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Bioethics ISSN 0269-9702 (print); 1467-8519 (online) Volume 28 Number 4 2014 pp 178–180
doi:10.1111/bioe.12091
WHY PUBLISHING PSEUDONYMOUSLY CAN PROTECT ACADEMIC FREEDOM FRANCESCA MINERVA ‘The point of philosophy is to start with something so simple as not to seem worth stating, and to end with something so paradoxical that no one will believe it’ Bertrand Russell, The Philosophy of Logical Atomism In ‘New Threats to Academic Freedom’ I suggested that new media may represent a threat to academic freedom.1 In particular, I argued that academic freedom may be limited ab ovo if people fear that they will have to go through media storms when publishing papers that might be perceived as controversial. But if only uncontroversial ideas or questions were discussed, would we ever stimulate progress? Of course, academics are not the only ones who should be allowed and indeed encouraged to think freely. I do not think academics have ‘special epistemic powers’ (see Dawson’s response to my article).2 However, I was interested in academic freedom because not only do academics share (with every member of society) the right to freely think, but they also have a duty to communicate the results of their research. Bioethics invited four philosophers to comment on my proposal and I am grateful that they considered such a proposal worth discussing. I found their observations, comments and criticisms on my article very engaging and I am delighted that the article prompted such a fascinating discussion. Michael Tooley shares my concerns about the new media being a threat to academic freedom and he agrees that we should do something to prevent this from happening.3 His proposal for solving the problem is extremely interesting. In my article I used ‘anonymous’ and ‘pseudonymous’ publications almost interchangeably. However, Tooley correctly points out that a system that allows one to publish under a pseudonym offers 1 F. Minerva. New Threats to Academic Freedom, Bioethics, doi:10.1111/bioe.12066. 2 A. Dawson. Academic freedom and the professional responsibility of applied ethicists: a comment on Minerva. Bioethics; 28: 174–177. 3 M. Tooley. Solutions to the New Threats to Academic Freedom? Bioethics; 28: 163–165.
distinct advantages over publishing anonymously. In particular, I would welcome a website of the kind Tooley proposes: one that allows academic journals to publish papers they would otherwise hesitate to publish. I hope that someone does in fact develop such a website. There is only one point on which I do not fully agree with Tooley, and this is where he suggests that the real identity of the author should be withheld even from the editor. I think it might be better to make sure that the editor always knows the identity of the author, but these are details that can be discussed once the system is in place and we have a better idea of how to improve it. Baker’s paper is focussed on an episode that occurred in 1894 and which brought about the decision to ban pseudonymous publications from the Journal of the American Medical Association (JAMA).4 The JAMA controversy was apparently due to misbehaviour by the editor, who allowed the publication of pseudonymous letters (some of which were written by himself). However, these letters were not peer-reviewed, and I think this is an essential difference between the JAMA case and the solution I propose. Peer review may not be a perfect system, but it is the best system we have for maintaining the standard of academic publishing. I doubt that papers containing (for example) anti-Semitic, anti-Muslim or homophobic statements would pass standard peer-review scrutiny in a respectable academic journal. If anything, the JAMA case seems to support an argument in favour of limited powers for editors rather than an argument against pseudonymous publication of peer-reviewed research. Baker also raises an excellent point about conflicts of interest. I agree that possible conflicts of interests are an issue we should take into account, not just with respect to anonymous or pseudonymous publications, but for all academic publications. I think that instead of relying on ‘watchdog scholars’ who occasionally and by accident spot these conflicts, someone should be paid to perform this task. These professional ‘watchdogs’ could then be permitted access to the website proposed by Tooley,
4
R. Baker. Against Anonymity. Bioethics; 28: 166–169.
Address for correspondence: Centre for Applied Philosophy and Public Ethics (CAPPE), University of Melbourne, Old Quad Building, room 123, Parkville Melbourne, Victoria 3050, Australia. T: 03 834-49951. Email: [email protected] Conflict of interest statement: No conflicts declared © 2014 John Wiley & Sons Ltd
179
Francesca Minerva
where the pseudonymous names of authors are matched with their real names. Of course, suitable confidentiality agreements would need to be in place to prevent the ‘watchdogs’ from sharing the information they access. So while I agree with Baker that possible conflicts of interest are an important issue, I think that there are better ways to address the problem and to allow pseudonymous publications at the same time. Lastly, Baker questions whether the death threats Alberto Giubilini and I received were actual threats. He suggests they were instead attempts to communicate an emotive response to a controversial proposal which had seemed to threaten people with disabilities. Baker, quite obviously, did not have the opportunity to read all the hundreds of emails I received, but I am quite confident that they were actual threats. We clarified the fact that our article was not referring to disability in three other papers5 that followed our original publication.6 I am grateful for the opportunity to do so again, because I am deeply concerned with conveying that message to both fellow academics and the lay public. The article did not address newborns, foetuses or embryos with disabilities, as Baker and Dawson seem to think. The article was about the equivalence of the moral value of embryos, foetuses and newborns (I will refrain from going into too much detail; those interested in the actual argument can read the articles I have referred to). Perhaps critics thought that our argument applied in particular to embryos (or foetuses, or newborns) with disabilities because they assumed that foetuses with a risk of disability are most likely to be terminated. But this assumption is false. Data available7 clearly shows that the majority of abortions are not due to abnormalities of the embryo/foetus, but to personal reasons (e.g. lack of emotional or economic stability, etc.). For this reason our argument, by supporting the moral equivalence of abortion and afterbirth abortion, does not concern disabled embryos/ foetuses/newborns more than non-disable ones. Obviously, I understand that some people disagree with me. I understand that Catholics, for instance, think that Person Francesca is no different from Embryo/ Foetus/Newborn Francesca. I also understand that some 5
A. Giubilini & F. Minerva. Some Clarification On The Moral Status Of Newborns, J Med Ethics 2013; 39: 264–265; A. Giubilini & F. Minerva. Reasons and Freedom. Hastings Cent Rep 2013: 43(1); A. Giubilini & F. Minerva. Defending After-Birth Abortion, Monash Bioethics Review 2012; 30(2): 48–60. 6 A. Giubilini & F. Minerva. After-birth Abortion. Why Should the Baby Live? J Med Ethics 2013; 39: 261–263. 7 B. Lawrence, L.F. Finer, L.A. Frohwirth, S.S. Dauphinee & A.M. Moore. Reasons U.S. Women Have Abortions: Quantitative and Qualitative Perspectives. Perspect Sex Reprod Health 37: 110–118. doi: 10.1111/j.1931-2393.2005.tb00045.x.
pro-choice people, instead, think that Embryo/Foetus Francesca are different from Newborn Francesca. According to Baker, those potentially affected by this argument (every human being, as it turns out, and not only handicapped people) have a right to confront us with their fears. I partly agree with the fact that society has a right to ask me to explain further the arguments in my article. Micheal Tooley suggests a system whereby it would be possible to release phone interviews to journalists without disclosing the author’s name. I think this is a very good way to solve the problem. The author could answer questions the public has a right to ask but at the same time s/he would be better protected from media attacks. I think this would be a much better way to balance all the interests at stake. This point made by Baker is similar to a point highlighted by Dawson.8 According to Dawson, ethicists have a duty to both (A) be conscientious philosophers and (B) be willing to engage with pressing policy issues, including reasoning with a wider public. This second point apparently also ‘guards against the unnecessarily provocative use of language’. And, according to Dawson, these duties are not compatible with the publication of pseudonymous or anonymous papers. I agree with Dawson on the general point that we have the responsibility to (A) and (B). However, I do not think that they are incompatible with the publication of pseudonymous papers. Indeed I think that our being conscientious implies a duty to write about issues we consider important and to stimulate a debate around these issues. After all, the after-birth abortion paper was aimed at asking questions and at suggesting possible answers concerning the moral value of embryos, foetuses and newborns. I do not agree with Dawson that the title was provocative. On the contrary, I think the title perfectly summarized the central idea of the article. Talking about euthanasia would have been a distraction, since the article had naught to do with severely ill newborns suffering unbearable pain and no perspective of survival for whom, for example, euthanasia might currently be requested in the Netherlands.9 Had our true names been kept secret, I think people would have focussed less on discussing on how evil, attractive, ugly or disgusting we are and more on the ideas we were presenting. I certainly don’t see how putting my image on the Daily Mail website helped to better anyone’s understanding of our argument. So I think, with Micheal Tooley, that we could engage with the public even if we published pseudonymously. Indeed, I think that pseudonymous publications would force 8
Dawson, op.cit. note 6. A.A.E. Verhagen & P.J.J. Sauer. The Groningen Protocol – Euthanasia in Severely Ill Newborns, N Engl J Med 2005; 352: 959–962. 9
© 2014 John Wiley & Sons Ltd
Why Publishing Pseudonymously Can Protect Academic Freedom newspapers and their readers to focus on the actual argument rather than on irrelevant elements, such as pictures and ad personam attacks. Finally, Häyry argues that my interpretation of Dworkin’s and Machlup’s accounts of academic freedom is mistaken and that what these authors wrote on the topic does not apply to threats coming from the Internet.10 Machlup and Dworkin wrote about academic freedom in 1955 and 1996 respectively, when the Internet either did not exist or was used by a comparatively small group of people. I think it is difficult to say whether they would have agreed with me or not on this specific case. However, I did not base my arguments on their interpretations of academic freedom and my case would stand or fall regardless of their hypothetical support or disagreement. Häyry shares some of the concerns raised by Dawson and Baker when he argues that some public reactions ‘should not be thwarted to begin with’ because ‘authors have access to people’s living rooms with ideas that may cause offense and anxiety – so it is only fair that people have comparable access to the author’s professional spaces with their responses’. But if these reactions can be interpreted as harassing or physically threatening, Häyry suggests, we should deal with them through legal means. I think that these two points are, unfortunately, correlated. There is no legal means to track a person who sends harassing or threatening emails, or someone who writes defamatory blog posts or comments in online newspapers, especially if, as in my case, the authors of these 10
M. Häyry. Academic freedom, public reactions, and anonymity. Bioethics; 28: 170–173.
© 2014 John Wiley & Sons Ltd
180
messages live in different countries. When I contacted the police about being harassed, I was told they could do nothing to stop the threats from occurring. The knowledge they would never be tracked gave these people the confidence to behave the way they did. To sum up, I think Michael Tooley’s suggested improvement to my proposal should be seriously considered if we want our society to continue being challenged, renewed and confronted with new, sometimes controversial, but ultimately thought-provoking ideas. I understand the general concerns about lack of responsibilities of the authors of these papers and the duties we have as academics and as beneficiaries of academic freedom. However, I think that the main responsibility we have, as academics, is to keep asking questions and to seek answers to these questions, even when this can offend or irritate others. I do not think it would be wise to rely solely on academics’ bravery to make sure that ideas keep circulating and flourishing regardless of the risks involved. I would prefer a world where people were free to ask questions and to attempt to give answers to those questions without being dragged into media frenzies, missing out on job opportunities (as happened to both me and Alberto Giubilini) and being threatened with physical harm. But as we do not live in such an ideal world, the best we can do in order to change the current society into a less violent and intolerant one is to keep asking questions, and to keep seeking answers. Francesca Minerva is a McKenzie post-doctoral fellow at the University of Melbourne, School of Historical and Philosophical Studies. Francesca holds a Masters degree (laurea magistrale) in Philosophy and a PhD in Law and New Technologies, Bioethics.
Bioethics ISSN 0269-9702 (print); 1467-8519 (online) Volume 28 Number 4 2014 pp 178–180
doi:10.1111/bioe.12091
WHY PUBLISHING PSEUDONYMOUSLY CAN PROTECT ACADEMIC FREEDOM FRANCESCA MINERVA ‘The point of philosophy is to start with something so simple as not to seem worth stating, and to end with something so paradoxical that no one will believe it’ Bertrand Russell, The Philosophy of Logical Atomism In ‘New Threats to Academic Freedom’ I suggested that new media may represent a threat to academic freedom.1 In particular, I argued that academic freedom may be limited ab ovo if people fear that they will have to go through media storms when publishing papers that might be perceived as controversial. But if only uncontroversial ideas or questions were discussed, would we ever stimulate progress? Of course, academics are not the only ones who should be allowed and indeed encouraged to think freely. I do not think academics have ‘special epistemic powers’ (see Dawson’s response to my article).2 However, I was interested in academic freedom because not only do academics share (with every member of society) the right to freely think, but they also have a duty to communicate the results of their research. Bioethics invited four philosophers to comment on my proposal and I am grateful that they considered such a proposal worth discussing. I found their observations, comments and criticisms on my article very engaging and I am delighted that the article prompted such a fascinating discussion. Michael Tooley shares my concerns about the new media being a threat to academic freedom and he agrees that we should do something to prevent this from happening.3 His proposal for solving the problem is extremely interesting. In my article I used ‘anonymous’ and ‘pseudonymous’ publications almost interchangeably. However, Tooley correctly points out that a system that allows one to publish under a pseudonym offers 1 F. Minerva. New Threats to Academic Freedom, Bioethics, doi:10.1111/bioe.12066. 2 A. Dawson. Academic freedom and the professional responsibility of applied ethicists: a comment on Minerva. Bioethics; 28: 174–177. 3 M. Tooley. Solutions to the New Threats to Academic Freedom? Bioethics; 28: 163–165.
distinct advantages over publishing anonymously. In particular, I would welcome a website of the kind Tooley proposes: one that allows academic journals to publish papers they would otherwise hesitate to publish. I hope that someone does in fact develop such a website. There is only one point on which I do not fully agree with Tooley, and this is where he suggests that the real identity of the author should be withheld even from the editor. I think it might be better to make sure that the editor always knows the identity of the author, but these are details that can be discussed once the system is in place and we have a better idea of how to improve it. Baker’s paper is focussed on an episode that occurred in 1894 and which brought about the decision to ban pseudonymous publications from the Journal of the American Medical Association (JAMA).4 The JAMA controversy was apparently due to misbehaviour by the editor, who allowed the publication of pseudonymous letters (some of which were written by himself). However, these letters were not peer-reviewed, and I think this is an essential difference between the JAMA case and the solution I propose. Peer review may not be a perfect system, but it is the best system we have for maintaining the standard of academic publishing. I doubt that papers containing (for example) anti-Semitic, anti-Muslim or homophobic statements would pass standard peer-review scrutiny in a respectable academic journal. If anything, the JAMA case seems to support an argument in favour of limited powers for editors rather than an argument against pseudonymous publication of peer-reviewed research. Baker also raises an excellent point about conflicts of interest. I agree that possible conflicts of interests are an issue we should take into account, not just with respect to anonymous or pseudonymous publications, but for all academic publications. I think that instead of relying on ‘watchdog scholars’ who occasionally and by accident spot these conflicts, someone should be paid to perform this task. These professional ‘watchdogs’ could then be permitted access to the website proposed by Tooley,
4
R. Baker. Against Anonymity. Bioethics; 28: 166–169.
Address for correspondence: Centre for Applied Philosophy and Public Ethics (CAPPE), University of Melbourne, Old Quad Building, room 123, Parkville Melbourne, Victoria 3050, Australia. T: 03 834-49951. Email: [email protected] Conflict of interest statement: No conflicts declared © 2014 John Wiley & Sons Ltd
179
Francesca Minerva
where the pseudonymous names of authors are matched with their real names. Of course, suitable confidentiality agreements would need to be in place to prevent the ‘watchdogs’ from sharing the information they access. So while I agree with Baker that possible conflicts of interest are an important issue, I think that there are better ways to address the problem and to allow pseudonymous publications at the same time. Lastly, Baker questions whether the death threats Alberto Giubilini and I received were actual threats. He suggests they were instead attempts to communicate an emotive response to a controversial proposal which had seemed to threaten people with disabilities. Baker, quite obviously, did not have the opportunity to read all the hundreds of emails I received, but I am quite confident that they were actual threats. We clarified the fact that our article was not referring to disability in three other papers5 that followed our original publication.6 I am grateful for the opportunity to do so again, because I am deeply concerned with conveying that message to both fellow academics and the lay public. The article did not address newborns, foetuses or embryos with disabilities, as Baker and Dawson seem to think. The article was about the equivalence of the moral value of embryos, foetuses and newborns (I will refrain from going into too much detail; those interested in the actual argument can read the articles I have referred to). Perhaps critics thought that our argument applied in particular to embryos (or foetuses, or newborns) with disabilities because they assumed that foetuses with a risk of disability are most likely to be terminated. But this assumption is false. Data available7 clearly shows that the majority of abortions are not due to abnormalities of the embryo/foetus, but to personal reasons (e.g. lack of emotional or economic stability, etc.). For this reason our argument, by supporting the moral equivalence of abortion and afterbirth abortion, does not concern disabled embryos/ foetuses/newborns more than non-disable ones. Obviously, I understand that some people disagree with me. I understand that Catholics, for instance, think that Person Francesca is no different from Embryo/ Foetus/Newborn Francesca. I also understand that some 5
A. Giubilini & F. Minerva. Some Clarification On The Moral Status Of Newborns, J Med Ethics 2013; 39: 264–265; A. Giubilini & F. Minerva. Reasons and Freedom. Hastings Cent Rep 2013: 43(1); A. Giubilini & F. Minerva. Defending After-Birth Abortion, Monash Bioethics Review 2012; 30(2): 48–60. 6 A. Giubilini & F. Minerva. After-birth Abortion. Why Should the Baby Live? J Med Ethics 2013; 39: 261–263. 7 B. Lawrence, L.F. Finer, L.A. Frohwirth, S.S. Dauphinee & A.M. Moore. Reasons U.S. Women Have Abortions: Quantitative and Qualitative Perspectives. Perspect Sex Reprod Health 37: 110–118. doi: 10.1111/j.1931-2393.2005.tb00045.x.
pro-choice people, instead, think that Embryo/Foetus Francesca are different from Newborn Francesca. According to Baker, those potentially affected by this argument (every human being, as it turns out, and not only handicapped people) have a right to confront us with their fears. I partly agree with the fact that society has a right to ask me to explain further the arguments in my article. Micheal Tooley suggests a system whereby it would be possible to release phone interviews to journalists without disclosing the author’s name. I think this is a very good way to solve the problem. The author could answer questions the public has a right to ask but at the same time s/he would be better protected from media attacks. I think this would be a much better way to balance all the interests at stake. This point made by Baker is similar to a point highlighted by Dawson.8 According to Dawson, ethicists have a duty to both (A) be conscientious philosophers and (B) be willing to engage with pressing policy issues, including reasoning with a wider public. This second point apparently also ‘guards against the unnecessarily provocative use of language’. And, according to Dawson, these duties are not compatible with the publication of pseudonymous or anonymous papers. I agree with Dawson on the general point that we have the responsibility to (A) and (B). However, I do not think that they are incompatible with the publication of pseudonymous papers. Indeed I think that our being conscientious implies a duty to write about issues we consider important and to stimulate a debate around these issues. After all, the after-birth abortion paper was aimed at asking questions and at suggesting possible answers concerning the moral value of embryos, foetuses and newborns. I do not agree with Dawson that the title was provocative. On the contrary, I think the title perfectly summarized the central idea of the article. Talking about euthanasia would have been a distraction, since the article had naught to do with severely ill newborns suffering unbearable pain and no perspective of survival for whom, for example, euthanasia might currently be requested in the Netherlands.9 Had our true names been kept secret, I think people would have focussed less on discussing on how evil, attractive, ugly or disgusting we are and more on the ideas we were presenting. I certainly don’t see how putting my image on the Daily Mail website helped to better anyone’s understanding of our argument. So I think, with Micheal Tooley, that we could engage with the public even if we published pseudonymously. Indeed, I think that pseudonymous publications would force 8
Dawson, op.cit. note 6. A.A.E. Verhagen & P.J.J. Sauer. The Groningen Protocol – Euthanasia in Severely Ill Newborns, N Engl J Med 2005; 352: 959–962. 9
© 2014 John Wiley & Sons Ltd
Why Publishing Pseudonymously Can Protect Academic Freedom newspapers and their readers to focus on the actual argument rather than on irrelevant elements, such as pictures and ad personam attacks. Finally, Häyry argues that my interpretation of Dworkin’s and Machlup’s accounts of academic freedom is mistaken and that what these authors wrote on the topic does not apply to threats coming from the Internet.10 Machlup and Dworkin wrote about academic freedom in 1955 and 1996 respectively, when the Internet either did not exist or was used by a comparatively small group of people. I think it is difficult to say whether they would have agreed with me or not on this specific case. However, I did not base my arguments on their interpretations of academic freedom and my case would stand or fall regardless of their hypothetical support or disagreement. Häyry shares some of the concerns raised by Dawson and Baker when he argues that some public reactions ‘should not be thwarted to begin with’ because ‘authors have access to people’s living rooms with ideas that may cause offense and anxiety – so it is only fair that people have comparable access to the author’s professional spaces with their responses’. But if these reactions can be interpreted as harassing or physically threatening, Häyry suggests, we should deal with them through legal means. I think that these two points are, unfortunately, correlated. There is no legal means to track a person who sends harassing or threatening emails, or someone who writes defamatory blog posts or comments in online newspapers, especially if, as in my case, the authors of these 10
M. Häyry. Academic freedom, public reactions, and anonymity. Bioethics; 28: 170–173.
© 2014 John Wiley & Sons Ltd
180
messages live in different countries. When I contacted the police about being harassed, I was told they could do nothing to stop the threats from occurring. The knowledge they would never be tracked gave these people the confidence to behave the way they did. To sum up, I think Michael Tooley’s suggested improvement to my proposal should be seriously considered if we want our society to continue being challenged, renewed and confronted with new, sometimes controversial, but ultimately thought-provoking ideas. I understand the general concerns about lack of responsibilities of the authors of these papers and the duties we have as academics and as beneficiaries of academic freedom. However, I think that the main responsibility we have, as academics, is to keep asking questions and to seek answers to these questions, even when this can offend or irritate others. I do not think it would be wise to rely solely on academics’ bravery to make sure that ideas keep circulating and flourishing regardless of the risks involved. I would prefer a world where people were free to ask questions and to attempt to give answers to those questions without being dragged into media frenzies, missing out on job opportunities (as happened to both me and Alberto Giubilini) and being threatened with physical harm. But as we do not live in such an ideal world, the best we can do in order to change the current society into a less violent and intolerant one is to keep asking questions, and to keep seeking answers. Francesca Minerva is a McKenzie post-doctoral fellow at the University of Melbourne, School of Historical and Philosophical Studies. Francesca holds a Masters degree (laurea magistrale) in Philosophy and a PhD in Law and New Technologies, Bioethics.
