The Cultural Lens Approach to Evaluating Cultural Validity of Psychological Theory Erin E. Elardin Christine Robitschek Lisa Y. Flores Rachel L. Navarro Matthew W. Ashton

In this article, we introduce the cultural lens approach (CIA), a novel approach to evaluating the extent to which a psychological theory applies across cultural groups. The CLA requires scholars to apply their accumulated knowledge about cultural influences and differences (e.g., independent and interdependent self-construals; Markus & Kitayama, 1991) to the ways in which theo­ retical propositions are interpreted and operationalized. First we highlight three limitations in existing approaches to cultural validity and the ways in which the CLA ad­ dresses these limitations. Next, we articulate the five steps involved in the CLA and apply it to three different theories from social, vocational, and positive psychology to dem­ onstrate its broad utility. In all cases, we highlight how applying the CLA can generate multiple novel testable hypotheses to stimulate future research and to advance knowledge that is culturally sensitive. Keywords: cultural lens approach, cultural validity, emic, etic ood theories evolve. Psychological phenomena and the people we study are too complex and human intellect too limited to get it right on the first try. A good theory accounts for extant data erates new testable hypotheses, the results of which may affirm some aspects of the theory even as they inevitably challenge others. In doing so, new data challenge theorists to answer second- and third-generation questions of when and why the theory holds (Zanna & Fazio, 1982). As our understanding of the importance of culture in human cog­ nition (e.g., Morris & Peng, 1994), affect (e.g., Bagozzi, Wong, & Yi, 1999), motivation (e.g., Brutus & Greguras, 2008), and behavior (e.g., Benet-Martmez, Leu, Lee, & Morris, 2002) has developed, psychological theories have come under increasing scrutiny. Such scrutiny focuses on the cultural validity of theories, or the extent to which aspects of theories are generalizable across, equally rele­ vant to, or equally useful to diverse groups (Fouad & Kantamneni, 2010). Typically, there have been two approaches to studying the cultural validity of theories: etic and emic (see Cheung, van de Vijver, & Leong, 2011). The etic approach focuses on developing theories that can be applied universally and

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University of Tennessee Texas Tech University University of Missouri-Columbia University of North Dakota Texas Tech University

testing the generalizability of theories across diverse groups. In contrast, the emic approach focuses on develop­ ing theories specific to an individual cultural group or identifying culturally specific factors that could be incor­ porated to make existing theories more culturally valid. More recently, scholars have proposed integrating etic and emic approaches (Cheung et al., 2011) in an effort to identify personality constructs and to develop new mea­ sures that are universal at their core but incorporate the variety of personality manifestations that may occur across cultures. Psychological science will benefit by moving from either/or (etic vs. emic) methods to approaches that more accurately represent our understanding of the com­ plex interplay of universal and culturally specific influences on psychological phenomena. However, there are several important limitations of all three approaches (emic, etic, and combined) to understanding, testing, and enhancing cultural validity. First, there has been an almost exclusive focus on the cultural validity of assessments, typically of individualdifferences factors such as personality constructs (e.g., Cheung et al., 2011). Perhaps this is because cultural va­ lidity is sometimes seen as a special case of construct validity (e.g., Leong & Brown, 1995), which is often in­ defined as the extent to which something mea­ andformally gen­ sures what it is supposed to measure (cf. Borsboom, Mellenbergh, & van Heerden, 2004). Early approaches (Hui & Triandis, 1985; Lonner, 1985) explicitly focused on the cultural validity of tests as a function of different types of equivalence (e.g., scalar or linguistic equivalence), and this focus on assessments continues. Of the more than 600 This article was published Online First May 19, 2014. Erin E. Hardin, Department of Psychology, University of Tennessee; Christine Robitschek, Department of Psychology, Texas Tech University; Lisa Y. Flores, Department of Educational, School, and Counseling Psy­ chology, University of Missouri-Columbia; Rachel L. Navarro, Counsel­ ing, Psychology, and Community Services, University of North Dakota; Matthew W. Ashton, Department of Psychology, Texas Tech University. Matthew W. Ashton is now at the Counseling Center, University of Kentucky. We thank Jeff Larsen and Denis McCarthy for helpful feedback on earlier versions of this article. Correspondence concerning this article should be addressed to Erin E. Hardin, Department of Psychology, University of Tennessee, Austin Peay Building, Knoxville, TN 37996. E-mail: [email protected]

October 2014 • American Psychologist © 2014 American Psychological Association 0003-066X/14/$12.00 Vol. 69, No. 7, 6 5 6 -6 6 8 http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/a0036532

Erin E. Hardin

articles and books that emerged in a PsycINFO search of cultural validity or culturally valid, 66% were focused on the cultural validity of tests and measures, as evidenced by their inclusion of these and related terms (e.g., scale, as­ sessment, inventory) in the title or abstract. However, as Messick (1995) noted, the validity of assessment is not simply about tests and test scores, but also about the interpretation and meaning of test scores in a broader context. As a result, our understanding of test validity is constantly evolving (cf. Borsboom et al., 2004). Questions of cultural validity, too, must evolve beyond simple questions about the construct validity of measures to more sophisticated questions about underlying theoretical relationships and their implications. Broadening the focus to the relations among underlying theoretical constructs will require broadening the focus beyond scores on tests, which comprise a narrow operationalization of theoretical constructs. Whereas personality assessments reveal indi­ vidual differences in traits, those interested in states (such as frustration), for example, may operationalize constructs in terms of specific experimental research paradigms (e.g., frustration inductions) and the behaviors elicited in partic­ ipants (e.g., aggression; Anderson & Bushman, 1997). Here, questions of cultural validity would focus on the extent to which the induction (a) actually induced the intended state of frustration and (b) elicited aggression in different cultural contexts. Importantly, considerations of the cultural validity of these other types of operationaliza­ tions are lacking. For example, less than 15% of the re­ search articles in the 2012 volume of the Journal o f CrossCultural Psychology used experimental designs. Second, existing approaches to cultural validity focus on evaluating the extent to which assessments (and, to a lesser degree, theories) are cross-culturally relevant/equiv­

October 2014 • American Psychologist

alent and thus valid. This focus yields information for making decisions regarding whether to use the construct or assessment in a particular cultural context (Robitschek, Sirles, & Hardin, 2014). However, if the answer is no, scientists and practitioners are left in a void. The literature has specified what not to use but has not indicated what to do instead. Moreover, knowing that a particular assessment tool or research paradigm has limited cultural validity in a specific cultural context does not necessarily yield infor­ mation for determining whether the underlying theoretical construct has limited cultural validity. If an alleged frus­ tration induction influences aggression in Cultural Context A but not Cultural Context B, is it because frustration has no influence on aggression in Cultural Context B (indicat­ ing limited cultural validity of the theoretical proposition), or does the induction not induce frustration in Cultural Context B (indicating limited cultural validity of the ex­ perimental task but not necessarily the theory)? Finally, existing approaches to cultural validity have focused almost entirely on cultural groups defined in terms of geographic, national, racial, and linguistic differences. Such definitions have fostered cross-cultural comparison research of the extent to which, for example, a measure is equally valid for Chinese versus North American individ­ uals. As Matsumoto and Yoo (2006) have described, how­ ever, cross-cultural research has evolved beyond this Phase I research to more sophisticated questions involving the identification of meaningful dimensions of cultural vari­ ability (e.g., individualism/collectivism; Phase II research), to cultural studies that use these measured individual-level dimensions in place of group-level categories (Phase III research), to Phase IV studies that empirically link these individual-level dimensions to group-level observed differ­ ences. Thus, to keep pace with advances in cross-cultural research that have moved away from reified group differ­ ences, approaches to testing cultural validity must also move away from examining fo r whom theoretical con­ structs are more or less culturally valid to understanding why theoretical constructs are more or less valid. Knowing that a particular paradigm does not induce frustration in Cultural Context B, for example, is less useful than under­ standing why it does not. In addition to perpetuating an emphasis on crosscultural differences, the existing focus on reified geo­ graphic, racial, and linguistic groups represents a relatively narrow definition of culture, despite the fact that definitions of culture vary widely (Triandis, 1996). Matsumoto and Yoo (2006) defined culture “as a meaning and information system shared by a group and transmitted across genera­ tions” (p. 237) and argued explicitly that religion, for example, is not an aspect of culture. Even so, these same authors recognized that others would disagree with this exclusion of religion (and other variables) from this defi­ nition of culture. We adopt Matsumoto and Yoo’s defini­ tion of culture as a shared system o f meaning transmitted across generations, but, in keeping with other authors (e.g., American Psychological Association [APA], 2003), we expand this definition of culture to include groups defined by shared experiences and social influences associated not

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only with religion but with sex, gender, sexual orientation, (dis)ability, and/or social class (see Sue & Sue, 2013).

Refining and Extending Cultural Validity: The Cultural Lens Approach We address these limitations in existing approaches to evaluating cultural validity by articulating a new perspec­ tive: the cultural lens approach (CLA). The CLA is an example of a combined em ic-etic approach (Cheung et al., 2011) because it integrates culturally specific knowledge into existing theories to assess and improve their univer­ sality. Unlike earlier approaches, however, the CLA ex­ plicitly addresses the three limitations noted above. First, the CLA goes beyond individual-differences assessment to include applications to other types of opera­ tionalizations, such as specific experimental manipulations or behavioral measures. The CLA draws on the hypothesis­ testing tradition and methodology of experimental psychol­ ogy to enrich our understanding of the cultural validity of psychological theories by focusing broadly on theoretical propositions about relationships between constructs, rather than focusing narrowly on measures of those constructs. Second, the CLA does not stop at categorical decisions regarding presence or absence of equivalence with any particular group; rather, the CLA delineates a series of specific steps to take to assess cultural validity, which (a) leads to the generation of testable hypotheses about cultural variations in the operationalization of constructs and theo­ retical propositions, and (b) ultimately, in many cases, broadens theoretical applications across cultures. In using the CLA, we do not assume that all aspects of a given psychological theory will apply in all cultures; neither do we assume that psychological theories developed in one culture are necessarily limited in others. The CLA instead

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answers questions of when and why a theory holds (cf. Zanna & Fazio, 1982). Finally, we draw on broader defi­ nitions of culture in our examples to demonstrate how the CLA may be applied to assess cultural validity more broadly and in ways that move beyond cross-cultural com­ parisons. Our purpose is to describe the specific steps in the CLA and to provide examples of using the approach so that researchers can apply the CLA to a range of psychological theories. The CLA will allow researchers to ask novel questions about cultural validity, answer many of them, and ultimately provide a more sophisticated understanding of the extent to which theories generalize across cultural groups. The CLA is so named because its steps are de­ signed to help researchers metaphorically look through different cultural lenses. Just as someone wearing rosecolored glasses perceives the world to have a pink hue, theorists steeped in a highly individualist culture, for ex­ ample, cannot help but perceive psychological phenomena (at least initially) from fundamentally independent perspec­ tives. By shifting the cultural lenses through which we view psychological phenomena, we cannot help but see these theories in a different way. The goal of the CLA is to facilitate shifting our cultural lenses so that researchers may separate culturally specific operationalizations from the underlying theoretical propositions themselves; doing so will allow researchers to test the generalizability of the underlying theoretical prop­ ositions more directly. For example, if research showed that frustration manifests differently and/or has different causes in different cultural contexts but nonetheless reli­ ably elicits aggression in those contexts, then we would conclude that the theoretical proposition that frustration elicits aggression has good cultural validity. In this way, our understanding of the frustration-aggression relation­ ship might be seen as having evolved beyond narrow conceptions of these constructs, even as the integrity of the theory—the fundamental underlying predictions—remains intact. If, on the other hand, research showed that culturally appropriate frustration inductions do not reliably elicit ag­ gression in those contexts, then the underlying theoretical proposition—and thus the cultural validity of the theory itself—is questioned. Unfortunately, as Triandis (1996) has pointed out, “all humans are ethnocentric” (p. 407). This makes putting on new cultural lenses profoundly difficult—yet doing so is at the heart of cultural competence. There have long been calls for practitioners to develop cultural competence (e.g., Sue, Arredondo, & McDavis, 1992); calls for researchers to develop cultural competence are more recent (e.g., APA, 2003). Specifically, APA’s (2003) multicultural guidelines for research highlight the development and implementation of research practices that place culture at the center of all phases of research. If our personal cultural worldview and practices are left unexamined, they will shape the ways in which we define “problems,” develop and phrase research questions, interact with research participants, and interpret data. Culturally competent research, however, requires more than gaining basic cultural knowledge about other

October 2014 • American Psychologist

What does it look like for someone to have more self­ esteem than someone else?)?” “What would we accept (or have researchers typically accepted) as evidence that this phenomenon (e.g., bystander effect) has occurred?” The goal here is to make the implicit explicit, often by articu­ lating both conceptual definitions (e.g., self-esteem is one’s general positive regard for oneself) and operationalizations (e.g., I know someone has self-esteem when they tell me they like themselves by endorsing items on a self-report measure [Rosenberg, 1965] or when they associate positive traits with themselves quickly on a reaction time task [A. G. Greenwald & Famham, 2000]). Although some researchers may begin to recognize unexamined assump­ tions in or limitations of definitions as they move through this step, this recognition is not necessary to proceed to the next step. Step 2 : Id e n tify th e g ro u p s (a ) fro m w h ich these d efin itio n s h a v e b e e n d e riv e d a n d (b) to w h ic h the constructs h a v e e ith e r n o t b e e n a p lie d o r w ith w h ic h surprisin g results h a v e een fo u n d . This straightforward step involves ask­

L isa Y . F lo re s

groups; it requires using this knowledge to frame all stages of the project from the cultural perspective of the popula­ tions of interest. However, applying these principles rigor­ ously across studies is rare, which suggests that researchers have difficulty translating the basic principles of good science into culturally competent research. Admonishments to become more culturally compe­ tent scholars are readily available, but specific advice on how researchers may do so is rare. By delineating a clear series of steps, the CLA fills this gap by providing a structure through which researchers may become aware of their cultural assumptions and blindspots, consider alternate perspectives, and test culturally informed hy­ potheses. The CLA provides a framework for research­ ers to translate their hypothesis-generating and testing skills into more culturally appropriate practice. The CLA has five steps. The Five Steps o f the C u ltu ra l Lens A p p ro a c h Step 1: A rtic u la te h o w c e n tra l constructs h a v e b e e n d e fin e d (im p lic itly o r e x p lic itly ) a n d thus o p e ra tio n a liz e d in p a s t re se a rch . In the

process of backward course design (Wiggins & McTighe, 1998), educators begin by articulating the enduring under­ standings they want students to learn, then identify the evidence they will accept that students have acquired such understanding. Similarly, in this step of the CLA, research­ ers ask questions such as the following: “What are the constructs (e.g., frustration, self-esteem, depression) or be­ haviors (e.g., aggression, helping) of interest?” “How do we know when they are present (e.g., How do we know if someone is depressed? What does aggression look like?)?” “How are these states (e.g., frustration) induced?” “How do we know when someone has more than someone else (e.g., October 2014 • American Psychologist

g

ing, “With whom would I like to study this construct?” “With which groups has the cultural validity of this construct already been questioned, and what has been found?” At first blush, this step involves a focus on reified groups; indeed, this step is at the heart of tradi­ tional approaches to cultural validity: “This measure or paradigm has been used with Group A— how would it perform in Group B?” However, this step is necessary because it forces researchers to articulate the specific cultural contexts of interest, which, in turn, is a prereq­ uisite for identifying underlying, and likely more mean­ ingful, differences. Step 3 : Id e n tify re le v a n t dim ensions u n ­ d e rly in g c u ltu ra l v a ria b ility : W h a t d o w e k n o w a b o u t th e c u ltu ra l contexts o f G roups A a n d B? This step begins with using or acquiring basic

cultural knowledge to be able to answer a question such as “What are salient cultural differences between the groups in question and how might they be relevant?” This step explicitly moves researchers beyond Phase I questions of monolithic between-groups differences (“Are Japanese different from North Americans?” “Are European Americans different from African Ameri­ cans?”) to questions about why such differences might exist: “On what relevant underlying cultural dimensions (e.g., self-construal, power distance, uncertainty avoid­ ance) might individuals within and between these groups vary?” In doing so, this step helps researchers avoid committing the cultural attribution fallacy (Matsumoto & Yoo, 2006), which occurs when differences between groups are erroneously assumed to be due to culture— or, using our broader definition of culture, are misattributed to an aspect of culture (e.g., assuming ethnicity is the relevant difference when in fact social class or reli­ gion accounts for the observed group differences). Therefore, in this step, researchers should also intention­ ally ask questions such as “Are there other ways in which these groups might differ that I’ve not considered 659

validity of a particular research paradigm, researchers might need to ask themselves, “If I were high in this cultural dimension, how would I experience this manipu­ lation?” Cultural informants are also likely to be extremely useful during this stage, as the questions asked during this stage require a shift in the researcher’s perspective to adopt different cultural lenses. Step 5 : D e riv e research questions a n d sp e­ cific hypo theses b a s e d on the questions a n d a n s w e rs fro m Step 4 . Due in part to the paucity of

Rachel L. N a v a rro

yet?” Hays’s (2007) ADDRESSING framework may be used to consider differences in Age and generational influences, Developmental or acquired Disabilities, Re­ ligion and spiritual orientation, Ethnicity, Socioeco­ nomic status, Sexual orientation, Indigenous Heritage, National origin, and Gender. Step 4 : E v a lu a te the d e fin itio n s /o p e ra ­ tio n a liz a tio n s o f th e c e n tra l constructs (fro m Step 1) in th e c o n te x t o f b r o a d e r c u ltu ra l k n o w le d g e a b o u t those g ro u p s (fro m Step 3 ): W h a t d o w e k n o w a b o u t Construct X w ith in th e c u ltu ra l c o n te x t o f G ro u p B? This step is the

heart of the CLA, as this is the point at which researchers integrate culturally specific knowledge to consider the ex­ tent to which theoretical propositions have been conceptu­ alized or operationalized in culturally limited ways. In this step, researchers go beyond basic knowledge-based ques­ tions (“On what meaningful cultural dimensions do mem­ bers of these groups differ?”) to consider the implications of the answers to those questions (“What do these differ­ ences mean for the ways we understand and operationalize Construct X?”). In this step, then, researchers consider questions such as the following: “What alternate concep­ tualizations or operationalizations of the relevant constructs have been, or could be, used?” “To what extent might these constructs have different meanings to, or these manipula­ tions have different effects on, members of different groups?” “To what extent are these constructs manifested in different ways by members of different groups?” “What do these differences mean for my understanding of the construct?” Here, researchers may be able to rely on careful read­ ing of the empirical and theoretical literature with these questions in mind. For example, in considering the cultural

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research explicitly linking underlying dimensions of cul­ ture to behavioral and psychological outcomes (see Matsumoto & Yoo, 2006), answers to many of the questions raised in Steps 3 and 4 will be speculative. As such, the questions themselves readily yield empirical questions. For example, questions may be unanswered in Step 4 either because of a lack of knowledge or a lack of perspective­ taking ability on the researcher’s part, and thus become an empirical question in Step 5: “Do individuals high and low in this cultural dimension experience this manipulation differently?” In other cases, following the previous steps will identify meaningful cultural dimensions and specula­ tion about the ways in which they may be relevant; this speculation, in turn, naturally yields research questions and hypotheses. For example, identifying a different experi­ mental task or measurement approach in Step 4 leads naturally to asking “What would happen if we used this task instead of that task or measured Construct X in this way instead of that way?” T h e V a lu e o f th e C u ltu r a l L en s A p p r o a c h : T h r e e C a s e s S t u d ie s

In the rest of this article, we apply the five steps of the CLA to three examples: cognitive dissonance theory (Festinger, 1957), Holland’s (1966, 1997) person-environment fit the­ ory, and personal growth initiative theory (Robitschek, 1998). By applying the CLA to popular theories from social, vocational/counseling, and positive psychology, our goal is to demonstrate the broad utility of the CLA. In all three cases, we first present a general overview of the theoretical proposition or construct of interest, and then we explicitly apply the five steps of the CLA. CLA A p p lie d to C ognitive D issonance Th eo ry

Our first example is based on work (Hoshino-Browne et al., 2005) that predates the CLA; as such, it is unlikely that the authors followed the CLA step by step. Nonetheless, it provides a straightforward demonstration of how a re­ searcher could intentionally apply the CLA’s steps. One result of dissonance reduction is postdecisional spreading o f alternatives (Brehm, 1956). In a typical research para­ digm, individuals evaluate several mundane objects (e.g., ballpoint pens), then choose one to keep. They subse­ quently evaluate the chosen object more positively and unchosen objects less positively than they had before mak­ ing their choices. By doing so, people can prevent cognitive

October 2014 • American Psychologist

as Japan, see the self as intertwined with others and are motivated to fit in and support group goals. Step 4 : E v a lu a te the d e fin itio n s /o p e ra ­ tio n a liza tio n s o f the c e n tra l constructs in th e c o n te x t o f b r o a d e r c u ltu ra l k n o w le d g e a b o u t those g ro u p s . Given that postdecisional spreading of

alternatives is likely to occur for more important choices (Festinger, 1957; but cf. H. J. Greenwald, 1969), in this case, critical questions would have been “What constitutes an important choice among Japanese adults?” More spe­ cifically, “To what extent is the classic paradigm of choos­ ing an object for oneself experienced as an equally impor­ tant choice across cultures?” Hoshino-Browne et al. (2005) reasoned that choosing an object for oneself is a highly independent choice that may carry less significance for someone from a more collectivist culture (like Japan). In a more interdependent cultural context, then, a more cultur­ ally relevant important choice might be making a choice for a significant other, not oneself. M a tth e w W . A s h to n

dissonance associated with thinking they did not make the best choice. Step 1: A rtic u la te h o w c e n tra l constructs h a v e b e e n d e fin e d (im p lic itly o r e x p lic itly ) a n d thus o p e r a tio n a liz e d in p a s t re s e a rc h . Post-

decisional spreading of alternatives was defined as widen­ ing the evaluative range between chosen and unchosen objects after an important choice, and operationalized as ratings of a pen before and after choosing one to keep. Step 2 : Id e n tify the g ro u p s (a ) fro m w h ic h these d efin itio n s h a v e b e e n d e riv e d a n d (b ) to w h ich the constructs h a v e e ith e r n o t b e e n a p ­ p lie d o r w ith w h ic h su rp ris in g results h a v e b e e n fo u n d . Although long-considered a classic strat­

egy of dissonance reduction based on research with North American samples, cross-cultural research indicated that postdecisional spreading of alternatives did not occur among the Japanese (Heine & Lehman, 1997), suggesting that this fundamental dissonance reduction strategy had limited validity across cultures. Step 3 : Id e n tify re le v a n t d im ensions u n ­ d e rly in g c u ltu ra l v a ria b ility . W h a t d o w e k n o w a b o u t th e c u ltu ra l co n texts o f G ro u p s A a n d B? To answer this question, Hoshino-Browne et al.

(2005) drew on well-established cultural differences in self-construal, which refers to how one sees the self in relation to others (Markus & Kitayama, 1991; see also Cross, Hardin, & Gercek-Swing, 2011). Individuals with a stronger independent self-construal, more common in indi­ vidualist cultures, see the self as separate from others and are motivated to stand out and pursue individual goals. On the other hand, individuals with a stronger interdependent self-construal, more common in collectivist cultures such

October 2014 • American Psychologist

Step 5 : D e riv e specific hypo theses b a s e d on th e a n s w e rs to these questions fro m S tep 4 .

These steps lead directly to the hypothesis that postdeci­ sional spreading of alternatives would occur in the context of a more culturally relevant important choice (Hypothesis 1; see Table 1). Hoshino-Browne et al. (2005) implemented the traditional paradigm in a more interdependent context: Rather than being asked to choose an object for oneself, participants of Asian descent were asked to choose an object to give as a gift to an important other. In this more culturally appropriate relational context, postdecisional spreading of alternatives did occur. The construct of post­ decisional spreading of alternatives was not culturally in­ valid but had been operationalized too narrowly. When the researchers used a different cultural lens to define an im­ portant choice in an interdependent cultural context, the fundamental predictions of cognitive dissonance theory were supported. CLA A p p lie d to H o lla n d 's ( 19 6 6 , 7 9 9 7 ) P e rso n -E n v iro n m e n t Fit T h eo ry

Our first example involved cultural differences in the con­ text in which making decisions (e.g., about pens) influences attitudes. In the real world, of course, people make deci­ sions that are far more important than choosing pens. One of the most important decisions most adults make is choos­ ing a career. This decision is so important because work is intimately related to one’s sense of self (Holland, 1966, 1997) and well-being (Lucas, Clark, Georgellis, & Diener, 2004). Beyond individual well-being, work also may pro­ mote societal well-being by reducing poverty and increas­ ing community connection (Blustein, 2008). We focus on Holland’s (1966, 1997) theory because it is among the most influential and enduring theories in vocational psychology yet has also been criticized for its cultural blindspots (e.g., Leong & Brown, 1995). The basic premise of Holland’s (1966, 1997) theory is that the best career choices are those that match the work environment to the individual’s personality. At the heart of Holland’s theory is the idea that both individuals

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Table 1 List o f Hypotheses G enerated b y A p p lyin g the Cultural Lens A pproach N um ber

Hypothesis

Cognitive dissonance theory Postdecisional spreading of alternatives would occur in the context of a more culturally relevant important choice.

Hypothg

Holland's person-environment fit theory Hypothesis 2 Hypothesis 3 Hypothesis 4 Hypothesis 4a Hypothesis 4b Hypothesis 5 Hypothesis 5a Hypothesis 5b

For more interdependent persons, different Holland codes w ill be generated by measuring different aspects of personality. Aspects of personality other than interests w ill reliably predict career choice for some groups. For more interdependent persons, different Holland codes w ill be generated when personality is measured in the context of different social roles. For more interdependent persons, work personality better predicts job choice than do other aspects of personality. For more interdependent persons, the match between an individual's work personality and work environment predicts job satisfaction and tenure. For more interdependent persons, different Holland codes w ill be generated when personality is measured in different physical environments. For more interdependent persons, an individual's personality, as measured in a specific work environment, predicts job choice. For more interdependent persons, the match between an individual's personality, as measured in a specific work environment, and that individual's work environment predicts job satisfaction and tenure. Personal growth initiative (PGI) theory

Hypothesis Hypothesis Hypothesis Hypothesis

6 7 8 8a

Hypothesis 8b

Note.

PGIS scores are uncorrelated with interdependent self-construal. PGIS scores are uncorrelated with acculturation. The w ay in which PGI manifests in an individual likely is culturally determined. Higher interdependence is correlated with listing more interpersonal domains of growth, whereas higher independence is correlated with listing more independent domains of growth. Participants randomly assigned to an interdependent priming condition w ill list more interpersonally focused domains of growth than w ill participants randomly assigned to an independent priming condition.

PGIS = Personal G row th Initiative Scale.

and work environments may be categorized according to six types. Realistic types are characterized by working with one’s hands and learning by doing (e.g., automotive mechanics and the military). Investigative types are characterized by working with data and ideas (e.g., sci­ ence and math-related careers). Artistic types are char­ acterized by creativity (e.g., careers in music, theater, or writing). Social types are characterized by working with and for the direct benefit of people (e.g., teaching and social work). Enterprising types are characterized by leading and influencing others (e.g., careers in business or politics). Finally, Conventional types are character­ ized by precision and order (e.g., clerical and financerelated careers). These six types are typically referred to by their first letters: R, I, A, S, E, and C. Holland’s theory is thus sometimes referred to as the RIASEC model. According to Holland (1966, 1997), both individu­ als and environments may be categorized according to these six RIASEC types. Measures such as the Strong Interest Inventory (Donnay, Morris, Schaubhut, & 662

Thompson, 2005) assess an individual’s personality type and provide a Holland code, a three-letter code that indicates the strongest three types. For example, some­ one who showed the strongest interest in Investigative activities, second strongest interest in Social activities, and third strongest interest in Artistic activities would receive a Holland code of ISA. Holland’s (1966, 1997) theory includes a number of additional propositions (see Fouad & Kantamneni, 2010, for a recent review of cultural validity evidence for the theory more broadly), but for the purposes of this article, we focus on the categorization of personalities using the RIASEC model. Holland theorized that people seek to match their personality to their environment; thus, per­ sonality type predicts career choice (i.e., environment type). Importantly, the more congruent a career choice is with one’s personality, the more satisfied one will be with his or her career. Thus, for example, someone with an Investigative-Social-Artistic (ISA) type is likely to be more satisfied working in an Investigative-Social (IS) October 2014 • American Psychologist

occupation such as psychology than is someone with a Social-Artistic-Enterprising (SAE) type. Step 1: A rtic u la te h o w c e n tra l constructs h a v e b e e n d e fin e d a n d o p e ra tio n a liz e d in p a s t re se a rch . Central to Holland’s (1966, 1997) the­

ory is the idea of person-environment fit, with person broadly defined. Spokane, Luchetta, and Richwine (2002) noted, “People search for environments that will let them exercise their skills and abilities, express their attitudes and values, and take on agreeable problems and roles’’ (p. 379, emphasis added). This broad definition of person in the vocational literature is consistent with that of other authors (e.g., Robitschek & Woodson, 2006). Despite this broad definition of person, however, re­ search and practice based on Holland’s (1966, 1997) theory have operationalized person almost exclusively in terms of interests (e.g., in work and leisure activities) and how much respondents would like different occupational tasks. In­ deed, Holland (1997) himself stated, “Interest inventories are personality inventories” (p. 8). Spokane et al. (2002) reviewed empirical evidence that interests assess personal­ ity more broadly, showing that, in the absence of psycho­ pathology, correlation coefficients between interests and personality (in terms of the Big Five personality traits) are typically in the .50-60 range. Spokane et al. concluded, “For the moment . . . interests should be considered com­ plex measures that reflect personality” (pp. 403-404). However, even these substantial correlation coefficients indicate that at least two thirds of the variance in interests and personality is not shared, suggesting that defining personality solely in terms of interests may be problematic. Step 2 : Id e n tify th e g ro u p s (a ) fro m w h ich these d e fin itio n s h a v e b e e n d e riv e d a n d (b ) to w h ic h th e constructs h a v e e ith e r n o t b e e n a p lie d o r w ith w h ic h su rp ris in g results h a v e een fo u n d . The research demonstrating that interests

E

are adequate indicators of personality involves samples from the United States (e.g., Gottfredson, Jones, & Hol­ land, 1993) or Europe (e.g., De Fruyt & Mervielde, 1997) in which the race/ethnicity of the sample was not reported, making it difficult to determine to what specific cultural groups these results would generalize. Research on the cultural validity of Holland’s (1966, 1997) theory has fo­ cused largely on validity across racial/ethnic groups in the United States. Such research has demonstrated good sup­ port for the prediction that interests predict choice with African Americans (see Brown, 1995) but poor support for the prediction with Latino(a)s (e.g., Flores & O’Brien, 2002) and Asian Americans (e.g., Tang, Fouad, & Smith, 1999). For example, Tang et al. (1999) found that family preferences were more important predictors of career choice than interests in a sample of Asian American college students. Step 3 : Id e n tify re le v a n t d im ensions u n ­ d e rly in g c u ltu ra l v a ria b ility : W h a t d o w e k n o w a b o u t th e c u ltu ra l co n texts o f G ro u p s A a n d B? In this step, we must consider any relevant

cultural differences between European Americans, on the one hand, and Latino(a)s and Asian Americans, on October 2014 • American Psychologist

the other, both in terms of the specific samples used in past research and in general. Much of the past research has relied on large samples of late adolescent/young adult students, either high school seniors (e.g., Flores & O’Brien, 2002) or college undergraduates (e.g., Tang et al., 1999). Thus, there is little apparent reason to suspect these samples differed in age, disability, or sexual ori­ entation (and thus that these cultural dimensions are more salient than ethnicity). Much less is known about the socioeconomic status, national origin, religious iden­ tities, or indigenous heritage of the participants in the studies, although there is good reason to suspect system­ atic differences in many of these cultural identities be­ tween these ethnic groups (e.g., 18% of participants in Flores & O’Brien’s, 2002, study reported being born in Mexico, whereas over 35% of Tang et al.’s, 1999, par­ ticipants reported being raised in Asia). Therefore, to avoid committing the cultural attribution fallacy and assuming differences are due to only one of these cultural identities, we must consider whether there are any meaningful dimensions of culture that might be relevant across these identities. Despite the tremendous diversity across and within these groups, self-construal again emerges as potentially relevant. Both Asian and Latino cultures are typically associated with greater collec­ tivism (e.g., Triandis, 1989). Many traditional Latino cul­ tural values (e.g., familismo', Marin & Marin, 1991) have been described as consistent with interdependence/collectivism. Moreover, greater interdependence/collectivism has also been associated with female gender (Cross & Madson, 1997) and lower socioeconomic statuses (Triandis, 1989). To be sure, this brief analysis does not demonstrate that self-construal is the sole or most important potential cul­ tural dimension; rather, this analysis demonstrates that selfconstrual may be useful because it underlies multiple as­ pects of culture (not just ethnicity) that are relevant in this case. Step 4 : E v a lu a te th e d e fin itio n s /o p e ra tio n a liza tio n s o f th e c e n tra l constructs in the c o n te x t o f b r o a d e r c u ltu ra l k n o w le d g e a b o u t those g ro u p s . We noted in Step 1 that personality

has typically been defined solely in terms of interests. A critical question, then, is whether there is reason to believe that defining personality solely in terms of in­ terests would be less valid for individuals with a more interdependent self-construal. We know that individuals with a more interdependent self-construal, by definition, tend to have a more varied and contextually based sense of self. Whereas an independent self-construal is char­ acterized by reference to stable, internal traits (e.g., assertive, shy) and a motivation for internal consistency, an interdependent self-construal is characterized by ref­ erence to relationships and roles (e.g., daughter, profes­ sor) and a motivation to adjust to the social situation (see Cross et al., 2011). Consistent with this, East Asians are more likely to simultaneously endorse opposite person­ ality traits (Choi & Choi, 2002) and to show less self663

concept clarity (Campbell et al., 1996) than European Americans. Step 5 : D e riv e specific hyp o th eses b a s e d on th e a n s w e rs to th e questions fro m Step 4 .

Based on the research highlighted above, it seems unlikely that interests will correlate as highly with other aspects of personality for someone with a more interdependent selfconstrual, raising the question “What would happen if we measured personality in some other way?” This generates the specific hypothesis that a more interdependent individ­ ual might have different Holland codes depending on what aspects of personality are assessed (Hypothesis 2). For example, an interdependent person might be an Investiga­ tive type based on interests and activities (influenced by the types of people with whom these activities are shared, such as friends) but a Social type based on values and life goals (influenced by a different group of people, such as family). Another testable hypothesis is that different individuals or groups match different aspects of their personality to the environment when choosing a career. For example, whereas interests may be a reliable predictor of choice for those with an independent self-construal, perhaps some other aspect of personality, such as values, reliably pre­ dicts career choice for those with a more interdependent self-construal (Hypothesis 3). If so, then it is not that Holland’s fundamental premise that personality predicts choice has limited cultural validity but rather that we need to broaden the ways in which personality is operational­ ized. On the other hand, if future research finds that varying operationalizations of personality continue to be poor pre­ dictors of career choice for members of some groups, then we would have even stronger evidence of the limited cul­ tural validity of this aspect of the theory. Not only might different Holland codes be generated for more interdependent persons depending on what as­ pects of personality are measured (Hypothesis 2), different Holland codes might also be generated depending on the context in which personality is measured (Hypothesis 4). A hallmark of an interdependent self is that the self is defined by context, such that manifestations of personality vary to some extent from situation to situation (Cross et al., 2011; Markus & Kitayama, 1991). For example, when asked to rate the extent to which 20 trait words (e.g., honest, out­ going) described them in various social-role contexts (i.e., when alone or with a friend, parent, professor, younger person, or stranger), Korean students showed significantly more variability across contexts than U.S. students (Suh, 2002). It might therefore be helpful when assessing aspects of personality to ask participants to think of themselves in the context of their work roles (their work personalities) as opposed to asking them to describe themselves more gen­ erally. Doing so might reveal that work personality does predict job choice (Hypothesis 4a); moreover, the match between an individual’s work personality and work envi­ ronment may also predict job satisfaction and tenure (Hy­ pothesis 4b). Again, if such culturally informed operation­ alizations failed to yield support for the hypotheses, we would have stronger evidence that these theoretical prop­ ositions have limited cultural validity. 664

In addition to the effect that thinking of oneself in different social contexts might have on measured interests for more interdependent individuals, there may also be an effect of the actual physical context in which the assess­ ment is completed. Whereas Suh (2002) asked participants to think of themselves in different social roles and to describe themselves in those roles (e.g., “When I interact with my parents, I am talkative,” p. 1380), Kanagawa, Cross, and Markus (2001) randomly assigned their Japa­ nese and U.S. participants to one of four physical contexts in which to describe themselves: alone, in the presence of an authority figure, with another peer, or in a group of peers. Thus, rather than asking participants, “When you are with a professor, who are you?” (as Suh, 2002, did), Ka­ nagawa et al. actually had a professor ask the participant, “Who are you?” The types of words used to describe the self varied more across these four contexts for the Japanese than the U.S. participants. For example, Japanese partici­ pants referenced ability significantly more often when alone than in the other contexts. To the extent that these cultural differences are due to differences in self-construal, results such as these suggest that the measured interests of a more interdependent indi­ vidual might actually change according to context. Previ­ ous studies that have failed to find support for Holland’s (1966, 1997) theory have typically used undergraduate student participants who completed interest inventories as part of a large group (e.g., Tang et al., 1999). Kanagawa et al.’s (2001) research suggests that interdependent individ­ uals may describe themselves differently when in a group than in other contexts; this suggests that if interdependent participants are asked to complete an interest inventory when randomly assigned to other contexts (e.g., alone, at work), different Holland codes might be generated than in the standard group-administered classroom context (Hy­ pothesis 5). If so, this would support the possibility that using measures of personality obtained in different contexts might yield better support for the cultural validity of Hol­ land’s basic premise of person-environment fit (Hypothe­ ses 5a and 5b). S u m m a ry . Applying the CLA involves deriving and testing specific hypotheses that result from questioning the operationalization of central constructs in light of cul­ turally specific knowledge. We have provided examples of how, in the case of Holland’s (1966, 1997) theory of person-environment fit, doing so involves critically exam­ ining how person is understood. Knowledge about selfconstrual, for example, challenges researchers to view per­ sonality more broadly and not to assume that interests are adequate measures of personality for all individuals. More­ over, the recognition that manifestations of personality likely vary by context for those with a more interdependent self-construal (Kanagawa et al., 2001; Suh, 2002) chal­ lenges researchers to rethink how fundamental tenets of the theory are measured. The CLA could also be applied to critically examine how environments are conceptualized and operationalized within Holland’s (1966, 1997) theory. A fundamental crit­ icism of Holland’s theory has been its failure to recognize October 2014 • American Psychologist

the ways in which structural barriers (based, e.g., on racism or heterosexism) limit choice for many individuals (e.g., Leong & Brown, 1995). The CLA may provide rich op­ portunities to consider ways in which cultural influences are both intrapersonal (e.g., self-construal, values orienta­ tions) and extrapersonal (such as these structural barriers; cf. Lopez & Guarnaccia, 2000), which may in turn yield more culturally relevant conceptualizations not only of person but also of environment. CLA A p p lie d to P e rs o n a l Growth In itia tiv e T h eo ry

In our final example, we discuss how the CLA may be applied to another theory, the personal growth initiative (PGI) theory (Robitschek et al., 2012), to highlight the broader relevance of the approach. PGI (Robitschek et ah, 2012) is a global inclination to improve oneself across life domains. “PGI is a developed set of skills for self-improvement and includes cognition and behavior (Robitschek, 1998) that a person carries into life expe­ riences,” (Robitschek et ah, 2012, p. 274). A fundamen­ tal characteristic of PGI is that it is conscious, active, and intentional, which distinguishes it from related con­ structs, such as the personal growth aspect of psycho­ logical well-being highlighted by Ryff (1989). Accord­ ing to PGI theory, PGI develops from being taught the process of intentional personal growth and experiencing environmental encouragement to engage in this process. PGI theory also predicts that higher levels of PGI will enhance mental health and protect against or reduce psychological distress. Consistent with this theory, in samples of predominantly European American college students, higher levels of PGI were associated with higher levels of well-being, happiness, life satisfaction (Robitschek & Keyes, 2009), and positive affect (Har­ din, Weigold, Robitschek, & Nixon, 2007; Robitschek & Keyes, 2009) and with lower levels of anxiety and negative affect (Hardin et al., 2007). Step 1: A rtic u la te h o w c e n tra l constructs h a v e b e e n d e fin e d (im p lic itly o r e x p lic itly ) a n d thus o p e ra tio n a liz e d in past research .

Although a revised scale has recently been developed (Robitschek et al., 2012), virtually all published research on PGI has utilized the nine-item Personal Growth Initia­ tive Scale (PGIS; Robitschek, 1998, 1999), which assesses respondents’ involvement in active, intentional growth ac­ tivities (“I know how to change specific things that I want to change in my life”). Importantly, the items on both the original and revised PGIS do not specify particular do­ mains of personal growth toward which one might be striving; thus, respondents appear to be free to complete the PGIS with virtually any domain of growth in mind. Thus, in both the original and revised scales, the central construct of personal growth has been conceptualized as autonomous self-direction. There is an assumption that people can choose the ways in which they want to grow with at least a minimal level of autonomy and independent thought and action (Robitschek, 2003). Correlational research with pri­ marily European American samples provides support for October 2014 • American Psychologist

these assumptions; for example, PGI is positively related to instrumentality, assertiveness, and internal locus of control (Robitschek, 1998). Step 2 : Id e n tify the g ro u p s (a ) fro m w h ich these d efin itio n s h a v e b e e n d e riv e d a n d (b) to w h ic h the constructs h a v e e ith e r n o t b e e n a p ­ p lie d o r w ith w h ic h su rp risin g results h a v e b e e n fo u n d . PGI theory was developed on samples

comprising primarily European American, middle- to up­ per-middle-class, highly educated adults. Although PGI is increasingly being used in multicultural and global con­ texts, the majority of published PGI research has been conducted with predominantly European American college student samples in the United States. Step 3 : Id e n tify re le v a n t dim ensions u n ­ d e rly in g c u ltu ra l v a ria b ility : W h a t d o w e k n o w a b o u t th e c u ltu ra l contexts o f G rou ps A a n d B? Because of PGI’s association with autonomous

self-direction and its development with predominantly Eu­ ropean American college students (a group that tends to be high in independence), PGI has sometimes been thought of as being more relevant for those with a more independent self-construal and likely to be less relevant for someone with a more interdependent orientation (cf. Robitschek, 2003). Step 4 : E v a lu a te the d e fin itio n s /o p e ra ­ tio n a liza tio n s o f the c e n tra l constructs in the c o n te x t o f b r o a d e r c u ltu ra l k n o w le d g e a b o u t d iffe re n t g ro u p s. The next step, then, is to evaluate

an understanding of personal growth as autonomous self-direction by asking what we know about autonomy among those with a more interdependent self-construal. Two particularly important questions raised by the CLA include the following: “What alternate conceptualiza­ tions or operationalizations of autonomy have been used in the literature?”and “To what extent does autonomy manifest in different ways in members of different groups?” Kagitcibasi (2005) has addressed both of these questions. He argued that autonomy has long been inap­ propriately equated with independence and assumed to be in opposition to relatedness. Kagitcibasi argued in­ stead that autonomy is orthogonal to relatedness and actually more synonymous with agency: Agency, as constmed by Bandura (1989), refers to motivated action, with a sense of efficacy, toward a desired outcome. The dictionary definition of autonomy includes self-rule and volition . . . the construal of autonomy in this article . . . is in terms of agency that also involves volition. It is to be an agent and at the same time to act willingly, without a sense of coercion. Autonomy and agency are thus seen as overlapping, (p. 404)

Kagitcibasi (2005) goes on to argue that autonomy is a fundamental human need, regardless of culture, but that culture is one determinant of the goals—the desired out­ come—toward which individuals direct their autonomy. In individualist cultures, the desired outcome is often individ­ uation and individual-self-serving goals, but in collectivist 665

cultures, autonomy is often expressed in terms of seeking relatedness and achieving interpersonal goals. Step 5 : D e riv e specific hyp o th eses b a s e d on th e a n s w e rs to these questions fro m Step 4 .

This broad understanding of autonomy leads to several specific hypotheses about the cultural validity of the PGIS. If the PGIS measures aspects of autonomy that are separate from Kagitcibasi’s (2005) orthogonal relatedness motiva­ tion, PGIS scores should be uncorrelated with measures of relatedness, such as interdependent self-construal (Hypoth­ esis 6). Indeed, in a sample of Mexican American college students, PGIS scores were not related to interdependent self-construal for women or men (Robitschek, 2003), al­ though PGIS scores were related to independent self-con­ strual, instrumentality, assertiveness, and internal locus of control. Moreover, if the PGIS measures a culturally uni­ versal drive for personal growth, PGIS scores should be— and were— unrelated to measures of cultural identification, such as acculturation (Hypothesis 7). These data support the conclusion that neither the construct of PGI nor its measurement via the PGIS is culturally limited. Here we see that following the steps of the CLA yielded both theoretical and empirical evidence to support the cultural validity of the PGIS in ways that go beyond simple tests of metric, measurement, or linguistic equiva­ lence. However, even in cases such as this in which cultural validity seems to be affirmed, the CLA raises additional, novel research questions and hypotheses. Specifically, con­ sidering Kagitcibasi’s (2005) definition of autonomy forced us to reflect on the fact that PGI theory explicitly states that the specific domains in which one chooses to grow are individually determined. Implicit in this is the assumption that the ways in which PGI manifests in an individual likely are culturally determined (Hypothesis 8); thus, we might hypothesize that someone with a more independent selfconstrual would be more likely to identify domains for growth that will bring self-satisfaction or personal achieve­ ment, whereas someone with a more interdependent selfconstrual might be more likely to select domains for growth that are encouraged by family or other significant commu­ nities. This hypothesis could be tested by asking participants to list some number of important domains of growth, coding these domains as independent or interdependent (cf. Somech, 2000), and then correlating participants’ selfconstrual scores with these codes. We would expect that higher interdependence would be associated with listing more interdependent domains of growth, whereas higher independence would be associated with listing more inde­ pendent domains of growth (Hypothesis 8a). This hypoth­ esis could also be tested by manipulating participants’ self-construal (e.g., through priming tasks; see Oyserman & Lee, 2008) and then asking them to identify important domains of growth. We would expect that participants randomly assigned to the interdependent priming condition would list more interpersonally focused domains of growth than would participants assigned to the independent prim­ ing condition (Hypothesis 8b).

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S u m m a ry . Concerns about the cultural validity of PGI theory have centered on the extent to which it is appropriate to expect autonomy and pursuit of personal goals from members of more collectivist cultures. The CLA challenges us to apply a culturally informed definition of autonomy as agency (Kagitcibasi, 2005), separate from a motivation for relatedness. In doing so, we see that the concept of active, intentional involvement in achieving a desired outcome is likely to be universally relevant. More­ over, the CLA challenges us to recognize that for more interdependent individuals, the personal is interpersonal: Nothing in PGI theory precludes conceptualizing related­ ness goals as relevant domains for personal growth. This perspective leads to several novel hypotheses, including that manipulating participants’ self-construal will lead to predictable differences in the most salient domains of growth they identify (Hypothesis 8b).

Conclusion We have shown that the cultural lens approach is broadly relevant, applying it to theories from social (Festinger, 1957), vocational (Holland, 1997), and positive (Robitschek et al., 2012) psychology. The CLA is so widely relevant because it is not limited to assessing the cultural validity of individual differences measures, but it may be applied more broadly to assess the cultural validity of theoretical propositions about the relationships between constructs and the cultural validity of experimental manip­ ulations and behavioral operationalizations. The steps of the CLA provide a clear framework for researchers to use in engaging in culturally competent scholarship (cf. APA, 2003) by providing a structure for examining cultural assumptions, seeking relevant culturally specific information, and integrating this knowledge to broaden understanding of theoretical constructs and their operationalizations. Importantly, as demonstrated through­ out this article, applying the CLA raises multiple new testable hypotheses (see Table 1 for a summary) that not only provide rigorous and more nuanced tests of cultural validity but also extend theoretical applications. Thus, the CLA has the potential to stimulate new research and gen­ erate important new culturally relevant knowledge. Although our examples focused on evaluating the cultural validity of existing theories, proceeding through the CLA’s five steps may facilitate the development of new, more culturally valid theories. Scholars may use the approach to make explicit their implicit assumptions about central constructs and then to ask themselves the key ques­ tions highlighted previously, such as “What alternate con­ ceptualizations, operationalizations, or manipulations of the relevant constructs have been used in the literature?” “To what extent might the constructs or experimental tasks have a different meaning to members of different groups?” Such questions, in fact, have implicitly guided the devel­ opment of PGI theory and maintained the inclusive focus on individually determined domains of growth. By implic­ itly considering questions such as “To what extent is per­ sonal growth manifested in different ways by members of

October 2014 • American Psychologist

different groups?” Robitschek and her colleagues appear to have developed both theoretical propositions and specific measures that demonstrate good cultural validity thus far. Much of our discussion has focused on how an indi­ vidualistic bias has narrowed the ways in which constructs such as the self have been defined. In applying the CLA to other theories, additional aspects of culture, such as tight­ ness-looseness (the extent to which deviation from cultural norms is tolerated), complexity (Triandis, 1989), or power distance (the extent to which inequities in power are ex­ pected and accepted; Hofstede, 1983) may emerge as key considerations in changing the cultural lenses through which we view theories. As knowledge about cultural processes and the dimen­ sions underlying cultural differences accumulates, we must critically reevaluate our assumptions about and understand­ ing of theoretical propositions in light of this new cultural knowledge. We must not only question the extent to which psychological theories are limited but the extent to which our interpretation and understanding of those theories is limited by the cultural lenses through which we view them. By trying on different lenses using our ever-increasing knowledge about cultural processes, we will likely find that existing theories have broader relevance and application than previously realized, and we will generate new hypoth­ eses that stimulate future research. The Cultural Lens Ap­ proach to evaluating the cultural validity of psychological theories challenges us to question not only theories them­ selves but our culturally based understanding of them, with the promise of generating new knowledge and enhancing the relevance of psychological theory for people in all corners of the world. REFERENCES American Psychological Association. (2003). Guidelines on multicultural education, training, research, practice, and organizational change for psychologists. American Psychologist, 58, 377-402. doi: 10.1037/0003066X.58.5.377 Anderson, C. A., & Bushman, B. J. (1997). External validity of “trivial” experiments: The case of laboratory aggression. Review o f General Psychology, 1, 19-41. doi: 10.1037/1089-2680.1.1.19 Bagozzi, R. P., Wong, N., & Yi, Y. (1999). The role of culture and gender in the relationship between positive and negative affect. Cognition & Emotion, 13, 641-672. doi.T0.1080/026999399379023 Benet-Martmez, V., Leu, J., Lee, F„ & Morris, M. W. (2002). Negotiating biculturalism: Cultural frame switching in biculturals with oppositional versus compatible cultural identities. Journal o f Cross-Cultural Psy­ chology, 33, 492-516. doi: 10.1177/0022022102033005005 Blustein, D. L. (2008). The role of work in psychological health and well-being: A conceptual, historical, and public policy perspective. American Psychologist, 63, 228-240. doi:10.1037/0003-066X.63.4 .228 Borsboom, D„ Mellenbergh, G. J., & van Heerden, J. (2004). The concept of validity. Psychological Review, III, 1061-1071. doi:10.1037/0033295X.11L4.1061 Brehm. J. W. (1956). Postdecision changes in the desirability of alterna­ tives. The Journal o f Abnormal and Social Psychology, 52, 384-389. doi:10.1037/h0041006 Brown, M. T. (1995). The career development of African Americans: Theoretical and empirical issues. In F. T. L. Leong (Ed.), Career development and vocational behavior o f racial and ethnic minorities (pp. 7-36). Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum.

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