Responses and Dialogue
Some Additional Thoughts on Considerable Life Extension and the Meaning of Life MATTI HÄYRY
My thanks are due to Kristen Hine1 for her comments on my article “Considerable Life Extension and Three Views on the Meaning of Life.”2 Since both my original article and Hine’s commentary can be read in this journal, I only briefly summarize my points and her criticisms and concentrate on presenting my own responses and further thoughts on the theme. In my article, I suggested that there are (at least) three views on the meaning of life that can throw light on the questions of considerable life extension and its desirability. First, the “more is better” view says that as long as individuals find meaning in their own continued existence, this provides a reason for extending their lives indefinitely. Second, the “moral is better” view says that because the meaning of human life resides in communities and because communities need generation changes to remain viable, considerable life extension would not be a good idea. Third, an “Epicurean” view says that death should not be feared, and that considerable life extension should be neither prioritized nor condemned. In her article, Hine argues that “the Epicurean approach positively supports considerable life extension,” “the more is better approach seems to be a somewhat implausible approach to thinking about the meaning of life,” and “the question of whether considerable life extension is desirable is ambiguous”— something that the “more is better approach fails to appreciate.” Let me
68
respond to these points in reverse order, starting from the last one and working my way to the first. Whether Considerable Life Extension Is Desirable Is Ambiguous Hine states that life extension could be desirable for many distinct reasons, or, in other words, that “there are many different ways to evaluate a life”— aesthetic, moral, social, welfare-based, meaning-driven, and perhaps others. As an example, she presents a person who only counts blades of grass and “enjoys a fairly high level of welfare” while doing this. According to Hine, “we might say that this person’s life is meaningless, purposeless”; indeed “we might criticize this person for devoting his entire life to a worthless activity.” What she says is obviously true. Of course lives can be assessed by a variety of criteria. And of course a conveniently defined collective (“we”) might say that the grass counter’s life is meaningless. But where do we go from there? Hine argues further that the more is better view “seems to conflate welfare with meaning,” thereby making a mistake that invalidates the theory in the context of life extension. I am not entirely sure where Hine gets the idea of welfare, meaning, and their connection. The word “welfare” does not appear in my original article— the closest I come to this notion is when I say that the more is better view is more interested in individuals and their Cambridge Quarterly of Healthcare Ethics (2014), 23, 68–72. © Cambridge University Press 2013. doi:10.1017/S0963180113000467
Responses and Dialogue subjectively felt well-being than in persons as members of collectives and the objectively defined worth of their lives. And this, I believe, is not close at all, as the point I was making was the comparison between individual and collective, subjectively (internally) experienced and objectively (externally) determined; something that can be easily applied to conflicting theories of welfare as well. Anyway, Hine’s decision to read a particular relationship between welfare and meaning into the more is better approach brings us to her second point, which is intertwined with the present one. The More Is Better Approach Seems to Be a Somewhat Implausible Approach to Thinking about the Meaning of Life If we conflate welfare with meaning, we cannot make the judgment that the happy grass counter’s life is without purpose. But this, according to Hine, is a judgment that we must be able to make. So if the more is better approach cannot support the verdict, it is useless as a theory of life’s meaning. Hine also believes that it is useless as a defense of antiaging technologies, as mere welfare without meaning “does not provide a very persuasive reason for pursuing considerable life extension.” It is true that the more is better view seems to allow a strong connection between continued welfare and the meaning of life. This does not, however, constitute a decisive criticism against the view. The connection, real or apparent, presents the creed’s opponents a feature that they can object to, but it does not necessarily move the creed’s proponents to abandon their beliefs. Instead, they can defend their ideas by two independent and alternative observations. First, it could be the case that the more is better model simply defines
life’s meaning as subjective welfare (or happiness or preference satisfaction). This is a fairly traditional solution in secular outcome-based ethics. The contention in this tradition is that human life has no objective (metaphysical) meaning, and that giving priority to intersubjective (collective) considerations would pose a risk to individuality and individuals. If the grass counter is happy, let him live for as long as he finds meaning and satisfaction in his self-chosen activity. (If his life is economically and socially unproductive, others may not want to pay for his life-extension treatments, but this is a different question, to be tackled by political philosophies. There are many desirable things in this world that we cannot have due to the scarcity of resources, and considerable life extension for all may turn out to be one of them.) Second, it could also be the case that the more is better model, or one of its variations, does not actually conflate welfare with meaning. John Harris, a proponent of the view, says that reasonable people would welcome the opportunity to live longer if they so wish.3 The value and meaning of their lives could then be in the continual reaffirmation of life and in the expectation of future pursuits rather than in their current well-being, and Hine’s objection would be rendered ineffectual. But I leave the development of these details to people who actually want to defend the more is better view and indefinitely longer human lives. In my original article, I was merely pointing out why I saw the view as a plausible contender in the discussion on considerable life extension and the meaning of life. The Epicurean Approach Positively Supports Considerable Life Extension Hine argues, “contrary to Häyry’s conclusion,” that “the Epicurean approach
69
Responses and Dialogue positively supports considerable life extension.” She agrees with me that within the model “it may be true that more time does not increase or enhance the completeness of one’s life—it does not add to its meaning” but holds that “it is nonetheless true that more time is desirable”: “Epicureans would positively support considerable life extension, and they would do so for a reason that is much like the reason why the more is better approach supports it: if life is good, we have reason to prefer its continuation.” To support her conclusion, Hine presents a passage from Epicurus and quotes A. A. Long and D. N. Sedley, who say that “no doubt the prolongation of good is still preferable to its cessation: hence Epicurus advises us against positively courting death.”4 The view that Hine attributes to Epicurus and the Epicureans resembles, in my mind, surprisingly closely the more is better notion that she deems implausible. If living longer, regardless of life’s meaning, is desirable, and if the prolongation of a good embedded in a human life is preferable to ending it, then it seems that more is better and considerable life extension commendable much in the way that Harris and others have argued. This is a perfectly legitimate Epicurean approach, but it is doubtful that it would have been the view held by Epicurus himself, and it is certain that it is not the only possible Epicurean interpretation in the matter. (I leave it to Hine to explain why and how her Epicurean reading and the more is better model outlined in my original article differ from each other.) What Epicurus Said The preserved literary works of Epicurus consist of three letters and numerous short fragments. What he said about
70
death and dying, and the futility of fearing either, forms about a fifth of one of the three letters, his letter to Menoeceus. Let us see what we can deduce about his views on life extension from this source: (1) Accustom yourself to the belief that death is nothing to us. For all good and evil lie in sensation, whereas death is the absence of sensation. (2) Hence the correct understanding that death is nothing to us makes the mortality of life enjoyable, not by adding infinite time, but by ridding us of the desire for immortality. (3) For there is nothing fearful in living for one who genuinely grasps that there is nothing fearful in not living. (4) Therefore he speaks idly who says that he fears death not because it will be painful when present but because it is painful in anticipation. For if something causes no distress when present, it is fruitless to be pained by the expectation of it. (5) Therefore that most frightful of evils, death, is nothing to us, seeing that when we exist death is not present, and when death is present we do not exist. Thus it is nothing to either the living or the dead, seeing that the former do not have it and the latter no longer exist. (6) The many sometimes shun death as the greatest of evils, but at other times choose it as a release from life’s evils. But the wise man neither deprecates living nor fears not living. For he neither finds living irksome nor thinks not living an evil. But just as he chooses the pleasantest food, not simply the greater quantity, so too he enjoys the pleasantest time, not the longest. (7) He who advises the young man to live well but the old man to die well is naive, not only because life is something to be welcomed, but also because to practise living well and to practise dying well are one and the same. (8) Much worse, however, is he who says “It’s a fine thing never to be born. Or, once born, to pass through the gates of Hades
Responses and Dialogue with the utmost speed.” If he believes what he says, why does he not take his departure from life? He has every opportunity to do so, supposing that his resolve were serious. If he is joking, his words are idle and will be greeted with incredulity.5
There is, of course, no mention in the passage of high-tech life extension, but should it nonetheless be inferred that Epicurus would have been firmly in favor of such a practice? Hine cites, in defense of her reading, the last two sentences of paragraph 6 and paragraph 7 in its entirety, and she concludes that Epicurus would have supported considerable life extension as a way of prolonging a good. This, I submit, is misleading. That the wise man “enjoys the pleasantest time, not the longest” should alone indicate that prolonging a life beyond its limits is, according to Epicurus, pointless. But what is more, the lines quoted by Hine specifically address suicide as a solution to life’s adversities and old age. It is highly questionable that the two distinct choices—the deliberate ending of our lives out of irrational fear and the rational acceptance of our mortality after a satisfying life—would for Epicurus be sufficiently similar to justify Hine’s argument on considerably extending human lives. My impression seems, incidentally, to be shared by Long and Sedley in the passage that Hine cites partially. The full quotation reads: A possible criticism of Epicurus’ stance is that, having thus shown that mortality is not an evil, he wrongly supposes that he has shown that death is not an evil either. Since, however, untimely death prevents say thirty-five years of pleasure from being extended to seventy, why is the loss of extra good not to be shunned? He would no doubt reply that the cessation of
pleasure is normally a pain, and hence to be shunned as an evil, but that this cannot possibly apply to death, which is the cessation of pleasure and pain, of good and evil. No doubt the prolongation of good is still preferable to its cessation: hence Epicurus advises us against positively courting death. But equally its cessation is not an evil, so that death is not to be feared. If you believed otherwise, you might marginally improve your chances of completing seventy years instead of thirty-five, but the fear of death would make them far less pleasant. And we should judge a life more by quality than by quantity. Since avoidances are justified only if based on correct hedonistic calculation, Epicurus is surely right that a fear becomes irrational when by its presence it diminishes our pleasure more than its object would if realized.6
This passage seems to follow closely the spirit of one of the Epicurean fragments, namely paragraph 19 of the Principal Doctrines of Epicurus, which states: “Unlimited time and limited time afford an equal amount of pleasure, if we measure the limits of that pleasure by reason.”7 But by repeating only the “against positively courting death” part of Long and Sedley’s comment, Hine seeks support from the counter-counterargument against suicide, sidelining their main argument, which still appears to emphasize quality over quantity in the assessment of a life. Hine’s interpretation seems, here again, to come very close to the more is better view. What Epicureans Can Say Although Hine in her article talks about Epicurus and the Epicurean view, I would much rather talk about different kinds of Epicurean ideas, their presuppositions, and their implications. As I have said, I can see the more is
71
Responses and Dialogue better model as one possible way of proceeding from Epicurean premises, as I see Hine’s reasoning, albeit that I have difficulties telling it apart from the more is better way of thinking. In my original article, and in this response, I have tried to outline another type of Epicurean argument, one that is more amenable to the notion that extending lives considerably is not that important. Having said this, I can readily see the possibility of other readings that might make Epicurus an ardent supporter of life-extending technologies. He could not conceive of the opportunities potentially offered to us by advances in genetics and biomedical gerontology, and perhaps he would have welcomed a few hundred or thousand years more—always recognizing that mortality is still our inescapable lot and that prolonging lives out of
72
the fear of death leads to futile unhappiness and is therefore unwise. Notes 1. Hine K. Häyry reconsidered. Cambridge Quarterly of Healthcare Ethics 2014;23: 63–67. 2. Häyry M. Considerable life extension and three views on the meaning of life. Cambridge Quarterly of Healthcare Ethics 2011;20:21–9. 3. Harris J. Enhancing Evolution: The Ethical Case for Making Better People. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press; 2007, at 59–71. 4. Long AA, Sedley DN, eds. The Hellenistic Philosophers, Vol. I: Translations of the Principal Sources, with Philosophical Commentary. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press; 1987, at 154. 5. See note 4, Long, Sedley 1987, at 149–50. 6. See note 4, Long, Sedley 1987, at 154. Intratextual references omitted. 7. Principal Doctrines 19. Hicks RD, trans.; availableatclassics.mit.edu/Epicurus/princdoc.html (last accessed 18 Sept 2013).
Some Additional Thoughts on Considerable Life Extension and the Meaning of Life MATTI HÄYRY
My thanks are due to Kristen Hine1 for her comments on my article “Considerable Life Extension and Three Views on the Meaning of Life.”2 Since both my original article and Hine’s commentary can be read in this journal, I only briefly summarize my points and her criticisms and concentrate on presenting my own responses and further thoughts on the theme. In my article, I suggested that there are (at least) three views on the meaning of life that can throw light on the questions of considerable life extension and its desirability. First, the “more is better” view says that as long as individuals find meaning in their own continued existence, this provides a reason for extending their lives indefinitely. Second, the “moral is better” view says that because the meaning of human life resides in communities and because communities need generation changes to remain viable, considerable life extension would not be a good idea. Third, an “Epicurean” view says that death should not be feared, and that considerable life extension should be neither prioritized nor condemned. In her article, Hine argues that “the Epicurean approach positively supports considerable life extension,” “the more is better approach seems to be a somewhat implausible approach to thinking about the meaning of life,” and “the question of whether considerable life extension is desirable is ambiguous”— something that the “more is better approach fails to appreciate.” Let me
68
respond to these points in reverse order, starting from the last one and working my way to the first. Whether Considerable Life Extension Is Desirable Is Ambiguous Hine states that life extension could be desirable for many distinct reasons, or, in other words, that “there are many different ways to evaluate a life”— aesthetic, moral, social, welfare-based, meaning-driven, and perhaps others. As an example, she presents a person who only counts blades of grass and “enjoys a fairly high level of welfare” while doing this. According to Hine, “we might say that this person’s life is meaningless, purposeless”; indeed “we might criticize this person for devoting his entire life to a worthless activity.” What she says is obviously true. Of course lives can be assessed by a variety of criteria. And of course a conveniently defined collective (“we”) might say that the grass counter’s life is meaningless. But where do we go from there? Hine argues further that the more is better view “seems to conflate welfare with meaning,” thereby making a mistake that invalidates the theory in the context of life extension. I am not entirely sure where Hine gets the idea of welfare, meaning, and their connection. The word “welfare” does not appear in my original article— the closest I come to this notion is when I say that the more is better view is more interested in individuals and their Cambridge Quarterly of Healthcare Ethics (2014), 23, 68–72. © Cambridge University Press 2013. doi:10.1017/S0963180113000467
Responses and Dialogue subjectively felt well-being than in persons as members of collectives and the objectively defined worth of their lives. And this, I believe, is not close at all, as the point I was making was the comparison between individual and collective, subjectively (internally) experienced and objectively (externally) determined; something that can be easily applied to conflicting theories of welfare as well. Anyway, Hine’s decision to read a particular relationship between welfare and meaning into the more is better approach brings us to her second point, which is intertwined with the present one. The More Is Better Approach Seems to Be a Somewhat Implausible Approach to Thinking about the Meaning of Life If we conflate welfare with meaning, we cannot make the judgment that the happy grass counter’s life is without purpose. But this, according to Hine, is a judgment that we must be able to make. So if the more is better approach cannot support the verdict, it is useless as a theory of life’s meaning. Hine also believes that it is useless as a defense of antiaging technologies, as mere welfare without meaning “does not provide a very persuasive reason for pursuing considerable life extension.” It is true that the more is better view seems to allow a strong connection between continued welfare and the meaning of life. This does not, however, constitute a decisive criticism against the view. The connection, real or apparent, presents the creed’s opponents a feature that they can object to, but it does not necessarily move the creed’s proponents to abandon their beliefs. Instead, they can defend their ideas by two independent and alternative observations. First, it could be the case that the more is better model simply defines
life’s meaning as subjective welfare (or happiness or preference satisfaction). This is a fairly traditional solution in secular outcome-based ethics. The contention in this tradition is that human life has no objective (metaphysical) meaning, and that giving priority to intersubjective (collective) considerations would pose a risk to individuality and individuals. If the grass counter is happy, let him live for as long as he finds meaning and satisfaction in his self-chosen activity. (If his life is economically and socially unproductive, others may not want to pay for his life-extension treatments, but this is a different question, to be tackled by political philosophies. There are many desirable things in this world that we cannot have due to the scarcity of resources, and considerable life extension for all may turn out to be one of them.) Second, it could also be the case that the more is better model, or one of its variations, does not actually conflate welfare with meaning. John Harris, a proponent of the view, says that reasonable people would welcome the opportunity to live longer if they so wish.3 The value and meaning of their lives could then be in the continual reaffirmation of life and in the expectation of future pursuits rather than in their current well-being, and Hine’s objection would be rendered ineffectual. But I leave the development of these details to people who actually want to defend the more is better view and indefinitely longer human lives. In my original article, I was merely pointing out why I saw the view as a plausible contender in the discussion on considerable life extension and the meaning of life. The Epicurean Approach Positively Supports Considerable Life Extension Hine argues, “contrary to Häyry’s conclusion,” that “the Epicurean approach
69
Responses and Dialogue positively supports considerable life extension.” She agrees with me that within the model “it may be true that more time does not increase or enhance the completeness of one’s life—it does not add to its meaning” but holds that “it is nonetheless true that more time is desirable”: “Epicureans would positively support considerable life extension, and they would do so for a reason that is much like the reason why the more is better approach supports it: if life is good, we have reason to prefer its continuation.” To support her conclusion, Hine presents a passage from Epicurus and quotes A. A. Long and D. N. Sedley, who say that “no doubt the prolongation of good is still preferable to its cessation: hence Epicurus advises us against positively courting death.”4 The view that Hine attributes to Epicurus and the Epicureans resembles, in my mind, surprisingly closely the more is better notion that she deems implausible. If living longer, regardless of life’s meaning, is desirable, and if the prolongation of a good embedded in a human life is preferable to ending it, then it seems that more is better and considerable life extension commendable much in the way that Harris and others have argued. This is a perfectly legitimate Epicurean approach, but it is doubtful that it would have been the view held by Epicurus himself, and it is certain that it is not the only possible Epicurean interpretation in the matter. (I leave it to Hine to explain why and how her Epicurean reading and the more is better model outlined in my original article differ from each other.) What Epicurus Said The preserved literary works of Epicurus consist of three letters and numerous short fragments. What he said about
70
death and dying, and the futility of fearing either, forms about a fifth of one of the three letters, his letter to Menoeceus. Let us see what we can deduce about his views on life extension from this source: (1) Accustom yourself to the belief that death is nothing to us. For all good and evil lie in sensation, whereas death is the absence of sensation. (2) Hence the correct understanding that death is nothing to us makes the mortality of life enjoyable, not by adding infinite time, but by ridding us of the desire for immortality. (3) For there is nothing fearful in living for one who genuinely grasps that there is nothing fearful in not living. (4) Therefore he speaks idly who says that he fears death not because it will be painful when present but because it is painful in anticipation. For if something causes no distress when present, it is fruitless to be pained by the expectation of it. (5) Therefore that most frightful of evils, death, is nothing to us, seeing that when we exist death is not present, and when death is present we do not exist. Thus it is nothing to either the living or the dead, seeing that the former do not have it and the latter no longer exist. (6) The many sometimes shun death as the greatest of evils, but at other times choose it as a release from life’s evils. But the wise man neither deprecates living nor fears not living. For he neither finds living irksome nor thinks not living an evil. But just as he chooses the pleasantest food, not simply the greater quantity, so too he enjoys the pleasantest time, not the longest. (7) He who advises the young man to live well but the old man to die well is naive, not only because life is something to be welcomed, but also because to practise living well and to practise dying well are one and the same. (8) Much worse, however, is he who says “It’s a fine thing never to be born. Or, once born, to pass through the gates of Hades
Responses and Dialogue with the utmost speed.” If he believes what he says, why does he not take his departure from life? He has every opportunity to do so, supposing that his resolve were serious. If he is joking, his words are idle and will be greeted with incredulity.5
There is, of course, no mention in the passage of high-tech life extension, but should it nonetheless be inferred that Epicurus would have been firmly in favor of such a practice? Hine cites, in defense of her reading, the last two sentences of paragraph 6 and paragraph 7 in its entirety, and she concludes that Epicurus would have supported considerable life extension as a way of prolonging a good. This, I submit, is misleading. That the wise man “enjoys the pleasantest time, not the longest” should alone indicate that prolonging a life beyond its limits is, according to Epicurus, pointless. But what is more, the lines quoted by Hine specifically address suicide as a solution to life’s adversities and old age. It is highly questionable that the two distinct choices—the deliberate ending of our lives out of irrational fear and the rational acceptance of our mortality after a satisfying life—would for Epicurus be sufficiently similar to justify Hine’s argument on considerably extending human lives. My impression seems, incidentally, to be shared by Long and Sedley in the passage that Hine cites partially. The full quotation reads: A possible criticism of Epicurus’ stance is that, having thus shown that mortality is not an evil, he wrongly supposes that he has shown that death is not an evil either. Since, however, untimely death prevents say thirty-five years of pleasure from being extended to seventy, why is the loss of extra good not to be shunned? He would no doubt reply that the cessation of
pleasure is normally a pain, and hence to be shunned as an evil, but that this cannot possibly apply to death, which is the cessation of pleasure and pain, of good and evil. No doubt the prolongation of good is still preferable to its cessation: hence Epicurus advises us against positively courting death. But equally its cessation is not an evil, so that death is not to be feared. If you believed otherwise, you might marginally improve your chances of completing seventy years instead of thirty-five, but the fear of death would make them far less pleasant. And we should judge a life more by quality than by quantity. Since avoidances are justified only if based on correct hedonistic calculation, Epicurus is surely right that a fear becomes irrational when by its presence it diminishes our pleasure more than its object would if realized.6
This passage seems to follow closely the spirit of one of the Epicurean fragments, namely paragraph 19 of the Principal Doctrines of Epicurus, which states: “Unlimited time and limited time afford an equal amount of pleasure, if we measure the limits of that pleasure by reason.”7 But by repeating only the “against positively courting death” part of Long and Sedley’s comment, Hine seeks support from the counter-counterargument against suicide, sidelining their main argument, which still appears to emphasize quality over quantity in the assessment of a life. Hine’s interpretation seems, here again, to come very close to the more is better view. What Epicureans Can Say Although Hine in her article talks about Epicurus and the Epicurean view, I would much rather talk about different kinds of Epicurean ideas, their presuppositions, and their implications. As I have said, I can see the more is
71
Responses and Dialogue better model as one possible way of proceeding from Epicurean premises, as I see Hine’s reasoning, albeit that I have difficulties telling it apart from the more is better way of thinking. In my original article, and in this response, I have tried to outline another type of Epicurean argument, one that is more amenable to the notion that extending lives considerably is not that important. Having said this, I can readily see the possibility of other readings that might make Epicurus an ardent supporter of life-extending technologies. He could not conceive of the opportunities potentially offered to us by advances in genetics and biomedical gerontology, and perhaps he would have welcomed a few hundred or thousand years more—always recognizing that mortality is still our inescapable lot and that prolonging lives out of
72
the fear of death leads to futile unhappiness and is therefore unwise. Notes 1. Hine K. Häyry reconsidered. Cambridge Quarterly of Healthcare Ethics 2014;23: 63–67. 2. Häyry M. Considerable life extension and three views on the meaning of life. Cambridge Quarterly of Healthcare Ethics 2011;20:21–9. 3. Harris J. Enhancing Evolution: The Ethical Case for Making Better People. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press; 2007, at 59–71. 4. Long AA, Sedley DN, eds. The Hellenistic Philosophers, Vol. I: Translations of the Principal Sources, with Philosophical Commentary. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press; 1987, at 154. 5. See note 4, Long, Sedley 1987, at 149–50. 6. See note 4, Long, Sedley 1987, at 154. Intratextual references omitted. 7. Principal Doctrines 19. Hicks RD, trans.; availableatclassics.mit.edu/Epicurus/princdoc.html (last accessed 18 Sept 2013).
