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The American Journal of Bioethics Publication details, including instructions for authors and subscription information: http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/uajb20
Would Moral Bioenhancement Lead to an Inegalitarian Society? a
Felice Marshall a
Victoria University of Wellington Published online: 14 Apr 2014.
To cite this article: Felice Marshall (2014) Would Moral Bioenhancement Lead to an Inegalitarian Society?, The American Journal of Bioethics, 14:4, 29-30, DOI: 10.1080/15265161.2014.889253 To link to this article: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/15265161.2014.889253
PLEASE SCROLL DOWN FOR ARTICLE Taylor & Francis makes every effort to ensure the accuracy of all the information (the “Content”) contained in the publications on our platform. However, Taylor & Francis, our agents, and our licensors make no representations or warranties whatsoever as to the accuracy, completeness, or suitability for any purpose of the Content. Any opinions and views expressed in this publication are the opinions and views of the authors, and are not the views of or endorsed by Taylor & Francis. The accuracy of the Content should not be relied upon and should be independently verified with primary sources of information. Taylor and Francis shall not be liable for any losses, actions, claims, proceedings, demands, costs, expenses, damages, and other liabilities whatsoever or howsoever caused arising directly or indirectly in connection with, in relation to or arising out of the use of the Content. This article may be used for research, teaching, and private study purposes. Any substantial or systematic reproduction, redistribution, reselling, loan, sub-licensing, systematic supply, or distribution in any form to anyone is expressly forbidden. Terms & Conditions of access and use can be found at http:// www.tandfonline.com/page/terms-and-conditions
The American Journal of Bioethics, 14(4): 29–49, 2014 c Taylor & Francis Group, LLC Copyright ISSN: 1526-5161 print / 1536-0075 online DOI: 10.1080/15265161.2014.889253
Open Peer Commentaries
Would Moral Bioenhancement Lead to an Inegalitarian Society?
Downloaded by [ECU Libraries] at 03:35 30 May 2014
Felice Marshall, Victoria University of Wellington Robert Sparrow (2014) raises serious concerns about the effects of moral bioenhancement on social and political equality. He worries that a society-wide implementation of the enhancement of moral capacities through biomedical means would contribute to the justification of an inegalitarian politics, and in particular the possibility that it could create a class of moral elites who would warrant greater political representation within democratic political systems. Sparrow premises this concern on two interrelated claims. The first is that variation in individuals’ responses to moral bioenhancement may result in the currently “most moral” in society getting the greatest benefit from moral bioenhancement exacerbating the inequality between the most and least moral. The second is that this variation may create a class of moral elites who warrant greater political representation, due to being more likely to act in the common interest. This would effectively disenfranchise the morally average from full political participation. I offer grounds for being skeptical of both of these claims. Sparrow’s first claim is actually two distinct claims that need to be separated out. The first is that due to natural variation in response to moral bioenhancement, those who are currently the most moral among us may gain the greatest increase to their moral capacities. The second is that the most moral will gain benefits in virtue of their enhanced moral capacities from which the least moral will be excluded. The first point is plausible, but not inevitable; it is possible that those who are currently the least moral will receive the greatest boost to their moral capacities, leaving the currently most moral relatively unenhanced. In this case, moral bioenhancement would reduce rather than increase the gap between the moral capacities of the most and the least moral. It is difficult to assess the probabilities of these outcomes, as they depend on how exactly moral bioenhancement will interact with people’s moral capacities. On at least one proposal for moral bioenhancement the latter scenario seems more likely. Thomas Douglas (2008) has proposed using biomedical means to attenuate countermoral attitudes or dispositions such as racial prejudice and impulses toward violent aggression. A reduction in these dispositions seems much more likely to be effective in people who have these
tendencies to a greater degree than in those in which these dispositions are less prominent. It is largely an empirical matter what the effects of moral bioenhancement would be on different individuals, one that depends on how moral bioenhancement interacts with our moral capacities and on what kinds of capacities it targets. Given this uncertainty, let us grant for the sake of argument that moral bioenhancement may increase the gap between the most and the least moral. I suggest that even granting this possibility it does not follow that those who receive the greatest increase to their moral capacities will receive the most benefit of that increase. Sparrow suggests that their greater capacity for cooperative behavior could allow the morally enhanced to gain benefits from participating in collaborative enterprises from which the morally unenhanced would need to be excluded. Yet it is not clear that these benefits would amass only to those who are part of the collaborative enterprise. The sorts of collaborations to which being more moral would be relevant are primarily those that would benefit society as a whole. For example, Ingmar Persson and Julian Savulescu (2010) envision moral bioenhancement as contributing to reducing the threat posed by climate change. Any collaboration that contributes to reducing this threat would benefit everyone, not just those who are directly involved in the collaboration. However, it seems more likely that rather than new collaborative projects, the morally enhanced would instead contribute more fully to current collaborative projects in which we all participate to varying degrees. They would be more likely to vote, pay their taxes, obey the law, or conversely lobby to change unjust laws. In fact, I’m hard put to think of morally motivated collaborations in which the benefits would accrue exclusively to those who are involved in the collaboration rather than to society as a whole. If so, then apart from some small benefit that comes from enjoying being part of the collaborative process itself, it is hard to see how the most moral would get greater benefits from their morally motivated collaborations than anyone else, including those who remain unenhanced. This leads to Sparrow’s second more significant worry: that the creation of a class of people who are more moral
Address correspondence to Felice Marshall, Victoria University of Wellington, Philosophy Programme, Murphy Building, Kelburn Parade, Wellington, New Zealand. E-mail: [email protected]
ajob 29
Downloaded by [ECU Libraries] at 03:35 30 May 2014
The American Journal of Bioethics
than the general population could provide grounds for the justification of an inegalitarian political system. This is a concern that is worth taking seriously. Arguments for greater political representation for specific groups of people have the potential to do serious damage to a political commitment to egalitarianism. Importantly, Sparrow highlights how it would be in everyone’s best interests to grant the morally enhanced greater political representation. But if we are committed to egalitarianism then this outcome would be undesirable. Sparrow offers three theories of democratic legitimacy that might justify an inegalitarian distribution of political rights. The first is a consequentialist justification for political elitism. On this account the moral elite would warrant greater political representation in virtue of their moral expertise and superior ability to set aside their own selfinterest. I’m not sure how this is a problem for moral bioenhancement, however. Even without moral enhancement we recognize that there are disparities between different people’s moral capacities, and an elitist account should grant those who are currently more moral greater political representation. It is hard to see how political elitism is an objection to moral bioenhancement in particular, rather than merely in opposition to egalitarianism simpliciter. Sparrow’s latter two conceptions of democratic legitimacy seem more fruitful for his case that moral bioenhancement could undermine egalitarianism. Epistemic and deliberative democracy both present the democratic process as valuable due to their increasing the probability of reaching the right answer to what is in the common interest—the former by assuming that the majority is more likely to be right as to what is in the common interest and the latter on the basis that a process of public deliberation is more likely to result in the correct answers winning out in a rational and informed debate. According to Sparrow, both accounts could entail granting the morally enhanced greater political representation if they are better placed to avoid the distortions of self-interest in determining what is in the common interest, and will have better access to the correct answers to social and political questions due to their greater moral insight. I think, however, that it is important to distinguish two claims that can be made as to the superior moral faculties of the morally enhanced. One is that they are more likely to act morally well due to being more motivated to act in accordance with their well-considered moral beliefs. The other is that they are more likely to know what is in the common interest due to having moral expertise. It is only the latter claim
30 ajob
that could ground greater political representation for the morally enhanced. But it would appear that the morally enhanced could lay claim only to the former competency. I would argue that the morally enhanced would not be moral experts in the sense required to ground a greater say in a democratic political process. In his recent book on applied epistemology, David Coady (2012) concludes a chapter on epistemic expertise by offering an argument against the idea of moral experts. (For further arguments against the existence of moral experts see also McGrath [2011].) He suggests that while it makes sense to acknowledge that some people (moral philosophers perhaps) can claim to have particular skills in moral reasoning and argumentation, nevertheless morality is too “vast and amorphous to a subject for anyone to be significantly better informed than most people about it” (Coady 2012, 55, emphasis in original). The relevance of the breadth of morality is that it problematizes the idea that simply by becoming better at being moral, one also becomes better at determining what is morally correct across a vast range of subject matters. The claim that a class of moral elites would “have a higher probability of being right about the proper ends of policy in a democratic society than other citizens” (25) falls down if the morally enhanced are not moral experts, and thus would not be entitled to greater political representation than the morally average citizenry. Though I have undertaken a critical commentary here, I agree with Sparrow that variation in individuals’ responses to bioenhancement may well bring about asymmetries within a population, which has the potential to lead to social and political problems. It is easy to focus on the possible benefits of bioenhancement programs, and it is vital that the possible negative consequences are carefully scrutinized too. REFERENCES Coady, D. 2012. What to believe now: Applying epistemology to contemporary issues. Malden, MA: Wiley-Blackwell. Douglas, T. 2008. Moral enhancement. Journal of Applied Philosophy 25(3): 228–245. McGrath, S. 2011. Skepticism about moral expertise as a puzzle for moral realism. Journal of Philosophy (108)3: 111–137. Persson, I., and J. Savulescu. 2010. Unfit for the future: The need for moral enhancement. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press. Sparrow, R. 2014. Egalitarianism and moral bioenhancement. American Journal of Bioethics 14(4): 20–28.
April, Volume 14, Number 4, 2014
The American Journal of Bioethics Publication details, including instructions for authors and subscription information: http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/uajb20
Would Moral Bioenhancement Lead to an Inegalitarian Society? a
Felice Marshall a
Victoria University of Wellington Published online: 14 Apr 2014.
To cite this article: Felice Marshall (2014) Would Moral Bioenhancement Lead to an Inegalitarian Society?, The American Journal of Bioethics, 14:4, 29-30, DOI: 10.1080/15265161.2014.889253 To link to this article: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/15265161.2014.889253
PLEASE SCROLL DOWN FOR ARTICLE Taylor & Francis makes every effort to ensure the accuracy of all the information (the “Content”) contained in the publications on our platform. However, Taylor & Francis, our agents, and our licensors make no representations or warranties whatsoever as to the accuracy, completeness, or suitability for any purpose of the Content. Any opinions and views expressed in this publication are the opinions and views of the authors, and are not the views of or endorsed by Taylor & Francis. The accuracy of the Content should not be relied upon and should be independently verified with primary sources of information. Taylor and Francis shall not be liable for any losses, actions, claims, proceedings, demands, costs, expenses, damages, and other liabilities whatsoever or howsoever caused arising directly or indirectly in connection with, in relation to or arising out of the use of the Content. This article may be used for research, teaching, and private study purposes. Any substantial or systematic reproduction, redistribution, reselling, loan, sub-licensing, systematic supply, or distribution in any form to anyone is expressly forbidden. Terms & Conditions of access and use can be found at http:// www.tandfonline.com/page/terms-and-conditions
The American Journal of Bioethics, 14(4): 29–49, 2014 c Taylor & Francis Group, LLC Copyright ISSN: 1526-5161 print / 1536-0075 online DOI: 10.1080/15265161.2014.889253
Open Peer Commentaries
Would Moral Bioenhancement Lead to an Inegalitarian Society?
Downloaded by [ECU Libraries] at 03:35 30 May 2014
Felice Marshall, Victoria University of Wellington Robert Sparrow (2014) raises serious concerns about the effects of moral bioenhancement on social and political equality. He worries that a society-wide implementation of the enhancement of moral capacities through biomedical means would contribute to the justification of an inegalitarian politics, and in particular the possibility that it could create a class of moral elites who would warrant greater political representation within democratic political systems. Sparrow premises this concern on two interrelated claims. The first is that variation in individuals’ responses to moral bioenhancement may result in the currently “most moral” in society getting the greatest benefit from moral bioenhancement exacerbating the inequality between the most and least moral. The second is that this variation may create a class of moral elites who warrant greater political representation, due to being more likely to act in the common interest. This would effectively disenfranchise the morally average from full political participation. I offer grounds for being skeptical of both of these claims. Sparrow’s first claim is actually two distinct claims that need to be separated out. The first is that due to natural variation in response to moral bioenhancement, those who are currently the most moral among us may gain the greatest increase to their moral capacities. The second is that the most moral will gain benefits in virtue of their enhanced moral capacities from which the least moral will be excluded. The first point is plausible, but not inevitable; it is possible that those who are currently the least moral will receive the greatest boost to their moral capacities, leaving the currently most moral relatively unenhanced. In this case, moral bioenhancement would reduce rather than increase the gap between the moral capacities of the most and the least moral. It is difficult to assess the probabilities of these outcomes, as they depend on how exactly moral bioenhancement will interact with people’s moral capacities. On at least one proposal for moral bioenhancement the latter scenario seems more likely. Thomas Douglas (2008) has proposed using biomedical means to attenuate countermoral attitudes or dispositions such as racial prejudice and impulses toward violent aggression. A reduction in these dispositions seems much more likely to be effective in people who have these
tendencies to a greater degree than in those in which these dispositions are less prominent. It is largely an empirical matter what the effects of moral bioenhancement would be on different individuals, one that depends on how moral bioenhancement interacts with our moral capacities and on what kinds of capacities it targets. Given this uncertainty, let us grant for the sake of argument that moral bioenhancement may increase the gap between the most and the least moral. I suggest that even granting this possibility it does not follow that those who receive the greatest increase to their moral capacities will receive the most benefit of that increase. Sparrow suggests that their greater capacity for cooperative behavior could allow the morally enhanced to gain benefits from participating in collaborative enterprises from which the morally unenhanced would need to be excluded. Yet it is not clear that these benefits would amass only to those who are part of the collaborative enterprise. The sorts of collaborations to which being more moral would be relevant are primarily those that would benefit society as a whole. For example, Ingmar Persson and Julian Savulescu (2010) envision moral bioenhancement as contributing to reducing the threat posed by climate change. Any collaboration that contributes to reducing this threat would benefit everyone, not just those who are directly involved in the collaboration. However, it seems more likely that rather than new collaborative projects, the morally enhanced would instead contribute more fully to current collaborative projects in which we all participate to varying degrees. They would be more likely to vote, pay their taxes, obey the law, or conversely lobby to change unjust laws. In fact, I’m hard put to think of morally motivated collaborations in which the benefits would accrue exclusively to those who are involved in the collaboration rather than to society as a whole. If so, then apart from some small benefit that comes from enjoying being part of the collaborative process itself, it is hard to see how the most moral would get greater benefits from their morally motivated collaborations than anyone else, including those who remain unenhanced. This leads to Sparrow’s second more significant worry: that the creation of a class of people who are more moral
Address correspondence to Felice Marshall, Victoria University of Wellington, Philosophy Programme, Murphy Building, Kelburn Parade, Wellington, New Zealand. E-mail: [email protected]
ajob 29
Downloaded by [ECU Libraries] at 03:35 30 May 2014
The American Journal of Bioethics
than the general population could provide grounds for the justification of an inegalitarian political system. This is a concern that is worth taking seriously. Arguments for greater political representation for specific groups of people have the potential to do serious damage to a political commitment to egalitarianism. Importantly, Sparrow highlights how it would be in everyone’s best interests to grant the morally enhanced greater political representation. But if we are committed to egalitarianism then this outcome would be undesirable. Sparrow offers three theories of democratic legitimacy that might justify an inegalitarian distribution of political rights. The first is a consequentialist justification for political elitism. On this account the moral elite would warrant greater political representation in virtue of their moral expertise and superior ability to set aside their own selfinterest. I’m not sure how this is a problem for moral bioenhancement, however. Even without moral enhancement we recognize that there are disparities between different people’s moral capacities, and an elitist account should grant those who are currently more moral greater political representation. It is hard to see how political elitism is an objection to moral bioenhancement in particular, rather than merely in opposition to egalitarianism simpliciter. Sparrow’s latter two conceptions of democratic legitimacy seem more fruitful for his case that moral bioenhancement could undermine egalitarianism. Epistemic and deliberative democracy both present the democratic process as valuable due to their increasing the probability of reaching the right answer to what is in the common interest—the former by assuming that the majority is more likely to be right as to what is in the common interest and the latter on the basis that a process of public deliberation is more likely to result in the correct answers winning out in a rational and informed debate. According to Sparrow, both accounts could entail granting the morally enhanced greater political representation if they are better placed to avoid the distortions of self-interest in determining what is in the common interest, and will have better access to the correct answers to social and political questions due to their greater moral insight. I think, however, that it is important to distinguish two claims that can be made as to the superior moral faculties of the morally enhanced. One is that they are more likely to act morally well due to being more motivated to act in accordance with their well-considered moral beliefs. The other is that they are more likely to know what is in the common interest due to having moral expertise. It is only the latter claim
30 ajob
that could ground greater political representation for the morally enhanced. But it would appear that the morally enhanced could lay claim only to the former competency. I would argue that the morally enhanced would not be moral experts in the sense required to ground a greater say in a democratic political process. In his recent book on applied epistemology, David Coady (2012) concludes a chapter on epistemic expertise by offering an argument against the idea of moral experts. (For further arguments against the existence of moral experts see also McGrath [2011].) He suggests that while it makes sense to acknowledge that some people (moral philosophers perhaps) can claim to have particular skills in moral reasoning and argumentation, nevertheless morality is too “vast and amorphous to a subject for anyone to be significantly better informed than most people about it” (Coady 2012, 55, emphasis in original). The relevance of the breadth of morality is that it problematizes the idea that simply by becoming better at being moral, one also becomes better at determining what is morally correct across a vast range of subject matters. The claim that a class of moral elites would “have a higher probability of being right about the proper ends of policy in a democratic society than other citizens” (25) falls down if the morally enhanced are not moral experts, and thus would not be entitled to greater political representation than the morally average citizenry. Though I have undertaken a critical commentary here, I agree with Sparrow that variation in individuals’ responses to bioenhancement may well bring about asymmetries within a population, which has the potential to lead to social and political problems. It is easy to focus on the possible benefits of bioenhancement programs, and it is vital that the possible negative consequences are carefully scrutinized too. REFERENCES Coady, D. 2012. What to believe now: Applying epistemology to contemporary issues. Malden, MA: Wiley-Blackwell. Douglas, T. 2008. Moral enhancement. Journal of Applied Philosophy 25(3): 228–245. McGrath, S. 2011. Skepticism about moral expertise as a puzzle for moral realism. Journal of Philosophy (108)3: 111–137. Persson, I., and J. Savulescu. 2010. Unfit for the future: The need for moral enhancement. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press. Sparrow, R. 2014. Egalitarianism and moral bioenhancement. American Journal of Bioethics 14(4): 20–28.
April, Volume 14, Number 4, 2014
