Risk Analysis, Vol. 34, No. 7, 2014

DOI: 10.1111/risa.12173

Strengthening Safety Compliance in Nuclear Power Operations: A Role-Based Approach 1,∗ ´ ´ Tomas, ´ 1 and Jose´ M. Peiro´ 1,2 Mario Mart´ınez-Corcoles, Francisco J. Gracia,1 Ines

Safety compliance is of paramount importance in guaranteeing the safe running of nuclear power plants. However, it depends mostly on procedures that do not always involve the safest outcomes. This article introduces an empirical model based on the organizational role theory to analyze the influence of legitimate sources of expectations (procedures formalization and leadership) on workers’ compliance behaviors. The sample was composed of 495 employees from two Spanish nuclear power plants. Structural equation analysis showed that, in spite of some problematic effects of proceduralization (such as role conflict and role ambiguity), procedure formalization along with an empowering leadership style lead to safety compliance by clarifying a worker’s role in safety. Implications of these findings for safety research are outlined, as well as their practical implications. KEY WORDS: Leadership; nuclear safety; role theory; safety performance; safety procedures

1. INTRODUCTION

provised behaviors that can jeopardize safety.(3) At the same time, it is not difficult to find studies in the safety literature suggesting that compliance alone does not guarantee safe results(3–6) because compliance in complex and dynamic environments depends mostly on rules and procedures that may be unclear, contradictory, complex, confusing, incomplete, or inadequate (nonapplicable) for existing situational constraints. This article aims to: (1) explore the link between procedures formalization and compliance with these procedures by analyzing the pros and cons of proceduralization and (2) propose a leadership style that counteracts the associated negative effects of procedures, enabling them to achieve the results for which they are designed. To do so, this article tests an empirical model (see Fig. 1) based on organizational role theory (ORT),(7) in which procedures formalization and leadership are considered two legitimate and influential sources of expectations that indicate to workers what is expected of them. Specifically, this model hypothesizes that procedures formalization and an empowering leadership (EL)

In spite of its reliability, the nuclear industry continues to be the most dangerous industrial sector as far as potential accident consequences are concerned. Just a single severe accident at one of the 437 fission reactors worldwide could have adverse effects on entire continents over several generations.(1) Nuclear power plants (NPPs) are complex technological systems involving very specific detailed procedures, where command and control and compliance monitoring continue to be the principal features.(2) Rules and procedures serve as comforting guidelines when the course of operation is not easy to find or is too controversial, and compliance with these procedures offers protection from arbitrary orders or im1 Research

Institute on Personnel Psychology, Organizational Development, and Quality of Working Life (IDOCAL), University of Valencia, Spain. 2 Valencian Institute of Economic Research, Spain. ∗ Address correspondence to Mario Mart´ınez-Corcoles, ´ Department of Social Psychology, Faculty of Psychology, Autonomous University of Barcelona, 08193 Bellaterra (Barcelona), Spain; [email protected].

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C 2014 Society for Risk Analysis 0272-4332/14/0100-1257$22.00/1 

´ Mart´ınez-Corcoles et al.

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Procedures formalization Safety Role clarity

compliance

Empowering leadership Fig. 1. Hypothesized model.

style provide workers with role clarity, which leads them to proper safety compliance.

1.1. Safety Compliance Consistent with the distinction between task performance and contextual performance,(8) researchers have identified two types of safety-related behaviors. Safety compliance(9) is analogous to task performance, and it refers to adhering to standard work procedures, wearing personal protective equipment, and reporting incidents. Safety compliance encompasses behaviors that are required or expected as part of the obligations and responsibilities of the assigned role, in other words, intrarole behaviors(7) related to safety. Safety participation is analogous to contextual performance, and it focuses on discretionary, extra-role, and self-directed behaviors that go beyond prescribed safety precautions and make the workplace safer, an example of which would be volunteering to perform safety audits. Although both types of behaviors are linked to a lower number of accidents and injuries,(10) safety compliance is still considered (especially for practitioners) the basis for achieving good safety results.(11) However, there is more to safety compliance than meets the eye. Whereas safety participation is increasingly seen as an enhancer of safety operations,(12) the functionality of safety compliance has been questioned in recent years. In fact, there are two strong, but conflicting, safety views. On the one hand, the traditional view assumes that the increasing standardization of individual, group, and organizational behaviors leads to higher predictability of safe outcomes. Therefore, managers have defended

the adoption of strict compliance based on the argument that if procedures or rules are not strictly followed, workers could easily fall into deviant practices that can lead to catastrophic consequences. On the other hand, according to recent research, safety compliance alone is not sufficient to ensure the best possible safety levels, and it has even been considered dangerous under certain special or unexpected circumstances. This perspective argues that any complex system susceptible to unpredictability and uncertainty should accept “necessary deviations” or “make adjustments” to the rules and procedures in order to manage a given situation, while being as resilient as possible.(13) This latter approach has gradually been adopted to some degree by the nuclear industry in recent years. Thus, proper safety compliance currently implies more than just blindly carrying out procedures, but also understanding the reasoning behind them, thinking through situations where exceptions are needed,(14) questioning those procedures or behaviors that can put safety at risk,(15) and immediately reporting procedures that would lead to undesired outcomes, as well as necessary deviations made in order to maintain normal operations. Important safety researchers in the social sciences claim that compliance “can only be described with regard to a social context in which behavior is governed by operating procedures, codes of practices and the like.”(1) It is important to remember that high-reliability organizations are complex sociotechnical systems (not only technical) where individuals behave within a social system while interacting with technology. In the social environment of an organization, sources of influence are tailored, transmitted, and perceived by workers who finally make decisions about their own behavior.(16) The present article uses

Strengthening Safety Compliance in Nuclear Power Operations ORT as a theoretical framework in order to better understand how the different influences operate and how they are perceived by individuals who make decisions about whether or not to show compliance.

1.2. ORT as a Theoretical Framework to Understand the Relation Between Procedures, Leadership, and Safety Compliance ORT is a psychosocial perspective that explains how workers accept and enact specific roles related to the position they occupy in the organization. A work role is traditionally defined as a set of behaviors expected from an employee (role occupant) who occupies a certain position. These behaviors are assigned and conferred by the firm and adopted by each individual employee in order for an organization to function effectively as a goal-oriented social entity. The origins and development of the work role can be traced back to the work of Katz and Kahn,(7) who stated that the assignment of work roles prescribes the behavior that employees are expected to comply with, so that they are able to perform their specified tasks and duties effectively. As a social entity, an organization comprises a nexus of distinct functional groups of employees who have specific work roles to enact. These functional groups help to define a “roleset” for the role occupant, which is an assortment of individuals (leader/s, teamwork colleagues, colleagues from other units, subordinates, etc.) that determines the specific role behaviors the role occupant is expected to enact.(7) Therefore, the organization itself and the different parts of the role-set behave as sources of emitted expectations, and the work role enacted by the occupant will depend largely on these expectations, as well as on the role occupant’s own expectations.(17–19) For effective and efficient organizational functioning, the array of roles must be effectively communicated, fully understood, and accepted by the employees.(7) In order to fit the role expected and then enacted, ORT provides a dynamic review process known as role episodes, in which interactions between the role occupant and the role emitters help to offer performance feedback to the role occupant and make adjustments to possible variations between expected and enacted behaviors. Following Wickham and Parker,(20) the role episode review process is underpinned by four subprocesses: (1) an employee will “take” or accept a role that is conferred on him/her by the organization and its members (the role tak-

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ing process); (2) there will be a consensus about the expectations for all the roles (the role consensus process), in which employers and employees hold common norms and values that give rise to consistency in expectations and behavior;(21) (3) employees will comply with the behavior that is expected of them (the role compliance process); and (4) role conflict will arise if expectations are not consensual (the role conflict process), and role ambiguity will occur if expectations are insufficient or not clearly defined. In order to operate nuclear facilities safely, electrical companies need to be sure that the expectations for the role are clear and well defined, so that workers know what, when, and how to proceed. For that purpose, they formalize the way things must be done by elaborating procedures. Undoubtedly, compliance with procedures is an essential part of any safety system designed to prevent accidents and achieve safety. At the same time, this compliance may be unsuitable and jeopardize the normal system operations if procedures are followed without detecting (or reporting) their possible deficiencies(22) (i.e., inaccurate, incomplete, or complex procedures) until it is too late. In the following section and under the umbrella of ORT, we will discuss the functionalitydysfunctionality of procedures as a legitimate source of expectations. 1.3. Procedures Formalization: A Role-Based Approach Procedures formalization is absolutely necessary in the nuclear industry for two main reasons. First of all, from a contextual approach, political decisions about nuclear energy could depend on the popular response. Public opinion about nuclear power really matters, and governing authorities require a demonstration of safety in the form of legal requirements for operating procedures in nuclear facilities.(6) Second, at the plant level, procedures help employees to guide and control their tasks in a planned way; at the same time, they avoid placing an excessive workload on employees due to new and complex technology (i.e., fatigue, anxiety, etc.).(3) Without procedures, employees would have to create a “freestyle in real time” experience-based strategy, susceptible to producing latent errors3 or even direct fatal consequences. Moreover, procedures draw attention 3 Based

on Ramanujam and Goodman’s concept of latent errors,(23) we understand risky behavior to be a deviation from

1260 to deviations, preventing the normalization of deviance, where deviations could become accepted as normal tasks in the daily work. Within facilities, proceduralization is the most influential source of expectations transmitted by the company. Procedures have a high level of legitimacy4 because their approval depends mostly on relevantspecialized entities, such as suppliers of technology, regulatory bodies, and/or the company itself. A procedure is defined as a set of explicit and written expectations about how to behave in response to predicted situations in order to achieve the required level of safety outcomes. That is, procedures have the function of communicating to workers how they have to behave in certain circumstances, or in other words, what role they must play in order to maintain a safe operation. Thus, procedures are transmitters of the role expected, and they are designed to reduce uncertainty about the role the worker should enact.

1.3.1. Procedures Formalization as a Source of Role Clarity As mentioned above, a procedure is an emitter of the role expected. The formalization of that procedure is, hence, the degree of accuracy with which that role is emitted (e.g., accessiblenonaccessible for the role occupant, clear-unclear, updated-outdated, etc.), in order to clarify the worker’s role and achieve the goal for which it was designed: compliance. Therefore, if compliance with safety procedures is expected, procedures must be as accessible to the user,(24) clear, and updated as possible. Several authors have theoretically shown that procedures formalization is essential to clarifying the worker’s role and minimizing conflict. For example, Scott(25) pointed out that procedures formalization has an important effect on role clarity through its capacity to regulate the work, deal with the division of labor, and clearly present the expectations to job incumbents. Rogers and Molnar(26) suggested that formalization of norms and procedures clarifies expectations, minimizing conflict and ambiguity. Following Kirkhaug,(27) the purpose of procedures standard organizational practices, procedures, and expectations that does not always produce direct and immediate adverse consequences and can lead to efficient (but not necessarily safe) outcomes. 4 Peiro ´ (18) argues that the legitimacy of the emission sources is relevant in determining the effectiveness of expectations.

´ Mart´ınez-Corcoles et al. formalization is to reduce the possibility of being exposed to conflicting demands and misunderstandings that could reduce efficiency and safety readiness. Unfortunately, these assertions have not been framed within a broader theoretical context, such as the one provided by ORT. Similarly, there are no available studies that shed empirical light on the gap between procedures formalization and its compliance, and this is precisely what we pursue in our first hypothesis. Following the ORT approach, procedures formalization contribute to creating role clarity based on more than just its legitimate nature, since the role occupant could misunderstand or misinterpret the information, as we will see in the next section. Procedures emit expectations in written and explicit forms, which also means that all employees can access them easily. Because of their explicitness and availability, procedures are known by all the role-set members, which will force a certain consensus in the expectations emitted by different parts of the role-set. This consensus will amplify the clarity of the role expected and, hence, increase the fit between the role expected (comply with the procedures) and the role enacted. Therefore, the clarity of the expectations transmitted (written and explicit), along with the consensus between the role-set parts, will increase the probability of the role occupant’s safety compliance. Based on this argument, the first hypothesis is the following. H1: Role clarity will mediate the relationship between procedures formalization and safety compliance. Specifically, the more procedures formalization there is, the more role clarity there will be, and the more safety compliance will take place. 1.3.2. Procedures Formalization as a “Double-Edged Sword” It is difficult to imagine normal daily operations in NPPs without adequate, clear, and updated procedures, but at the same time we cannot ignore the limitations involved in procedures as transmitters of information (expectations). Although it is true that formalization of organizational behavior clarifies roles and minimizes conflict in complex environments, it is also true that it can bring problematic associated effects, which are paradoxically the opposite ones: role conflict, role ambiguity, and progressive latent loss of resilience.

Strengthening Safety Compliance in Nuclear Power Operations 1.3.2.1. Proceduralization and role conflict. Role conflict occurs when the role occupant feels that he/she is faced with incompatible or conflicting expectations.(28) Rizzo and colleagues(29) identified two main types of role conflict based on perceptions of inconsistent demands by one or more external sources. (1) Intrasender conflict, when the expectations of a sole role emitter are conflicting or incongruent. A good example of this is the “additive safety” effect of procedures.(30) Along with technological advances and newly reported events, there is a constant need to introduce new procedures. Thus, they are continually being updated to address changing working conditions and new equipment. These complex technological systems contain numerous procedures, as safety solutions tend to be additive over time, producing more rules and procedures. Additive safety implies that the probability of finding conflicting, inconsistent, “not matching,” or outdated procedures is very high. (2) Intersender conflict occurs when inconsistent demands are made on the role occupant by different sources or emitters. This conflict is greater if the sources are legitimate because if multiple sources of direction do not emit the same expectations, they tend to create incongruence and inconsistency about organizational means and goals.(28,31) An example of this would be when following procedures is emphasized within the company, while an immediate supervisor takes shortcuts to avoid wasting time following the procedures. In this case, different sources of expectations (i.e., procedures and leader) do not match regarding the role expected (the company expects the “be safe” role, whereas the leader emphasizes the “be fast and productive” role).

1.3.2.2. Proceduralization and role ambiguity. The absence of clarity or “role ambiguity” is defined as the discrepancy between the information provided to the worker and the information required for adequate performance of his/her role.(7,18) This situation occurs if the role occupant lacks adequate rolerelevant information, as in the case where information is restricted or when role expectations are not clearly defined. Although procedures are designed to reduce uncertainty, they also have the capacity to increase it. Procedures that are not clearly stated or sufficiently detailed or the lack of procedures for new scenarios can contribute considerably to role ambiguity. For example, operators in the Fukushima Daiichi plant faced ambiguity when Tepco’s abnormal

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operating procedures did not address the possibility of a prolonged, total loss of power at the nuclear facility. When onsite workers referred to the severe accident guide, the answers they were looking for simply were not there.(32) 1.3.2.3. Proceduralization and progressive latent loss of resilience. Following procedures is crucial for maintaining normal operation within the established limits, but it is important to mention that the safest decisions do not always have to do with strict adherence. Although severe accident management guidelines are available even under core damage accidents, there are still special cases (obviously not specified on the procedures, as they are unpredictable) in which individuals are forced to depart from procedures or do whatever they think is suitable in order to maintain or reestablish core reactor control with the least possible consequences for the population and workers. But even under these special circumstances where workers need to be independent from obsolete procedures and improvise solutions, procedures have already created a latent negative effect on individuals that has been incubated during the previous periods of normal operation, limiting the current workers’ adaptability when the unexpected appears. In other words, procedures formalization itself gives a false sense of safety when circumstances are going as expected. Their clear description or continual revision, along with safe running over time, creates the arrogance of optimism(26) or the absolute nuclear safety myth,(32,33) which keeps individuals from looking for “what-if” situations and formulating new unforeseen scenarios.(34) This fact often leads to task routinization, with a progressive loss of safety system knowledge, awareness, creativity, proactivity, and adaptability during possible unexpected situations. Therefore, proceduralization is clearly a doubleedge sword. On the one hand, it seems that today’s emphasis on the use of procedures is, in fact, a threat to making new progress in safety(3) for the reasons mentioned above. On the other hand, procedures provide clarity and have public/safety benefits in high-reliability organizations (see the reasons mentioned in Section 1.3 for the nuclear industry in particular). Considering both the advantages and disadvantages, the question should go beyond whether proceduralization is desirable or should be avoided, by being more pragmatic: How can the negative effects of proceduralization be reduced? This

1262 question remains open and has not yet been empirically studied.

´ Mart´ınez-Corcoles et al. proposed as an optimal leadership style for these purposes. 1.4.1. Empowering Leadership

1.4. Leadership: A Role-Based Approach As mentioned above, workers are not only influenced by procedures formalization as a source of expectations (in spite of its relevance), but they are also involved in a role-set composed mainly of their colleagues and their leader. This argument finds support in the safety field from Simard and Marchand’s findings.(35) These authors found that rules and procedures compliance in the manufacturing industry were best predicted by good social relations in the work group (colleagues) and a participative leadership style. Although colleagues’ expectations are relevant, if we take into account the source’s legitimacy, the power of expectations emitted by direct leaders resides in the fact that they represent the organization in terms of implementing what the organization enacts (in this case, procedures). Following this argument, leaders are in the position of contributing to role clarification when procedures cause role conflict (i.e., procedures are inconsistent or contradictory), or even when other informal role emitters, such as other team members’ expectations, differ from procedures. Furthermore, leaders are in the position of contributing to role clarification when there is role ambiguity caused by outdated procedures (e.g., procedures that do not take into account recent design modifications) or a lack of procedures specification to cope with contingencies or new or unforeseen situations. Therefore, a leadership style should be introduced that can significantly complement procedures formalization as a powerful legitimate source of expectations, with the aim of reducing its limitations as much as possible and achieving role clarity. Safety compliance does not necessarily mean workers cannot be autonomous in analyzing each situation, thinking, and reporting (or correcting) when procedures are inadequate or insufficient. Leaders should increase the team’s autonomy, foster open communication, and develop a questioning attitude among their followers, beyond leading members to strict compliance with procedures through command and control forms. Furthermore, leaders should inform workers about safety topics, show concern about their employees’ misunderstandings, and encourage employees to participate in safety issues collaboratively.(12,36,37) In the next section, EL is

Empirical findings in safety research have shown that leadership constitutes one of the strongest factors affecting organizational safety performance. Many of these studies focus on well-known leadership approaches, namely, leader-member exchange (LMX)(38,39) and transformational leadership,(40,41) and they have been applied to several industrial sectors, such as manufacturing, metal processing, construction, or food service.(42,43) Within the nuclear field, empirical research about leadership and its relationship with safety performance is scarce. Several years ago, participative management (communicating and giving feedback to subordinates) was found to be positively associated with safety performance.(44) More recently, according to Flin and Yule,(45) leadership techniques like stimulating, individually considering, and rewarding styles were found to foster leaders’ impact on workers’ safety behaviors. As far as the impact of the EL style in NPPs is concerned, three very recent studies reveal its potential positive influence on safety performance.(12,36,37) The first study(36) assessed the impact of an EL style on employees’ perceived safety behavior, and the authors found that the empowering behavior of leaders (i.e., leading by example, participative decision making, interacting with employees, etc.) enhances perceived safety behaviors through the influence on safety climate. Moreover, these authors showed that empowering leaders positively influence employees’ safety climate, both in strong and weak safety cultures. However, the effect of this relationship was different depending on the strength of the safety culture. Surprisingly, the positive relationship was greater under weak safety culture conditions. However, better safety results were obtained when this leadership was embedded within a strong safety culture. The second study(12) tested the link between EL and safety participation behaviors, and the findings showed that safety participation was fostered by collaborative learning created by empowering leaders in their teamwork. At the same time, the results showed that empowering leaders create collaborative learning not only directly, but also by promoting dialogue and open communication in their work groups. Finally, the third and most recent study,(37) using a multilevel methodology, revealed that EL (at the group level) directly

Strengthening Safety Compliance in Nuclear Power Operations influences three different safety performance behaviors: a negative effect on risky behaviors, and a positive effect on both safety compliance and safety participation. Taking into account the potential positive influence of EL on safety performance within the nuclear industry, our attention was drawn to the same EL model used in the three aforementioned studies. Developed by Arnold et al.,(46) this leadership model claims that the main function of a leader is to increase the team’s potential for self-management. The authors distinguish five dimensions corresponding to different behaviors that empowering leaders should show. “Leading by example” refers to a set of behaviors that demonstrate the leader’s commitment to his/her own work, as well as to the work of his/her members. The leader serves as a role model and stands up for what he/she thinks is the right way to perform the job. “Participative decision making” refers to the leader’s use of members’ inputs in decisionmaking. The leader’s behavioral repertoire may range from delegating decisions to his/her team members to encouraging them to express their ideas and opinions. Tjosvold(47) found that members of a flight crew performed more effectively in risky situations when team members were motivated by their leaders to contribute to team performance with their ideas. “Coaching” is another relevant dimension. It involves the ability of leaders to encourage their team members to solve problems in a self-managed way, thereby providing members with opportunities to share and increase their knowledge. It has been shown that as team knowledge increases, the propensity to engage in risk-taking behaviors decreases.(48) The fourth dimension is “informing.” It refers to the dissemination of information by leaders, such as information about the organization’s mission or philosophy or other important information. Finally, “showing concern/interacting with employees” focuses on behaviors such as taking time to discuss members’ concerns or showing concern for their welfare. Katsva and Condrey(49) highlighted individual treatment and feedback as crucial to obtaining good safety outcomes in NPPs. Although the EL style was originally composed of five different dimensions, other dimensional structures have been studied due to the high correlations detected among the five dimensions by the authors. For instance, a one-dimensional model encompassing the five dimensions was recently chosen as the best dimensional model, using an adapted scale.(36)

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Ensuring clear descriptions of expected performance is not a new function of leaders, and it includes traditional supervisory behaviors, such as clarifying what is to be accomplished and how it is to be done.(50) However, the way leaders perform these behaviors is what determines the leadership style and performance results. Using a transactional style, leaders would mainly use punishment and positive rewards (especially feedback) to delimit what has to be done. Feedback is the process through which individuals receive guidance about previous behaviors, and it can be a way to communicate clear and direct information about the performance of work roles.(51) From an empowering perspective, leaders would not limit their behaviors to providing positive feedback and punishment in order to drive individuals’ role behavior. Instead, empowering leaders also use bottom-up and topdown interactions, providing opportunities for workers to feel free to question deficiencies or inconsistencies they detect. Alternatively, workers receive additional crucial information and exchange contradictory or ambiguous information with leaders. Furthermore, empowering leaders encourage members to participate in decisionmaking and work in a collaborative way on safety concerns.(12) These interactions among leader-member/s and among team members will provide workers with alignment or consensus among the different sources of expectations. Furthermore, individuals who are allowed to participate in the decision-making process and work collaboratively achieve increased role clarity through perceived empowerment, control, and legitimacy.(19) Accordingly, this leadership style allows individuals to retrieve information that is unperceived, misunderstood, or contradictory, while obtaining crucial information input in role episodes that is needed to clarify their roles through their leader and their colleagues. When empowering leaders enhance workers’ participation in understanding and making sense of the procedures formally required (even with the goal of improving them), workers will clarify their roles about what is expected of them and be willing to comply with safety procedures. Thus, this argument leads us to our second hypothesis: H2: Role clarity will mediate the relation between EL and safety compliance. Specifically, the more EL there is, the more role clarity there will be, and the more safety compliance will take place.

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1264 2. METHOD 2.1. Participants and Procedure Our sample was composed of 495 workers from two NPPs. Data were collected in March 2011. A response rate of 65.1% was obtained. All responsibility levels and functional areas in the nuclear facility were included. Within our sample, 3% of the respondents are younger than 30 years old, 18% are between 30 and 45 years old, and 79% are over 45. In addition, 47.3% of the respondents hold a university degree. The questionnaire was administered in the workplace as part of a set of questionnaires to evaluate safety culture. The time usually required to fill out the questionnaires was about 30 minutes. Participation was voluntary and took place during work time. Anonymity and confidentiality were guaranteed. Data were collected in sessions where a group of participants completed the questionnaires individually. In all sessions, the researchers explained the objectives of the research, and they were available to immediately answer any questions raised by the employees.

2.2. Measures 2.2.1. Procedures Formalization We used the following three items with a fivepoint Likert response scale ranging from 1 (completely disagree) to 5 (completely agree): “The procedures we have to follow to do our work are updated,” “The procedures we have to follow to do our work are clearly drafted,” or “The procedures we have to follow to do our work are sufficiently detailed.” Items were developed by our research team. Internal consistency reliability for the present scale was 0.88.

5 (always) was used. Items covered the five dimensions of the theoretical construct proposed by Arnold et al.(46) Three items corresponded to “leading by example,” three items to “participative decision making,” four items to “coaching,” four items to “informing,” and three items to “showing concern/interacting with employees.” Sample items assessing leadership include: my immediate boss “sets high standards for safety performance through his/her own behavior,” “encourages work group members to express ideas/suggestions,” or “pays attention to my work group’s efforts.” Internal consistency reliability for the scale was 0.98. 2.2.3. Role Clarity Four items from the role ambiguity scale(29) were selected. A five-point Likert scale ranging from 1 (completely disagree) to 5 (completely agree) was used. Items include: “I know exactly what is expected of me,” “I know how to do my work,” “I know what my responsibilities are,” and “Clearly planned goals and objectives exist for my work.” Internal consistency reliability for the scale was 0.81. 2.2.4. Safety Compliance In order to measure compliance with safety rules and procedures, the original scale by Neal and Griffin(52) was used. The scale consists of three items, with a five-point Likert response scale ranging from 1 (completely disagree) to 5 (completely agree). Scale items were: “I use all the necessary safety equipment to do my job,” “I use the correct safety procedures for performing my job,” and “I ensure the highest levels of safety when I do my job.” Internal consistency reliability for the scale was 0.88. 2.3. Analyses

2.2.2. Empowering Leadership An adaptation of the “Empowering Leadership Questionnaire (ELQ)”(46) was considered onedimensional, as a one-dimensional model was recently chosen as the best factor solution in previous safety research(36) using the same scale. The scale consisted of a total of 17 items, after omitting some items from the original scale to adapt to time constraints (the original scale contains 38 items). A fivepoint Likert response scale ranging from 1 (never) to

The first step in the data analysis was to test the factorial structure of the scales used in our sample in order to obtain evidence of their validity. To that end, we performed two confirmatory factor analyses (CFA) using LISREL 8.80.(53) Robust maximum likelihood (ML) was used to estimate model parameters (as the large number of items involved and the sample size did not allow us to use weighted least square estimation). Considering the ordinal nature of the variables, both the polychoric correlations matrix

Strengthening Safety Compliance in Nuclear Power Operations

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Procedures formalization Safety Role clarity

compliance

Empowering leadership Fig. 2. Direct and indirect (mediated) paths between variables, following Baron and Kenny’s procedure.(54)

and the asymptotic covariances matrix were used as input for the analyses. The scales were included in the same battery of questionnaires (participants responded to the scales sequentially and immediately), and the method used was the same for all respondents. Therefore, we first conducted a CFA using the four scales together. The Empowering Leadership Scale (adapted from Arnold et al.)(46) was introduced as one dimensional, as mentioned above. Procedures formalization, role clarity, and safety compliance were also introduced as one-dimensional scales. Second, we examined the possibility that a single factor could emerge for all four constructs, taking into account that common variance could inflate the associations among the study variables (all of them were obtained by means of self-reports). To explore this possibility, we conducted a second CFA in which all the items in the four variables loaded in a single factor. Thus, a Harman Single Factor test was carried out using the CFA method.(54) Its basic assumption is that if a substantial amount of common method variance is present, either a single factor will emerge from the factor analysis or one general factor will account for the majority of the covariance among the measures, with all items loading in this single factor. In order to assess the fit of the models, we examined the RMSEA (root mean square error of approximation), CFI (comparative fit index), and NNFI (nonnormed fit index). The interpretation of these indexes is the following: RMSEA 0.90 = acceptable model, and >0.95 = excellent model;(57) and NNFI >0.90 = acceptable model, and >0.95 = excellent model.(57) In order to test differences between models and decide which one presents a better fit, a modeling rationale was considered. Some criteria have been proposed in the literature to interpret differences in practical fit indices based on

modeling rationale criteria. Thus, for example, differences not larger than 0.01 between NNFI and CFI values (NNFI and CFI) are considered an indication of negligible practical differences.(58,59) Chen(60) suggested that when the RMSEA increases by less than 0.015, one can also claim support for the more constrained (parsimonious) model. Finally, with the purpose of providing support for our hypotheses, we executed a structural equation model with the observed variables by using LISREL 8.80.(53) As we were introducing continuous variables, we used the ML method to estimate the model parameters. All variables assumed normal distribution; thus, we used a Pearson correlation matrix as input for the analysis. We also employed the RMSEA, CFI, and NNFI indexes to determine the fit for the model. The interpretation of the goodnessof- fit indexes was the same as in the CFA. In order to assess the nature of the mediations (total or partial), we followed Baron and Kenny’s procedure,(61) which points out that when a previous significant direct relationship from independent variable to dependent variable (direct effects) is considerably reduced when indirect effects (mediated effects) are controlled, the mediation is partial. When this relationship is no longer significant, the mediation is full. For this reason, both direct and indirect (mediated) effects were tested (see Fig. 2).

3. RESULTS Table I presents descriptive statistics and Pearson correlations(62) for all measures. In general, the participants reported high scores for EL (M = 3.52, SD = 0.97), procedures formalization (M = 4.00, SD = 0.77), role clarity (M = 4.28, SD = 0.63), and safety compliance (M = 4.56, SD = 0.60). Pearson

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1266 Table I. Descriptive Statistics, Cronbach’s Alpha, and Intercorrelations Between Study Variables Factor 1. Procedures formalization 2. Empowering leadership 3. Role clarity 4. Safety compliance

M

SD

1

2

4.00

0.77

–

3.52

0.97

0.33*

–

4.28 4.56

0.63 0.60

0.45* 0.37*

0.44* 0.32*

(four factors), in which the study variables were considered different constructs.

3

4

3.2. Structural Equation Model

– 0.43*

–

*p < 0.01.

correlations revealed positive relations among all the variables (p < 0.01).

3.1. Confirmatory Factor Analyses Two confirmatory factor analyses were performed: a four-factor model (one factor for each scale) and a single-factor model (associated with all the items on the four scales). The four-factor model provided an excellent fit (χ 2 = 1097.185, df = 318, p < 0.01; RMSEA = 0.073; CFI = 0.979; NNFI = 0.983), and all parameters estimated were statistically significant (p < 0.05). Results indicated that each item saturated in its corresponding scale. The fit of the single-factor model was not as good (χ 2 = 3126.281, df = 324, p < 0.01; RMSEA = 0.138; CFI = 0.940; NNFI = 0.941). The incremental fit indices indicated significant differences between the two tested models on the NNFI, CFI, and RMSEA indexes. All the goodness-of-fit indexes are satisfactory for the four-factor model, whereas the single-factor model shows a poor fit to data (cut-off values in RMSEA are not reached). In sum, a single-factor model did not explain our data as well as the predicted model

The structural equation analysis performed to test the proposed model revealed an excellent fit (χ 2 = 1.851, df = 1, p < 0.01; RMSEA = 0.043; CFI = 0.998; NNFI = 0.987). All the estimated parameters were statistically significant (p < 0.01) and showed the expected sign, except the path from EL to safety compliance, which was not significant. According to Baron and Kenny’s method,(61) nonsignificant paths between the independent variables (procedures formalization and EL) and the dependent variable (safety compliance) indicate full mediation (of role clarity). In contrast, significant paths show partial mediation. Thus, whereas the significant path between procedures formalization and safety compliance results in a partial mediation of role clarity between these two variables, a nonsignificant path from EL to safety compliance shows the full mediation of role clarity between these two variables. Paths between variables and standardized parameters for the model are presented in Fig. 3. Results indicated that the two hypotheses were clearly confirmed. Workers’ safety compliance is enhanced when they are clear about the expectations transmitted by both procedures formalization and empowering leaders. Role clarity mediated (partially) the relationship between procedures formalization and safety compliance (Hypothesis 1). At the same time, role clarity turned out to be a full mediator in the relationship between EL and employees’ safety compliance (Hypothesis 2). The partial mediation (Hypothesis 1) showed that procedures formalization also positively predicts its own compliance

Procedures

.29**

formalization .46**

.36**

Safety

Role clarity compliance

.12**

Empowering leadership Fig. 3. Paths between variables and standardized parameters. **p < 0.01.

.05

Strengthening Safety Compliance in Nuclear Power Operations directly, which means that role clarity is not necessarily an absolute precondition for individuals’ compliance. 4. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS Using ORT as the theoretical framework, the present article was designed to test the effects of two very influential sources of expectations (procedures formalization and leadership) on safety compliance within the nuclear field. ORT has also enabled us to explore the negative side of procedures formalization from a role-based approach. The results obtained could have important implications for safety research in three different ways. First, the ORT approach enabled us to explore the antecedents of safety compliance and create an integrated model using the role theory rationale. To our knowledge, no studies have used this approach to study safety compliance (intrarole safety behaviors), and the present study could provide new insights about the study of intrarole/extra-role behaviors related to safety in high-risk organizations. Second, role clarity plays a key role as a predominant antecedent of safety compliance. This finding is in line with previous studies that support the positive impact of role clarity on general performance.(63,64) Staff will comply with safety if they are clear about and understand what is expected from them in their job. Third, role clarity is enhanced by two highly influential sources of expectations: procedures formalization and EL. On the one hand, clearly defined, legible, and updated procedures (procedures formalization) transmit explicit organizational expectations that provide individuals with role clarification about what they have to do regarding safety. Moreover, procedures are written and explicitly formulated, and role-set members are familiar with them, increasing the probability of consensus between the different parts of the role-set and providing the role occupant with role clarity. Procedures formalization also provides comforting guidelines when the course of action is complicated or controversial (avoiding fatigue or overload). It directly guides compliance behaviors without the need to clarify the worker’s role, which explains the significant positive direct impact of procedures formalization on compliance with these procedures (without the mediated effect of role clarity). On the other hand, this article supports the idea that proceduralization is actually a paradox with benefits and drawbacks, sometimes producing op-

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posite effects to those desired.5 Although our results show that procedures formalization clarifies the worker’s role, we cannot ignore that it sometimes involves role conflict and/or associated ambiguity. In order to overcome these negative effects, this study also empirically supports the positive influence of the EL style as a complementary source of expectations for providing workers with role clarity. Empowering leaders are constantly in touch with their employees, facilitating additional information about the suitable behaviors they should perform and about their role in the entire safety system, including the meaning and sense of the proceduralization embedded in it. At the same time, these leaders support employees’ safety concerns (i.e., about conflicting procedures), taking into consideration workers’ suggestions and encouraging them to adopt a questioning attitude toward safety. This argument follows the requirements for a sound safety culture in NPPs as defined by the International Atomic Energy Agency, which promotes the concepts of a questioning attitude and open communication.(15) Empowering leaders also create collaborative dynamics where employees can confront each other and exchange information (which would increase the role-set consensus), and these collaborative dynamics enhance subordinates’ participation in safety issues.(12) Safety participation has been associated with an improvement in the capacity for safe behavior under less predictable circumstances.(65) Empowering behaviors by leaders during normal operations will keep workers constantly activated, in continual vigilance, updated, and aware of critical safety information and the functioning of the overall safety system, compared to the normalization and routinization that proceduralization involves. This implies a high level of preparedness when the unexpected comes and, therefore, a greater probability of coping effectively. Not only during normal operations, but also in unexpected circumstances when departure from procedures is needed, workers should be clear about what they have to do (role clarity) and act in order to be as safe as possible (always reporting deviations to be included as “performance allowed deviations or PAD”). In summary, the present article has empirically demonstrated how an EL style complements procedures formalization as another important source of 5 Proceduralization

is designed to improve safety, but if not mitigated by empowering leaders correctly, it can sometimes jeopardize safety.

´ Mart´ınez-Corcoles et al.

1268 expectations, providing necessary additional information so that workers know what is expected of them, and overcoming the limitations of proceduralization as a source of expectations in both predicted and unpredicted circumstances. However, readers need to consider several limitations when interpreting the results. First, our study has a cross-sectional nature, reducing our variables to a “snapshot,” rather than assessing them over time. Longitudinal assessment, especially for dynamic constructs like role clarity and leadership, would provide further validation of the specific relationships. Second, we used selfreported measures, meaning that our results may have been inflated due to respondents’ tendency to respond in a consistent manner or answer in a socially desirable way. However, we guaranteed the anonymous and confidential nature of the survey in order to obtain reliable data. Future studies could benefit from using objective measures to validate the impact of procedures and EL on safety compliance in other high-risk settings. Despite these limitations, and based on the results of this and previous publications, we believe that the EL style emerges as a powerful source of safe employee behaviors in the nuclear industry. ACKNOWLEDGMENTS This investigation was supported by Research Grant CONSOLIDER-C (SEJ2006-14086/PSIC) and FEDER from the Spanish Ministry of Education and Science. The authors wish to thank CIEMAT for the support rendered.

9. 10. 11. 12.

13. 14.

15. 16.

17. 18. 19.

20. 21. 22.

23.

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