Cognition, 36 (1990) 91-96
JACK YATES University of Afofihern Iowa Yates, J., 1990. What is a theory? A response to Springer. Cognition, 36:.91-96. _
Springer (1990) criticizes our views (Yates et al., 1988) by claiming: (a) we misrepresented the theory view; (b) we failed to take into account the fact that our subjects may hold multiple theories; and (c) our ePnpirica1 evidence favoring prototypes over theories was flawed and inadequate. Our general rebuttal of these criticisms is that tacit realist assumptions led Springer to misunderstand our relativist position (Yates, 1985) in several important respects, and that the nature of intuitive theories that Springer favors over prototypes remains so unspecified that it is difficult to determine what counts as counter evidence. We address each of Springer’s specific points in turn. ese Springer takes issue with our claim that the theory view (in contrast to the prototype view) draws an inescapable distinction between theoretical and empirical knowledge. We continue to maintain that any realist view requires this distinction between theoretical and empirical knowledge. Otherwise where are the empirical “data” on which true theoretical knowledge is to be based? Of course it can be claimed that these two forms of knowledge are not distinct in any particular instance; evidence is said to be colored, or tainted, by theoretical preconceptions, blinders, or biases. The point remains that the theory view makes a distinction between theoretical and empirical knowledge (one that we believe is problematic) that the prototype view does not make. Springer himself appears to accept this distinction when he argues that empirical knowledge (as opposed to theoretical knowledge) is psychologically uninteresting. We assume that empirical knowledge is uninteresting to realists because it is believed to be a trivial product of the world, not of the mind. *Requests for reprints should be sent to Jack Yates, Department of Psychology, Baker 140, University of Northern Iowa, Cedar Falls. . ..‘--. TA -_ - .SMld-MOC _ ___ . --_--, 1J.S.R.
OOlO-0277/90/$2.300 1990, Elsevier Science Publishers BY.
ecific even
n Springer alludes to the states that theories could not be to be. To be coherent ries of situations
direct access :o
efinition situation specific.
Springer implies that we unfairly characterized the intuitive theory view as taking a nonpluralist (and elitist) approach, in which theories (scientific and intuitive) approach or mirror a single reality to a greater or lesser extent. He claims correctly that the protot e view takes a pluralistic stand, but he in haracterizes this as the view that “all realities are equally deep”. metaphor that Springer uses is related to the realist mirror metaphor - a “deeper reality” is a more accurate mirroring (Rorty9 1979). an objectionable characterization of knowledge, in the proe did not state that all realities are equally deep. Instead, ave in mind our statement (p. 273) that “there is nothing particularly true or fundamental in Newtonian theory; it is simply a useful quantitative conceptualization of the macroscopic universe, especially the motions of celestial bodies”. It is clear that this pluralist view is not shared e intuitive theory view, who appear to take a stand ralist and elitist. Otherwise how can we interpret d Green’s (1981) surprise that intuitive theories ingly at variance with the most fundamental physical laws” VP rhildtwn little crientictc y& ,Fa$e (pp. 117~118), or Carey’s question, “ 1As1v vI.I.II__a ___ v~I~~~.sucu theories of the world?” (Carey, 1972, emphasis added). These statements are clearly nonpluralist and elitist, because they assume that there is only one true theory for a given domain, and that scientific theories are truer than lay theories. ence we do not think our characterization of the theory position is unfair.
ksponse to Sprhger
93
That the theory view is an elitist formulation is clear, if from nothing more than its parentage. Scientific theos’es are taken to be truthful, more accurate representations of reality than are ordinary beliefs. Scientists are elite experts who know truths that ordinary mortals do not possess. We propose instead a utility formulation; conceptions (including both scientific theories a& intuitive understandings of the world) are adopted by virtue of their use allowing successful interactions with the world - not “the world” in general, but rather those specific situations that arise for individuals. In fairness to the theory view, it is likely that the distinction between nonpluralist elitist and pluralist utility formulations simply has not been critically considered. The elitist formulation of intuitive theories may have been passively imported from scientific theories. Springer claims that nothing in its nature prevents the theory view from taking a pluralist position. He proposes that subjects may hold more than one theory, that intuitive principles are narrower than standard physical principles so that the sling and spiral problems are not treated as versions of one another, and that subjects may have been misled by superficial surface detail. We also discussed some of these ways of saving the theory view (i.e., more principles, each with narrower applications) in the results section, in the discussion section, and in footnote 5. We pointed out that only with many theories (not just two, as Springer implies) can the theory approach account for the data, but in that case the theory view is in danger of becoming empirically indistinguishable from the prototype view, especially if an intuitive theory is nothing more than a set of “stable mental structures”, as Springer implies at one point. Moreover, possession of multiple theories certainly is not accounted for by the theory view, nor is it compatible with that view’s reliance on a tacit analogy to scientific theories; when scientific theories are contradictory, the one with less fidelity to reality must eventually be abandonedL In contrast , prototypes are based on utility (in the form of values, purposes, interests, and goals), not truth (fidelity to external reality). Decattse values, purposes, and interc.sts are likely to vary across situations, the prototype view does indeed anticipate that one source of inconsistencies will be multi@e “theories”. The fact that the surface of a problem may “mislead” subjects is .z3t a point in favor of intuitive theories. It reinforces our interpretation that :xany subjects do not possess a general theory of physical phenomena tllat allows them to ignore “superficial detail”. The fact is that the prototype view immediately expiains this fact, whereas the theory view is mute on this point.
94
J. Ya&?s
e found that enactment (seeing the problem situation unfold in imagination) frequently accompanied problem solution, and we discussed evidence that subjects generate overt solutions to physics problems by observing and
results of enactments. Springer believes instead that the instructions, not the probkms, are responsible for the enactment we found. At issue are two conditions in which subjects were requested to “imagine being inside the ball” or to “take the point of view of the ball”. First, these phrases are not ordinarily thoug t literally to presuppose an view it is completely unimage, much ss an enactment. Given the the ckar why the instructions should have any particular effect at all. Second, Springer’s argument assumes that enactment occurs primarily after these instructions were given. yet 19 out of 26 subjects (73%) indicated
copying
the
enactment in their responses before being given any specific instructions. In a subsequent study (Yates et al., 1989), in which subjects simply filled in a booklet rather than being interviewed, the enactment rate with no leading instructions was 66% (pz = 76). Under what “tacit th ” is Springer operating to claim that our instructions entail enactment? e agree that in retrospect, given the problem (and the instructions), it seems natzwd that subjects would enact. But no theory, other than the one we propose, ~~redicts enactment, nor predicts that the particular enactment produced by the instructions should affect the answers ects. One must distinguish between plausible intuitions about ns in the problem situijtion, and a theory that predicts those cognitions. Springer continues by pointing out that instability of responses may be an artifact of the within-subjects design, because subjects might feel compelled to respond differently to different problenzs. This is a possible interpretation of the research we reported. However, Yates et al. (1989) subsequently showed that when subjects’ responses to the very same sling problem were separated by eight weeks, 47% drew a substantially different path on the two occasions. Et seems unlikely that subjects felt con7pelled to respond differently ih these circumstances. In fact, subjects might hcve felt obliged to fespon”? consistently, if they could recall their previous response, because the instructions and problem were identical.
Response to Springer
95
As Springer states, we are skeptical about intuitive theories, Why? Not because we think individuals do not construct their own views about the world. In fact we think subjects formulate the world itself. This brings us to the question: What is a theory 3 We aqele with the basic intuition of the theory view that scientists constructing thiories are carrying out the same cognitive activities that children use when they acquire an understanding of the physical and biological worlds, and that all of us use when we learn to interact with new situations. Our skepticism centers around the notion that everyday mental structures resemble standard realist views of scientific theories. It seems unlikely that ordinary individuals in construing everyday events have the standard view’s obsession with truth- Usefulness, not truth, is the relevant criterion for intuitive theories or mental objects; the practical concerns and needs of everyday life must be addressed by these mental structures. We should not expect to find a “theory of theories” ready-made in the standard reaJ&+-~~EYE’iF tific theories - views that are themselves encounte&g~great deal of difficulty (Bhaskar, 1978; Manicas, 19S7). The basic difficulty with the theory view lies in another characteristic it inherits from its realist scientific parent, a characteristic Springer stumbles over in taking issue with the distinction between theoretical and empirical knowledge. Once the theory view, or any realist psychological theory, has made the prerequisite separation between data and theory, there is the difficulty of putting the two back together - of allowing them the relatedness also required by this view. Data/theory, external/internal, and objective/subjective are the polarities that plague theories, scientific or otherwise. We read that data/the real world/reality is colored or tainted by theory, that perceptions are biased by knowledge, and that memories are distorted by beliefs. These statements are attempts to bring theory and data back together; theories are of little use if they cannot be used to interpret the real world. l3ut these statements presume both that we have access to data to construct theories (as it is presumed of good scientists) yet on other occasions that we do not have access to the corrective ministrations of data. We avoid this incoherence by proposing instead that perceptions, memories, and reality itself are mental constructions.
Ehaskar, R. (1978). A PO:!& rheor,v of science. Atlantic Highlands, NJ: Humanities Press. Caramazza, A., McClosk~y , M, %& Grs-ten,B. (1981). Naive beliefs in ‘*sophisticated” subjects: Misconceptions objects. Cog&ion, 9, 117-123. about trajectories Carey, S. (1972). Arc CA:: n fide scitmists with false theoriesofthe wdd? Unpublished doctoral dissertation, Harvard UniveEq, Cambridge, MA. Manicas, P. (1987). A h, mry and phibsophy cf the social sciences. New York: Basil Blackwell. Springer, K. (1990). In &fense of theories. Cog&on, J&293-298. Rorty, R. (1979). Bhikm~phy and rise mirror of nature. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. t of awareness is a model of the world. Psychofogka! Review, 92, 249-284. ne. M., Jertson, D., Sly, K., & Wendelboe, B. (1988). Are conceptions of motion ry or on prototypes? Cognition, 29, 251-275. Sly, K., Jertson, D.. Dunne, M.. & Bessman. M. (1989). Knowledge of motion is based on prototypes. not oil theories. Unpublished manuscript.
JACK YATES University of Afofihern Iowa Yates, J., 1990. What is a theory? A response to Springer. Cognition, 36:.91-96. _
Springer (1990) criticizes our views (Yates et al., 1988) by claiming: (a) we misrepresented the theory view; (b) we failed to take into account the fact that our subjects may hold multiple theories; and (c) our ePnpirica1 evidence favoring prototypes over theories was flawed and inadequate. Our general rebuttal of these criticisms is that tacit realist assumptions led Springer to misunderstand our relativist position (Yates, 1985) in several important respects, and that the nature of intuitive theories that Springer favors over prototypes remains so unspecified that it is difficult to determine what counts as counter evidence. We address each of Springer’s specific points in turn. ese Springer takes issue with our claim that the theory view (in contrast to the prototype view) draws an inescapable distinction between theoretical and empirical knowledge. We continue to maintain that any realist view requires this distinction between theoretical and empirical knowledge. Otherwise where are the empirical “data” on which true theoretical knowledge is to be based? Of course it can be claimed that these two forms of knowledge are not distinct in any particular instance; evidence is said to be colored, or tainted, by theoretical preconceptions, blinders, or biases. The point remains that the theory view makes a distinction between theoretical and empirical knowledge (one that we believe is problematic) that the prototype view does not make. Springer himself appears to accept this distinction when he argues that empirical knowledge (as opposed to theoretical knowledge) is psychologically uninteresting. We assume that empirical knowledge is uninteresting to realists because it is believed to be a trivial product of the world, not of the mind. *Requests for reprints should be sent to Jack Yates, Department of Psychology, Baker 140, University of Northern Iowa, Cedar Falls. . ..‘--. TA -_ - .SMld-MOC _ ___ . --_--, 1J.S.R.
OOlO-0277/90/$2.300 1990, Elsevier Science Publishers BY.
ecific even
n Springer alludes to the states that theories could not be to be. To be coherent ries of situations
direct access :o
efinition situation specific.
Springer implies that we unfairly characterized the intuitive theory view as taking a nonpluralist (and elitist) approach, in which theories (scientific and intuitive) approach or mirror a single reality to a greater or lesser extent. He claims correctly that the protot e view takes a pluralistic stand, but he in haracterizes this as the view that “all realities are equally deep”. metaphor that Springer uses is related to the realist mirror metaphor - a “deeper reality” is a more accurate mirroring (Rorty9 1979). an objectionable characterization of knowledge, in the proe did not state that all realities are equally deep. Instead, ave in mind our statement (p. 273) that “there is nothing particularly true or fundamental in Newtonian theory; it is simply a useful quantitative conceptualization of the macroscopic universe, especially the motions of celestial bodies”. It is clear that this pluralist view is not shared e intuitive theory view, who appear to take a stand ralist and elitist. Otherwise how can we interpret d Green’s (1981) surprise that intuitive theories ingly at variance with the most fundamental physical laws” VP rhildtwn little crientictc y& ,Fa$e (pp. 117~118), or Carey’s question, “ 1As1v vI.I.II__a ___ v~I~~~.sucu theories of the world?” (Carey, 1972, emphasis added). These statements are clearly nonpluralist and elitist, because they assume that there is only one true theory for a given domain, and that scientific theories are truer than lay theories. ence we do not think our characterization of the theory position is unfair.
ksponse to Sprhger
93
That the theory view is an elitist formulation is clear, if from nothing more than its parentage. Scientific theos’es are taken to be truthful, more accurate representations of reality than are ordinary beliefs. Scientists are elite experts who know truths that ordinary mortals do not possess. We propose instead a utility formulation; conceptions (including both scientific theories a& intuitive understandings of the world) are adopted by virtue of their use allowing successful interactions with the world - not “the world” in general, but rather those specific situations that arise for individuals. In fairness to the theory view, it is likely that the distinction between nonpluralist elitist and pluralist utility formulations simply has not been critically considered. The elitist formulation of intuitive theories may have been passively imported from scientific theories. Springer claims that nothing in its nature prevents the theory view from taking a pluralist position. He proposes that subjects may hold more than one theory, that intuitive principles are narrower than standard physical principles so that the sling and spiral problems are not treated as versions of one another, and that subjects may have been misled by superficial surface detail. We also discussed some of these ways of saving the theory view (i.e., more principles, each with narrower applications) in the results section, in the discussion section, and in footnote 5. We pointed out that only with many theories (not just two, as Springer implies) can the theory approach account for the data, but in that case the theory view is in danger of becoming empirically indistinguishable from the prototype view, especially if an intuitive theory is nothing more than a set of “stable mental structures”, as Springer implies at one point. Moreover, possession of multiple theories certainly is not accounted for by the theory view, nor is it compatible with that view’s reliance on a tacit analogy to scientific theories; when scientific theories are contradictory, the one with less fidelity to reality must eventually be abandonedL In contrast , prototypes are based on utility (in the form of values, purposes, interests, and goals), not truth (fidelity to external reality). Decattse values, purposes, and interc.sts are likely to vary across situations, the prototype view does indeed anticipate that one source of inconsistencies will be multi@e “theories”. The fact that the surface of a problem may “mislead” subjects is .z3t a point in favor of intuitive theories. It reinforces our interpretation that :xany subjects do not possess a general theory of physical phenomena tllat allows them to ignore “superficial detail”. The fact is that the prototype view immediately expiains this fact, whereas the theory view is mute on this point.
94
J. Ya&?s
e found that enactment (seeing the problem situation unfold in imagination) frequently accompanied problem solution, and we discussed evidence that subjects generate overt solutions to physics problems by observing and
results of enactments. Springer believes instead that the instructions, not the probkms, are responsible for the enactment we found. At issue are two conditions in which subjects were requested to “imagine being inside the ball” or to “take the point of view of the ball”. First, these phrases are not ordinarily thoug t literally to presuppose an view it is completely unimage, much ss an enactment. Given the the ckar why the instructions should have any particular effect at all. Second, Springer’s argument assumes that enactment occurs primarily after these instructions were given. yet 19 out of 26 subjects (73%) indicated
copying
the
enactment in their responses before being given any specific instructions. In a subsequent study (Yates et al., 1989), in which subjects simply filled in a booklet rather than being interviewed, the enactment rate with no leading instructions was 66% (pz = 76). Under what “tacit th ” is Springer operating to claim that our instructions entail enactment? e agree that in retrospect, given the problem (and the instructions), it seems natzwd that subjects would enact. But no theory, other than the one we propose, ~~redicts enactment, nor predicts that the particular enactment produced by the instructions should affect the answers ects. One must distinguish between plausible intuitions about ns in the problem situijtion, and a theory that predicts those cognitions. Springer continues by pointing out that instability of responses may be an artifact of the within-subjects design, because subjects might feel compelled to respond differently to different problenzs. This is a possible interpretation of the research we reported. However, Yates et al. (1989) subsequently showed that when subjects’ responses to the very same sling problem were separated by eight weeks, 47% drew a substantially different path on the two occasions. Et seems unlikely that subjects felt con7pelled to respond differently ih these circumstances. In fact, subjects might hcve felt obliged to fespon”? consistently, if they could recall their previous response, because the instructions and problem were identical.
Response to Springer
95
As Springer states, we are skeptical about intuitive theories, Why? Not because we think individuals do not construct their own views about the world. In fact we think subjects formulate the world itself. This brings us to the question: What is a theory 3 We aqele with the basic intuition of the theory view that scientists constructing thiories are carrying out the same cognitive activities that children use when they acquire an understanding of the physical and biological worlds, and that all of us use when we learn to interact with new situations. Our skepticism centers around the notion that everyday mental structures resemble standard realist views of scientific theories. It seems unlikely that ordinary individuals in construing everyday events have the standard view’s obsession with truth- Usefulness, not truth, is the relevant criterion for intuitive theories or mental objects; the practical concerns and needs of everyday life must be addressed by these mental structures. We should not expect to find a “theory of theories” ready-made in the standard reaJ&+-~~EYE’iF tific theories - views that are themselves encounte&g~great deal of difficulty (Bhaskar, 1978; Manicas, 19S7). The basic difficulty with the theory view lies in another characteristic it inherits from its realist scientific parent, a characteristic Springer stumbles over in taking issue with the distinction between theoretical and empirical knowledge. Once the theory view, or any realist psychological theory, has made the prerequisite separation between data and theory, there is the difficulty of putting the two back together - of allowing them the relatedness also required by this view. Data/theory, external/internal, and objective/subjective are the polarities that plague theories, scientific or otherwise. We read that data/the real world/reality is colored or tainted by theory, that perceptions are biased by knowledge, and that memories are distorted by beliefs. These statements are attempts to bring theory and data back together; theories are of little use if they cannot be used to interpret the real world. l3ut these statements presume both that we have access to data to construct theories (as it is presumed of good scientists) yet on other occasions that we do not have access to the corrective ministrations of data. We avoid this incoherence by proposing instead that perceptions, memories, and reality itself are mental constructions.
Ehaskar, R. (1978). A PO:!& rheor,v of science. Atlantic Highlands, NJ: Humanities Press. Caramazza, A., McClosk~y , M, %& Grs-ten,B. (1981). Naive beliefs in ‘*sophisticated” subjects: Misconceptions objects. Cog&ion, 9, 117-123. about trajectories Carey, S. (1972). Arc CA:: n fide scitmists with false theoriesofthe wdd? Unpublished doctoral dissertation, Harvard UniveEq, Cambridge, MA. Manicas, P. (1987). A h, mry and phibsophy cf the social sciences. New York: Basil Blackwell. Springer, K. (1990). In &fense of theories. Cog&on, J&293-298. Rorty, R. (1979). Bhikm~phy and rise mirror of nature. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. t of awareness is a model of the world. Psychofogka! Review, 92, 249-284. ne. M., Jertson, D., Sly, K., & Wendelboe, B. (1988). Are conceptions of motion ry or on prototypes? Cognition, 29, 251-275. Sly, K., Jertson, D.. Dunne, M.. & Bessman. M. (1989). Knowledge of motion is based on prototypes. not oil theories. Unpublished manuscript.
