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British Journal of Social Psychology (2015), 54, 371–382 © 2014 The British Psychological Society www.wileyonlinelibrary.com
Brief report
Tapping generalized essentialism to predict outgroup prejudices Gordon Hodson* and Malvina N. Skorska Brock University, St. Catharines, Ontario, Canada Psychological essentialism, the perception that groups possess inherent properties binding them and differentiating them from others, is theoretically relevant to predicting prejudice. Recent developments isolate two key dimensions: essentialistic entitativity (EE; groups as unitary, whole, entity-like) and essentialistic naturalness (EN; groups as fixed and immutable). We introduce a novel question: does tapping the covariance between EE and EN, rather than pitting them against each other, boost prejudice prediction? In Study 1 (re-analysis of Roets & Van Hiel, 2011b, Samples 1–3, in Belgium) and Study 2 (new Canadian data) their common/shared variance, modelled as generalized essentialism, doubles the predictive power relative to regression-based approaches with regard to racism (but not anti-gay or -schizophrenic prejudices). Theoretical implications are discussed.
Social groups are generally considered to have ‘essence’, that is ‘deep, hidden, and unchanging properties that make their members what they are’ (Prentice & Miller, 2007, p. 202). Such perceptions are critical for a host of intragroup and intergroup processes – without seeing groups as coherent and distinct they would not be psychologically meaningful as ‘groups’ or social categories. In his seminal work, Allport (1954) emphasized how basic social categorization, particularly when needs for closure are operating, predicts prejudice by increasing essentialist thinking (see also Roets & Van Hiel, 2011a). Although researchers have long expressed interest in relations between essentialist thinking and stereotyping (e.g., Bastian & Haslam, 2006; Hamilton, Sherman, Crump, & Spencer-Rodgers, 2009; Tadmor, Chao, Hong, & Polzer, 2013), presumably because both represent predominantly cognitive processes relevant to group properties or characteristics, little research examines links between essentialism and prejudice (i.e., negative evaluations; but see Haslam, Rothschild, & Ernst, 2002; Roets & Van Hiel, 2011b). In fact, recent prejudice texts (Brown, 2010; Dovidio, Hewstone, Glick, & Esses, 2010; Whitley & Kite, 2010) devote
British Journal of Social Psychology (2015), 54, 371–382 © 2014 The British Psychological Society www.wileyonlinelibrary.com
Brief report
Tapping generalized essentialism to predict outgroup prejudices Gordon Hodson* and Malvina N. Skorska Brock University, St. Catharines, Ontario, Canada Psychological essentialism, the perception that groups possess inherent properties binding them and differentiating them from others, is theoretically relevant to predicting prejudice. Recent developments isolate two key dimensions: essentialistic entitativity (EE; groups as unitary, whole, entity-like) and essentialistic naturalness (EN; groups as fixed and immutable). We introduce a novel question: does tapping the covariance between EE and EN, rather than pitting them against each other, boost prejudice prediction? In Study 1 (re-analysis of Roets & Van Hiel, 2011b, Samples 1–3, in Belgium) and Study 2 (new Canadian data) their common/shared variance, modelled as generalized essentialism, doubles the predictive power relative to regression-based approaches with regard to racism (but not anti-gay or -schizophrenic prejudices). Theoretical implications are discussed.
Social groups are generally considered to have ‘essence’, that is ‘deep, hidden, and unchanging properties that make their members what they are’ (Prentice & Miller, 2007, p. 202). Such perceptions are critical for a host of intragroup and intergroup processes – without seeing groups as coherent and distinct they would not be psychologically meaningful as ‘groups’ or social categories. In his seminal work, Allport (1954) emphasized how basic social categorization, particularly when needs for closure are operating, predicts prejudice by increasing essentialist thinking (see also Roets & Van Hiel, 2011a). Although researchers have long expressed interest in relations between essentialist thinking and stereotyping (e.g., Bastian & Haslam, 2006; Hamilton, Sherman, Crump, & Spencer-Rodgers, 2009; Tadmor, Chao, Hong, & Polzer, 2013), presumably because both represent predominantly cognitive processes relevant to group properties or characteristics, little research examines links between essentialism and prejudice (i.e., negative evaluations; but see Haslam, Rothschild, & Ernst, 2002; Roets & Van Hiel, 2011b). In fact, recent prejudice texts (Brown, 2010; Dovidio, Hewstone, Glick, & Esses, 2010; Whitley & Kite, 2010) devote
