting a Terror Management Theory (TMT) perspective on the reinforced culturally buffering of death anxiety, it may be that probabilistic thinking is a culturally determined mechanism for assessing the potential risks and gains of an action. Previous research on probabilistic thinking has been focused on the individual’s perceptions of confidence in choosing a correct answer (Wright & Phillips, 1979, 1980). Importantly, in the Wright and Phillips work, individuals who may not normally think probabilistically were forced to do so and there were no options for “not at all.” From a TMT perspective, the role of individual differences in probabilistic thinking as a buffer against death anxiety has yet to be explored. One approach to human development centralizes the mediational role of culture in influencing the impact of biological and environmental influences on development (Cole, 1999). Indeed, if the construct of probabilistic thinking is culturally dependent (Wright & Phillips, 1980), then it can be utilized to reflect some aspects of the cultural worldview that enables individuals to develop defenses against death anxiety. Such defenses may be especially important in death denying cultures (Kastenbaum, 2009a). The Probabilistic Thinking Scale (PTS) presented here measures the degree to which an individual will use probability to distort reality in making the possibility of injury, illness, or death more distant. If a) culture is born of the need of humans to perceive life as meaningful, b) acts as a buffer against the awareness of self mortality (Becker, 1973; Greenberg et al., 1986; Hayslip, 2003), and c) certain cultures gauge decision making on the basis of the likelihood of risks and gains, then probabilistic thinking can be viewed as an extension of the individual’s cultural worldview. We propose that probabilistic thinking reflects this cultural worldview which serves to buffer mortality salience and acts as a defense to reduce the existential fear with the realization of self-mortality. Individuals who more frequently engage in probabilistic thinking will experience less conscious death anxiety due to their ability to successfully distance themselves from the likelihood of death or serious injury as a potential outcome of their own behavior (e.g., “it is unlikely that I will be in a car accident,” and “I rarely worry about cutting myself when I use a knife”).

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Research Questions and Hypotheses The research questions we explored here related to presenting evidence for the reliability and validity of the PTS in exploring its internal consistency, factor structure, and both construct and discriminant validity. In this respect, we utilized measures of both self-reported and unconscious death fear as well as a measure of repression-sensitization to validate the PTS, on the assumption that individuals who are more likely to endorse probabilistic thinking will be less death anxious and utilize repression to a greater extent as a way of coping with events which are adverse or threatening to them personally. Consequently, we hypothesize that the PTS will demonstrate construct validity when correlated with measures of death anxiety and repression/sensitization, wherein persons who think probabilistically will evidence less conscious/self-reported death anxiety and utilize denial to a greater extent as a defense against fears of death. We also expect that probabilistic thinking will vary between genders (see Hirschberger et al., 2002) and will differentiate persons on the basis of age, paralleling findings pertaining to conscious death anxiety (Hayslip, 2003; Hayslip, Pinder, & Lumsden, 1981). While we do not have explicit predictions regarding the relationship between age and probabilistic thinking, previous work would suggest that males will evidence more probabilistic thinking than will females. METHOD Participants and Procedure Participants consisted of 472 younger, middle aged, and older adults ranging in age from 18 to 88, with a mean age of 42.09 years (SD = 24.09). Seventy-four percent of the sample was women. The sample was 78.7% Caucasian, 10.3% African American, 7.1% Hispanic/Latino, while the remainder consisted of (1.3%) Asian Indian, (1%) Chinese, (0.4%) Korean, (1%) American Indian, and (.2%) another racial group. Undergraduate students who participated were compensated with partial course credit in a psychology course. They were given an additional packet to bring home to have family members complete. That such persons actually completed the survey was verified via phone conversations, and all surveys were returned in a sealed envelope. Participants were asked to supply information about their age, gender, level of education, ethnicity, and if they had experienced the death of a relative, friend, or pet within the last year. Measures Probabilistic Thinking Scale

Items for the PTS were generated by the first and third authors, growing in part out of the first author’s experiences in teaching the Psychology of Death and

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Dying over a 35-year period of time, wherein questions about the “odds” of dying from a given cause of death were commonplace, and indeed reinforced by textbooks presenting death rates by cause of death varying by age (Corr & Corr, 2013; Despelder & Strickland, 2011). The Probabilistic Thinking Scale (PTS) initial item pool consisted of 70 items (37 are reverse coded) developed by the first and second authors to reflect the broad tendency of an individual to use probability to think about the world, themselves, and their relationships to others. The items ranged in defining differing scenarios that could illicit probabilistic thinking (e.g., skydiving, caving, stealing, safety concerns; see Table 1). Participants were asked to rate how they feel about each of the statements, rating their agreement with each using a 5-point Likert scale (1 = strongly disagree to 5 = strongly agree). Higher scores indexed greater probabilistic thinking.

Table 1. Items Defining the Probabilistic Thinking Scale 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 12. 13. 14. 15. 16. 17. 18. 19. 20. 21. 22. 23. 24.

I think people who skydive are risking getting hurt seriously.*—RR I always wear my seatbelt when I drive.*—DD Taking risks makes life more enjoyable.—RS Driving too fast on ice will cause you to have an accident.*—DD Smoking is harmful to one’s health.*—DD I rarely go out if it is icy or the weather is bad.*—RR I would skydive if I could.—RS I enjoy driving fast.—RS It is important to me that I maintain my car properly.*—WN I would wear protective gear if I played sports.*—WN I make sure I get a flu shot every year.*—WN Binge drinking is definitely dangerous.*—DD I enjoy games of chance.—RS You need to take risks to get ahead.—RS I would not swim in a pool that did not have a life guard.*—RR If I get away with something once, it is likely that I won’t get caught in the future.—RS One can drive safely if he or she has been drinking.—RS I will not engage in high risk activities for fear of getting hurt.*—RR and RS I regularly inspect my tires for wear.*—WN It is important to have fences and locks in place to keep children from drowning in a pool.*—DD I enjoy watching people do dangerous things (e.g., racing cars).—RS People that ride motorcycles should wear helmets.*—DD I stay away from metal and water when severe storms are in the area.*—WN I would never go caving, for fear of being bitten by a bat.*—RR

Note: *denotes reverse-scoring. RR = Risk-repressing subscale; DD = Death Denial subscale; RS = Risk-seeking subscale; WN = Willful Neglect subscale.

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Once data was collected from participants, it was cleaned and coded, and the sample was subsequently randomly split in halves. For one half of the data, items were assessed on the basis of the extent to which their presence influenced improvement in Cronbach’s alpha for the PTS. This resulted in the deletion of 35 items. At this point, the internal consistency reliability of the PTS was .86. Based upon this reduced pool of items, a series of exploratory principle components analyses (PCA) with varimax rotation were conducted. Items which cross loaded substantially and/or failed to be defined by a given factor, wherein four such factors were derived, were eliminated; this resulted in the deletion of an additional 11 items, which ultimately resulted in 24 items from the initial pool remaining to be used to define PT. The resulting alpha for this 24 item scale was .84 (see Tables 1-3). Utilizing the second randomly selected half of the sample, a similar exploratory PCA was conducted, which also resulted in a similar 4 factor solution, accounting for 42.75% of the common variance among items.

Table 2. Factor Structure of the Probabilistic Thinking Scale Items 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24

Risk-repressing .278 –.177 .027 .233 .070 .591 .220 .141 –.067 .006 .179 .109 –.061 .001 .515 –.470 –.382 –.389 .029 .008 .048 –.161 .050 .598

Death-denial .080 .506 –.132 .725 .772 .192 –.022 .079 .223 .063 –.045 .453 –.088 –.065 –.131 .156 .148 .199 –.129 .600 .178 .597 .220 –.039

Risk-seeking .167 .057 .709 –.099 –.144 .037 .575 .527 –.213 –.043 .231 .051 .647 .608 .252 .381 .375 .376 –.074 .042 .631 .063 .190 .106

Willful neglect –.321 –.002 –.179 .047 .108 –.036 –.117 –.153 –.672 –.714 –.491 –.270 .171 –.012 –.251 –.276 –.148 –.014 –.711 –.115 .255 –.057 –.399 –.139

Note: Using the pattern matrix for the complete data set, oblique rotation converged in 17 iterations. Bolded numbers indicate factor loadings greater than or equal to .25.

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Table 3. Subscales of the Probabilistic Thinking Scale Factor 1—Risk-Repressing 6. I rarely go out if it is icy or the weather is bad.* 15. I would not swim in a pool that did not have a life guard.* 16. If I get away with something once, it is likely that I won’t get caught in the ` future. 18. I will not engage in high risk activities for fear of getting hurt.* 24. I would never go caving, for fear of being bitten by a bat.* Factor 2—Death Denial 2. I always wear my seatbelt when I drive.* 4. Driving too fast on ice will cause you to have an accident.* 5. Smoking is harmful to one’s health.* 12. Binge drinking is definitely dangerous.* 20. It is important to have fences and locks in place to keep children from drowning in a pool.* 22. People that ride motorcycles should wear helmets.* Factor 3—Risk-Seeking 3. Taking risks makes life more enjoyable. 7. I would skydive if I could. 8. I enjoy driving fast. 13. I enjoy games of chance. 14. You need to take risks to get ahead. 16. If I get away with something once, it is likely that I won’t get caught in the future. 17. One can drive safely if he or she has been drinking. 18. I will not engage in high risk activities for fear of getting hurt.* 21. I enjoy watching people do dangerous things (e.g., racing cars.) Factor 4—Willful Neglect 1. I think people who skydive are risking getting hurt seriously.* 9. It is important to me that I maintain my car properly.* 10. I would wear protective gear if I played sports.* 11. I make sure I get a flu shot every year.* 19. I regularly inspect my tires for wear.* 23. I stay away from metal and water when severe storms are in the area.* Note: Alpha coefficients relying on items that uniquely defined each factor were: Factor 1 (.63), Factor 2 (.69), Factor 3 (.74), and Factor 4 (.66). Eigenvalues and percentages of variance accounted for were for Factor 1 (4.95, 20.61%), Factor 2 (2.40, 9.99%), Factor 3 (1.74, 7.24%), and Factor 4 (1.31, 5.46%). * = recoded items, where low scores represent a higher degree of probabilistic thinking.

Using the entire sample, a PCA with oblique rotation to a terminal solution (see Table 2) was conducted, and four factor scores (see below) were saved and utilized in the analyses below. This final PCA accounted for 43.3% of the common variance among the 24 items. The factor pattern matrix (Table 2) indicated that a small minority of items (1, 15, 16, 17, 18) to load (.25 or higher) on two factors.

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The resulting four subscales were labeled based on what aspects of PT each item defined, tapping into the larger construct of probabilistic thinking. Items 16, 17, and 18 were found to load on multiple factors (see Table 2). Relying on those items that principally (".30) defined each factor, the subscales consisted of: Riskrepressing (6 items, internal consistency reliability = .63, e.g., “I rarely go out if it is icy or the weather is bad”), Death denial (6 items, internal consistency reliability = .69, e.g., “Binge drinking is definitely dangerous”), Risk-seeking (9 items, internal consistency reliability = .74, e.g., “Taking risks makes life more enjoyable”), and Willful Neglect (6 items, internal consistency reliability = .66, e.g., “I make sure I get a flu shot every year”) (see Table 3). Importantly, the PTS had an overall internal consistency reliability of .82. Unconscious Death Anxiety

The incomplete sentence blank (ISB; Hayslip, 1981; Hayslip et al., 1981) is a 10-item task that asks individuals to complete the thought that first comes to their mind based on unstructured prompts (e.g., “I like . . . ,” “I regret . . . ,” “In the past . . .”). Participants are instructed that there are no right or wrong answers. These sentences were coded by the second author for occurrence of death related themes, where five dimensions of unconscious death fear were derived—anxiety consisting of: a) overt mention of death or dying, b) fear of separation or isolation, c) fear of dependency or loss of control, d) fear of loss of goals, and e) fear of pain, injury, or disease in oneself were derived from each response to each sentence stem (Hayslip, 1981, 2003). Inter-scorer agreement for the above dimensions of covert death fear exceeded 80% (see Hayslip, 2003). Individuals with higher ISB scores (lower scores on ISB dimension 1) are said to deny or repress their anxiety about death, where the correlation between the ISB and measures of self reported death anxiety is negative (Hayslip & Guarnaccia, 2002). Repression-Sensitization

The Repression-Sensitization Scale (RSS) of the MMPI-I (Butcher & Williams, 2000; Byrne, 1961; Byrne, Barry, & Nelson, 1963; Hathaway & McKinley, 1940, 1942) reflects the manner in which an individual responds to a threatening stimuli. Individuals indicate whether a statement (e.g., “I find it hard to keep my mind on track”) are true (or mostly true) or false (or mostly false) when applied to them. The RSS is composed of 127 statements (18 reverse coded items) that are scored and places individuals on a continuum of whether they tend to repress threatening stimuli or are sensitized to it. The RSS has an internal consistency of .88 and test-retest reliability of .88 (Byrne, 1961; Byrne et al., 1963). The internal consistency reliability for the RSS in the current study was .94.

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Self-Reported Death and Dying Anxiety

The Revised Collett-Lester Scale (Collett & Lester, 1969; Lester, 1990, 1991, 1994) self-reported death anxiety regarding self and others, and consisted of 32 items organized into 4 subscales that assess anxiety toward one’s own death and dying, the death of others, and others’ dying. Participants rate how disturbed or anxious each statement makes them using a 5-point Likert scale (ranging from 1 = not anxious to 5 = very anxious). The Cronbach’s Alphas for the subscales are: Death of Others, .88; Death of Self, .91, Dying of Others, .92; Dying of Self, .92 (Lester & Abdel-Khalek, 2003). The internal consistency reliabilities for the current study were .82, .88, .89, and .90 respectively. The Death Anxiety Scale-Extended

The Death Anxiety Scale Extended (DAS-E; Templer, Awadalla, Al-Feyez, Frazee, Bassman, Connelly, et al., 2006) consists of 51 items that reflect the severity of death anxiety in an individual in everyday life. Participants are asked to circle true for statements that occur to them or are mostly true or to circle false if the item does not apply to them or if it is mostly false. Some example items are “I am very much afraid to die” and “I am troubled about the purpose of life.” The DAS-E has a Kuder Richardson Formula coefficient range of .87 to .93 (Templer et al., 2006). The internal consistency reliability for DAS- E in the current study was .90. Social Desirability

The Marlowe-Crowne Social Desirability Scale (MCSDS; Crowne & Marlowe, 1960) assesses how often participants present themselves in a socially acceptable manner to control for response bias. This study used the 32-item form of the MCSDS scale, which asks participants statements like “Are you willing to admit when you make a mistake?” and are given the options “yes” or “no.” The internal consistency reliability for this measure in the current study was .82. RESULTS Construct Validity of the PTS To explore the construct validity of the PTS, total PTS scores and the above 4-factor scores (from the PCA with oblique rotation) were intercorrelated with measures of death anxiety (DAS-E, Collett-Lester Death Anxiety Scale, ISB), and repression/sensitization, controlling for prior death experiences within the last year and social desirability. Table 4 presents the partial correlations for the PTS total scores and the factor scores with measures of death anxiety and repression/sensitization. While neither PTS total scores nor the factor scores

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related to the repression/sensitization scale, scores from the Others’ Dying subscale of the Revised Collett-Lester Scale were related (p < .05) to PTS scores. DAS-E Total scores were also related to two of four PTS factor scores as well as the PTS total score. All PTS scores related to ISB dimensions: 1) overt mention of death; 2) fear of isolation/separation; or 3) fear of dependency/loss of control. This pattern of findings suggests that for the most part, persons who thought more probabilistically were either less consciously death anxious regarding self or others, or utilized denial to a lesser extent in helping them cope with their own fear of death (see Table 4).

Table 4. Partial Correlations for the PT Scale when Controlling for Death Experiences and Social Desirability Variable

Risk-R

Death-D

Risk-S

Willful neglect

PTS total

Risk-repressing Death-denial Risk-seeking Willful neglect PTS Total CLYODEATH CLYODYING CLODEATH CLODYING DAS_TOT ISB1 ISB2 ISB3 ISB4 ISB5 RS_TOT

1 .11 .21*** –.20** .51*** –.06 –.05 –.03 –.12* –.12* –.03 –.14* –.10 .06 –.06 –.09

1 .11 –.20** .52*** –.00 –.11 –.10 –.19** –.11 .14* –.11 –.13* .03 .02 –.01

1 –.12* .73*** .01 .03 –.04 –.08 –.14* –.14* –.31*** –.10 –.01 –.03 .02

1 –.62*** –.07 .04 .02 .19** .01 –.07 .18** .08 –.03 .10 –.08

1 .01 –.06 –.07 –.23*** –.16* .00 –.34*** –.16* .03 –.06 .02

Note: PTS total = Probabilistic Thinking Scale total; CLYODeath = Your Own Death subscale of the Revised Collett-Lester Scale; CLYODying = Self Dying subscale of the Revised Collett-Lester Scale; CLODeath = Others’ Death subscale of the Revised Collett-Lester Scale; CLODying = Others’ Dying subscale of the Revised Collett-Lester Scale; DAS_TOT = the total score on the Templer Death Anxiety Scale-Extended; ISB1 = dimension 1 of the incomplete sentence blank task; ISB2 = dimension 2 of the incomplete sentence blank task; ISB3 = dimension 3 of the incomplete sentence blank task; ISB4 = dimension 4 of the incomplete sentence blank task; ISB5 = dimension 5 of the incomplete sentence blank task. RS_TOT = the total score of the Repression-Sensitization Scale. The variables of the individual’s scores on social desirability and nomination of recent prior death experiences were controlled for. *p < .05; **p < .01; ***p < .001.

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Discriminant Validity of the PTS To assess the impact of gender and age on the usage of probabilistic thinking, a two (age: age 39 or younger versus age 40 and older-median split) by two (gender) MANCOVA was conducted with the four factor scores of the PTS as dependent variables, and social desirability and prior death experiences as covariates. The analysis here thus compared differences in probabilistic thinking in individuals who identified themselves as young and male (n = 49), young and female (n = 201), older and male (n = 59) and older and female (n = 109; see Table 5). The MANCOVA (see Table 5) yielded a statistically significant difference for the four subscale factor scores as a set by gender (Wilks’s Lambda = .908, F(1, 409) = 10.37, p < .001, partial eta2 = .09), as well as for age (Wilks’s Lambda = .695, F(1, 409) = 44.87, p < .001, partial eta2 = .31). The interaction between gender and age was not statistically significant. The factor scores related to Risk-Repressing and Risk-Seeking varied by gender (favoring men), F(1, 412) = 7.22, p = .008, partial eta2 = .017 and F(1, 412) = 30.99, p < .001, partial eta2 = .070, respectively. PTS factors reflecting Death Denial and Willful Neglect did not vary by gender. There were statistically significant differences across age for PTS factor scores relating to RiskRepressing, F(1, 412) = 30.44, p < .001, partial eta2 = .069, Risk-Seeking, F(1, 412) = 54.77, p < .001, partial eta2 = .117, and Willful Neglect, F(1, 412) = 88.08, p < .001, partial eta2 = .176. There were no differences by age on factor scores relating to Death Denial. While scores for Risk Repression and Risk Seeking favored younger persons, Willful Neglect scores were higher for older adults. For PTS total scores, the 2 by 2 ANCOVA (see Table 5) yielded a gender difference when controlling for prior death experiences and social desirability. There was no statistically significant interaction between gender and age group on PTS total scores. Gender differences were significant, F(1, 412) = 25.17, p < .001, as were age differences, F(1, 412) = 126.73, p < .001. Such scores favored younger persons and men. An analysis of individual difference relationships suggested that there was a negative relationship between age and PTS total score (r = –.49, p < .001) when controlling for prior death experiences and social desirability. Additionally, there were negative relationships between age and factor scores associated with Risk Repression (r = –.28, p < .001) and Risk Seeking (r = –.34, p < .001). While Death Denial factor scores were found not to correlate with age (r = –.07, p > .05), there was a positive relationship between age and Willful Neglect (r = .46, p < .001). Thus, when controlling for prior death experience and social desirability, the Risk Repression and Risk Seeking subscales of the PTS had negative relationships with age, except for Willful Neglect, whose relationship with age was positive.

.75

–.41

RiskSeeking

Willful Neglect –.45

.26

.01

.22

M

67.97 63.21

–.37

.72

.27

.42

Adj. M

9.35

.82

.88

.82

.86

SD

–.44

.01

.07

.26

M

9.59

.81

.99

.87

.87

SD

Total

62.26 64.26

–.37

.20

–.01

.21

Adj. M

Female (n = 201)

53.02

.66

–.12

–.07

–.15

M

9.36

.81

.88

.84

1.01

SD

.64

–.69

–.16

–.51

M

.89

.87

1.29

1.07

SD

.56

–.61

–.14

–.50

Adj. M

Female (n = 109)

.65

–.49

–.13

–.39

M

9.59

.86

.91

1.15

1.06

SD

Total

54.45 47.63 12.03 48.88 49.42

.56

–.03

–.04

–.13

Adj. M

Male (n = 59)

Age > 40

Note: Age is in years. PT Total = the total score on the Probabilistic Thinking Scale, the means and standard deviations were acquired through an ANCOVA; the means and standard deviations for the subscales were determined through a MANCOVA.

PTS Total 68.55 9.44

.79

.92

.28 1.04

DeathDenial

.89

.44

SD

RiskRepres.

M

Male (n = 49)

Age < 39

Table 5. Observed and Adjusted Means for PT Factors Scores by Age and Gender

PROBABILISTIC THINKING AS A DEATH ANXIETY BUFFER / 263

264 / HAYSLIP ET AL.

DISCUSSION The Probabilistic Thinking Scale (PTS) presented here can be viewed as an extension of the tenets of Terror Management Theory (TMT) to understand death anxiety beyond a traditional mortality salience (priming) approach to questions of how persons cope with their mortality. Theoretically, the use of the PTS represents a novel application of TMT that has everyday implications for human behavior, going beyond its obvious relevance to the likelihood of death. Indeed, the use of the PTS enables us as researchers and practitioners to more fully use TMT to understand other manifestations of culture’s impact on fear of death, enhancing our understanding of how cultures create and retain their death ethos, and how cultures serve to buffer death anxiety. This article dealt with the development of a scale to assess probabilistic thinking as a culturally determined cognitive coping mechanism enabling persons to minimize their anxiety about death. In this context, the present study presented findings pertaining to the development and psychometric characteristics of a measure assessing probabilistic thinking (PTS), grounded in Terror Management Theory. In this study, we found relationships between PTS subscale scores and measures of death anxiety, where persons higher in probabilistic thinking either selfreported less anxiety about death or utilized denial to a lesser extent to coping with their death. This pattern of findings suggests that probabilistic thinking is an efficacious strategy to reduce anxiety about the separation or death of those close to one, consistent with the notion that individuals use probabilistic thinking to distance themselves from the possibility of others’ death. PTS Death denial’s positive relationship with the Overt Mention of Death subscale of the ISB also provides some evidence for construct validity here in that among individuals who consciously distance themselves from death via probabilistic thinking, its salience at a conscious level of awareness (mentioning death without being prompted) serves to elicit such purposeful distancing. That there was a relationship between the Risk-Seeking factor scores and death anxiety as measured by the DAS-E reflects a reduction of concern about the potential outcomes of being seriously or mortally injured via a particular behavior through the use of probabilistic thinking as a means of distancing an individual from death. Similarly, PTS Risking-Seeking factor scores were negatively related to the Separation/Isolation subscale of the ISB, again reflecting the adaptive role of PT in reducing death anxiety, wherein probabilistic thinking serves an adaptive role in lessening the use of denial. Factor scores on PTS Willful Neglect (where probability is ignored) were positively related to Others’ Dying subscale of the Revised Collett-Lester scale. This again suggests that probabilistic thinkers may minimize the potential of themselves being injured, versus the same situations where others may be more likely to be harmed. PTS Willful Neglect subscale factor scores also were positively related

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(indicating greater denial) to the Separation/Isolation subscale of the ISB. This could suggest that probabilistic thinkers ignore the odds of their own death and the associated consequences it brings in separating them permanently from loved ones. While this may be adaptive for them, the impact of engaging in risky behaviors may have dire consequences for others who must cope with the outcomes of, for example, DWIs or contracting HIV/AIDS through drug use or a lack of protected sex. Overall, these findings suggest that the greater use of probabilistic thinking is related to either lessened death anxiety or a greater tolerance for anxiety (i.e., lessened denial) about death. In either case, greater such thinking is adaptive, consistent with predictions made on the basis of TMT. That we found no relationship between either PTS scores or PTS factor scores and repression-sensitization scores suggests that probabilistic thinking is a coping mechanism specific to death, and not reflective of a general tendency to repress one’s feelings about experiences or events that are either threatening or aversive in nature. From a scale development perspective, findings here suggest that the PTS is internally consistent and multifactorial in nature, where Risk Repression and Risk Seeking are positively related. This indicates that perceptions of risk vary along a continuum of certainty and/or risk to self versus another. In contrast, the negative relationship between Willful Neglect and the remaining factors of the PTS suggests that preventative behavioral/attitudinal manifestations underscoring risktaking are to an extent reflective of ignoring probability when making decisions versus allowing probability to influence such decisions. Interestingly, such tendencies correlated positively with age, suggesting that older persons are less influenced by probability in thinking about their own deaths. This may reflect a fatalistic perception of death given the greater life experiences involving loss and/or illness among such persons (i.e., two things one cannot control—death and taxes) or an acceptance of the inevitability of death in later life (see Hayslip, 2003). Our data also suggest that the PTS possesses discriminant validity in being sensitive to age effects, paralleling other findings by Hayslip (1981) and Hayslip et al. (1981) which found age differences in overt and covert death anxiety. This is consistent with the assumption that there should be a corresponding increase in probabilistic thinking if it acts as a defense mechanism to distance the individual from death anxiety. In this respect, younger adults reported a higher degree of probabilistic thinking, while older individuals (older than 40 years) reported less probabilistic thinking. The correlations between PTS scores associated with Risk Repression and Risk Seeking and age were negative, with the exception of Willful Neglect, when controlling for prior death experiences and social desirability. This is consistent with death anxiety research in that age and conscious death fear are negatively related (Hayslip, 2003). We also found gender differences with men using more probabilistic thinking than their female counterparts, consistent with earlier work on gender and risky behavior (Hirschberger et al., 2002).

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Clinically, one could utilize probabilistic thinking as a tool to screen persons whose thinking puts them at risk for engaging in risky behaviors that may be personally harmful to them or others. Indeed, as Shneidman (1973, 1983) has discussed, many everyday behaviors have a self-destructive component to them, and thus, willingly “playing the odds,” for example, driving without a seatbelt, crossing a busy street against the light (see Kastenbaum, 2009b), binge drinking, not taking one’s medication, or eating sweets having diabetes, reflect the tendency or underestimate the odds of harmful consequences to oneself on either a shortterm or a long-term basis, when one behaves in potentially self-destructive ways. In that the PTS is multidimensional, this could more precisely inform the clinician in addressing the nature of harm to clients engaging in risky behaviors that could lead to detrimental consequences to them and/or to those they love. That younger persons and/or males are more likely to engage in probabilistic thinking as a defense against harm to themselves suggests that they may be especially at risk in this respect. In this manner, future work utilizing the PTS could profitably explore its ability to predict such risky behaviors (e.g., smoking, not wearing sunscreen, drug use, driving under the influence of drugs or alcohol, speeding, or condom use). LIMITATIONS OF THE PRESENT STUDY There are several limitations to consider here. While age and gender differences were fairly robust, relationships between PTS scores and death anxiety were not, though they were reliably different from zero. This likely reflects the multidimensional nature of death fear (for a review, see Hayslip, 2003; Neimeyer, Moser, & Wittkowski, 2003). Future research should replicate the findings here with a new sample and/or with samples from other cultures to determine if probabilistic thinking is a culturally dependent construct, where cultures that use probabilistic thinking as a death anxiety buffer and which are death denying could be compared to other cultures that are death accepting (Hayslip, 2003). It is also of note that there might have been a potential priming effect in the ordering of the measures used here; that is, directly preceding the 70 items in the Probabilistic Thinking Scale item pool was the question of recent death experiences and the ISB. This priming could have activated the probabilistic thinking buffer as per the mortality salience hypothesis (Burke, Martens, & Faucher, 2010). Future work should vary the sequencing of scales to confirm or refute this potential priming effect. Additionally, future research should also specifically address levels of probabilistic thinking before and/or after a mortality salience prime and control priming techniques (see Hayes, Schimel, Arndt, & Faucher, 2010, for a review) to assess the role of PT in either moderating such effects or being influenced by them. If there is an increase in probabilistic thinking for individuals who are exposed to a death reminder compared to a neutral prime, this could be strong evidence for the viability of this death buffer. It must also be pointed out that PT

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might be one of many manifestations of the TMT stance on buffering, thus helping account for the relatively low, but consistent, relationships found here between PT and measures of death anxiety. While it is still not widely understood why individuals will place themselves in situations that could result in serious harm or death, that persons engage in probabilistic thinking could potentially help explain such behavior via persons being able to distance themselves from the likelihood of death. It should be pointed out that although probabilistic thinking could act as a buffer to keep death anxiety at bay, its overuse could also lead to behaviors which are harmful or deathenhancing; this may reflect the Willful Neglect component of PTS. If there is a 40% chance of thunderstorms, would you carry an umbrella?

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