Journal of Youth and Adolescence, Vol. 4, No. 1, 1975
The Structure of Moral Character and the Explanation of Moral Action Robert Hogan ~
Received September 11, 1974
This article discusses the relationship between human rule systems and social action. It assumes that all meaningful behavior is rule-governed. I f so, then individual differences in moral conduct can be explained in terms o f differences in the manner in which people use, justify, and maintain rules. Specifically, moral behavior can be understood in terms o f five dimensions: moral knowledge, style o f moral judgment, socialization, empathy, and autonomy. Evidence is presented which suggests that these dimensions can be objectively assessed and that the model works reasonably well in predicting and explaining moral conduct.
INTRODUCTION This article presents a point of view concerning the relationship between human rule systems and human nature, and reviews some evidence supporting this viewpoint. It is organized in five sections. The first provides an overview or metatheory from which a more specific model of moral development can be derived. The second section contains some definitions on which much of the subsequent discussion depends. The third section describes a means of conceptualizing moral development; this model serves both to explain a considerable range of moral conduct and to define some important parameters o f character development. The fourth section offers evidence in support of the model. The final section points up some implications of considering the origins of moral conduct in these terms. 1Associate Professor of Psychology, The Johns Hopkins University, Baltimore, Maryland. Received his Ph.D. from the University of California, Berkeley. Professional interests include personality theory and moral development. 1 0 1 9 7 5 P l e n u m Publishing C o r p o r a t i o n , 2 2 7 West 1 7 t h Street, New Y o r k , N , Y . 1 0 0 1 1 . N o part o f this p u b l i c a t i o n m a y be r e p r o d u c e d , stored in a retrieval system, or t r a n s m i t t e d , in a n y f o r m o r b y a n y means, e l e c t r o n i c , mechanical, p h o t o c o p y i n g , m i c r o f i l m i n g , r e c o r d i n g , o r o t h e r w i s e , w i t h o u t w r i t t e n permission o f t h e Publisher.
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METATHEORETICAL CONSIDERATIONS The dynamics of social conduct can be described in terms of a very modest (and therefore oversimplified) motivational theory. Let us assume first that most people need social interaction--they require recognition, approval, affiliation, and attention. Second, let us assume that most people need structure, order, and predictability in their lives. These assumptions suggest that man is, simultaneously, an attention-seeking and rule-following animal, that he is strongly disposed toward social interaction within a rule-governed framework, and that recurrent interactions will tend quickly to become ritualized. As Berger and Luckmann (1967) observe, the second time two people meet, they tend to repeat, as a matter of convenience, whatever they did on the first occasion. As they start to repeat these activities on the third meeting, they may experience a sense of "Here we go again!" On subsequenfmeetings, it will become increasingly difficult to deviate from the pattern the interaction has previously taken. If at a later time a third person joins the group, the established ritual will seem arbitrary to that person and require justification--this justification becomes a process of socializing the newcomer with respect to the ritual. Consider for a moment what happens the first time we visit someone's home, business, or laboratory. We are given a brief and often very explicit introductory course in how things are done there. Moreover, the nature of the subsequent interaction will depend on how well these rules are observed. Thus interactions as simple as those associated with the morning cup of coffee tend inexorably to become ritualized. Max Weber referred to this phenomenon on a larger scale as "routinization." Ritualization and routinization are inherent in organizations or social systems of any type. Their dynamics are rooted in human nature and can be derived from the motivational assumptions sketched above. In a earlier article, Hogan and Henley (1970) proposed as a formal analytical perspective that man be considered as a rule-following and rule-formulating animal. The term "nomotics" was introduced to denote the study of human rule systems, and it was suggested that most, if not all, social behavior can be conceptualized from a nomotic perspective. Obvious examples of nomotic behavior systems include games, languages, and moralities. Three points from that earlier article are apposite to the present discussion. First, a nomotic perspective provides a more formally adequate and intellectually satisfying solution to the problem of the explanation of social behavior than does either behaviorism or structuralism. Excellent recent discussions of this point may be found in Hart6 and Secord (1973), Mischel (1969), Peters (1958), yon Wright (1971), and Winch (1958). These writers all converge on the conclusion, crudely stated, that a proper explanation of social conduct will take account of the rules an actor is following. A second implication of the nomotic perspective is that individual differences in social behavior, moral conduct, and, finally, character structure can be
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explained in terms o f differences in the manner in which people use, justify, and maintain rules. People differ strongly with regard to the kinds of rules they are and are not willing to observe; there are, of course, underlying dynamic processes that produce these differences in rule observance. These processes are normally referred to as "character structure." A third and perhaps most important implication of the nomotic perspective is that skillful and mature practitioners o f any rule system inevitably develop a sense of "the spirit of the game." They develop a perspective, variously called "chivalry," "sportsmanship," "a sense of fair play," or "the concept of justice," that allows them to compensate for the inequities that inevitably arise in practice. In the spirit of fairness, the rules of the game are often momentarily set aside while the moral balance is restored; only then can play be resumed. Thus the spirit of the game is a rough and ready but not entirely reliable means of compensating for the imperfect nature of all rule systems. As an example, good tennis players will sometimes allow an opponent to win a point uncontested if they feel the opponent has lost a point through an incorrect decision by a line judge. Before closing this metatheoretical discussion, it is worth making a distinction between first- and second-order nomotic behavior (i.e., doing vs. codifying). Both derive from man's need for order and tendencies to ritualize social interactions. However, first-order nomotic behavior refers to rule use as manifested in overt social conduct. Second-order nomotic behavior includes all those quasi-legal preoccupations that produce by-laws, rules of order, The Watch Officer's Guide, taxonomies such as Pliny's bestiary, almanacs, the Dictionary o f Occupational Titles, the Encyclopedia Brittanica, and most scholarship. Furthermore, first- and second-order nomotic behavior regulate and facilitate social interaction. Consequently, they may well be adaptive biological emergents rather than the unfortunate aftermath of fussy toilet-training and an obsessive concern with fecal matter. DEFINITIONS
Morality
Hart (1961) proposed that the basis of any morality is a system of rules of conduct which defines a network of reciprocal rights and obligations and which prohibits at least gross acts of malevolence. Similarly, Piaget (1965) remarked that "all morality consists in a system of rules, and the essence of morality is to be sought for in the respect which the individual acquires for these rules." Gert (1970) nicely captures the rule-based nature of morality: The moral rules are central to morality. And the moral philosopher ought to be concerned only with that code of conduct of which the moral rules form the
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Thus moralities are systems o f rules, external to people, designed to guide social and interpersonal behavior, which can be to some degree codified and spelled out. A given morality need not be entirely compatible with or unequivocally promote the welfare of everyone subject to its demands; moreover, it need not be particularly equitable when judged from an "external point o f view" (cf. Hart, 1961, p. 86). Moral Conduct Moral conduct is behavior which has as its referent the rules that apply in a given social context. This includes such categories o f social action as obeying, disobeying, enforcing, subverting, learning, and using rules. All these are forms o f moral conduct or misconduct that require explanation. In terms o f sheer frequency of occurrence, however, obedience or rule compliance is the most important form o f moral conduct in everyday life. That is, moral behavior in every case ultimately comes down to following or disregarding a specific social rule of some sort; consequently, the major focus o f the present discussion, and a major problem for social psychology, broadly defined, is to account for compliance (or noncompliance) with social norms. Moral Character I take the somewhat old-fashioned view that people develop more or less stable sets of (often unconscious) values, expectations, and b e l i e f s - i.e., a character structure -- that generate specific instances of nomotic behavior. The concept o f character, as AUport (1961) noted, is closely related to the notion o f personality (e.g., character is personality evaluated, personality is character devaluated). Character can be defined in terms of a person's orientation toward the social rules that ostensibly govern his behavior. That is, character structure is a function of a person's largely unconscious, typified ways of selecting, using, justifying, and enforcing rules. Ichheiser's (1970) distinction between "views in principle" and "views in fact" is relevant here. As he observes, views in principle are those we hold about social issues in general, views which d o n ' t have any serious implications for our actions. They are like games we play with ourselves, and reveal only how we think we would or should act when faced by certain situations or issues. In contrast, according to Ichheiser, views in fact actually determine our actions. They are the true basis of social conduct. Most people, however, don't know what views they hold in fact, because these views
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are typically unconscious, and if they are asked to comment on an issue they typically report their views in principle. Measures such as the Study of Values (Allport, 1961), most social psychological attitude research, and Kohlberg's (I 964) measure of moral judgment assess views in principle. Consequently, these measures tend only weakly to predict overt behavior. On the other hand, the totality of a person's views in fact -- in Ichheiser's terms -- is roughly what is meant here by character structure.
A PERSPECTIVE ON MORAL DEVELOPMENT
If moral conduct can be explained in terms of the manner in which people think about and use rules, then it is important to determine the major parameters around which people vary with respect to rule usage. These same parameters are also related to character structure; that is, character structure initially arises from, then subsequently conditions and determines, the manner in which one uses social rules. Thus there is, at a deep level, a correspondence between character structure and stylistic differences in nomotic behavior. It has proven theoretically and empirically useful to conceptualize moral character and to interpret moral conduct in terms of five dimensions (two are cognitive, three are affective). These dimensions reflect certain enduring themes in philosophy and psychology, and are conceptually independent and operationally distinguishable. In the remainder of this section, I will describe each dimension, speculate on how it develops within the individual, and indicate its role in the explication of moral conduct. Moral Knowledge
The first and minimal requirement for moral action is knowledge of the applicable moral r u l e s - one cannot comply with an unknown rule. Moral knowledge is a cognitive dimension; i.e., knowledge of a rule entails no impulsion to action. Moral knowledge implies only that one can state a rule, or that one regularly acts so that his knowledge can be readily inferred. During their moral educations, people leam three distinct kinds of rules: (1) specific, usually negative injunctions that apply to very concrete situat i o n s - e.g., "Don't pick your nose in public," "Don't hit your sister"; (2) v a l u e s - decision rules that allow one to make moral judgments and to assign priorities to actions; (3) comparison rules -- cognitive strategies by which one is able to compare what he is actually doing with the idealized norms defined in (1) and (2) above. Moral knowledge is a necessary but insufficient precondition for moral conduct; and it serves two functions. First, it provides the foundation for prudential action; action in accordance with social norms is usually in one's best
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interests, but such action is possible only if one knows the rules. Second, moral knowledge provides the possibility of rational self-control. That is, knowledge of concrete injunctions and socially relevant values, when combined with the ability to compare one's ongoing behavior with these norms, affords one the opportunity to regulate one's actions accordingly. It is obvious, however, that one won't regulate his actions in accordance with the rules of a game he doesn't want to play. This points up the limits of moral knowledge as an explanatory concept with regard to moral conduct. Moral knowledge is a function of the quality and diversity of the developing person's social experience, and of the person's ability to discover the rules that underlie social conduct. This suggests a relationship at the conceptual level between moral knowledge and intelligence. It also suggests that people will vary considerably with regard to the complexity and abstractness of their moral thought. The Ethics of Conscience and the Ethics of Responsibility The second cognitive dimension of moral development has to do with the degree to which people regard rules as a useful means for ordering and regulating their lives, i.e., the degree to which people perceive rules as having instrumental value. Some people prefer to govern their interpersonal affairs in terms of relatively explicit agreements concerning mutual rights and obligations, whereas others prefer to deal with each situation as it arises. The first position is closely aligned with classic Utilitarian ethics wherein the law is seen as a rational instrument of social reform and its justification resides in the degree to which it fulfills such purposes -- good laws maximize the common good, bad laws work against it. This position I call the "ethics of responsibility." The second perspective is called the "ethics of conscience"; it is a viewpoint wherein social conduct tends to be regulated by personal and intuitive notions of morality and wherein the manifest law is regarded with some detachment if not actual suspicion. The emphasis is constantly on what the self-directed individual perceives as the right thing for him personally to do, with minimum essential regard for established norms and conventions. This position represents the dominant viewpoint of the American intellectual establishment. Although these two perspectives seem strongly related to individual temperament, they are undoubtedly fostered and encouraged during development by adult models and by systematic instruction. Socialization The first of the affective dimensions is called "socialization," although this may be an unfortunate if not actually misleading choice of terms. The defining
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feature of socialization and the critical nomotic attitude involved is the sense that the rules and values of one's society, culture, and family are personally obligatory and binding. To the degree that one perceives these rules and values as alien, external, and intrusive, he is unsocialized. Durkheim (1961) suggested that the first stage in moral development involves acquiring a sense of respect for the existing rules of one's social milieu. Freud (1960) agreed and attempted to account for the dynamics of this phenomenon through his discussion of the Oedipus complex, the resolution of which results in a child's internalizing parental norms and values. G. H. Mead (1934) explained internalization of social rules in terms of the evolution of roletaking ability within each person. As role-taking skill evolves, one becomes progressively willing to regulate his own behavior in terms of external social norms. Internalization of social rules brings about a qualitative transformation in character structure. In the absence of further developmental changes, it also produces a characterological syndrome which Piaget (1965)called "moral realism," and which we call the "ethics of authority." Such persons act as if rules have been handed down by the godhead and are, consequently, sacred and immutable, to be valued for their own sake. Social learning theory (Bandura, 1971) explains socialization in terms of the "acquisition" of behavior or response dispositions. A child observes a relevant adult model act according to a social norm, which action is followed by a desirable outcome of some sort (e.g., the actor is praised or otherwise rewarded). Such events strengthen the likelihood that the child will act in a socialized fashion in similar circumstances. It follows, however, that when the rewards stop coming the socialized responses will tend to drop out of the child's "repertoire of behavior." Thus social learning theory fails to capture the essence of socialization as conceptualized by Durkheim, Freud, Mead, and Piaget; i.e., if a rule is internalized, it will be followed regardless of the consequences of rule compliance to the actor. Indeed, from this older perspective, conscience may act completely contrary to reason. The childhood origins of socialization are reasonably well understood. Generally speaking, warm but restrictive parents produce the most socialized children. Children of cold, restrictive parents tend to be anxious and neurotic; children of cold, permissive parents tend to be aggressive and delinquent; children of warm, permissive parents tend to be sociopathic. Two reasons suggest that there is more to moral development than socialization. First, there is a driveness about such behavior that removes it from the category of ethical choice. Although socialized behavior is by definition moral behavior, it is somehow not "truly" moral. Second, it is empirically the case that many people are able to comply with social rules that they experience as alien and external (cf. Kurtines and Hogan, 1972). Thus some mechanism must develop which facilitates compliance in addition to the dynamics of socialization.
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The second affective dimension is called "empathy," which here refers to the capacity and disposition to regulate one's behavior in terms of the expectations of others. To the degree that one takes account of the expectation of his family, social group, or community, he is considered to be empathic. Utilitarian philosophers as early as the Second Earl of Shaftesbury have argued that man has an innate capacity for social sensitivity which, when allowed to develop normally, regulates his social conduct. Development of an empathic disposition also produces a transformation in character structure. In persons who are unsocialized, empathy provides the foundations for prosocial conduct, the stimulus for compliance with social norms. In persons who are otherwise well socialized, an empathic disposition will serve to humanize the moral realism of the preceding stage. Empathy provides the possibility of a person's setting a rule aside for the sake of a human need. One should be very careful, however, not to consider empathy as a good guy-bad guy syndrome. In the absence of further developmental changes, too much empathy can be as maladaptive as too little; i.e., one can be too concerned with the needs, the expectations, and the welfare of others. Thus empathy can produce equivocation and indecisiveness as well as tact, sympathy, and concern. The developmental antecedents of empathy are not well understood. It is possible, however, to make a few informed guesses about the origins of this aspect of character development. First, empathy entails adopting alternative perspectives with regard to one's actions, an intellectual task that is quite similar to spatial reasoning. Thus there must be some association between empathy and intelligence, a hypothesis first suggested by Mead (1934). Second, empathy is probably related to role-taking practice in childhood. Parents, therefore, who are too consistent in the way they treat their children, who give them no training in adopting alternative perspectives, probably fail to stimulate their children's natural empathic tendencies. Third, as Allport (1961) suggested, empathic tendencies are undoubtedly stimulated by adversity- the disposition to put oneself in another person's place probably results from having suffered at some point in one's own life. Autonomy The third affective dimension is called "autonomy," referring to the capacity to make moral choices that are uninfluenced by peer group pressure, prestige factors, and the dictates of authority. In moral philosophy and psychology, the concept of autonomy is more closely associated with European writers -- especiaUy the Swiss and Germans -- than with the English Utilitarians. Kant argued, for example, that conduct guided by considerations of prudence (appeals to the
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welfare of society as a whole are obviously, au fond, prudential in nature) are nonmoral in principle. Rather, truly moral conduct stems from an autonomous will and a personal (although rather mysterious) sense of duty. Nietzsche's prototype of the autonomous person, the Uebermensch, honors moral obligations because "that's the way men treat one another when they are free." Freud's genital character, whom Rieff (1959) has termed "Psychological Man," has insight into the unconscious sources of his moral compulsions; nonetheless, he remains rule-observant. The difference between a person who is guided by his irrational superego and Psychological Man is that the latter has replaced repression with condemnation- the outward effects on social behavior remain the same. Durkheim (1961) also considered autonomous rule compliance to be the hallmark of the moral man. Piaget (1965), who seems to have taken many of his ideas on moral development from Durkheim, also suggests that the end point of moral development is the emergence of an autonomous morality. Discussions of the development of an autonomous sense of duty may also be found in James (1962) and McDougall ( 1 9 0 8 ) - it's interesting to note in this regard that both James and McDougall were primarily influenced by European writers. The development of an autonomous sense of social obligation brings about a final qualitative transformation in the structure of moral character. In conjunction with high socialization and high empathy, it produces an ethics of equity --i.e., moral maturity. In conjunction with low empathy and high socialization, autonomy will tend to produce a stern, patriarchical, Old Testament morali s t - Melville's Captain Ahab, Hugo's Inspector Javert, Dickens' Madame La Farge. In conjunction with low empathy and low socialization, autonomy will tend to produce tough, effective, resolute, unyielding scoundrels. Literary exampies would include Shakespeare's Richard III and Kierkegaard's demonic man. The childhood antecedents of autonomy have been explored very effectively by Baumrind (1971). To summarize a good deal of developmental data, the most autonomous children are produced by authoritative parents. Such parents are strong, individualistic, independent, and demanding; thus they provide their children with vivid adult models of autonomous behavior. Authoritative parents dearly label certain actions as worthy of praise or blame, explain their roles, make their approval contingent on the child's meeting specified standards of performance. The authoritative parent can, in an oversimplified way, be contrasted with an authoritarian parent on the one hand, and with an undemanding, overprotecting, permissive parent on the other. Both of the latter types tend to produce children who are less than autonomous. As a means of summarizing the foregoing discussion, socialization, empathy, and autonomy provide three distinct sets of reasons for compliance with social norms. Initially, one does X because there is a rule which he regards as personally binding that requires X; later, one does X because others expect it of one; still later, one does X because that is just the sort of person he is. There
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are also three different sets of dynamics or forms of guilt associated with socialization, empathy, and autonomy. That is, initially one does X in part out of fear of parental disapproval; later, one does X partly from fear of peer and social disapproval; finally, one does X out of fear of self-disapproval. Guilt arising from self-disapproval is probably what Miller and Swanson (1966, p. 174) refer to as "mature self-critical guilt," the only form of moral emotion actually related to moral conduct.
SOME EVIDENCE Evidence in support of the foregoing model for conceptualizing the structure of moral character and explaining moral conduct can be placed in two categories. The first concerns how well the dimensions can be-assessed or operationally defined. The fact that these dimensions can be treated within a psychometric framework in itself tends to add to the persuasiveness of the model. The second category includes studies regarding the evaluation of the model proper.
Moral Knowledge Mailer (1944) convincingly argues that measures of moral knowledge can be regarded as surrogate indices of intelligence. From the present perspective, therefore, moral knowledge is regarded as adequately assessed by any standardized measure of intellectual performance. Concerning the influence of moral knowledge on one's capacity for prudential self-control, one source of evidence comes from the field of corrections. That is, it is an obvious but little remarked upon fact that intelligence test scores predict the delinquency-nondelinquency criterion about as well as any other sociopsychological index, including social class and the socialization scale of the California Psychological Inventory. Given that tests of moral knowledge and intelligence are functionally equivalent, and that incarcerated delinquents tend to be less bright than the normal population, the model presented here suggests that these facts are in part mediated by the delinquent's reduced ability to compare his actions with idealized norms of conduct. Such comparisons, we have argued, provide the potential for prudential self-control.
The Ethics of Conscience and the Ethics of Responsibility The ethics of conscience-ethics of responsibility continuum can be assessed reasonably well with the Survey of Ethical Attitudes (SEA; Hogan, 1970). Low scores on this reliable 35-item scale reflect a personal conscience orienta-
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tion; high scores indicate a social responsibility viewpoint. The scale nicely discriminates between persons who are preoccupied with promoting social change (political activists, street demonstrators) and those who are more concerned with the preservation and maintenance of existing forms and institutions (police). With regard to the bipolar continuum formed by the ethics of conscience and responsibility, Hogan and Dickstein (1972b) found that persons who believed in the innate goodness of man and considered corrupt institutions as the primary source of injustice in society tend to endorse the ethics of conscience. Conversely, persons who are suspicious about man's natural tendencies and who regard social institutions as an important check on man's otherwise antisocial leanings tend to endorse the ethics of responsibility. Similarly, MacDonald (1971) found that the ethics of responsibility is associated with a tendency to hold individuals responsible for their misfortune. Kilkowski and Makransky (1973) found that the ethics of conscience was associated with a proclivity toward social innovation- in particular with a tendency toward marijuana use before such a practice became commonplace. Socialization
Socialization can be assessed with the socialization scale of the California Psychological Inventory (CPI; Gough, 1969). Evidence concerning the development and validation of this reliable and unusually powerful scale can be found in Megargee (1972). High scores on this scale reflect an unambivalent and unconflicted rule-following disposition. Low scores indicate hostility toward authority, conflict, and rebelliousness. Perhaps the most important recent finding concerning socialization stems from a suggestion by Waddington (1967) that the dynamics of culture necessarily presuppose that children spontaneously accept the dictates of adult authority. Stayton et al. (1971) found, with children in the 11-month age range, that maternal warmth and nurturance strongly predicted compliance with maternal commands. This raises the possibility that socialization is an emergent phenomenon rather than an alien intrusion as described by Freud. Empathy
Empathy can be assessed using a 64-item empathy scale (Hogan, 1969), 39 items of which are found on the CPI. Evidence for the reliability and validity of this empathy scale is summarized in Greif and Hogan (1973). High scores on the scale reflect perceptiveness, sensitivity to interpersonal expectations, and competence and poise in social situations. Low scores reflect insensitivity, tactlessness, and indifference to the regard of others.
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The interaction between socialization and empathy suggests a simple but interesting typology. That is, other things being equal, persons high on both scales should be "morally mature," and persons low on both scales should be delinquent. Those who score high on socialization and low on empathy should be hard-nosed rule followers, relatively unconcerned with the needs of others~ conversely, those who score low on socialization but high on empathy should be cavalier about rules, but much concerned with pleasant and convivial social relations. Little information is available about persons with high scores on both scales -- they are relatively rare -- however, our theoretical predictions have been nicely confirmed for the other three types. That is, heroin addicts, who are a clearly delinquent subgroup in this society, receive alarmingly low scores for both scales (cf. Kurtines et al., 1975). Undergraduate marijuana smokers, on the other hand, receive low scores for socialization but high scores for empathy (cf. Hogan et al., 1970). Police officers tend to receive high scores for socialization and low scores for empathy (cf. Hogan, 1971). Autonomy Autonomy can be assessed using a 38-item autonomy scale, also scorable from the CPI. Information concerning the development, reliability, and validity of this scale is contained in Kurtines (1973). High scorers on the scale are forceful, self-assured, and rather i n d e p e n d e n t - particularly with regard to matters of personal concern. Low scorers are passive, appreciative, and conforming. Finally, there is some evidence that the complete model works as it should. One important piece of information is the degree to which the measures used to assess the five dimensions are independent. Table I presents the best recent evidence concerning the correlations among the scales used to assess the dimensions. Other researchers will want to verify the magnitude of these correlations for themselves. Nonetheless, as Table I suggests, the scales are sufficiently independent to be useful. A more important question concerns the relationship between these measures and other indices of character development. Table I also presents some preliminary data on this subject. Hogan and Dickstein (1972a) developed a 15-item projective measure designed to assess maturity of moral judgment. The measure can be scored reliably, subjects' responses are stable across items, and scores derived from the measure were significantly associated with peer ratings for "sensitivity to injustice." The correlation between moral knowledge and mature moral judgment can be estimated from Kohlberg's (1964) data. With the exception of the Survey of Ethical Attitudes, the correlations in Table I support the model reasonably w e l l - people who make mature moral judgments (and, consequently, tend to be seen by peer informants as sensitive to injustice) tend
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Table I. Estimated Relationships Among Five Dimensions of Character Structure and Moral Maturity Correlations Dimensions
SEA
So
Em
Au
Moral maturity
Moral knowledge Ethics of responsibility (SEA) Socialization (So) Empathy (Em) Autonomy (Au)
0.00 -
0.00 0.26 -
0.30 -0.20 0.00 -
0.20 0.28 0.24 0.24 -
0.31 -0.40 0.40 0.50 0.00
to be well-socialized, empathic, but not necessarily autonomous. The negative correlation with the Survey of Ethical Attitudes may reflect the fact that the sociopolitical climate in America today tends to support a personal conscience m o r a l i t y - as exemplified by the Berrigans, Daniel Ellsberg, etc., and assigns higher value to responses characterizing that perspective. SOME IMPLICATIONS
The burden of the preceding sections can be summarized in three points. First, moral conduct can be explained in terms of the manner in which a person thinks about and uses social rules o f conduct. Second, moral character can be conceptualized in terms of a person's location along five dimensions of moral development. Third, it seems empirically fruitful to consider moral conduct and the growth of moral character in terms of a person's typical posture with regard to the norms o f his culture. Current thinkilag in anthropology and evolutionary theory (cf. Wallace, 1961; Eisenberg and Dillon, 1971; Mayr, 1963) suggests that man evolved as a hunter. For the largest proportion (e.g., 99%) o f his time on earth, Homo sapiens lived in small bands, each organized to kill game and members o f other bands as effectively as possible. Human society throughout prehistory consisted o f small groups literally struggling for survival. And the key to that survival was the quality o f the group rather than the talents of single individuals. Consequently, a clear adaptive advantage was conferred on those groups that developed an efficient social organization - defined in terms o f patterns of leadership, division of labor, systems of communication, transmission of knowledge, etc. Thus culture ot social organization rather than brain size was the key to man's evolutionary success. Man has evolved as a culture-bearing, norm-respecting animal -- his survivai depended on it. Moreover, social rules have to some degree taken the place o f instincts as regulators of social action. This means on the one hand that man
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has a deep, organic need for his culture, and on the other hand that his rulecompliance must be overdetermined. If one mechanism for insuring norm.observance fails, others will be available to compensate for that failure. Consequently, it may be a serious error to conceptualize moral development in terms of such one-step processes as superego formation or the emergence of role-taking ability. Rather, moral development may be more appropriately seen as a complex, multidimensional, and thoroughly overdetermined phenomenon.
REFERENCES Allport, G. W. (1961). Pattern and Growth in Personality, Holt, New York. Bandura, A. (1971). Social Learning Theory, General Learning Press, Morristown, N.J. Baumrind, D. (1971). Current patterns o f parental authority. Develop. Psychol. 4: Part 2. Berger, P. L., and Luckmann, T. (1967). The Social Construction of Reality, Doubleday, Garden City, N.Y. Durkhdm, E. (1961). Moral Education, Free Press, New York. Eisenberg, J. F., and Dillon, W. S. (1971). Man and Beast: Comparative Social Behavior, Smithsonian Institution Press, Washington, D.C. Freud, S. (1960). Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego, Bantam, New York. Gert, B. (1970). The Moral Rules, Harper and Row, New York. Gough, H. G. (1969). Manualfor the CaliforniaPsychological Inventory, rev. ed., Consulting Psychologists Press, Palo Alto, Calif. Greif, E. B., and Hogan, R. (1973). The theory and measurement of empathy. J. Couns. Psychol. 20: 280-284. HarrY, R., and Secord, P. F. (1973). The Explanation of Social Behavior, Littlefield, Totowa, N.J. Hart, H. L. A. (1961). The Concept of Law, Oxford University Press, Oxford. Hogan, R. (1969). Development of an empathy scale. J. Consult. Clin. Psychol. 33: 307-316. Hogan, R. (1970). A dimension of moral judgment. J. Consult. Clin. Psychol. 35: 205-212. Hogan, R. (1971). Personality characteristics of highly rated policemen. Personnel Psychol. 24: 679-686. Hogan, R., and Dickstein, E. (1972a). A measure of moral values. J. Consult. Clin. Psychol. 39: 210-214. Hogan, R., and Dickstein, E. (1972b). Moral judgment and perceptions of injustice. J. Personal. Soc. PsychoL 23: 409-413. Hogan, R., and Henley, N. (1970). Nomotics: The science of human rule systems. Law Soc. Rev. 5: 135-146. Hogan, R., Mankin, E., Conway, J., and Fox, S. (1970). Personality correlates of undergraduate marijuana use. J. Consult. Clin. PsychoL 35: 58-63. Ichheiser, G. (1970). Appearances and Reality, Jossey-Bass, San Francisco. James, W. (1962). Psychology: Briefer Course, Collier-Macmillan,London. Kilkowski, J., and Makransky, J. (1973). Moral posture and social innovation. Unpublished manuscript, Department of Psychology, Johns Hopkins University. Kotdberg, L. (1964). Development of moral character and ideology. In Hoffman, M. L., and Hoffman, L. W. (eds.), Review of Child Development Research, Vol. I, Sage Foundation, New York. Kartines, W. (1973). A measure of autonomy. Unpublished doctoral dissertation, Johns Hopkins University. Kurtines, W., and Hogan, R. (1972). Sources of conformity in unsocialized college students. J. Abnorm. Psychol. 80: 49-51.
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Kurtines, W., Hogan, R., and Weiss, D. (1975). Personality dynamics of heroin use. d. Abnorm. PsychoL, in press. MacDonald, A. P., Jr. (1971). Correlates of the ethics of personal conscience and the ethics of social responsibility. J. Consult. Clin. Psyehol. 37: 443. Mailer, J. B. (1944). Personality tests. In Hunt, J. M. (ed.), Personality and the Behavior Disorders, Ronald Press, New York. Mayr, E. (1963). Populations, Species, and Evolution, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Mass. McDougall, W. (1908). Social Psychology, Methuen, London. Mead, G. H. (1934). Mind, Self, and Society, University of Chicago Press, Chicago. Megargee, E. I. (1972). The California Psychological Inventory Handbook, Jossey-Bass, San Francisco. Miller, D. R., and Swanson, G. E. (1966). Inner Conflict and Defense, Shocken, New York. Mischel, T., ed. (1969). Human Action, Academic Press, New York. Peters, R. S. (1958). The Concept of Motivation, Routledge and Kegan Paul, London. Piaget, J. (1965). The Moral Judgment of the Child, Free Press, New York. Rieff, P. (1959). Freud. The Mind o f a Moralist, Doubleday, Garden City, N.Y. Stayton, D., Hogan, R., and Ainsworth, M. D. S. (1971). Infant obedience and maternal behavior: The origins of socialization reconsidered. Child Develop. 42: 1057-1069. yon Wright, G. H. (1971). Explanation and Understanding, CorneU University Press, Ithaca, N.Y. Waddington, C. H. (1967). The Ethical Animal, University of Chicago Press, Chicago. Wallace, A. F. C. (1961). Culture and Personality, Random House, New York. Winch, P. (1958). The Idea of a Social Science, Routledge and Kegan Paul, London.
The Structure of Moral Character and the Explanation of Moral Action Robert Hogan ~
Received September 11, 1974
This article discusses the relationship between human rule systems and social action. It assumes that all meaningful behavior is rule-governed. I f so, then individual differences in moral conduct can be explained in terms o f differences in the manner in which people use, justify, and maintain rules. Specifically, moral behavior can be understood in terms o f five dimensions: moral knowledge, style o f moral judgment, socialization, empathy, and autonomy. Evidence is presented which suggests that these dimensions can be objectively assessed and that the model works reasonably well in predicting and explaining moral conduct.
INTRODUCTION This article presents a point of view concerning the relationship between human rule systems and human nature, and reviews some evidence supporting this viewpoint. It is organized in five sections. The first provides an overview or metatheory from which a more specific model of moral development can be derived. The second section contains some definitions on which much of the subsequent discussion depends. The third section describes a means of conceptualizing moral development; this model serves both to explain a considerable range of moral conduct and to define some important parameters o f character development. The fourth section offers evidence in support of the model. The final section points up some implications of considering the origins of moral conduct in these terms. 1Associate Professor of Psychology, The Johns Hopkins University, Baltimore, Maryland. Received his Ph.D. from the University of California, Berkeley. Professional interests include personality theory and moral development. 1 0 1 9 7 5 P l e n u m Publishing C o r p o r a t i o n , 2 2 7 West 1 7 t h Street, New Y o r k , N , Y . 1 0 0 1 1 . N o part o f this p u b l i c a t i o n m a y be r e p r o d u c e d , stored in a retrieval system, or t r a n s m i t t e d , in a n y f o r m o r b y a n y means, e l e c t r o n i c , mechanical, p h o t o c o p y i n g , m i c r o f i l m i n g , r e c o r d i n g , o r o t h e r w i s e , w i t h o u t w r i t t e n permission o f t h e Publisher.
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METATHEORETICAL CONSIDERATIONS The dynamics of social conduct can be described in terms of a very modest (and therefore oversimplified) motivational theory. Let us assume first that most people need social interaction--they require recognition, approval, affiliation, and attention. Second, let us assume that most people need structure, order, and predictability in their lives. These assumptions suggest that man is, simultaneously, an attention-seeking and rule-following animal, that he is strongly disposed toward social interaction within a rule-governed framework, and that recurrent interactions will tend quickly to become ritualized. As Berger and Luckmann (1967) observe, the second time two people meet, they tend to repeat, as a matter of convenience, whatever they did on the first occasion. As they start to repeat these activities on the third meeting, they may experience a sense of "Here we go again!" On subsequenfmeetings, it will become increasingly difficult to deviate from the pattern the interaction has previously taken. If at a later time a third person joins the group, the established ritual will seem arbitrary to that person and require justification--this justification becomes a process of socializing the newcomer with respect to the ritual. Consider for a moment what happens the first time we visit someone's home, business, or laboratory. We are given a brief and often very explicit introductory course in how things are done there. Moreover, the nature of the subsequent interaction will depend on how well these rules are observed. Thus interactions as simple as those associated with the morning cup of coffee tend inexorably to become ritualized. Max Weber referred to this phenomenon on a larger scale as "routinization." Ritualization and routinization are inherent in organizations or social systems of any type. Their dynamics are rooted in human nature and can be derived from the motivational assumptions sketched above. In a earlier article, Hogan and Henley (1970) proposed as a formal analytical perspective that man be considered as a rule-following and rule-formulating animal. The term "nomotics" was introduced to denote the study of human rule systems, and it was suggested that most, if not all, social behavior can be conceptualized from a nomotic perspective. Obvious examples of nomotic behavior systems include games, languages, and moralities. Three points from that earlier article are apposite to the present discussion. First, a nomotic perspective provides a more formally adequate and intellectually satisfying solution to the problem of the explanation of social behavior than does either behaviorism or structuralism. Excellent recent discussions of this point may be found in Hart6 and Secord (1973), Mischel (1969), Peters (1958), yon Wright (1971), and Winch (1958). These writers all converge on the conclusion, crudely stated, that a proper explanation of social conduct will take account of the rules an actor is following. A second implication of the nomotic perspective is that individual differences in social behavior, moral conduct, and, finally, character structure can be
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explained in terms o f differences in the manner in which people use, justify, and maintain rules. People differ strongly with regard to the kinds of rules they are and are not willing to observe; there are, of course, underlying dynamic processes that produce these differences in rule observance. These processes are normally referred to as "character structure." A third and perhaps most important implication of the nomotic perspective is that skillful and mature practitioners o f any rule system inevitably develop a sense of "the spirit of the game." They develop a perspective, variously called "chivalry," "sportsmanship," "a sense of fair play," or "the concept of justice," that allows them to compensate for the inequities that inevitably arise in practice. In the spirit of fairness, the rules of the game are often momentarily set aside while the moral balance is restored; only then can play be resumed. Thus the spirit of the game is a rough and ready but not entirely reliable means of compensating for the imperfect nature of all rule systems. As an example, good tennis players will sometimes allow an opponent to win a point uncontested if they feel the opponent has lost a point through an incorrect decision by a line judge. Before closing this metatheoretical discussion, it is worth making a distinction between first- and second-order nomotic behavior (i.e., doing vs. codifying). Both derive from man's need for order and tendencies to ritualize social interactions. However, first-order nomotic behavior refers to rule use as manifested in overt social conduct. Second-order nomotic behavior includes all those quasi-legal preoccupations that produce by-laws, rules of order, The Watch Officer's Guide, taxonomies such as Pliny's bestiary, almanacs, the Dictionary o f Occupational Titles, the Encyclopedia Brittanica, and most scholarship. Furthermore, first- and second-order nomotic behavior regulate and facilitate social interaction. Consequently, they may well be adaptive biological emergents rather than the unfortunate aftermath of fussy toilet-training and an obsessive concern with fecal matter. DEFINITIONS
Morality
Hart (1961) proposed that the basis of any morality is a system of rules of conduct which defines a network of reciprocal rights and obligations and which prohibits at least gross acts of malevolence. Similarly, Piaget (1965) remarked that "all morality consists in a system of rules, and the essence of morality is to be sought for in the respect which the individual acquires for these rules." Gert (1970) nicely captures the rule-based nature of morality: The moral rules are central to morality. And the moral philosopher ought to be concerned only with that code of conduct of which the moral rules form the
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Thus moralities are systems o f rules, external to people, designed to guide social and interpersonal behavior, which can be to some degree codified and spelled out. A given morality need not be entirely compatible with or unequivocally promote the welfare of everyone subject to its demands; moreover, it need not be particularly equitable when judged from an "external point o f view" (cf. Hart, 1961, p. 86). Moral Conduct Moral conduct is behavior which has as its referent the rules that apply in a given social context. This includes such categories o f social action as obeying, disobeying, enforcing, subverting, learning, and using rules. All these are forms o f moral conduct or misconduct that require explanation. In terms o f sheer frequency of occurrence, however, obedience or rule compliance is the most important form o f moral conduct in everyday life. That is, moral behavior in every case ultimately comes down to following or disregarding a specific social rule of some sort; consequently, the major focus o f the present discussion, and a major problem for social psychology, broadly defined, is to account for compliance (or noncompliance) with social norms. Moral Character I take the somewhat old-fashioned view that people develop more or less stable sets of (often unconscious) values, expectations, and b e l i e f s - i.e., a character structure -- that generate specific instances of nomotic behavior. The concept o f character, as AUport (1961) noted, is closely related to the notion o f personality (e.g., character is personality evaluated, personality is character devaluated). Character can be defined in terms of a person's orientation toward the social rules that ostensibly govern his behavior. That is, character structure is a function of a person's largely unconscious, typified ways of selecting, using, justifying, and enforcing rules. Ichheiser's (1970) distinction between "views in principle" and "views in fact" is relevant here. As he observes, views in principle are those we hold about social issues in general, views which d o n ' t have any serious implications for our actions. They are like games we play with ourselves, and reveal only how we think we would or should act when faced by certain situations or issues. In contrast, according to Ichheiser, views in fact actually determine our actions. They are the true basis of social conduct. Most people, however, don't know what views they hold in fact, because these views
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are typically unconscious, and if they are asked to comment on an issue they typically report their views in principle. Measures such as the Study of Values (Allport, 1961), most social psychological attitude research, and Kohlberg's (I 964) measure of moral judgment assess views in principle. Consequently, these measures tend only weakly to predict overt behavior. On the other hand, the totality of a person's views in fact -- in Ichheiser's terms -- is roughly what is meant here by character structure.
A PERSPECTIVE ON MORAL DEVELOPMENT
If moral conduct can be explained in terms of the manner in which people think about and use rules, then it is important to determine the major parameters around which people vary with respect to rule usage. These same parameters are also related to character structure; that is, character structure initially arises from, then subsequently conditions and determines, the manner in which one uses social rules. Thus there is, at a deep level, a correspondence between character structure and stylistic differences in nomotic behavior. It has proven theoretically and empirically useful to conceptualize moral character and to interpret moral conduct in terms of five dimensions (two are cognitive, three are affective). These dimensions reflect certain enduring themes in philosophy and psychology, and are conceptually independent and operationally distinguishable. In the remainder of this section, I will describe each dimension, speculate on how it develops within the individual, and indicate its role in the explication of moral conduct. Moral Knowledge
The first and minimal requirement for moral action is knowledge of the applicable moral r u l e s - one cannot comply with an unknown rule. Moral knowledge is a cognitive dimension; i.e., knowledge of a rule entails no impulsion to action. Moral knowledge implies only that one can state a rule, or that one regularly acts so that his knowledge can be readily inferred. During their moral educations, people leam three distinct kinds of rules: (1) specific, usually negative injunctions that apply to very concrete situat i o n s - e.g., "Don't pick your nose in public," "Don't hit your sister"; (2) v a l u e s - decision rules that allow one to make moral judgments and to assign priorities to actions; (3) comparison rules -- cognitive strategies by which one is able to compare what he is actually doing with the idealized norms defined in (1) and (2) above. Moral knowledge is a necessary but insufficient precondition for moral conduct; and it serves two functions. First, it provides the foundation for prudential action; action in accordance with social norms is usually in one's best
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interests, but such action is possible only if one knows the rules. Second, moral knowledge provides the possibility of rational self-control. That is, knowledge of concrete injunctions and socially relevant values, when combined with the ability to compare one's ongoing behavior with these norms, affords one the opportunity to regulate one's actions accordingly. It is obvious, however, that one won't regulate his actions in accordance with the rules of a game he doesn't want to play. This points up the limits of moral knowledge as an explanatory concept with regard to moral conduct. Moral knowledge is a function of the quality and diversity of the developing person's social experience, and of the person's ability to discover the rules that underlie social conduct. This suggests a relationship at the conceptual level between moral knowledge and intelligence. It also suggests that people will vary considerably with regard to the complexity and abstractness of their moral thought. The Ethics of Conscience and the Ethics of Responsibility The second cognitive dimension of moral development has to do with the degree to which people regard rules as a useful means for ordering and regulating their lives, i.e., the degree to which people perceive rules as having instrumental value. Some people prefer to govern their interpersonal affairs in terms of relatively explicit agreements concerning mutual rights and obligations, whereas others prefer to deal with each situation as it arises. The first position is closely aligned with classic Utilitarian ethics wherein the law is seen as a rational instrument of social reform and its justification resides in the degree to which it fulfills such purposes -- good laws maximize the common good, bad laws work against it. This position I call the "ethics of responsibility." The second perspective is called the "ethics of conscience"; it is a viewpoint wherein social conduct tends to be regulated by personal and intuitive notions of morality and wherein the manifest law is regarded with some detachment if not actual suspicion. The emphasis is constantly on what the self-directed individual perceives as the right thing for him personally to do, with minimum essential regard for established norms and conventions. This position represents the dominant viewpoint of the American intellectual establishment. Although these two perspectives seem strongly related to individual temperament, they are undoubtedly fostered and encouraged during development by adult models and by systematic instruction. Socialization The first of the affective dimensions is called "socialization," although this may be an unfortunate if not actually misleading choice of terms. The defining
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feature of socialization and the critical nomotic attitude involved is the sense that the rules and values of one's society, culture, and family are personally obligatory and binding. To the degree that one perceives these rules and values as alien, external, and intrusive, he is unsocialized. Durkheim (1961) suggested that the first stage in moral development involves acquiring a sense of respect for the existing rules of one's social milieu. Freud (1960) agreed and attempted to account for the dynamics of this phenomenon through his discussion of the Oedipus complex, the resolution of which results in a child's internalizing parental norms and values. G. H. Mead (1934) explained internalization of social rules in terms of the evolution of roletaking ability within each person. As role-taking skill evolves, one becomes progressively willing to regulate his own behavior in terms of external social norms. Internalization of social rules brings about a qualitative transformation in character structure. In the absence of further developmental changes, it also produces a characterological syndrome which Piaget (1965)called "moral realism," and which we call the "ethics of authority." Such persons act as if rules have been handed down by the godhead and are, consequently, sacred and immutable, to be valued for their own sake. Social learning theory (Bandura, 1971) explains socialization in terms of the "acquisition" of behavior or response dispositions. A child observes a relevant adult model act according to a social norm, which action is followed by a desirable outcome of some sort (e.g., the actor is praised or otherwise rewarded). Such events strengthen the likelihood that the child will act in a socialized fashion in similar circumstances. It follows, however, that when the rewards stop coming the socialized responses will tend to drop out of the child's "repertoire of behavior." Thus social learning theory fails to capture the essence of socialization as conceptualized by Durkheim, Freud, Mead, and Piaget; i.e., if a rule is internalized, it will be followed regardless of the consequences of rule compliance to the actor. Indeed, from this older perspective, conscience may act completely contrary to reason. The childhood origins of socialization are reasonably well understood. Generally speaking, warm but restrictive parents produce the most socialized children. Children of cold, restrictive parents tend to be anxious and neurotic; children of cold, permissive parents tend to be aggressive and delinquent; children of warm, permissive parents tend to be sociopathic. Two reasons suggest that there is more to moral development than socialization. First, there is a driveness about such behavior that removes it from the category of ethical choice. Although socialized behavior is by definition moral behavior, it is somehow not "truly" moral. Second, it is empirically the case that many people are able to comply with social rules that they experience as alien and external (cf. Kurtines and Hogan, 1972). Thus some mechanism must develop which facilitates compliance in addition to the dynamics of socialization.
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The second affective dimension is called "empathy," which here refers to the capacity and disposition to regulate one's behavior in terms of the expectations of others. To the degree that one takes account of the expectation of his family, social group, or community, he is considered to be empathic. Utilitarian philosophers as early as the Second Earl of Shaftesbury have argued that man has an innate capacity for social sensitivity which, when allowed to develop normally, regulates his social conduct. Development of an empathic disposition also produces a transformation in character structure. In persons who are unsocialized, empathy provides the foundations for prosocial conduct, the stimulus for compliance with social norms. In persons who are otherwise well socialized, an empathic disposition will serve to humanize the moral realism of the preceding stage. Empathy provides the possibility of a person's setting a rule aside for the sake of a human need. One should be very careful, however, not to consider empathy as a good guy-bad guy syndrome. In the absence of further developmental changes, too much empathy can be as maladaptive as too little; i.e., one can be too concerned with the needs, the expectations, and the welfare of others. Thus empathy can produce equivocation and indecisiveness as well as tact, sympathy, and concern. The developmental antecedents of empathy are not well understood. It is possible, however, to make a few informed guesses about the origins of this aspect of character development. First, empathy entails adopting alternative perspectives with regard to one's actions, an intellectual task that is quite similar to spatial reasoning. Thus there must be some association between empathy and intelligence, a hypothesis first suggested by Mead (1934). Second, empathy is probably related to role-taking practice in childhood. Parents, therefore, who are too consistent in the way they treat their children, who give them no training in adopting alternative perspectives, probably fail to stimulate their children's natural empathic tendencies. Third, as Allport (1961) suggested, empathic tendencies are undoubtedly stimulated by adversity- the disposition to put oneself in another person's place probably results from having suffered at some point in one's own life. Autonomy The third affective dimension is called "autonomy," referring to the capacity to make moral choices that are uninfluenced by peer group pressure, prestige factors, and the dictates of authority. In moral philosophy and psychology, the concept of autonomy is more closely associated with European writers -- especiaUy the Swiss and Germans -- than with the English Utilitarians. Kant argued, for example, that conduct guided by considerations of prudence (appeals to the
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welfare of society as a whole are obviously, au fond, prudential in nature) are nonmoral in principle. Rather, truly moral conduct stems from an autonomous will and a personal (although rather mysterious) sense of duty. Nietzsche's prototype of the autonomous person, the Uebermensch, honors moral obligations because "that's the way men treat one another when they are free." Freud's genital character, whom Rieff (1959) has termed "Psychological Man," has insight into the unconscious sources of his moral compulsions; nonetheless, he remains rule-observant. The difference between a person who is guided by his irrational superego and Psychological Man is that the latter has replaced repression with condemnation- the outward effects on social behavior remain the same. Durkheim (1961) also considered autonomous rule compliance to be the hallmark of the moral man. Piaget (1965), who seems to have taken many of his ideas on moral development from Durkheim, also suggests that the end point of moral development is the emergence of an autonomous morality. Discussions of the development of an autonomous sense of duty may also be found in James (1962) and McDougall ( 1 9 0 8 ) - it's interesting to note in this regard that both James and McDougall were primarily influenced by European writers. The development of an autonomous sense of social obligation brings about a final qualitative transformation in the structure of moral character. In conjunction with high socialization and high empathy, it produces an ethics of equity --i.e., moral maturity. In conjunction with low empathy and high socialization, autonomy will tend to produce a stern, patriarchical, Old Testament morali s t - Melville's Captain Ahab, Hugo's Inspector Javert, Dickens' Madame La Farge. In conjunction with low empathy and low socialization, autonomy will tend to produce tough, effective, resolute, unyielding scoundrels. Literary exampies would include Shakespeare's Richard III and Kierkegaard's demonic man. The childhood antecedents of autonomy have been explored very effectively by Baumrind (1971). To summarize a good deal of developmental data, the most autonomous children are produced by authoritative parents. Such parents are strong, individualistic, independent, and demanding; thus they provide their children with vivid adult models of autonomous behavior. Authoritative parents dearly label certain actions as worthy of praise or blame, explain their roles, make their approval contingent on the child's meeting specified standards of performance. The authoritative parent can, in an oversimplified way, be contrasted with an authoritarian parent on the one hand, and with an undemanding, overprotecting, permissive parent on the other. Both of the latter types tend to produce children who are less than autonomous. As a means of summarizing the foregoing discussion, socialization, empathy, and autonomy provide three distinct sets of reasons for compliance with social norms. Initially, one does X because there is a rule which he regards as personally binding that requires X; later, one does X because others expect it of one; still later, one does X because that is just the sort of person he is. There
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are also three different sets of dynamics or forms of guilt associated with socialization, empathy, and autonomy. That is, initially one does X in part out of fear of parental disapproval; later, one does X partly from fear of peer and social disapproval; finally, one does X out of fear of self-disapproval. Guilt arising from self-disapproval is probably what Miller and Swanson (1966, p. 174) refer to as "mature self-critical guilt," the only form of moral emotion actually related to moral conduct.
SOME EVIDENCE Evidence in support of the foregoing model for conceptualizing the structure of moral character and explaining moral conduct can be placed in two categories. The first concerns how well the dimensions can be-assessed or operationally defined. The fact that these dimensions can be treated within a psychometric framework in itself tends to add to the persuasiveness of the model. The second category includes studies regarding the evaluation of the model proper.
Moral Knowledge Mailer (1944) convincingly argues that measures of moral knowledge can be regarded as surrogate indices of intelligence. From the present perspective, therefore, moral knowledge is regarded as adequately assessed by any standardized measure of intellectual performance. Concerning the influence of moral knowledge on one's capacity for prudential self-control, one source of evidence comes from the field of corrections. That is, it is an obvious but little remarked upon fact that intelligence test scores predict the delinquency-nondelinquency criterion about as well as any other sociopsychological index, including social class and the socialization scale of the California Psychological Inventory. Given that tests of moral knowledge and intelligence are functionally equivalent, and that incarcerated delinquents tend to be less bright than the normal population, the model presented here suggests that these facts are in part mediated by the delinquent's reduced ability to compare his actions with idealized norms of conduct. Such comparisons, we have argued, provide the potential for prudential self-control.
The Ethics of Conscience and the Ethics of Responsibility The ethics of conscience-ethics of responsibility continuum can be assessed reasonably well with the Survey of Ethical Attitudes (SEA; Hogan, 1970). Low scores on this reliable 35-item scale reflect a personal conscience orienta-
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tion; high scores indicate a social responsibility viewpoint. The scale nicely discriminates between persons who are preoccupied with promoting social change (political activists, street demonstrators) and those who are more concerned with the preservation and maintenance of existing forms and institutions (police). With regard to the bipolar continuum formed by the ethics of conscience and responsibility, Hogan and Dickstein (1972b) found that persons who believed in the innate goodness of man and considered corrupt institutions as the primary source of injustice in society tend to endorse the ethics of conscience. Conversely, persons who are suspicious about man's natural tendencies and who regard social institutions as an important check on man's otherwise antisocial leanings tend to endorse the ethics of responsibility. Similarly, MacDonald (1971) found that the ethics of responsibility is associated with a tendency to hold individuals responsible for their misfortune. Kilkowski and Makransky (1973) found that the ethics of conscience was associated with a proclivity toward social innovation- in particular with a tendency toward marijuana use before such a practice became commonplace. Socialization
Socialization can be assessed with the socialization scale of the California Psychological Inventory (CPI; Gough, 1969). Evidence concerning the development and validation of this reliable and unusually powerful scale can be found in Megargee (1972). High scores on this scale reflect an unambivalent and unconflicted rule-following disposition. Low scores indicate hostility toward authority, conflict, and rebelliousness. Perhaps the most important recent finding concerning socialization stems from a suggestion by Waddington (1967) that the dynamics of culture necessarily presuppose that children spontaneously accept the dictates of adult authority. Stayton et al. (1971) found, with children in the 11-month age range, that maternal warmth and nurturance strongly predicted compliance with maternal commands. This raises the possibility that socialization is an emergent phenomenon rather than an alien intrusion as described by Freud. Empathy
Empathy can be assessed using a 64-item empathy scale (Hogan, 1969), 39 items of which are found on the CPI. Evidence for the reliability and validity of this empathy scale is summarized in Greif and Hogan (1973). High scores on the scale reflect perceptiveness, sensitivity to interpersonal expectations, and competence and poise in social situations. Low scores reflect insensitivity, tactlessness, and indifference to the regard of others.
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The interaction between socialization and empathy suggests a simple but interesting typology. That is, other things being equal, persons high on both scales should be "morally mature," and persons low on both scales should be delinquent. Those who score high on socialization and low on empathy should be hard-nosed rule followers, relatively unconcerned with the needs of others~ conversely, those who score low on socialization but high on empathy should be cavalier about rules, but much concerned with pleasant and convivial social relations. Little information is available about persons with high scores on both scales -- they are relatively rare -- however, our theoretical predictions have been nicely confirmed for the other three types. That is, heroin addicts, who are a clearly delinquent subgroup in this society, receive alarmingly low scores for both scales (cf. Kurtines et al., 1975). Undergraduate marijuana smokers, on the other hand, receive low scores for socialization but high scores for empathy (cf. Hogan et al., 1970). Police officers tend to receive high scores for socialization and low scores for empathy (cf. Hogan, 1971). Autonomy Autonomy can be assessed using a 38-item autonomy scale, also scorable from the CPI. Information concerning the development, reliability, and validity of this scale is contained in Kurtines (1973). High scorers on the scale are forceful, self-assured, and rather i n d e p e n d e n t - particularly with regard to matters of personal concern. Low scorers are passive, appreciative, and conforming. Finally, there is some evidence that the complete model works as it should. One important piece of information is the degree to which the measures used to assess the five dimensions are independent. Table I presents the best recent evidence concerning the correlations among the scales used to assess the dimensions. Other researchers will want to verify the magnitude of these correlations for themselves. Nonetheless, as Table I suggests, the scales are sufficiently independent to be useful. A more important question concerns the relationship between these measures and other indices of character development. Table I also presents some preliminary data on this subject. Hogan and Dickstein (1972a) developed a 15-item projective measure designed to assess maturity of moral judgment. The measure can be scored reliably, subjects' responses are stable across items, and scores derived from the measure were significantly associated with peer ratings for "sensitivity to injustice." The correlation between moral knowledge and mature moral judgment can be estimated from Kohlberg's (1964) data. With the exception of the Survey of Ethical Attitudes, the correlations in Table I support the model reasonably w e l l - people who make mature moral judgments (and, consequently, tend to be seen by peer informants as sensitive to injustice) tend
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Moral Character and Moral Action
Table I. Estimated Relationships Among Five Dimensions of Character Structure and Moral Maturity Correlations Dimensions
SEA
So
Em
Au
Moral maturity
Moral knowledge Ethics of responsibility (SEA) Socialization (So) Empathy (Em) Autonomy (Au)
0.00 -
0.00 0.26 -
0.30 -0.20 0.00 -
0.20 0.28 0.24 0.24 -
0.31 -0.40 0.40 0.50 0.00
to be well-socialized, empathic, but not necessarily autonomous. The negative correlation with the Survey of Ethical Attitudes may reflect the fact that the sociopolitical climate in America today tends to support a personal conscience m o r a l i t y - as exemplified by the Berrigans, Daniel Ellsberg, etc., and assigns higher value to responses characterizing that perspective. SOME IMPLICATIONS
The burden of the preceding sections can be summarized in three points. First, moral conduct can be explained in terms of the manner in which a person thinks about and uses social rules o f conduct. Second, moral character can be conceptualized in terms of a person's location along five dimensions of moral development. Third, it seems empirically fruitful to consider moral conduct and the growth of moral character in terms of a person's typical posture with regard to the norms o f his culture. Current thinkilag in anthropology and evolutionary theory (cf. Wallace, 1961; Eisenberg and Dillon, 1971; Mayr, 1963) suggests that man evolved as a hunter. For the largest proportion (e.g., 99%) o f his time on earth, Homo sapiens lived in small bands, each organized to kill game and members o f other bands as effectively as possible. Human society throughout prehistory consisted o f small groups literally struggling for survival. And the key to that survival was the quality o f the group rather than the talents of single individuals. Consequently, a clear adaptive advantage was conferred on those groups that developed an efficient social organization - defined in terms o f patterns of leadership, division of labor, systems of communication, transmission of knowledge, etc. Thus culture ot social organization rather than brain size was the key to man's evolutionary success. Man has evolved as a culture-bearing, norm-respecting animal -- his survivai depended on it. Moreover, social rules have to some degree taken the place o f instincts as regulators of social action. This means on the one hand that man
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Hogan
has a deep, organic need for his culture, and on the other hand that his rulecompliance must be overdetermined. If one mechanism for insuring norm.observance fails, others will be available to compensate for that failure. Consequently, it may be a serious error to conceptualize moral development in terms of such one-step processes as superego formation or the emergence of role-taking ability. Rather, moral development may be more appropriately seen as a complex, multidimensional, and thoroughly overdetermined phenomenon.
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Kurtines, W., Hogan, R., and Weiss, D. (1975). Personality dynamics of heroin use. d. Abnorm. PsychoL, in press. MacDonald, A. P., Jr. (1971). Correlates of the ethics of personal conscience and the ethics of social responsibility. J. Consult. Clin. Psyehol. 37: 443. Mailer, J. B. (1944). Personality tests. In Hunt, J. M. (ed.), Personality and the Behavior Disorders, Ronald Press, New York. Mayr, E. (1963). Populations, Species, and Evolution, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Mass. McDougall, W. (1908). Social Psychology, Methuen, London. Mead, G. H. (1934). Mind, Self, and Society, University of Chicago Press, Chicago. Megargee, E. I. (1972). The California Psychological Inventory Handbook, Jossey-Bass, San Francisco. Miller, D. R., and Swanson, G. E. (1966). Inner Conflict and Defense, Shocken, New York. Mischel, T., ed. (1969). Human Action, Academic Press, New York. Peters, R. S. (1958). The Concept of Motivation, Routledge and Kegan Paul, London. Piaget, J. (1965). The Moral Judgment of the Child, Free Press, New York. Rieff, P. (1959). Freud. The Mind o f a Moralist, Doubleday, Garden City, N.Y. Stayton, D., Hogan, R., and Ainsworth, M. D. S. (1971). Infant obedience and maternal behavior: The origins of socialization reconsidered. Child Develop. 42: 1057-1069. yon Wright, G. H. (1971). Explanation and Understanding, CorneU University Press, Ithaca, N.Y. Waddington, C. H. (1967). The Ethical Animal, University of Chicago Press, Chicago. Wallace, A. F. C. (1961). Culture and Personality, Random House, New York. Winch, P. (1958). The Idea of a Social Science, Routledge and Kegan Paul, London.
