Emotion 2013, Vol. 13, No. 6, 1080 –1085
© 2013 American Psychological Association 1528-3542/13/$12.00 DOI: 10.1037/a0033876
Don’t Start What You Can’t Stop: Differentiating Individual Differences in Ruminative Onset and Ruminative Persistence, and Their Contributions to Dysphoria Ben Grafton and Colin MacLeod
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University of Western Australia and Babes-Bolyai University There is much evidence to suggest that rumination and dysphoria share a close relationship. The tendency to ruminate is considered a stable individual difference, reflecting variation in repetitive thoughts concerning the causes and consequences of distress. In the present study, we evaluated the veracity of a proposed distinction between 2 hypothetical dimensions of ruminative tendency, which plausibly represent dissociable facets of dispositional rumination, and whose interactive influence may make a particularly strong contribution to dysphoria. These dimensions are ruminative onset, the probability of experiencing ruminative symptoms when feeling upset, and ruminative persistence, the continuation of ruminative symptoms once initiated. The findings indicate that ruminative onset and ruminative persistence do indeed represent dissociable dimensions of ruminative disposition. Furthermore, as hypothesized, it is the interaction between these 2 facets of rumination that makes the greatest contribution to the prediction of variance in dysphoria. Keywords: rumination, ruminative onset, ruminative persistence, dysphoria
1999; Nolen-Hoeksema, 2000; Nolen-Hoeksema, Morrow, & Fredrickson, 1993; Nolen-Hoeksema, Parker, & Larson, 1994; Spasojevic´ & Alloy, 2001), which typically have been measured using the Beck Depression Inventory (BDI; Beck, Ward, Mendelson, Mock, & Erbaugh, 1961). Across the past 20 years, the results of such studies have served to promote substantial research interest in rumination, as this work is thought to hold great potential to illuminate the patterns of cognitive processing that contribute to the onset, maintenance, and recurrence of dysphoria (Papageorgiou & Wells, 2004). To further illuminate the relationship between an elevated ruminative tendency and dysphoria, some researchers have sought to distinguish hypothetical subtypes of rumination. For example, Treynor, Gonzalez, and Nolen-Hoeksema (2003) suggested a possible distinction between rumination of a reflective versus brooding nature, which may differ in terms of adaptiveness. Of more direct relevance to our present research interest, Nolen-Hoeksema, Wisco, and Lyubomirsky (2008) proposed that individual differences in rumination may be better understood by distinguishing two hypothetical dimensions of ruminative disposition, which they describe as involving a reduced ability to “avoid falling into rumination” and a reduced ability to “break free of rumination once it has begun” (p. 418). Although the RRS does not discriminate between these two possible facets of rumination, we believe that this distinction could be relevant to the prediction of dysphoria. Given that variation in each type of ruminative tendency would influence the amount of time spent ruminating, then each ruminative dimension should independently predict dysphoria, but dysphoria should be best predicted by the interactive influence of these two facets of rumination. Specifically, the degree to which a heightened tendency to readily experience ruminative onset will give rise to elevated dysphoria should be disproportionately greater in participants who display a high rather than low tendency
It is now widely accepted that elevated levels of rumination play an important role in the development and maintenance of dysphoria (Roelofs, Muris, Huibers, Peeters, & Arntz, 2006). The tendency to ruminate is considered a stable individual difference (Nolen-Hoeksema & Davis, 1999), and typically is construed as a method of coping with distress that involves “passively and repetitively focusing on one’s symptoms of distress and the circumstances surrounding these symptoms” (Nolen-Hoeksema, McBride, & Larson, 1997, p. 855). The most common questionnaire instrument used to measure such dysphoric rumination is the Ruminative Response Scale (RRS; Nolen-Hoeksema & Morrow, 1991), which requires respondents to indicate the degree to which they experience ruminative symptoms when feeling upset, on a scale ranging from almost never to almost always. There is now an abundance of evidence demonstrating that an elevated ruminative tendency, as measured by the RRS, can reliably predict variance in dysphoric symptoms (Just & Alloy, 1997; Kuehner & Weber,
Ben Grafton, Centre for the Advancement of Research on Emotion, School of Psychology, University of Western Australia, Crawley, Australia; School of Psychology, Babes-Bolyai University, Cluj-Napoca, Romania. Colin MacLeod, Centre for the Advancement of Research on Emotion, School of Psychology, University of Western Australia, Crawley, Australia; School of Psychology, Babes-Bolyai University, Cluj-Napoca, Romania. This work was supported by Australian Research Council Grant DP0879589, and by a grant from the Romanian National Authority for Scientific Research, CNCS–UEFISCDI, Project Number PNII-ID-PCCE2011-2-0045. Correspondence concerning this article should be addressed to Ben Grafton, Centre for the Advancement of Research in Emotion, School of Psychology, M304, University of Western Australia, M304, 35 Stirling Highway, Crawley WA 6009, Australia. E-mail: [email protected] 1080
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for rumination to subsequently persist following onset. The present study was designed to address two questions relevant to this issue. Our first question was whether ruminative onset and ruminative perseveration represent dissociable facets of dispositional rumination. If so, then our second question concerned whether, as predicted, it is the interactive influence of these two ruminative dispositions that makes the greatest contribution to dysphoria. The proposal that individual differences in ruminative onset and ruminative persistence represent two dissociable facets of rumination is somewhat similar to one made recently in the anxiety literature, in which it has been shown that trait anxiety, a construct that reflects individual differences in the disposition to experience elevated state anxiety, can be parsed into dissociable dimensions of anxiety vulnerability (Rudaizky & MacLeod, 2013; Rudaizky, Page, & MacLeod, 2012). These two dimensions have been termed anxiety reactivity and anxiety perseveration, and reflect the elevated probability of an anxious reaction being elicited in response to a stressful situation, and the increased tendency to experience prolonged anxious reactions to stressors, respectively. By manipulating the question used to assess trait anxiety, Rudaizky et al. (2012) found that these are dissociable facets of anxious disposition. Specifically, the authors asked participants three questions about each of the anxiety symptoms that compose the Spielberger State–Trait Anxiety Inventory (STAI; Spielberger, Gorsuch, Lushene, Vagg, & Jacobs, 1983), a widely used instrument employed to measure trait anxiety (Grös, Antony, Simms, & McCabe, 2007). Participants were first asked the original STAI–Trait question, concerning the extent to which each symptom described them. They were then asked two additional questions about each symptom. One question assessed anxiety reactivity and required respondents to indicate the probability that they would experience each symptom when exposed to stress. The other question assessed anxiety perseveration and required respondents to indicate how long each symptom would persist once it had been elicited. Using multiple regression analysis, the authors found that anxiety reactivity and anxiety perseveration scores each accounted for independent variance in conventional trait anxiety scores, confirming that they represent dissociable facets of dispositional anxiety. The confirmation of this distinction between these two types of anxiety vulnerability lends weight to the possibility that a similar distinction may also be drawn between ruminative onset and ruminative persistence. It would be of considerable potential theoretical interest and applied importance to empirically differentiate these two hypothetical facets of ruminative disposition. Specifically, this distinction may enable the development of more precise theoretical accounts of dispositional rumination, and of the relationship between such rumination and dysphoria, while also permitting the better prediction of future dysphoria, thereby enhancing the identification of individuals at risk of developing clinical levels of dysphoria. In the present study, we adopted an approach similar to that employed by Rudaizky et al. (2012) in their anxiety research. Participants were asked three questions about each of the 22 ruminative symptoms that compose the RRS. First, they were asked the original RRS question, concerning the degree to which they experience ruminative symptoms when feeling upset. This yielded the conventional ruminative disposition score. They were then asked two additional questions about each ruminative symptom. One question assessed the probability that they would expe-
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rience each ruminative symptom when feeling upset, thereby yielding a ruminative onset score. The other question assessed how long each ruminative symptom tended to persist once initiated, thereby yielding a ruminative persistence score. Finally, participants completed the Beck Depression Inventory—II (BDI–II; Beck, Steer, & Brown, 1996) to assess their levels of dysphoria. We employed multiple regression to address the two questions under empirical scrutiny. First, we examined whether variability in ruminative onset and ruminative persistence scores each accounted for independent variance in the conventional RRS measure of ruminative disposition to determine whether they do indeed represent dissociable dimensions of such ruminative disposition. Second, we examined whether it is the interactive influence of ruminative onset and ruminative persistence that makes the greatest contribution to variance in dysphoric symptoms, as measured by the BDI–II.
Method Participants Participants were 350 undergraduate psychology students at the University of Western Australia. The sample consisted of 63% women, with a mean age of 20.1 years (SD ⫽ 6.1, range 17– 68 years). The mean RRS score was 43.5 (SD ⫽ 14.1, range 22– 88), and the mean BDI–II score was 11.0 (SD ⫽ 9.9, range 0 –53).
Questionnaire Measure RRS. In the present study, we used the RRS (NolenHoeksema & Morrow, 1991) to measure dysphoric rumination. This instrument comprises 22 items, each describing a particular ruminative symptom. To obtain the conventional ruminative disposition score, we asked participants the original RRS question, “Please indicate if you never, sometimes, often or always think or do each one when you feel down, sad or depressed.” The RRS has been shown to have both high internal reliability and validity (cf. Luminet, 2004). It is important to note that although higher conventional scores on the RRS indicate higher levels of rumination, such scores could in principle reflect more frequent rumination, more prolonged rumination, or a combination of both. Therefore, to determine whether ruminative onset and ruminative persistence represent dissociable facets of ruminative disposition, we asked participants two new questions about each of the 22 ruminative symptoms contained in the RRS. The wording of these questions was adapted from the wording used by Rudaizky et al. (2012) to distinguish anxiety reactivity and anxiety perseveration. The ruminative onset question was designed to assess the probability of experiencing a particular ruminative symptom when feeling upset. Participants were asked, “When feeling upset, what tends to be the probability that you will engage in the following response?” Four response options were provided, reflecting probability estimates ranging from 1 ⫽ extremely improbable to 4 ⫽ extremely probable. As there can be no persistence without onset, the ruminative persistence question was designed to assess the probability of each particular ruminative symptom persisting in the event that rumination had been initiated. This approach ensured that our measure of variability in ruminative persistence is conceptually distinct
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from our measure of variability in ruminative onset. Specifically, participants were asked, “When you do engage in this particular response, how long does this response tend to persist?” The four response options reflected ruminative persistence ranging from 1 ⫽ extremely transient to 4 ⫽ extremely persistent. In each case, the wording of the original RRS items was not altered. For both of these new questions, responses across the 22 items were summed, resulting in separate ruminative onset and ruminative persistence scores for each participant. BDI–II. Dysphoria was assessed using the BDI–II (Beck et al., 1996), which requires participants to respond to 21 statements describing various depressive symptoms, on a scale ranging from 0 to 3. The BDI–II has been shown to have both good reliability (Wiebe & Penley, 2005) and validity (Storch, Roberti, & Roth, 2004).1
Procedure The administration of the questionnaire measures was conducted in a group setting, with 20 –25 participants in each group. When completing the measures of rumination, participants were always first asked the conventional RRS question before being asked the ruminative onset and ruminative persistence questions.
Results As expected, both ruminative onset scores and ruminative persistence scores each were correlated with RRS scores (r ⫽ .88, p ⬍ .001, and r ⫽ .77, p ⬍ .001, respectively). To determine whether these measures of ruminative onset and ruminative persistence each predicted independent variance in the RRS scores, indicating that they represent dissociable dimensions of ruminative disposition, we entered the ruminative onset and ruminative persistence scores simultaneously into a multiple regression, with RRS scores as the dependent variable. Although ruminative onset and ruminative persistence scores were themselves correlated (r ⫽ .83, p ⬍ .001), the variance inflation factor was only 3.18, well below the critical value of 10 that is commonly taken as an indication of problematic multicollinearity (O’Brian, 2007). The results indicated that the regression model ( ⫽ .76 for ruminative onset and  ⫽ .14 for ruminative persistence) was significant, F(2, 347) ⫽ 618.82, p ⬍ .001. The ruminative onset beta weight was nominally larger than the ruminative persistence beta weight, suggesting that the RRS may principally be a measure of ruminative onset. Of greater theoretical importance, both the ruminative onset and ruminative persistence scores predicted independent variance in RRS scores: for ruminative onset scores, t(347) ⫽ 17.03, p ⬍ .001, and for ruminative persistence scores, t(347) ⫽ 3.16, p ⬍ .01.2 Thus, the results support the hypothesis that ruminative onset and ruminative persistence are indeed dissociable facets of rumination that contribute independently to variance in a conventional measure of ruminative disposition. We now consider whether, as hypothesized, it is the interactive influence of variation in ruminative onset and ruminative perseveration that best predicts dysphoria. RRS scores, ruminative onset scores, and ruminative persistence scores each significantly predicted BDI–II scores (r ⫽ .67, p ⬍ .001, r ⫽ .67, p ⬍ .001, and r ⫽ .62, p ⬍ .001, respectively). The ruminative onset and ruminative persistence scores were entered simultaneously into the first
step of a regression analysis, with the BDI–II scores as the dependent variable. The results revealed that the regression model ( ⫽ .35 for ruminative onset and  ⫽ .34 for ruminative persistence) was significant, F(2, 336) ⫽ 127.05, p ⬍ .001. It is interesting to note that both the ruminative onset and ruminative persistence scores predicted independent variance in BDI–II scores: for ruminative onset scores, t(336) ⫽ 4.87, p ⬍ .001, and for ruminative persistence scores, t(336) ⫽ 4.70, p ⬍ .001. Thus, not only is it the case that ruminative onset and ruminative perseveration represent dissociable dimensions of ruminative disposition, but each of the these differing facets of rumination does indeed make a distinctive contribution to variance in dysphoria. Of more relevance to the issue under consideration, when the Ruminative Onset ⫻ Ruminative Persistence interaction term was entered in the second step of the analysis, not only did the results reveal that the regression model ( ⫽ ⫺.09 for ruminative onset,  ⫽ ⫺.03 for ruminative persistence,  ⫽ .78 for Ruminative Onset ⫻ Ruminative Persistence) was significant, F(2, 335) ⫽ 92.38, p ⬍ .001, but the R2 change also was significant, F(1, 335) ⫽ 13.56, p ⬍ .001, indicating that the inclusion of this interaction term resulted in the model explaining significantly greater variance in BDI–II scores than could be explained by ruminative onset and persistence scores alone. Furthermore, when the Ruminative Onset ⫻ Ruminative Persistence interaction was added in the second step, only this interaction predicted independent variance in BDI–II scores, t(335) ⫽ 3.68, p ⬍ .001. Neither the ruminative onset scores, t(335) ⫽ ⫺0.63, ns, nor ruminative persistence scores, t(335) ⫽ ⫺0.25, ns, predicted additional variance in BDI–II scores beyond that accounted for by their interaction. Thus, the results support the hypothesis that the interactive influence of ruminative onset and persistence makes the greatest contribution to variance in dysphoria. As can be seen from Figure 1, the nature of this interaction was precisely as predicted. The degree to which higher ruminative onset scores, compared with lower ruminative onset scores, were associated with elevated dysphoria was disproportionately greater in those participants who obtained high ruminative persistence scores rather than those who obtained low ruminative persistence scores. Indeed, only in the former participants (i.e., those with high ruminative persistence scores) was it the case that BDI–II scores were significantly greater for those who obtained higher ruminative onset scores than for those who obtained lower ruminative onset scores, t(335) ⫽ 5.75, p ⬍ .001. In the latter participants (i.e., those with low ruminative persistence scores), there was no evidence that high ruminative onset scores were associated with elevated BDI–II scores, t(335) ⫽ 1.56, p ⬎ .05. Finally, we sought to examine whether this interactive influence of ruminative onset and persistence could predict variance in BDI–II scores beyond that accounted for by conventional RRS scores. The RRS scores were entered in the first step of the 1 Using a general community sample, Treynor et al. (2003) found that females scored higher than males on the RRS. In the present sample of student participants, men and women did not differ significantly in terms of RRS scores, ruminative onset scores, ruminative persistence scores, or BDI–II scores (ps ⬎ .05). 2 Treynor et al. (2003) identified that a number of the RRS items are contaminated by overlap with depression and have suggested using only those RRS items uncontaminated by such overlap. Hence, we conducted all reported analyses also using only those RRS uncontaminated by depression. Exactly the same patterns of significant effects emerged.
RUMINATIVE ONSET AND PERSISTENCE 20 18
Level of Dysphoria
16 14 12 High RP
10
Low RP
8 6
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4 2 0 Low RO
High RO
Figure 1. Interaction influence of ruminative onset (RO) and ruminative persistence (RP) in the prediction of dysphoria.
regression model, with BDI–II scores as the dependent variable. Not surprising, the results of the analysis indicated that the regression model in which only the RRS was entered ( ⫽ .67 for RRS) was significant, F(1, 337) ⫽ 274.05, p ⬍ .001. Next, we entered the ruminative onset and ruminative persistence scores in the second step of the analysis. This revealed that both the regression model ( ⫽ ⫺.005 for ruminative onset,  ⫽ .27 for ruminative persistence,  ⫽ .46 for RRS), F(2, 335) ⫽ 102.91, p ⬍ .001, and the R2 change were significant, F(1, 335) ⫽ 10.01, p ⬍ .001. Of more importance, however, when the Ruminative Onset ⫻ Ruminative Persistence interaction term was entered in the third step, the analysis revealed that the regression model ( ⫽ ⫺.43 for ruminative onset,  ⫽ ⫺.09 for ruminative persistence,  ⫽ .46 for RRS, and  ⫽ .77 for Ruminative Onset ⫻ Ruminative Persistence) was again significant, F(2, 334) ⫽ 83.78, p ⬍ .001, and that the R2 change was also significant, F(1, 334) ⫽ 14.21, p ⬍ .001. This indicates that the inclusion of the Ruminative Onset ⫻ Ruminative Persistence interaction term resulted in the model explaining significantly greater variance in BDI–II scores than could be explained by the combined weight of the conventional RRS and the ruminative onset and ruminative persistence measures.
Discussion The results obtained in present study shed light on each of the issues under empirical scrutiny. Our first question concerned whether the hypothetical dimensions of ruminative onset and ruminative persistence represent dissociable facets of dispositional rumination. The findings reveal that measures of ruminative onset and ruminative persistence independently predict scores on the most widely used measure of rumination, the RRS (NolenHoeksema & Morrow, 1991), confirming that each separately contributes to RRS variance. Thus, consistent with the proposal outlined by Nolen-Hoeksema et al. (2008), individual differences in ruminative onset and ruminative perseveration appear to represent distinctive aspects of ruminative tendency, each of which makes a unique contribution to variance in ruminative disposition.
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The present study lays a firm foundation for future programs of investigation that are designed to more sensitively delineate these two facets of ruminative tendency. One such approach will likely involve refining the psychometric properties of questionnaire instruments that assess ruminative onset and ruminative persistence. Post hoc analysis indicated that each of the two subscales of the present questionnaire measure, assessing ruminative onset and ruminative persistence, displayed a reassuringly high level of internal reliability (␣ ⫽ .95 in both cases). Although factor analysis did not confirm a strong fit for a two-factor solution that distinguished ruminative onset and ruminative persistence (root mean square error of approximation [RMSEA] ⫽ .13), this is not surprising given the present sample size. Such fit was not improved by using only RRS items not contaminated by depression, nor was it improved when considering a four-factor model that also included ruminative brooding and ruminative reflection (RMSEA ⫽ .21 and .17, respectively). Studies of the present type that employ larger sample sizes will be informative in guiding the further development of appropriate questionnaire measures. It should be noted, however, that the differential assessment of ruminative onset and ruminative persistence need not be restricted to questionnaire-based approaches alone. Indeed, a limitation of all questionnaire measures that rely on participant recall to assess emotional symptomatology is the possibility of responses being distorted by memory effects (Kihlstrom, Eich, Sandbrand, & Tobias, 2009). Hence, in addition to developing more sophisticated questionnaire measures, future researchers also could usefully construct and evaluate in vivo approaches for use in the assessment of ruminative onset and ruminative persistence. For example, this might involve first exposing participants to a contrived failure experience, and assessing not only the degree to which this elicits the commencement of rumination (i.e., ruminative onset), but also the degree to which such rumination continues for an extended period following this experience (i.e., ruminative perseveration). Further support for the conclusion drawn in the present study would be provided by the finding that such in vivo measures of ruminative onset and ruminative persistence independently predict variance in RRS scores. Having obtained evidence that ruminative onset and ruminative persistence are dissociable facets of ruminative disposition, it would be appropriate to now seek to identify the differing mechanisms that underpin individual differences in these two ruminative dimensions. One intriguing possibility suggested by recent developments within the cognition and emotion field, which may be of relevance here, is the distinction between selective cognitive engagement with and selective cognitive disengagement from negative emotional information (cf. Ouimet, Gawronski, & Dozois, 2009). One could speculate that increased cognitive engagement with negative information may contribute principally to heightened ruminative onset, and impaired cognitive disengagement from negative information instead may make a greater contribution to ruminative persistence. The empirical appraisal of this speculative hypothesis awaits future research designed to directly address this possibility. Not only have we shown in the present study that ruminative onset and ruminative perseveration are dissociable dimensions of ruminative disposition, but we also have demonstrated that consideration of these two facets of rumination can contribute to the prediction of dysphoria. Both ruminative onset and ruminative
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persistence scores accounted for independent variance in dysphoric symptoms when simultaneously entered in our regression analysis. The standardized beta weights obtained from the analysis were almost identical, suggesting that ruminative onset and persistence are of similar importance to individual differences in BDI–II scores. Nevertheless, these findings also indicate that each ruminative dimension predicts something distinctive about these dysphoric symptoms, and it is interesting to speculate what this difference may be. One possibility is that there may be a subset of depressive symptoms assessed by the BDI–II that are predicted by heightened ruminative onset and another subset that are instead predicted by heightened ruminative persistence. We were able to evaluate this possibility, in a post hoc manner, by exploring whether ruminative onset scores and ruminative persistence scores each uniquely predicted a different subset of BDI–II items. In fact, this was not the case. Both ruminative onset and ruminative persistence scores simultaneously predicted independent variance in almost all BDI–II items (in each case, p ⬍ .05), with the exception only of Item 4 (loss of pleasure), Item 9 (suicidal thoughts and wishes), and Item 16 (changes in sleeping pattern), where ruminative persistence scores alone predicted independent variance (for ruminative onset scores, p ⫽ .10 for Item 4, p ⫽ .06 for Item 9, and p ⫽ .12 for Item 16), and Item 21 (loss of interest in sex), where ruminative onset scores alone predicted independent variance (for ruminative persistence scores, p ⫽ .94). The observation that ruminative onset and ruminative persistence generally account for independent variance in the same dysphoric symptoms suggests that each facet of rumination may influence not which symptoms are experienced, but how these symptoms are experienced. Indeed, there is evidence to suggest that the psychological factors that contribute to the onset of a dysphoria episode (Gotlib, Joormann, Minor, & Hallmayer, 2008; Thase, Jindal, & Howland, 2002) are not the same as those that influence the perseveration of dysphoria (Teasdale, 1988). Hence, it does not seem implausible that the distinction drawn by Rudaizky et al. (2012) between the probability of experiencing an anxious reaction (anxiety reactivity) and the persistence of an anxious reaction (anxiety perseveration) may also be applied to dysphoria. An intriguing and testable hypothesis is that heightened ruminative onset may elevate the probability of experiencing dysphoria, and heightened ruminative persistence may increase the likely duration of dysphoria. This possibility could usefully be empirically evaluated in future research. Our findings also support the validity of our hypothesis that the interactive influence of variation in ruminative onset and in ruminative persistence would make a particularly powerful contribution to the prediction of dysphoria. Consistent with this hypothesis, when the Ruminative Onset ⫻ Ruminative Persistence interaction term was entered into the regression analysis, it accounted for additional variance in dysphoria over and above that predicted by either dimension alone, and neither dimension alone could account for any further variance beyond that predicted by this interaction term. The pattern of results indicates that when an elevated tendency to experience ruminative onset is also accompanied by an elevated tendency for this rumination to subsequently persist, then this particular mixture of ruminative styles will likely be associated with the greatest levels of dysphoria. The prediction of dysphoria is of more than theoretical interest, and researchers have drawn attention to the applied value of the
index of dysphoric vulnerability using measures of variability in rumination, which until now have usually been RRS scores (Watkins, 2008). Our results demonstrate that differentiating variability in ruminative onset from variability in persistence can enhance capacity to sensitively predict dysphoria beyond the level permitted by considering conventional RRS scores alone. Thus, although the measures of ruminative onset and ruminative persistence were themselves correlated, our findings clearly indicate that the use of these two measures was more helpful in predicting depression than was the use of the single RRS measure commonly employed in previous research. This highlights the potential value of questionnaire instruments of the present type that distinguish these two facets of ruminative disposition, as it suggests the possibility that these may be especially well suited to furthering the applied objective of identifying individuals at risk of developing clinical levels of dysphoria. The present finding that ruminative disposition can usefully be decomposed into two individual difference dimensions, respectively reflecting the ready onset of rumination and the enduring persistence of rumination, just as trait anxiety can be decomposed into two individual difference dimensions reflecting ready onset and enduring persistence of anxiety (Rudaizky et al., 2012), invites speculation that perhaps this onset versus persistence distinction may apply across the broad array of emotional dispositions. In principle, it is possible that other emotional traits, such as dispositional worry, trait anger, or positive affectivity, might meaningfully be deconstructed into component individual dimensions that reflect variability in the onset of, and in the persistence of, these emotional experiences. Whether this is the case can be determined only by appropriate empirical investigation, and so the evaluation of this possibility must await the attention of future investigators. For the moment, we can conclude that ruminative onset and ruminative persistence do represent dissociable facets of ruminative disposition, that variation in each of these two dimensions of rumination independently contributes to variance in dysphoria, that the interactive influence of ruminative onset and perseveration represents a particularly powerful predictor of dysphoria, and that the consideration of individual differences in these two ruminative dimensions can enhance our capacity to predict dysphoria, as measured by the BDI.
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RUMINATIVE ONSET AND PERSISTENCE memory: Implications for self-report. In A. Stone, J. Turkkan, C. Bachrach, J. Jobe, H. Kurtzman, & V. Cain (Eds.), The science of self-report (pp. 81–100). Mahwah, NJ: Erlbaum. Kuehner, C., & Weber, I. (1999). Responses to depression in unipolar depressed patients: An investigation of Nolen-Hoeksema’s response styles theory. Psychological Medicine, 29, 1323–1333. doi:10.1017/ S0033291799001282 Luminet, O. (2004). Assessment and measurement of rumination. In C. Papageorgiou & A. Wells (Eds.), Depressive rumination: Nature, theory, and treatment (pp. 187–215). Chichester, UK: Wiley. Nolen-Hoeksema, S. (2000). The role of rumination in depressive disorders and mixed anxiety/depressive symptoms. Journal of Abnormal Psychology, 109, 504 –511. doi:10.1037/0021-843X.109.3.504 Nolen-Hoeksema, S., & Davis, C. (1999). “Thanks for sharing that”: Ruminators and their social support networks. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 77, 801– 814. doi:10.1037/0022-3514.77.4.801 Nolen-Hoeksema, S., McBride, A., & Larson, J. (1997). Rumination and psychological distress among bereaved partners. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 72, 855– 862. doi:10.1037/0022-3514.72.4.855 Nolen-Hoeksema, S., & Morrow, J. (1991). A prospective study of depression and posttraumatic stress symptoms after a natural disaster: The 1989 Loma Prieta earthquake. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 61, 115–121. doi:10.1037/0022-3514.61.1.115 Nolen-Hoeksema, S., Morrow, J., & Fredrickson, L. (1993). Response styles and the duration of episodes of depressed mood. Journal of Abnormal Psychology, 102, 20 –28. doi:10.1037/0021-843X.102.1.20 Nolen-Hoeksema, S., Parker, E., & Larson, J. (1994). Ruminative coping with depressed mood following loss. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 67, 92–104. doi:10.1037/0022-3514.67.1.92 Nolen-Hoeksema, S., Wisco, B., & Lyubomirsky, S. (2008). Rethinking rumination. Perspectives on Psychological Science, 3, 400 – 424. doi: 10.1111/j.1745-6924.2008.00088.x O’Brien, R. (2007). A caution regarding rules of thumb for variance inflation factors. Quality & Quantity, 41, 673– 690. doi:10.1007/s11135006-9018-6 Ouimet, A. J., Gawronski, B., & Dozois, D. J. A. (2009). Cognitive vulnerability to anxiety: A review and an integrative model. Clinical Psychology Review, 29, 459 – 470. doi:10.1016/j.cpr.2009.05.004 Papageorgiou, C., & Wells, A. (2004). Nature, functions, and beliefs about depressive rumination. In C. Papageorgiou & A. Wells (Eds.), Depressive rumination: Nature, theory, and treatment (pp. 3–20). Chichester, UK: Wiley.
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Roelofs, J., Muris, P., Huibers, M., Peeters, F., & Arntz, A. (2006). On the measurement of rumination: A psychometric evaluation of the Ruminative Response Scale and the Rumination on Sadness Scale in undergraduates. Journal of Behavior Therapy and Experimental Psychiatry, 37, 299 –313. doi:10.1016/j.jbtep.2006.03.002 Rudaizky, D., & MacLeod, C. (2012). Anxiety reactivity and anxiety perseveration represent independent dimensions of anxiety vulnerability: An in-vivo study. Manuscript submitted for publication. Rudaizky, D., & MacLeod, C. (2013). Anxiety reactivity and anxiety perseveration represent dissociable dimensions of trait anxiety: A replication and extension. Australian Journal of Psychology. Advance online publication. doi:10.1111/ajpy.12024 Rudaizky, D., Page, A., & MacLeod, C. (2012). Anxiety reactivity and anxiety perseveration represent dissociable dimensions of trait anxiety. Emotion, 12, 903–907. doi:10.1037/a0025612 Spasojevi´c, J., & Alloy, B. (2001). Rumination as a common mechanism relating depressive risk factors to depression. Emotion, 1, 25–37. doi: 10.1037/1528-3542.1.1.25 Spielberger, C. D., Gorsuch, R. L., Lushene, R. E., Vagg, P., & Jacobs, G. (1983). Manual for the State–Trait Anxiety Inventory (Self-Evaluation Questionnaire). Palo Alto, CA: Consulting Psychologists Press. Storch, E., Roberti, J., & Roth, D. (2004). Factor structure, concurrent validity, and internal consistency of the Beck Depression Inventory-2nd ed. in a sample of college students. Depression and Anxiety, 19, 187– 189. doi:10.1002/da.20002 Teasdale, J. D. (1988). Cognitive vulnerability to persistent depression. Cognition and Emotion, 2, 247–274. doi:10.1080/02699938808410927 Thase, M., Jindal, R., & Howland, R. (2002). Biological aspects of depression. In I. Gotlib & C. Hammen (Eds.), Handbook of depression (pp. 192–218). New York, NY: Guilford Press. Treynor, W., Gonzalez, R., & Nolen-Hoeksema, S. (2003). Rumination reconsidered: A psychometric analysis. Cognitive Therapy and Research, 27, 247–259. doi:10.1023/A:1023910315561 Watkins, E. (2008). Constructive and unconstructive repetitive thought. Psychological Bulletin, 134, 163–206. doi:10.1037/0033-2909.134.2 .163 Wiebe, J., & Penley, J. (2005). A psychometric comparison of the Beck Depression Inventory—II in English and Spanish. Psychological Assessment, 17, 481– 485. doi:10.1037/1040-3590.17.4.481
Received August 30, 2012 Revision received June 21, 2013 Accepted June 24, 2013 䡲
© 2013 American Psychological Association 1528-3542/13/$12.00 DOI: 10.1037/a0033876
Don’t Start What You Can’t Stop: Differentiating Individual Differences in Ruminative Onset and Ruminative Persistence, and Their Contributions to Dysphoria Ben Grafton and Colin MacLeod
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University of Western Australia and Babes-Bolyai University There is much evidence to suggest that rumination and dysphoria share a close relationship. The tendency to ruminate is considered a stable individual difference, reflecting variation in repetitive thoughts concerning the causes and consequences of distress. In the present study, we evaluated the veracity of a proposed distinction between 2 hypothetical dimensions of ruminative tendency, which plausibly represent dissociable facets of dispositional rumination, and whose interactive influence may make a particularly strong contribution to dysphoria. These dimensions are ruminative onset, the probability of experiencing ruminative symptoms when feeling upset, and ruminative persistence, the continuation of ruminative symptoms once initiated. The findings indicate that ruminative onset and ruminative persistence do indeed represent dissociable dimensions of ruminative disposition. Furthermore, as hypothesized, it is the interaction between these 2 facets of rumination that makes the greatest contribution to the prediction of variance in dysphoria. Keywords: rumination, ruminative onset, ruminative persistence, dysphoria
1999; Nolen-Hoeksema, 2000; Nolen-Hoeksema, Morrow, & Fredrickson, 1993; Nolen-Hoeksema, Parker, & Larson, 1994; Spasojevic´ & Alloy, 2001), which typically have been measured using the Beck Depression Inventory (BDI; Beck, Ward, Mendelson, Mock, & Erbaugh, 1961). Across the past 20 years, the results of such studies have served to promote substantial research interest in rumination, as this work is thought to hold great potential to illuminate the patterns of cognitive processing that contribute to the onset, maintenance, and recurrence of dysphoria (Papageorgiou & Wells, 2004). To further illuminate the relationship between an elevated ruminative tendency and dysphoria, some researchers have sought to distinguish hypothetical subtypes of rumination. For example, Treynor, Gonzalez, and Nolen-Hoeksema (2003) suggested a possible distinction between rumination of a reflective versus brooding nature, which may differ in terms of adaptiveness. Of more direct relevance to our present research interest, Nolen-Hoeksema, Wisco, and Lyubomirsky (2008) proposed that individual differences in rumination may be better understood by distinguishing two hypothetical dimensions of ruminative disposition, which they describe as involving a reduced ability to “avoid falling into rumination” and a reduced ability to “break free of rumination once it has begun” (p. 418). Although the RRS does not discriminate between these two possible facets of rumination, we believe that this distinction could be relevant to the prediction of dysphoria. Given that variation in each type of ruminative tendency would influence the amount of time spent ruminating, then each ruminative dimension should independently predict dysphoria, but dysphoria should be best predicted by the interactive influence of these two facets of rumination. Specifically, the degree to which a heightened tendency to readily experience ruminative onset will give rise to elevated dysphoria should be disproportionately greater in participants who display a high rather than low tendency
It is now widely accepted that elevated levels of rumination play an important role in the development and maintenance of dysphoria (Roelofs, Muris, Huibers, Peeters, & Arntz, 2006). The tendency to ruminate is considered a stable individual difference (Nolen-Hoeksema & Davis, 1999), and typically is construed as a method of coping with distress that involves “passively and repetitively focusing on one’s symptoms of distress and the circumstances surrounding these symptoms” (Nolen-Hoeksema, McBride, & Larson, 1997, p. 855). The most common questionnaire instrument used to measure such dysphoric rumination is the Ruminative Response Scale (RRS; Nolen-Hoeksema & Morrow, 1991), which requires respondents to indicate the degree to which they experience ruminative symptoms when feeling upset, on a scale ranging from almost never to almost always. There is now an abundance of evidence demonstrating that an elevated ruminative tendency, as measured by the RRS, can reliably predict variance in dysphoric symptoms (Just & Alloy, 1997; Kuehner & Weber,
Ben Grafton, Centre for the Advancement of Research on Emotion, School of Psychology, University of Western Australia, Crawley, Australia; School of Psychology, Babes-Bolyai University, Cluj-Napoca, Romania. Colin MacLeod, Centre for the Advancement of Research on Emotion, School of Psychology, University of Western Australia, Crawley, Australia; School of Psychology, Babes-Bolyai University, Cluj-Napoca, Romania. This work was supported by Australian Research Council Grant DP0879589, and by a grant from the Romanian National Authority for Scientific Research, CNCS–UEFISCDI, Project Number PNII-ID-PCCE2011-2-0045. Correspondence concerning this article should be addressed to Ben Grafton, Centre for the Advancement of Research in Emotion, School of Psychology, M304, University of Western Australia, M304, 35 Stirling Highway, Crawley WA 6009, Australia. E-mail: [email protected] 1080
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for rumination to subsequently persist following onset. The present study was designed to address two questions relevant to this issue. Our first question was whether ruminative onset and ruminative perseveration represent dissociable facets of dispositional rumination. If so, then our second question concerned whether, as predicted, it is the interactive influence of these two ruminative dispositions that makes the greatest contribution to dysphoria. The proposal that individual differences in ruminative onset and ruminative persistence represent two dissociable facets of rumination is somewhat similar to one made recently in the anxiety literature, in which it has been shown that trait anxiety, a construct that reflects individual differences in the disposition to experience elevated state anxiety, can be parsed into dissociable dimensions of anxiety vulnerability (Rudaizky & MacLeod, 2013; Rudaizky, Page, & MacLeod, 2012). These two dimensions have been termed anxiety reactivity and anxiety perseveration, and reflect the elevated probability of an anxious reaction being elicited in response to a stressful situation, and the increased tendency to experience prolonged anxious reactions to stressors, respectively. By manipulating the question used to assess trait anxiety, Rudaizky et al. (2012) found that these are dissociable facets of anxious disposition. Specifically, the authors asked participants three questions about each of the anxiety symptoms that compose the Spielberger State–Trait Anxiety Inventory (STAI; Spielberger, Gorsuch, Lushene, Vagg, & Jacobs, 1983), a widely used instrument employed to measure trait anxiety (Grös, Antony, Simms, & McCabe, 2007). Participants were first asked the original STAI–Trait question, concerning the extent to which each symptom described them. They were then asked two additional questions about each symptom. One question assessed anxiety reactivity and required respondents to indicate the probability that they would experience each symptom when exposed to stress. The other question assessed anxiety perseveration and required respondents to indicate how long each symptom would persist once it had been elicited. Using multiple regression analysis, the authors found that anxiety reactivity and anxiety perseveration scores each accounted for independent variance in conventional trait anxiety scores, confirming that they represent dissociable facets of dispositional anxiety. The confirmation of this distinction between these two types of anxiety vulnerability lends weight to the possibility that a similar distinction may also be drawn between ruminative onset and ruminative persistence. It would be of considerable potential theoretical interest and applied importance to empirically differentiate these two hypothetical facets of ruminative disposition. Specifically, this distinction may enable the development of more precise theoretical accounts of dispositional rumination, and of the relationship between such rumination and dysphoria, while also permitting the better prediction of future dysphoria, thereby enhancing the identification of individuals at risk of developing clinical levels of dysphoria. In the present study, we adopted an approach similar to that employed by Rudaizky et al. (2012) in their anxiety research. Participants were asked three questions about each of the 22 ruminative symptoms that compose the RRS. First, they were asked the original RRS question, concerning the degree to which they experience ruminative symptoms when feeling upset. This yielded the conventional ruminative disposition score. They were then asked two additional questions about each ruminative symptom. One question assessed the probability that they would expe-
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rience each ruminative symptom when feeling upset, thereby yielding a ruminative onset score. The other question assessed how long each ruminative symptom tended to persist once initiated, thereby yielding a ruminative persistence score. Finally, participants completed the Beck Depression Inventory—II (BDI–II; Beck, Steer, & Brown, 1996) to assess their levels of dysphoria. We employed multiple regression to address the two questions under empirical scrutiny. First, we examined whether variability in ruminative onset and ruminative persistence scores each accounted for independent variance in the conventional RRS measure of ruminative disposition to determine whether they do indeed represent dissociable dimensions of such ruminative disposition. Second, we examined whether it is the interactive influence of ruminative onset and ruminative persistence that makes the greatest contribution to variance in dysphoric symptoms, as measured by the BDI–II.
Method Participants Participants were 350 undergraduate psychology students at the University of Western Australia. The sample consisted of 63% women, with a mean age of 20.1 years (SD ⫽ 6.1, range 17– 68 years). The mean RRS score was 43.5 (SD ⫽ 14.1, range 22– 88), and the mean BDI–II score was 11.0 (SD ⫽ 9.9, range 0 –53).
Questionnaire Measure RRS. In the present study, we used the RRS (NolenHoeksema & Morrow, 1991) to measure dysphoric rumination. This instrument comprises 22 items, each describing a particular ruminative symptom. To obtain the conventional ruminative disposition score, we asked participants the original RRS question, “Please indicate if you never, sometimes, often or always think or do each one when you feel down, sad or depressed.” The RRS has been shown to have both high internal reliability and validity (cf. Luminet, 2004). It is important to note that although higher conventional scores on the RRS indicate higher levels of rumination, such scores could in principle reflect more frequent rumination, more prolonged rumination, or a combination of both. Therefore, to determine whether ruminative onset and ruminative persistence represent dissociable facets of ruminative disposition, we asked participants two new questions about each of the 22 ruminative symptoms contained in the RRS. The wording of these questions was adapted from the wording used by Rudaizky et al. (2012) to distinguish anxiety reactivity and anxiety perseveration. The ruminative onset question was designed to assess the probability of experiencing a particular ruminative symptom when feeling upset. Participants were asked, “When feeling upset, what tends to be the probability that you will engage in the following response?” Four response options were provided, reflecting probability estimates ranging from 1 ⫽ extremely improbable to 4 ⫽ extremely probable. As there can be no persistence without onset, the ruminative persistence question was designed to assess the probability of each particular ruminative symptom persisting in the event that rumination had been initiated. This approach ensured that our measure of variability in ruminative persistence is conceptually distinct
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from our measure of variability in ruminative onset. Specifically, participants were asked, “When you do engage in this particular response, how long does this response tend to persist?” The four response options reflected ruminative persistence ranging from 1 ⫽ extremely transient to 4 ⫽ extremely persistent. In each case, the wording of the original RRS items was not altered. For both of these new questions, responses across the 22 items were summed, resulting in separate ruminative onset and ruminative persistence scores for each participant. BDI–II. Dysphoria was assessed using the BDI–II (Beck et al., 1996), which requires participants to respond to 21 statements describing various depressive symptoms, on a scale ranging from 0 to 3. The BDI–II has been shown to have both good reliability (Wiebe & Penley, 2005) and validity (Storch, Roberti, & Roth, 2004).1
Procedure The administration of the questionnaire measures was conducted in a group setting, with 20 –25 participants in each group. When completing the measures of rumination, participants were always first asked the conventional RRS question before being asked the ruminative onset and ruminative persistence questions.
Results As expected, both ruminative onset scores and ruminative persistence scores each were correlated with RRS scores (r ⫽ .88, p ⬍ .001, and r ⫽ .77, p ⬍ .001, respectively). To determine whether these measures of ruminative onset and ruminative persistence each predicted independent variance in the RRS scores, indicating that they represent dissociable dimensions of ruminative disposition, we entered the ruminative onset and ruminative persistence scores simultaneously into a multiple regression, with RRS scores as the dependent variable. Although ruminative onset and ruminative persistence scores were themselves correlated (r ⫽ .83, p ⬍ .001), the variance inflation factor was only 3.18, well below the critical value of 10 that is commonly taken as an indication of problematic multicollinearity (O’Brian, 2007). The results indicated that the regression model ( ⫽ .76 for ruminative onset and  ⫽ .14 for ruminative persistence) was significant, F(2, 347) ⫽ 618.82, p ⬍ .001. The ruminative onset beta weight was nominally larger than the ruminative persistence beta weight, suggesting that the RRS may principally be a measure of ruminative onset. Of greater theoretical importance, both the ruminative onset and ruminative persistence scores predicted independent variance in RRS scores: for ruminative onset scores, t(347) ⫽ 17.03, p ⬍ .001, and for ruminative persistence scores, t(347) ⫽ 3.16, p ⬍ .01.2 Thus, the results support the hypothesis that ruminative onset and ruminative persistence are indeed dissociable facets of rumination that contribute independently to variance in a conventional measure of ruminative disposition. We now consider whether, as hypothesized, it is the interactive influence of variation in ruminative onset and ruminative perseveration that best predicts dysphoria. RRS scores, ruminative onset scores, and ruminative persistence scores each significantly predicted BDI–II scores (r ⫽ .67, p ⬍ .001, r ⫽ .67, p ⬍ .001, and r ⫽ .62, p ⬍ .001, respectively). The ruminative onset and ruminative persistence scores were entered simultaneously into the first
step of a regression analysis, with the BDI–II scores as the dependent variable. The results revealed that the regression model ( ⫽ .35 for ruminative onset and  ⫽ .34 for ruminative persistence) was significant, F(2, 336) ⫽ 127.05, p ⬍ .001. It is interesting to note that both the ruminative onset and ruminative persistence scores predicted independent variance in BDI–II scores: for ruminative onset scores, t(336) ⫽ 4.87, p ⬍ .001, and for ruminative persistence scores, t(336) ⫽ 4.70, p ⬍ .001. Thus, not only is it the case that ruminative onset and ruminative perseveration represent dissociable dimensions of ruminative disposition, but each of the these differing facets of rumination does indeed make a distinctive contribution to variance in dysphoria. Of more relevance to the issue under consideration, when the Ruminative Onset ⫻ Ruminative Persistence interaction term was entered in the second step of the analysis, not only did the results reveal that the regression model ( ⫽ ⫺.09 for ruminative onset,  ⫽ ⫺.03 for ruminative persistence,  ⫽ .78 for Ruminative Onset ⫻ Ruminative Persistence) was significant, F(2, 335) ⫽ 92.38, p ⬍ .001, but the R2 change also was significant, F(1, 335) ⫽ 13.56, p ⬍ .001, indicating that the inclusion of this interaction term resulted in the model explaining significantly greater variance in BDI–II scores than could be explained by ruminative onset and persistence scores alone. Furthermore, when the Ruminative Onset ⫻ Ruminative Persistence interaction was added in the second step, only this interaction predicted independent variance in BDI–II scores, t(335) ⫽ 3.68, p ⬍ .001. Neither the ruminative onset scores, t(335) ⫽ ⫺0.63, ns, nor ruminative persistence scores, t(335) ⫽ ⫺0.25, ns, predicted additional variance in BDI–II scores beyond that accounted for by their interaction. Thus, the results support the hypothesis that the interactive influence of ruminative onset and persistence makes the greatest contribution to variance in dysphoria. As can be seen from Figure 1, the nature of this interaction was precisely as predicted. The degree to which higher ruminative onset scores, compared with lower ruminative onset scores, were associated with elevated dysphoria was disproportionately greater in those participants who obtained high ruminative persistence scores rather than those who obtained low ruminative persistence scores. Indeed, only in the former participants (i.e., those with high ruminative persistence scores) was it the case that BDI–II scores were significantly greater for those who obtained higher ruminative onset scores than for those who obtained lower ruminative onset scores, t(335) ⫽ 5.75, p ⬍ .001. In the latter participants (i.e., those with low ruminative persistence scores), there was no evidence that high ruminative onset scores were associated with elevated BDI–II scores, t(335) ⫽ 1.56, p ⬎ .05. Finally, we sought to examine whether this interactive influence of ruminative onset and persistence could predict variance in BDI–II scores beyond that accounted for by conventional RRS scores. The RRS scores were entered in the first step of the 1 Using a general community sample, Treynor et al. (2003) found that females scored higher than males on the RRS. In the present sample of student participants, men and women did not differ significantly in terms of RRS scores, ruminative onset scores, ruminative persistence scores, or BDI–II scores (ps ⬎ .05). 2 Treynor et al. (2003) identified that a number of the RRS items are contaminated by overlap with depression and have suggested using only those RRS items uncontaminated by such overlap. Hence, we conducted all reported analyses also using only those RRS uncontaminated by depression. Exactly the same patterns of significant effects emerged.
RUMINATIVE ONSET AND PERSISTENCE 20 18
Level of Dysphoria
16 14 12 High RP
10
Low RP
8 6
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4 2 0 Low RO
High RO
Figure 1. Interaction influence of ruminative onset (RO) and ruminative persistence (RP) in the prediction of dysphoria.
regression model, with BDI–II scores as the dependent variable. Not surprising, the results of the analysis indicated that the regression model in which only the RRS was entered ( ⫽ .67 for RRS) was significant, F(1, 337) ⫽ 274.05, p ⬍ .001. Next, we entered the ruminative onset and ruminative persistence scores in the second step of the analysis. This revealed that both the regression model ( ⫽ ⫺.005 for ruminative onset,  ⫽ .27 for ruminative persistence,  ⫽ .46 for RRS), F(2, 335) ⫽ 102.91, p ⬍ .001, and the R2 change were significant, F(1, 335) ⫽ 10.01, p ⬍ .001. Of more importance, however, when the Ruminative Onset ⫻ Ruminative Persistence interaction term was entered in the third step, the analysis revealed that the regression model ( ⫽ ⫺.43 for ruminative onset,  ⫽ ⫺.09 for ruminative persistence,  ⫽ .46 for RRS, and  ⫽ .77 for Ruminative Onset ⫻ Ruminative Persistence) was again significant, F(2, 334) ⫽ 83.78, p ⬍ .001, and that the R2 change was also significant, F(1, 334) ⫽ 14.21, p ⬍ .001. This indicates that the inclusion of the Ruminative Onset ⫻ Ruminative Persistence interaction term resulted in the model explaining significantly greater variance in BDI–II scores than could be explained by the combined weight of the conventional RRS and the ruminative onset and ruminative persistence measures.
Discussion The results obtained in present study shed light on each of the issues under empirical scrutiny. Our first question concerned whether the hypothetical dimensions of ruminative onset and ruminative persistence represent dissociable facets of dispositional rumination. The findings reveal that measures of ruminative onset and ruminative persistence independently predict scores on the most widely used measure of rumination, the RRS (NolenHoeksema & Morrow, 1991), confirming that each separately contributes to RRS variance. Thus, consistent with the proposal outlined by Nolen-Hoeksema et al. (2008), individual differences in ruminative onset and ruminative perseveration appear to represent distinctive aspects of ruminative tendency, each of which makes a unique contribution to variance in ruminative disposition.
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The present study lays a firm foundation for future programs of investigation that are designed to more sensitively delineate these two facets of ruminative tendency. One such approach will likely involve refining the psychometric properties of questionnaire instruments that assess ruminative onset and ruminative persistence. Post hoc analysis indicated that each of the two subscales of the present questionnaire measure, assessing ruminative onset and ruminative persistence, displayed a reassuringly high level of internal reliability (␣ ⫽ .95 in both cases). Although factor analysis did not confirm a strong fit for a two-factor solution that distinguished ruminative onset and ruminative persistence (root mean square error of approximation [RMSEA] ⫽ .13), this is not surprising given the present sample size. Such fit was not improved by using only RRS items not contaminated by depression, nor was it improved when considering a four-factor model that also included ruminative brooding and ruminative reflection (RMSEA ⫽ .21 and .17, respectively). Studies of the present type that employ larger sample sizes will be informative in guiding the further development of appropriate questionnaire measures. It should be noted, however, that the differential assessment of ruminative onset and ruminative persistence need not be restricted to questionnaire-based approaches alone. Indeed, a limitation of all questionnaire measures that rely on participant recall to assess emotional symptomatology is the possibility of responses being distorted by memory effects (Kihlstrom, Eich, Sandbrand, & Tobias, 2009). Hence, in addition to developing more sophisticated questionnaire measures, future researchers also could usefully construct and evaluate in vivo approaches for use in the assessment of ruminative onset and ruminative persistence. For example, this might involve first exposing participants to a contrived failure experience, and assessing not only the degree to which this elicits the commencement of rumination (i.e., ruminative onset), but also the degree to which such rumination continues for an extended period following this experience (i.e., ruminative perseveration). Further support for the conclusion drawn in the present study would be provided by the finding that such in vivo measures of ruminative onset and ruminative persistence independently predict variance in RRS scores. Having obtained evidence that ruminative onset and ruminative persistence are dissociable facets of ruminative disposition, it would be appropriate to now seek to identify the differing mechanisms that underpin individual differences in these two ruminative dimensions. One intriguing possibility suggested by recent developments within the cognition and emotion field, which may be of relevance here, is the distinction between selective cognitive engagement with and selective cognitive disengagement from negative emotional information (cf. Ouimet, Gawronski, & Dozois, 2009). One could speculate that increased cognitive engagement with negative information may contribute principally to heightened ruminative onset, and impaired cognitive disengagement from negative information instead may make a greater contribution to ruminative persistence. The empirical appraisal of this speculative hypothesis awaits future research designed to directly address this possibility. Not only have we shown in the present study that ruminative onset and ruminative perseveration are dissociable dimensions of ruminative disposition, but we also have demonstrated that consideration of these two facets of rumination can contribute to the prediction of dysphoria. Both ruminative onset and ruminative
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persistence scores accounted for independent variance in dysphoric symptoms when simultaneously entered in our regression analysis. The standardized beta weights obtained from the analysis were almost identical, suggesting that ruminative onset and persistence are of similar importance to individual differences in BDI–II scores. Nevertheless, these findings also indicate that each ruminative dimension predicts something distinctive about these dysphoric symptoms, and it is interesting to speculate what this difference may be. One possibility is that there may be a subset of depressive symptoms assessed by the BDI–II that are predicted by heightened ruminative onset and another subset that are instead predicted by heightened ruminative persistence. We were able to evaluate this possibility, in a post hoc manner, by exploring whether ruminative onset scores and ruminative persistence scores each uniquely predicted a different subset of BDI–II items. In fact, this was not the case. Both ruminative onset and ruminative persistence scores simultaneously predicted independent variance in almost all BDI–II items (in each case, p ⬍ .05), with the exception only of Item 4 (loss of pleasure), Item 9 (suicidal thoughts and wishes), and Item 16 (changes in sleeping pattern), where ruminative persistence scores alone predicted independent variance (for ruminative onset scores, p ⫽ .10 for Item 4, p ⫽ .06 for Item 9, and p ⫽ .12 for Item 16), and Item 21 (loss of interest in sex), where ruminative onset scores alone predicted independent variance (for ruminative persistence scores, p ⫽ .94). The observation that ruminative onset and ruminative persistence generally account for independent variance in the same dysphoric symptoms suggests that each facet of rumination may influence not which symptoms are experienced, but how these symptoms are experienced. Indeed, there is evidence to suggest that the psychological factors that contribute to the onset of a dysphoria episode (Gotlib, Joormann, Minor, & Hallmayer, 2008; Thase, Jindal, & Howland, 2002) are not the same as those that influence the perseveration of dysphoria (Teasdale, 1988). Hence, it does not seem implausible that the distinction drawn by Rudaizky et al. (2012) between the probability of experiencing an anxious reaction (anxiety reactivity) and the persistence of an anxious reaction (anxiety perseveration) may also be applied to dysphoria. An intriguing and testable hypothesis is that heightened ruminative onset may elevate the probability of experiencing dysphoria, and heightened ruminative persistence may increase the likely duration of dysphoria. This possibility could usefully be empirically evaluated in future research. Our findings also support the validity of our hypothesis that the interactive influence of variation in ruminative onset and in ruminative persistence would make a particularly powerful contribution to the prediction of dysphoria. Consistent with this hypothesis, when the Ruminative Onset ⫻ Ruminative Persistence interaction term was entered into the regression analysis, it accounted for additional variance in dysphoria over and above that predicted by either dimension alone, and neither dimension alone could account for any further variance beyond that predicted by this interaction term. The pattern of results indicates that when an elevated tendency to experience ruminative onset is also accompanied by an elevated tendency for this rumination to subsequently persist, then this particular mixture of ruminative styles will likely be associated with the greatest levels of dysphoria. The prediction of dysphoria is of more than theoretical interest, and researchers have drawn attention to the applied value of the
index of dysphoric vulnerability using measures of variability in rumination, which until now have usually been RRS scores (Watkins, 2008). Our results demonstrate that differentiating variability in ruminative onset from variability in persistence can enhance capacity to sensitively predict dysphoria beyond the level permitted by considering conventional RRS scores alone. Thus, although the measures of ruminative onset and ruminative persistence were themselves correlated, our findings clearly indicate that the use of these two measures was more helpful in predicting depression than was the use of the single RRS measure commonly employed in previous research. This highlights the potential value of questionnaire instruments of the present type that distinguish these two facets of ruminative disposition, as it suggests the possibility that these may be especially well suited to furthering the applied objective of identifying individuals at risk of developing clinical levels of dysphoria. The present finding that ruminative disposition can usefully be decomposed into two individual difference dimensions, respectively reflecting the ready onset of rumination and the enduring persistence of rumination, just as trait anxiety can be decomposed into two individual difference dimensions reflecting ready onset and enduring persistence of anxiety (Rudaizky et al., 2012), invites speculation that perhaps this onset versus persistence distinction may apply across the broad array of emotional dispositions. In principle, it is possible that other emotional traits, such as dispositional worry, trait anger, or positive affectivity, might meaningfully be deconstructed into component individual dimensions that reflect variability in the onset of, and in the persistence of, these emotional experiences. Whether this is the case can be determined only by appropriate empirical investigation, and so the evaluation of this possibility must await the attention of future investigators. For the moment, we can conclude that ruminative onset and ruminative persistence do represent dissociable facets of ruminative disposition, that variation in each of these two dimensions of rumination independently contributes to variance in dysphoria, that the interactive influence of ruminative onset and perseveration represents a particularly powerful predictor of dysphoria, and that the consideration of individual differences in these two ruminative dimensions can enhance our capacity to predict dysphoria, as measured by the BDI.
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Received August 30, 2012 Revision received June 21, 2013 Accepted June 24, 2013 䡲
