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The American Journal of Bioethics Publication details, including instructions for authors and subscription information: http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/uajb20
Egalitarianism and Successful Moral Bioenhancement a
Alan T. Wilson a
University of Edinburgh Published online: 14 Apr 2014.
Click for updates To cite this article: Alan T. Wilson (2014) Egalitarianism and Successful Moral Bioenhancement, The American Journal of Bioethics, 14:4, 35-36, DOI: 10.1080/15265161.2014.889250 To link to this article: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/15265161.2014.889250
PLEASE SCROLL DOWN FOR ARTICLE Taylor & Francis makes every effort to ensure the accuracy of all the information (the “Content”) contained in the publications on our platform. However, Taylor & Francis, our agents, and our licensors make no representations or warranties whatsoever as to the accuracy, completeness, or suitability for any purpose of the Content. Any opinions and views expressed in this publication are the opinions and views of the authors, and are not the views of or endorsed by Taylor & Francis. The accuracy of the Content should not be relied upon and should be independently verified with primary sources of information. Taylor and Francis shall not be liable for any losses, actions, claims, proceedings, demands, costs, expenses, damages, and other liabilities whatsoever or howsoever caused arising directly or indirectly in connection with, in relation to or arising out of the use of the Content. This article may be used for research, teaching, and private study purposes. Any substantial or systematic reproduction, redistribution, reselling, loan, sub-licensing, systematic supply, or distribution in any form to anyone is expressly forbidden. Terms & Conditions of access and use can be found at http:// www.tandfonline.com/page/terms-and-conditions
Egalitarianism and Moral Bioenhancement
Egalitarianism and Successful Moral Bioenhancement
Downloaded by [George Washington University] at 04:06 05 February 2015
Alan T. Wilson, University of Edinburgh Robert Sparrow (2014) has argued that the project of moral bioenhancement—the improving of moral character through medical or biological means—is one that ought to greatly concern those who are committed to egalitarianism. Importantly, Sparrow argues that there will be reason for concern regardless of whether or not the project is actually feasible. My aim is to challenge Sparrow’s claim that egalitarians would have reason to fear even successful moral bioenhancement. I will do this by focusing on two key claims: (1) the claim that it would be in the interests of the morally enhanced to exclude the nonenhanced from their collaborative enterprises, and (2) the claim that we would be justified in giving the morally enhanced privileged political access as a result of their greater decision-making abilities. Neither of these claims would be supported by a plausible understanding of both the nature and the aims of a morally enhanced individual. While Sparrow may be right to think that failed attempts at enhancement would be problematic, he does not do enough to show that egalitarians ought to be concerned about cases of successful moral bioenhancement. Some preliminaries: While “egalitarianism” can be (and has been) understood in many different ways,1 for the purposes of direct response I remain in line with Sparrow’s understanding of the term. On Sparrow’s understanding, egalitarianism involves the commitment that relations of fundamental political equality are good in themselves. I also do not question Sparrow’s claim that the project of moral bioenhancement would have to be both society-wide and nonvoluntary in order to be useful.2 An important feature of Sparrow’s article is that he divides his discussion between arguments assuming that moral bioenhancement will be successful and arguments assuming that it is bound to fail, and his conclusion is that egalitarians have reason for concern either way. I will consider the arguments that Sparrow provides regarding successful moral bioenhancement. The first argument that I want to consider involves the idea of successful collaborations within a society. Sparrow points out that the benefits that a given collective is able to produce will typically be affected by the extent to which members trust each other—the greater the level of trust, the more effective and beneficial the process will be. Therefore, collaborations where members fully trust each other will be better able to produce benefits. Assuming that those who have been enhanced will be more trustworthy, collab-
orations among the morally enhanced will be more beneficial than those that also include the nonenhanced. Those subject to successful moral bioenhancement will therefore have good reason to exclude the nonenhanced from their joint projects, and such exclusion will be considered objectionable by committed egalitarians. Let us now assess this argument. First, it may be worth briefly questioning the assumption that the morally enhanced will be more trustworthy with regard to fulfilling their collaborative obligations (although we should probably expect them to be more trustworthy in general). Typically, we might be concerned that a fellow collaborator will be willing to sacrifice us out of a concern for self-interest, and this will be less likely when dealing with an agent whom we know to be morally enhanced. However, a related worry may emerge. We might worry that our enhanced collaborator will be willing to sacrifice us whenever that collaborator could thereby perform a more morally worthy act—say, giving the proceeds of our collaboration to charity, or failing to attend a vital group meeting in order to promote the general well-being in some other way. Such a possibility will hamper the efficiency of a collaboration featuring successfully morally enhanced agents. Fellow members will demand exactly the same kinds of institutional mechanisms and checks that are mentioned by Sparrow. We therefore have reason to doubt the assumption that collaborations featuring the morally enhanced will be more beneficial for their members. A more pressing problem for this argument is the claim that successfully morally enhanced agents would actually be motivated to exclude the nonenhanced from their joint enterprises. Even if we accept that the enhanced would benefit from a policy of exclusion, this does not mean that they would be motivated to enforce such a policy. In a disanalogy with a case of purely cognitive enhancement, we can expect the morally enhanced to possess a particular motivational set that is incompatible with harmful exclusion. The morally enhanced will be less likely to be motivated by self-interest and more likely to be motivated by considerations of fairness or general well-being. Therefore, the possibility of gaining extra benefits through the exclusion of others will be less tempting for an agent subject to successful moral enhancement. We have no reason to believe that exclusive collaborations will be sufficiently widespread to “effectively represent exclusion from
1. Key texts on this issue include Sen (1980), Dworkin (2000), and Parfit (1997). 2. One paper that does question this assumption is Raki´c (2013). I believe that more could be said on this topic. Address correspondence to Alan T. Wilson, University of Edinburgh, Philosophy, Dugald Stewart Building, 3 Charles Street, Edinburgh, EH8 9AD, United Kingdom. E-mail: [email protected]
April, Volume 14, Number 4, 2014
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The American Journal of Bioethics
Downloaded by [George Washington University] at 04:06 05 February 2015
full social and political participation” for the nonenhanced, as Sparrow (24) claims. This argument does not provide egalitarians with grounds to be concerned about successful moral bioenhancement. A second argument from Sparrow suggests that we would be justified in allowing morally enhanced agents to have privileged political access. Sparrow points out that those whom we know to have been morally enhanced will be less likely to wield political power in their own selfinterest or in the interests of some subsection of society, and that their decision-making skills are likely to be better. He goes on to say that If the aim of democratic decision making is to increase the probability of reaching the right answer, then we might do better to replace mass democracy with government by the morally enhanced, who would presumably have a higher probability of being right. (Sparrow 2014, 25)
In such a system, the political access and power available to a given individual would be determined by biological factors and the extent to which the process of bioenhancement had been successful. If this system were to be justified as a result of successful moral bioenhancement, then egalitarians will have reason to be wary of such enhancement. However, there are problems with Sparrow’s suggestion. The major issue here is with the claim that a morally enhanced agent will be more likely to come up with the “right” answer. We may reasonably believe that a morally enhanced agent will be better placed to work out what is morally required in a given situation, or even what the morally optimal course of action would be. An explanation for this greater ability could be either that moral enhancement requires (or is partly constituted by) cognitive enhancement, or simply that a morally enhanced agent will be more motivated to work out the morally best course of action. However, it is not clear that the purpose of democratic decision making is to work out the right answer in this sense. Rather than aiming to work out the morally best result, the purpose of democratic decision making might plausibly be to determine the course of action that is in the interests of all members of a given collective. For example, while the morally best course of action for a richer nation might be to begin the process of transferring wealth out of the collective, it is not clear that this is the “right” answer
36 ajob
in the sense that democratic decision making aims toward. Indeed, there may be many situations in which it would not be in the interests of a society to have power in the hands of the most morally sensitive individual. Competence in leadership and moral competence are two different things, and moral considerations may be only one aspect to be considered when making decisions of state. We have no reason to believe that the morally enhanced will possess the appropriate form of competence or will be able to determine the “right” course of action in the sense of right that is appropriate to political decision making. Therefore, we should not accept that the aims of democracy would be furthered by granting privileged political access to the morally enhanced. Egalitarians should not fear the results of successful moral bioenhancement on those grounds. Therefore, the arguments provided by Sparrow do not support the conclusion that successful moral bioenhancement ought to be considered problematic by egalitarians. Of course, Sparrow may yet be correct in saying that a failed project of moral bioenhancement would be problematic, and if failure is the more likely outcome then egalitarians will still have cause for concern. What this shows is that it may not be possible to completely separate the moral question about the permissibility of bioenhancement from the scientific question regarding its possibility. FUNDING I am grateful to the Arts and Humanities Research Council for generously funding the period of research during which this article was written. REFERENCES Dworkin, R. 2000. Sovereign virtue: The theory and practice of equality. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Parfit, D. 1997. Equality and priority. Ratio 10(3): 202–221. Raki´c, V. 2013. Voluntary moral enhancement and the survival-atany-costs bias. Journal of Medical Ethics. Published online first, 14 February. doi:10.1136/medethics-2012-100700 Sen, A. 1980. Equality of what? In The Tanner lectures on human values, Vol. 1, ed. S. McMurrin, 195–220. Salt Lake City, UT: University of Utah Press. Sparrow, R. 2014. Egalitarianism and moral bioenhancement. American Journal of Bioethics 14(4): 20–28.
April, Volume 14, Number 4, 2014
The American Journal of Bioethics Publication details, including instructions for authors and subscription information: http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/uajb20
Egalitarianism and Successful Moral Bioenhancement a
Alan T. Wilson a
University of Edinburgh Published online: 14 Apr 2014.
Click for updates To cite this article: Alan T. Wilson (2014) Egalitarianism and Successful Moral Bioenhancement, The American Journal of Bioethics, 14:4, 35-36, DOI: 10.1080/15265161.2014.889250 To link to this article: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/15265161.2014.889250
PLEASE SCROLL DOWN FOR ARTICLE Taylor & Francis makes every effort to ensure the accuracy of all the information (the “Content”) contained in the publications on our platform. However, Taylor & Francis, our agents, and our licensors make no representations or warranties whatsoever as to the accuracy, completeness, or suitability for any purpose of the Content. Any opinions and views expressed in this publication are the opinions and views of the authors, and are not the views of or endorsed by Taylor & Francis. The accuracy of the Content should not be relied upon and should be independently verified with primary sources of information. Taylor and Francis shall not be liable for any losses, actions, claims, proceedings, demands, costs, expenses, damages, and other liabilities whatsoever or howsoever caused arising directly or indirectly in connection with, in relation to or arising out of the use of the Content. This article may be used for research, teaching, and private study purposes. Any substantial or systematic reproduction, redistribution, reselling, loan, sub-licensing, systematic supply, or distribution in any form to anyone is expressly forbidden. Terms & Conditions of access and use can be found at http:// www.tandfonline.com/page/terms-and-conditions
Egalitarianism and Moral Bioenhancement
Egalitarianism and Successful Moral Bioenhancement
Downloaded by [George Washington University] at 04:06 05 February 2015
Alan T. Wilson, University of Edinburgh Robert Sparrow (2014) has argued that the project of moral bioenhancement—the improving of moral character through medical or biological means—is one that ought to greatly concern those who are committed to egalitarianism. Importantly, Sparrow argues that there will be reason for concern regardless of whether or not the project is actually feasible. My aim is to challenge Sparrow’s claim that egalitarians would have reason to fear even successful moral bioenhancement. I will do this by focusing on two key claims: (1) the claim that it would be in the interests of the morally enhanced to exclude the nonenhanced from their collaborative enterprises, and (2) the claim that we would be justified in giving the morally enhanced privileged political access as a result of their greater decision-making abilities. Neither of these claims would be supported by a plausible understanding of both the nature and the aims of a morally enhanced individual. While Sparrow may be right to think that failed attempts at enhancement would be problematic, he does not do enough to show that egalitarians ought to be concerned about cases of successful moral bioenhancement. Some preliminaries: While “egalitarianism” can be (and has been) understood in many different ways,1 for the purposes of direct response I remain in line with Sparrow’s understanding of the term. On Sparrow’s understanding, egalitarianism involves the commitment that relations of fundamental political equality are good in themselves. I also do not question Sparrow’s claim that the project of moral bioenhancement would have to be both society-wide and nonvoluntary in order to be useful.2 An important feature of Sparrow’s article is that he divides his discussion between arguments assuming that moral bioenhancement will be successful and arguments assuming that it is bound to fail, and his conclusion is that egalitarians have reason for concern either way. I will consider the arguments that Sparrow provides regarding successful moral bioenhancement. The first argument that I want to consider involves the idea of successful collaborations within a society. Sparrow points out that the benefits that a given collective is able to produce will typically be affected by the extent to which members trust each other—the greater the level of trust, the more effective and beneficial the process will be. Therefore, collaborations where members fully trust each other will be better able to produce benefits. Assuming that those who have been enhanced will be more trustworthy, collab-
orations among the morally enhanced will be more beneficial than those that also include the nonenhanced. Those subject to successful moral bioenhancement will therefore have good reason to exclude the nonenhanced from their joint projects, and such exclusion will be considered objectionable by committed egalitarians. Let us now assess this argument. First, it may be worth briefly questioning the assumption that the morally enhanced will be more trustworthy with regard to fulfilling their collaborative obligations (although we should probably expect them to be more trustworthy in general). Typically, we might be concerned that a fellow collaborator will be willing to sacrifice us out of a concern for self-interest, and this will be less likely when dealing with an agent whom we know to be morally enhanced. However, a related worry may emerge. We might worry that our enhanced collaborator will be willing to sacrifice us whenever that collaborator could thereby perform a more morally worthy act—say, giving the proceeds of our collaboration to charity, or failing to attend a vital group meeting in order to promote the general well-being in some other way. Such a possibility will hamper the efficiency of a collaboration featuring successfully morally enhanced agents. Fellow members will demand exactly the same kinds of institutional mechanisms and checks that are mentioned by Sparrow. We therefore have reason to doubt the assumption that collaborations featuring the morally enhanced will be more beneficial for their members. A more pressing problem for this argument is the claim that successfully morally enhanced agents would actually be motivated to exclude the nonenhanced from their joint enterprises. Even if we accept that the enhanced would benefit from a policy of exclusion, this does not mean that they would be motivated to enforce such a policy. In a disanalogy with a case of purely cognitive enhancement, we can expect the morally enhanced to possess a particular motivational set that is incompatible with harmful exclusion. The morally enhanced will be less likely to be motivated by self-interest and more likely to be motivated by considerations of fairness or general well-being. Therefore, the possibility of gaining extra benefits through the exclusion of others will be less tempting for an agent subject to successful moral enhancement. We have no reason to believe that exclusive collaborations will be sufficiently widespread to “effectively represent exclusion from
1. Key texts on this issue include Sen (1980), Dworkin (2000), and Parfit (1997). 2. One paper that does question this assumption is Raki´c (2013). I believe that more could be said on this topic. Address correspondence to Alan T. Wilson, University of Edinburgh, Philosophy, Dugald Stewart Building, 3 Charles Street, Edinburgh, EH8 9AD, United Kingdom. E-mail: [email protected]
April, Volume 14, Number 4, 2014
ajob 35
The American Journal of Bioethics
Downloaded by [George Washington University] at 04:06 05 February 2015
full social and political participation” for the nonenhanced, as Sparrow (24) claims. This argument does not provide egalitarians with grounds to be concerned about successful moral bioenhancement. A second argument from Sparrow suggests that we would be justified in allowing morally enhanced agents to have privileged political access. Sparrow points out that those whom we know to have been morally enhanced will be less likely to wield political power in their own selfinterest or in the interests of some subsection of society, and that their decision-making skills are likely to be better. He goes on to say that If the aim of democratic decision making is to increase the probability of reaching the right answer, then we might do better to replace mass democracy with government by the morally enhanced, who would presumably have a higher probability of being right. (Sparrow 2014, 25)
In such a system, the political access and power available to a given individual would be determined by biological factors and the extent to which the process of bioenhancement had been successful. If this system were to be justified as a result of successful moral bioenhancement, then egalitarians will have reason to be wary of such enhancement. However, there are problems with Sparrow’s suggestion. The major issue here is with the claim that a morally enhanced agent will be more likely to come up with the “right” answer. We may reasonably believe that a morally enhanced agent will be better placed to work out what is morally required in a given situation, or even what the morally optimal course of action would be. An explanation for this greater ability could be either that moral enhancement requires (or is partly constituted by) cognitive enhancement, or simply that a morally enhanced agent will be more motivated to work out the morally best course of action. However, it is not clear that the purpose of democratic decision making is to work out the right answer in this sense. Rather than aiming to work out the morally best result, the purpose of democratic decision making might plausibly be to determine the course of action that is in the interests of all members of a given collective. For example, while the morally best course of action for a richer nation might be to begin the process of transferring wealth out of the collective, it is not clear that this is the “right” answer
36 ajob
in the sense that democratic decision making aims toward. Indeed, there may be many situations in which it would not be in the interests of a society to have power in the hands of the most morally sensitive individual. Competence in leadership and moral competence are two different things, and moral considerations may be only one aspect to be considered when making decisions of state. We have no reason to believe that the morally enhanced will possess the appropriate form of competence or will be able to determine the “right” course of action in the sense of right that is appropriate to political decision making. Therefore, we should not accept that the aims of democracy would be furthered by granting privileged political access to the morally enhanced. Egalitarians should not fear the results of successful moral bioenhancement on those grounds. Therefore, the arguments provided by Sparrow do not support the conclusion that successful moral bioenhancement ought to be considered problematic by egalitarians. Of course, Sparrow may yet be correct in saying that a failed project of moral bioenhancement would be problematic, and if failure is the more likely outcome then egalitarians will still have cause for concern. What this shows is that it may not be possible to completely separate the moral question about the permissibility of bioenhancement from the scientific question regarding its possibility. FUNDING I am grateful to the Arts and Humanities Research Council for generously funding the period of research during which this article was written. REFERENCES Dworkin, R. 2000. Sovereign virtue: The theory and practice of equality. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Parfit, D. 1997. Equality and priority. Ratio 10(3): 202–221. Raki´c, V. 2013. Voluntary moral enhancement and the survival-atany-costs bias. Journal of Medical Ethics. Published online first, 14 February. doi:10.1136/medethics-2012-100700 Sen, A. 1980. Equality of what? In The Tanner lectures on human values, Vol. 1, ed. S. McMurrin, 195–220. Salt Lake City, UT: University of Utah Press. Sparrow, R. 2014. Egalitarianism and moral bioenhancement. American Journal of Bioethics 14(4): 20–28.
April, Volume 14, Number 4, 2014
