This article was downloaded by: [Central Michigan University] On: 24 December 2014, At: 05:45 Publisher: Routledge Informa Ltd Registered in England and Wales Registered Number: 1072954 Registered office: Mortimer House, 37-41 Mortimer Street, London W1T 3JH, UK
The Journal of Social Psychology Publication details, including instructions for authors and subscription information: http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/vsoc20
The Symbolic/Value-Expressive Function of Outgroup Attitudes among Homosexuals Connie M. Kristiansen
a
a
Department of Psychology , Carleton University Published online: 01 Jul 2010.
To cite this article: Connie M. Kristiansen (1990) The Symbolic/Value-Expressive Function of Outgroup Attitudes among Homosexuals, The Journal of Social Psychology, 130:1, 61-69, DOI: 10.1080/00224545.1990.9922934 To link to this article: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00224545.1990.9922934
PLEASE SCROLL DOWN FOR ARTICLE Taylor & Francis makes every effort to ensure the accuracy of all the information (the “Content”) contained in the publications on our platform. However, Taylor & Francis, our agents, and our licensors make no representations or warranties whatsoever as to the accuracy, completeness, or suitability for any purpose of the Content. Any opinions and views expressed in this publication are the opinions and views of the authors, and are not the views of or endorsed by Taylor & Francis. The accuracy of the Content should not be relied upon and should be independently verified with primary sources of information. Taylor and Francis shall not be liable for any losses, actions, claims, proceedings, demands, costs, expenses, damages, and other liabilities whatsoever or howsoever caused arising directly or indirectly in connection with, in relation to or arising out of the use of the Content.
Downloaded by [Central Michigan University] at 05:45 24 December 2014
This article may be used for research, teaching, and private study purposes. Any substantial or systematic reproduction, redistribution, reselling, loan, sub-licensing, systematic supply, or distribution in any form to anyone is expressly forbidden. Terms & Conditions of access and use can be found at http://www.tandfonline.com/page/terms-and-conditions
The Journal of Social Psychology, 130(1), 61-69
Downloaded by [Central Michigan University] at 05:45 24 December 2014
The SymboIic/Value-Expressive Function of Outgroup Attitudes Among Homosexuals CONNIE M. KRISTIANSEN Department of Psychologv Carleton University
ABSTRACT.The claim that attitudes toward an outgroup symbolically represent beliefs that the outgroup violates important values was examined through the investigation of the intergroup versus intragroup nature of the relations between a sample of feminist lesbians (primarily involved in the women’s movement), gay movement lesbians (primarily involved in the gay movement), and gay men. Consistent with the intergroup relations documented between some feminist women and men, feminist lesbians (compared with gay movement lesbians) had less favorable attitudes toward gay men, associated with fewer gay men, perceived less common fate with gay men, wished to cooperate less with gay men, and perceived less value similarity with gay men. These and other fmdings suggested that feminist lesbians shared an intergroup relationship with gay men, whereas gay movement lesbians and gay men shared an intragroup relationship. Consistent with the notion that intergroup attitudes symbolically represent beliefs that an outgroup violates important values, feminist lesbians’ attitudes toward gay men were explained by their perceptions that gay men placed less importance on values they themselves regarded as important. The implications of these fmdings for understanding the nature of symbolic attitudes and subsequent research are discussed.
SYMBOLIC ATTITUDES, a concept recently introduced in the intergroup literature, have been defmed as irrational intergroup attitudes based on beliefs that outgroup members violate important values (Kinder, 1986). Within the context of American racism, for example, symbolic racism has been described as “a form of resistance to change in the racial status quo based on moral feelings that Blacks violate such traditional American values as individualism and self-reliance, the work ethic, and discipline” (Kinder & Sears,
Requests for reprints should be sent to Connie M. Krktiansen, Department of PJrchologv, Corleton University, Ottawa, Ontario, Canada KIS 5B6. 61
Downloaded by [Central Michigan University] at 05:45 24 December 2014
62
The Journal of Social PsychologV
1981, p. 416). Further, it has been suggested that symbolic attitudes fulfd a value-expressive or social identity function in that they express values tied to a person’s group membership or social identity (Herek, 1986; Shavitt, 1989). Consistent with the notion that intergroup attitudes are tied to perceptions that an outgroup has different value priorities, particularly regarding values that an ingroup deems important, Allen and Wilder (1979) found that differential perceptions of belief congruence applied to arbitrarily defined groups. In this experiment, subjects were categorized into groups, supposedly on the basis of their artistic preferences. Subsequently, subjects attributed more similar beliefs to individual ingroup members relative to individual outgroup members, particularly for beliefs relevant to the basis of group formation (i.e., artistic preferences). These results also provide support to the social identity theory of intergroup relations, which claims that to attain a positive and distinct social identity, people compare their own group with other groups along dimensions that allow the ingroup to be evaluated distinctly and positively (Tajfel & Turner, 1986; Turner, Hogg, Oakes, Reicher, & Wetherell, 1987).
Prior research indicating that interpersonal attraction varies as a function of belief similarity also suggests that intergroup attitudes may vary as a function of perceived value similarity. Rokeach (1968), for example, described a series of experiments in which the racial similarity of a stimulus person to a subject (e.g., Black vs. White; Jewish vs. gentile) and levels of perceived belief similarity were manipulated. Rokeach’s results indicated that belief similarity was a more powerful determinant of interpersonal attraction than was racial similarity, thereby lending support to his belief congruence hypothesis, which posits that belief congruence, rather than race or group membership per se, affects interpersonal attraction. A study by Triandis (1%1), however, suggested that information about value similarity cannot ovemde the effects of race or group membership on interpersonal attraction. To manipulate perceptions of value similarity, Triandis presented subjects with information indicating that a stimulus person had the same, or a different, philosophy of life, as determined by subjects’ most and least preferred of Moms’ (1956) 13 varieties of human values. Contrary to the belief congruence hypothesis, Triandis found that racial similarity explained four times more variance in a measure of social distance than value similarity did. In contrast to Rokeach (1%8), who manipulated perceptions of belief congruence regarding specific topics (e.g., allowing girls to visit men’s dormitories, the grading system), Triandis’s findings suggest that perceptions of general value similarity do not affect interpersonal attraction. Rokeach (1%1) argued that, although perceptions of belief or attitudinal similarity regarding specific issues affect interpersonal attraction, perceptions of value similarity are less likely to do so. Although values may be too vague
Downloaded by [Central Michigan University] at 05:45 24 December 2014
Kristiansen
63
to cause interpersonal attraction, perceptions or exaggerations of value differences may be an ideal way to justify intergroup discrimination and reaffm one’s social identity, precisely because values are broad enough to make it possible to find evidence suggesting that an outgroup violates values. Indeed, Sniderman and Tetlock (1986a, 1986b) suggested that symbolic attitudes are rationalizations of prejudicial attitudes in the form of appeals to values. In the present study, therefore, the value-related basis of intergroup attitudes was examined. A sample of lesbians and gay men were investigated. Despite the fact that lesbians and gay men can be considered members of the same group, namely homosexuals, there is a substantial rift between lesbians who are involved primarily in the women’s movement and other members of the gay community. As with the intergroup situation that exists between some feminist women and men (Williams& Giles, 1978), feminist lesbians tend to evaluate gay men negatively (Ettorre, 1980). To the extent that these attitudes stem from perceptions that their group identity as women is subordinated to that of men, and to the extent that feminist lesbians are striving for a positive and distinct social identity along the lines delineated by social identity theory (Tajfel & Turner, 1986; Turner et al., 1987), the attitudes of feminist lesbians may constitute intergroup attitudes. Hence, if intergroup attitudes are value expressive or symbolic, then feminist lesbians’ attitudes should be tied to perceptions that gay men violate important values.
Method Anonymous questionnaires were distributed through the Exeter Gay Community and Devon Lesbian Link in England in 1984. Gay men’s and lesbians’ attitudes toward each other were measured along 1@mm lines anchored by extremely unfavorable and extremely favorable. Lesbians (gay men) were then asked “of the gay people with whom you associate, how many are gay men (lesbians)?” Possible responses were none, very few, about hag or more than half. As measures of perceived common fate, respondents used 1Wmm lines to indicate how much “lesbians and gay men have in common in terms of each group’s oppression by society” and how much “lesbians and gay men should work together in campaigns for homosexual equality.” Lesbians also categorized themselves as either gay movement lesbian (more involved in the gay movement) or women’s movement lesbian (more involved in the women’s movement). Respondents then completed Rokeach’s (1%7) Value Survey in which they ranked 18 values (e.g., peace, family security) “in order pf their importance to you, as guiding principles in your life.” Finally, lesbians (gay men) were asked to complete the terminal value survey “in the order that you think gay men (lesbians), on average, would rank them.”
64
The Journal of Social Psychology
Results
Downloaded by [Central Michigan University] at 05:45 24 December 2014
Respondents
One hundred fifty questionnaires were distributed, and 41 lesbians (M age = 27.4, range = 19 to 46 years) and 46 gay men (Mage = 33.0, range = 19 to 69 years) responded. The Office of Population Censuses and Surveys (1980) classification of occupations was used to categorize respondents’ socioeconomic status. Among lesbians, 25 held professional and nonmanual positions, 2 held skilled manual positions, 8 were students, and 6 were unemployed. Among gay men, 32 occupied professional and nonmanual positions (ABCl), 1 had a skilled, manual occupation (C2), 2 were semi-skilled or unskilled manual workers (DE), 7 were students, 2 were unemployed, and 2 failed to answer this item. As in other studies of the gay community, it is impossible to comment on the representativenessof this sample. The sample does include a diverse range of ages and occupations, however, and so it is unlikely that these data are applicable to only a unique set of lesbians and gay men. The Intergroup Context
The first analyses examined whether, relative to gay movement lesbians (n = 16), feminist lesbians (n = 25) had less favorable attitudes toward gay men, associated with fewer gay men, perceived less common fate with gay men, and wished to cooperate less with them. A multivariate analysis of variance that compared the scores of gay men, gay movement lesbians, and feminist lesbians on these variables was significant, Pilluis Truce V = .26, F(8, 158) = 2.95, p < .01.’ A multivariate orthogonal comparison showed that gay men and gay movement lesbians did not differ, Pillais Truce V = .07,F(4, 78) = 1.47, ns. In contrast, feminist lesbians’ scores differed from the combined scores of gay men and gay movement lesbians, Pilluis Trace V = .19, F(4, 78) = 4.59, p < .01. As shown in Table 1, relative to gay men and gay movement lesbians, feminist lesbians had less favorable intergroup attitudes, 41, 81) = 12.37, p < .001, marginally less intergroup contact, F(1, 81) = 3.70, p < .06, believed in less intergroup cooperation, Rl, 81) = 8.46, p < .01, and perceived less common fate with gay men, F(1, 81) = 9.67, p < .01. The above fmdings show that the relations of feminist and gay movement lesbians with gay men differed in terms of variables known to be differentially associated with intergroup versus intragroup relationships, respectively (Tajfel & Turner, 1986; Turner et al., 1987). These findings therefore ‘Pillais Trace V is a statistical test evaluating multivariate differences between group means which, in comparison to other methods, is both powerful and robust to violations of statistical assumptions (Norusis, 1985).
TABLE 1 Comparisons of Group Means for Variables Assessing the Intergroup Context
Downloaded by [Central Michigan University] at 05:45 24 December 2014
Variable
Gay men
Attitudes Contact Cooperation Common fate
74.6a 2.6a 78.4a 63.7"
Lesbians Gay movement Feminist
73.9 3.38 833
70.7a
Note: Within each row, means with different superscripts differ at p
46.7c 2.2b 60.2c 42.l C
< .06 (b) or p < .01 (c).
lend reasonable support to the notion that feminist lesbians perceive an intergroup relation with gay men, whereas gay movement lesbians and gay men share an intragroup relationship. Given this, the following analyses were used to examine the role of values in these two contexts.
Group Values and Value Attributions Both the actual value priorities of the groups and the values they attributed to the group of the opposite sex were examined. Spearman correlations revealed that the value systems of all groups were actually very similar. Correlations ranged from .Wbetween the values of gay movement lesbians and gay men. to .79between the values of feminist lesbians and gay men, to .85 between the values of gay movement and feminist lesbians (ps < .001). To examine perceptions of value similarity, the Spearman correlation was calculated between each subject's own value ranks and the ranks he or she attributed to the opposite sex group. An analysis of variance revealed that gay men, gay movement lesbians, and feminist lesbians differed in their perceptions of value similarity, F(2, 68) = 11.93,p < .001. Planned comparisons showed that gay movement lesbians (Me = .32)and gay men (Me = .43)did not differ in the amount of perceived value similarity, t(68) = 1.30, ns, whereas feminist lesbians (Me = .06)perceived significantly less similarity between their own values and those of gay men, t(68) = 4.22, p < .001.
The Value-Attitude Relation
To examine whether intergroup attitudes were tied to perceptions that an outgroup violated important values, value difference scores were calculated by subtracting the value importance scores that subjects attributed to a potential outgroup from the importance the subjects themselves placed on these values. The value ranks were transformed into Z scores corresponding to a division
Downloaded by [Central Michigan University] at 05:45 24 December 2014
66
The Journal of Social Psychology
of the normal curve into 18 equal areas to permit these analyses. Respondents’ attitudes to the other group were then regressed onto the 18 value difference scores, separately for each of the three groups. Given the small number of respondents in each group, the values of R2 were adjusted for the number of subjects and predictor variables. Among gay movement lesbians, none of the value difference scores accounted for the variation in their attitudes toward gay men. Similarly, none of the value difference scores of gay men were tied significantly to their attitudes toward lesbians. In contrast, the more feminist lesbians perceived gay men as placing less importance, relative to themselves, on freedom, happiness, and inner harmony, and as placing more importance on salvation, the less favorable attitudes they had toward them, adjusted R2 = .667, F(4, 17) = 11.52, p < .001. The variability in these groups’ attitudes and value difference scores did not differ. Hierarchical regression analyses were used to examine whether the relation between feminist lesbians’ attitudes toward gay men and perceptions of value differences may simply have been due to less contact with gay men and hence less knowledge of their actual value priorities. The amount of contact feminist lesbians reported having with gay men explained 36.2% of the variance in their attitudes toward gay men, el,20) = 12.92, p < .02. Perceived differences in the priority of freedom, inner harmony, happiness, and salvation accounted for an additional 36.6% of the variance in feminist lesbians’ attitudes toward gay men, F(5, 16) = 12.26, p < .001. Discussion Consistent with Ettorre (1980), who described the relationship between feminist lesbians and gay men as antagonistic, the present study found that, relative to gay movement lesbians, feminist lesbians had less favorable attitudes toward gay men, associated with fewer gay men, perceived less shared oppression, wished to cooperate less with gay men, and perceived less value similarity. Together, these findings suggest that feminist lesbians regard their relationship with gay men as an intergroup relationship, whereas gay movement lesbians perceive themselves as part of the same social group as gay men, namely the gay community, acting together to oppose their oppression by heterosexuals. In spite of the consistency of these findings, the fact that feminist lesbians had essentially neutral, rather than negative, attitudes toward gay men merits elaboration. One explanation stems from research showing that, in intergroup contexts, ingroup favoritism is more extreme than outgroup discrimination (Brewer, 1979). A more intriguing explanation lies in the notion that women express intergroup conflict communally rather than competitively. Williams (1984), for example, speculated that feminists are likely to re-
Downloaded by [Central Michigan University] at 05:45 24 December 2014
Kristiansen
67
spond communally to intergroup conflict by increasing intragroup cohesion and intragroup social comparisons and by reducing their dependence on men. Yet another explanation stems from the possibility that gay men are not viewed as prototypical or representative of the outgroup category “males” and are therefore not responded to as such (Turner et al., 1987). Although each of these explanations is plausible, other results of the present study suggest that the neutrality of feminist lesbians’ attitudes toward gay men resulted from perceptions that they have at least some similarity in terms of their shared homosexual identities. For example, although feminist lesbians perceived less common fate with gay men than did gay movement lesbians, feminist lesbians nevertheless believed that they shared some common oppression with gay men. Hence, in line with the additivity model of crosscategorization effects (e.g., Brewer, Ho, Lee, & Miller, 1987, the common homosexual identity of feminist lesbians and gay men may have moderated the impact of feminist lesbians’ social identity based on male-female categorizations. In line with social identity theory’s claim that groups will underestimate the similarity between their own group and members of an outgroup to achieve a distinct and positive social identity (Tajfel & Turner, 1986; Turner et al., 1987), feminist lesbians perceived absolutely no similarity between their own values and those of gay men. In addition, all groups in the present study underestimated the actual degree of value similarity, but feminist lesbians were particularly inclined to do so. To the extent that the relation between feminist lesbians and gay men is an intergroup one, analyses of the relation between feminist lesbians’ attitudes toward gay men and their perceptions of value differences do suggest that intergroup attitudes are systematically tied to perceptions that an outgroup violates cherished values (Kinder, 1986; Kinder & Sears, 1981). Moreover, feminist lesbians saw gay men as giving less priority to freedom, inner harmony, and happiness, values that feminists ranked 4th, 7th, and 9th in their hierarchy of 18 values, supporting Herek’s (1986) and Shavitt’s (1989) suggestion that symbolic attitudes are self-expressivein the sense of being tied to values that are central to the self-concept. As the relation between feminist lesbians’ attitudes toward gay men and their perceptions of value incongruence occurred over and above the amount of interpersonal contact these lesbians had with gay men, it is unlikely that lack of knowledge of gay men’s value priorities is responsible for the symbolic nature of feminist lesbians’ attitudes. Rather, these findings provide some support for Snideman and Tetlock’s (1986a, 1986b) claim that symbolic attitudes are rationalizations of prejudicial attitudes in the form of appeals to values. Thus, just as people may appeal to values to justify their attitudes toward social issues (Kristiansen & Zanna, 1988), they may also exaggerate perceptions of intergroup differences to bolster their social identity. To
Downloaded by [Central Michigan University] at 05:45 24 December 2014
68
The Journal of Social Psychology
the extent that values, in contrast to beliefs and attitudes, are intimately tied to the self-concept, as suggested by Rokeach (lW, 1!V3), perceptions that an outgroup violates cherished values may be a particuIarly effective way of affirming the worth of an ingroup relative to an outgroup, thereby enhancing self-regard (Lemyre & Smith, 1985). Moreover, the vague nature of values (Rokeach, l%l), in contrast to beliefs or attitudes, may facilitate this process. The correlational nature of the present study, however, makes it impossible to say whether perceptions that an outgroup had different values caused negative intergroup attitudes or intergroup attitudes caused perceptions of value differences. The validity of these causal suggestions therefore await the findings of experimental research.
REFERENCES Allen, V. L., &Wilder, D. A. (1979). Group categorization and attribution of belief similarity. Small Group Behavior, 10, 73-80. Brewer, M. B. (1979). In-group bias in the minimal intergroup situation: A cognitive-motivational analysis. Psychological Bulletin, 86, 307-324. Brewer, M. B., Ho, H.K., Lee, J. Y., & Miller, N. (1987). Social identity and social distance among Hong Kong school children. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 13, 156-165. Ettorre, E. M. (1980). Lesbians, women and society. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul. Herek, G. M. (1986). The instrumentality of attitudes: Toward a neofunctional theory. Journal of Social Issues, 42, 99-114. Kinder, D. R. (1986). The continuing American dilemma: White resistance to racial change after 40 years. Journal of Sociul Issues, 42, 151-171. Kinder, D. R., & Sears, D. 0. (1981). Prejudice and politics: Symbolic racism versus racial threats to the good life. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 40, 414-431.
Kristiansen, C. M.,& Zanna, M. P. (1988). Justifying attitudes by appealing to values: A functional perspective. British Journal of Social Psychology, 27, 247-256. Lemyre, L., & Smith, P. M. (1985). Intergroup discrimination and self-esteem in the minimal group paradigm. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 49, 660-670.
Moms, C. (1956). Varietiesof humun value. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Norusis, M. J. (1985). SPSSX advanced statistics guide (pp. 220-221). New York: McGraw-Hill. Office of Population Censuses and Surveys (1980). Classipcation of occupations, 1980. London: Her Majesty’s Stationery Office. Rokeach, M. (l%l). Belief versus race as determinants of social distance: A comment on Triandis’ paper. Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology, 62, 187-188. Rokeach, M. (1%7). Value survey. Sunnyvale, CA: Halgren Tests. Rokeach, M. (1%8). Beliefs, attitudes, and values: A theory of organization and change. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass. Rokeach, M. (1973). The nature of human values. New York: Free Press. Shavitt, S. (1989). Operationalizing functional theories of attitudes. In A. R. Prat-
Downloaded by [Central Michigan University] at 05:45 24 December 2014
Kristiansen
69
kanis, S. J. Breckler, & A. G. Greenwald (Eds.), Attitude structure and function (pp. 311-337). Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum. Sniderman, P. M.,& Tetlock, P. E. (1986a). Symbolic racism: Problems of motive attribution in political analysis. Journal of Social I m e s , 42. 129-150. Sniderman, P. M.,& Tetlock, P. E. (1986b). Reflections on American racism. Journal O f Social I . a , 42, 173-187. Tajfel, H., & Turner, J. C. (1986). The social identity theory of intergroup behavior. In S. Worchel & W. G.Austin (Eds.), psVchology of intergroup relations (2nd ed., pp. 7-24). Chicago: Nelson-Hall. Triandis, H. C. (l%l). A note on Rokeach’s theory of prejudice. Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology, 62, 184-186. Turner, J. C., H o g , M. A., Oakes, P. J., Reicher, S., & Wetherell, M. S. (1987). Rediscovering the social group: A self-categorization theory. Oxford: Blackwell. Williams, J. A. (1984). Gender and intergroup behavior. Towards an integration. British Journal of Social Psychology. 23, 31 1-316. Williams, J., & Giles, H. (1978). The changing status of women in society: An intergroup perspective. In H. Tajfel (Ed.), Di/ferentiation betwen social groups (pp. 431-446). New York: Academic Press.
Received April 13, 1989
The Journal of Social Psychology Publication details, including instructions for authors and subscription information: http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/vsoc20
The Symbolic/Value-Expressive Function of Outgroup Attitudes among Homosexuals Connie M. Kristiansen
a
a
Department of Psychology , Carleton University Published online: 01 Jul 2010.
To cite this article: Connie M. Kristiansen (1990) The Symbolic/Value-Expressive Function of Outgroup Attitudes among Homosexuals, The Journal of Social Psychology, 130:1, 61-69, DOI: 10.1080/00224545.1990.9922934 To link to this article: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00224545.1990.9922934
PLEASE SCROLL DOWN FOR ARTICLE Taylor & Francis makes every effort to ensure the accuracy of all the information (the “Content”) contained in the publications on our platform. However, Taylor & Francis, our agents, and our licensors make no representations or warranties whatsoever as to the accuracy, completeness, or suitability for any purpose of the Content. Any opinions and views expressed in this publication are the opinions and views of the authors, and are not the views of or endorsed by Taylor & Francis. The accuracy of the Content should not be relied upon and should be independently verified with primary sources of information. Taylor and Francis shall not be liable for any losses, actions, claims, proceedings, demands, costs, expenses, damages, and other liabilities whatsoever or howsoever caused arising directly or indirectly in connection with, in relation to or arising out of the use of the Content.
Downloaded by [Central Michigan University] at 05:45 24 December 2014
This article may be used for research, teaching, and private study purposes. Any substantial or systematic reproduction, redistribution, reselling, loan, sub-licensing, systematic supply, or distribution in any form to anyone is expressly forbidden. Terms & Conditions of access and use can be found at http://www.tandfonline.com/page/terms-and-conditions
The Journal of Social Psychology, 130(1), 61-69
Downloaded by [Central Michigan University] at 05:45 24 December 2014
The SymboIic/Value-Expressive Function of Outgroup Attitudes Among Homosexuals CONNIE M. KRISTIANSEN Department of Psychologv Carleton University
ABSTRACT.The claim that attitudes toward an outgroup symbolically represent beliefs that the outgroup violates important values was examined through the investigation of the intergroup versus intragroup nature of the relations between a sample of feminist lesbians (primarily involved in the women’s movement), gay movement lesbians (primarily involved in the gay movement), and gay men. Consistent with the intergroup relations documented between some feminist women and men, feminist lesbians (compared with gay movement lesbians) had less favorable attitudes toward gay men, associated with fewer gay men, perceived less common fate with gay men, wished to cooperate less with gay men, and perceived less value similarity with gay men. These and other fmdings suggested that feminist lesbians shared an intergroup relationship with gay men, whereas gay movement lesbians and gay men shared an intragroup relationship. Consistent with the notion that intergroup attitudes symbolically represent beliefs that an outgroup violates important values, feminist lesbians’ attitudes toward gay men were explained by their perceptions that gay men placed less importance on values they themselves regarded as important. The implications of these fmdings for understanding the nature of symbolic attitudes and subsequent research are discussed.
SYMBOLIC ATTITUDES, a concept recently introduced in the intergroup literature, have been defmed as irrational intergroup attitudes based on beliefs that outgroup members violate important values (Kinder, 1986). Within the context of American racism, for example, symbolic racism has been described as “a form of resistance to change in the racial status quo based on moral feelings that Blacks violate such traditional American values as individualism and self-reliance, the work ethic, and discipline” (Kinder & Sears,
Requests for reprints should be sent to Connie M. Krktiansen, Department of PJrchologv, Corleton University, Ottawa, Ontario, Canada KIS 5B6. 61
Downloaded by [Central Michigan University] at 05:45 24 December 2014
62
The Journal of Social PsychologV
1981, p. 416). Further, it has been suggested that symbolic attitudes fulfd a value-expressive or social identity function in that they express values tied to a person’s group membership or social identity (Herek, 1986; Shavitt, 1989). Consistent with the notion that intergroup attitudes are tied to perceptions that an outgroup has different value priorities, particularly regarding values that an ingroup deems important, Allen and Wilder (1979) found that differential perceptions of belief congruence applied to arbitrarily defined groups. In this experiment, subjects were categorized into groups, supposedly on the basis of their artistic preferences. Subsequently, subjects attributed more similar beliefs to individual ingroup members relative to individual outgroup members, particularly for beliefs relevant to the basis of group formation (i.e., artistic preferences). These results also provide support to the social identity theory of intergroup relations, which claims that to attain a positive and distinct social identity, people compare their own group with other groups along dimensions that allow the ingroup to be evaluated distinctly and positively (Tajfel & Turner, 1986; Turner, Hogg, Oakes, Reicher, & Wetherell, 1987).
Prior research indicating that interpersonal attraction varies as a function of belief similarity also suggests that intergroup attitudes may vary as a function of perceived value similarity. Rokeach (1968), for example, described a series of experiments in which the racial similarity of a stimulus person to a subject (e.g., Black vs. White; Jewish vs. gentile) and levels of perceived belief similarity were manipulated. Rokeach’s results indicated that belief similarity was a more powerful determinant of interpersonal attraction than was racial similarity, thereby lending support to his belief congruence hypothesis, which posits that belief congruence, rather than race or group membership per se, affects interpersonal attraction. A study by Triandis (1%1), however, suggested that information about value similarity cannot ovemde the effects of race or group membership on interpersonal attraction. To manipulate perceptions of value similarity, Triandis presented subjects with information indicating that a stimulus person had the same, or a different, philosophy of life, as determined by subjects’ most and least preferred of Moms’ (1956) 13 varieties of human values. Contrary to the belief congruence hypothesis, Triandis found that racial similarity explained four times more variance in a measure of social distance than value similarity did. In contrast to Rokeach (1%8), who manipulated perceptions of belief congruence regarding specific topics (e.g., allowing girls to visit men’s dormitories, the grading system), Triandis’s findings suggest that perceptions of general value similarity do not affect interpersonal attraction. Rokeach (1%1) argued that, although perceptions of belief or attitudinal similarity regarding specific issues affect interpersonal attraction, perceptions of value similarity are less likely to do so. Although values may be too vague
Downloaded by [Central Michigan University] at 05:45 24 December 2014
Kristiansen
63
to cause interpersonal attraction, perceptions or exaggerations of value differences may be an ideal way to justify intergroup discrimination and reaffm one’s social identity, precisely because values are broad enough to make it possible to find evidence suggesting that an outgroup violates values. Indeed, Sniderman and Tetlock (1986a, 1986b) suggested that symbolic attitudes are rationalizations of prejudicial attitudes in the form of appeals to values. In the present study, therefore, the value-related basis of intergroup attitudes was examined. A sample of lesbians and gay men were investigated. Despite the fact that lesbians and gay men can be considered members of the same group, namely homosexuals, there is a substantial rift between lesbians who are involved primarily in the women’s movement and other members of the gay community. As with the intergroup situation that exists between some feminist women and men (Williams& Giles, 1978), feminist lesbians tend to evaluate gay men negatively (Ettorre, 1980). To the extent that these attitudes stem from perceptions that their group identity as women is subordinated to that of men, and to the extent that feminist lesbians are striving for a positive and distinct social identity along the lines delineated by social identity theory (Tajfel & Turner, 1986; Turner et al., 1987), the attitudes of feminist lesbians may constitute intergroup attitudes. Hence, if intergroup attitudes are value expressive or symbolic, then feminist lesbians’ attitudes should be tied to perceptions that gay men violate important values.
Method Anonymous questionnaires were distributed through the Exeter Gay Community and Devon Lesbian Link in England in 1984. Gay men’s and lesbians’ attitudes toward each other were measured along 1@mm lines anchored by extremely unfavorable and extremely favorable. Lesbians (gay men) were then asked “of the gay people with whom you associate, how many are gay men (lesbians)?” Possible responses were none, very few, about hag or more than half. As measures of perceived common fate, respondents used 1Wmm lines to indicate how much “lesbians and gay men have in common in terms of each group’s oppression by society” and how much “lesbians and gay men should work together in campaigns for homosexual equality.” Lesbians also categorized themselves as either gay movement lesbian (more involved in the gay movement) or women’s movement lesbian (more involved in the women’s movement). Respondents then completed Rokeach’s (1%7) Value Survey in which they ranked 18 values (e.g., peace, family security) “in order pf their importance to you, as guiding principles in your life.” Finally, lesbians (gay men) were asked to complete the terminal value survey “in the order that you think gay men (lesbians), on average, would rank them.”
64
The Journal of Social Psychology
Results
Downloaded by [Central Michigan University] at 05:45 24 December 2014
Respondents
One hundred fifty questionnaires were distributed, and 41 lesbians (M age = 27.4, range = 19 to 46 years) and 46 gay men (Mage = 33.0, range = 19 to 69 years) responded. The Office of Population Censuses and Surveys (1980) classification of occupations was used to categorize respondents’ socioeconomic status. Among lesbians, 25 held professional and nonmanual positions, 2 held skilled manual positions, 8 were students, and 6 were unemployed. Among gay men, 32 occupied professional and nonmanual positions (ABCl), 1 had a skilled, manual occupation (C2), 2 were semi-skilled or unskilled manual workers (DE), 7 were students, 2 were unemployed, and 2 failed to answer this item. As in other studies of the gay community, it is impossible to comment on the representativenessof this sample. The sample does include a diverse range of ages and occupations, however, and so it is unlikely that these data are applicable to only a unique set of lesbians and gay men. The Intergroup Context
The first analyses examined whether, relative to gay movement lesbians (n = 16), feminist lesbians (n = 25) had less favorable attitudes toward gay men, associated with fewer gay men, perceived less common fate with gay men, and wished to cooperate less with them. A multivariate analysis of variance that compared the scores of gay men, gay movement lesbians, and feminist lesbians on these variables was significant, Pilluis Truce V = .26, F(8, 158) = 2.95, p < .01.’ A multivariate orthogonal comparison showed that gay men and gay movement lesbians did not differ, Pillais Truce V = .07,F(4, 78) = 1.47, ns. In contrast, feminist lesbians’ scores differed from the combined scores of gay men and gay movement lesbians, Pilluis Trace V = .19, F(4, 78) = 4.59, p < .01. As shown in Table 1, relative to gay men and gay movement lesbians, feminist lesbians had less favorable intergroup attitudes, 41, 81) = 12.37, p < .001, marginally less intergroup contact, F(1, 81) = 3.70, p < .06, believed in less intergroup cooperation, Rl, 81) = 8.46, p < .01, and perceived less common fate with gay men, F(1, 81) = 9.67, p < .01. The above fmdings show that the relations of feminist and gay movement lesbians with gay men differed in terms of variables known to be differentially associated with intergroup versus intragroup relationships, respectively (Tajfel & Turner, 1986; Turner et al., 1987). These findings therefore ‘Pillais Trace V is a statistical test evaluating multivariate differences between group means which, in comparison to other methods, is both powerful and robust to violations of statistical assumptions (Norusis, 1985).
TABLE 1 Comparisons of Group Means for Variables Assessing the Intergroup Context
Downloaded by [Central Michigan University] at 05:45 24 December 2014
Variable
Gay men
Attitudes Contact Cooperation Common fate
74.6a 2.6a 78.4a 63.7"
Lesbians Gay movement Feminist
73.9 3.38 833
70.7a
Note: Within each row, means with different superscripts differ at p
46.7c 2.2b 60.2c 42.l C
< .06 (b) or p < .01 (c).
lend reasonable support to the notion that feminist lesbians perceive an intergroup relation with gay men, whereas gay movement lesbians and gay men share an intragroup relationship. Given this, the following analyses were used to examine the role of values in these two contexts.
Group Values and Value Attributions Both the actual value priorities of the groups and the values they attributed to the group of the opposite sex were examined. Spearman correlations revealed that the value systems of all groups were actually very similar. Correlations ranged from .Wbetween the values of gay movement lesbians and gay men. to .79between the values of feminist lesbians and gay men, to .85 between the values of gay movement and feminist lesbians (ps < .001). To examine perceptions of value similarity, the Spearman correlation was calculated between each subject's own value ranks and the ranks he or she attributed to the opposite sex group. An analysis of variance revealed that gay men, gay movement lesbians, and feminist lesbians differed in their perceptions of value similarity, F(2, 68) = 11.93,p < .001. Planned comparisons showed that gay movement lesbians (Me = .32)and gay men (Me = .43)did not differ in the amount of perceived value similarity, t(68) = 1.30, ns, whereas feminist lesbians (Me = .06)perceived significantly less similarity between their own values and those of gay men, t(68) = 4.22, p < .001.
The Value-Attitude Relation
To examine whether intergroup attitudes were tied to perceptions that an outgroup violated important values, value difference scores were calculated by subtracting the value importance scores that subjects attributed to a potential outgroup from the importance the subjects themselves placed on these values. The value ranks were transformed into Z scores corresponding to a division
Downloaded by [Central Michigan University] at 05:45 24 December 2014
66
The Journal of Social Psychology
of the normal curve into 18 equal areas to permit these analyses. Respondents’ attitudes to the other group were then regressed onto the 18 value difference scores, separately for each of the three groups. Given the small number of respondents in each group, the values of R2 were adjusted for the number of subjects and predictor variables. Among gay movement lesbians, none of the value difference scores accounted for the variation in their attitudes toward gay men. Similarly, none of the value difference scores of gay men were tied significantly to their attitudes toward lesbians. In contrast, the more feminist lesbians perceived gay men as placing less importance, relative to themselves, on freedom, happiness, and inner harmony, and as placing more importance on salvation, the less favorable attitudes they had toward them, adjusted R2 = .667, F(4, 17) = 11.52, p < .001. The variability in these groups’ attitudes and value difference scores did not differ. Hierarchical regression analyses were used to examine whether the relation between feminist lesbians’ attitudes toward gay men and perceptions of value differences may simply have been due to less contact with gay men and hence less knowledge of their actual value priorities. The amount of contact feminist lesbians reported having with gay men explained 36.2% of the variance in their attitudes toward gay men, el,20) = 12.92, p < .02. Perceived differences in the priority of freedom, inner harmony, happiness, and salvation accounted for an additional 36.6% of the variance in feminist lesbians’ attitudes toward gay men, F(5, 16) = 12.26, p < .001. Discussion Consistent with Ettorre (1980), who described the relationship between feminist lesbians and gay men as antagonistic, the present study found that, relative to gay movement lesbians, feminist lesbians had less favorable attitudes toward gay men, associated with fewer gay men, perceived less shared oppression, wished to cooperate less with gay men, and perceived less value similarity. Together, these findings suggest that feminist lesbians regard their relationship with gay men as an intergroup relationship, whereas gay movement lesbians perceive themselves as part of the same social group as gay men, namely the gay community, acting together to oppose their oppression by heterosexuals. In spite of the consistency of these findings, the fact that feminist lesbians had essentially neutral, rather than negative, attitudes toward gay men merits elaboration. One explanation stems from research showing that, in intergroup contexts, ingroup favoritism is more extreme than outgroup discrimination (Brewer, 1979). A more intriguing explanation lies in the notion that women express intergroup conflict communally rather than competitively. Williams (1984), for example, speculated that feminists are likely to re-
Downloaded by [Central Michigan University] at 05:45 24 December 2014
Kristiansen
67
spond communally to intergroup conflict by increasing intragroup cohesion and intragroup social comparisons and by reducing their dependence on men. Yet another explanation stems from the possibility that gay men are not viewed as prototypical or representative of the outgroup category “males” and are therefore not responded to as such (Turner et al., 1987). Although each of these explanations is plausible, other results of the present study suggest that the neutrality of feminist lesbians’ attitudes toward gay men resulted from perceptions that they have at least some similarity in terms of their shared homosexual identities. For example, although feminist lesbians perceived less common fate with gay men than did gay movement lesbians, feminist lesbians nevertheless believed that they shared some common oppression with gay men. Hence, in line with the additivity model of crosscategorization effects (e.g., Brewer, Ho, Lee, & Miller, 1987, the common homosexual identity of feminist lesbians and gay men may have moderated the impact of feminist lesbians’ social identity based on male-female categorizations. In line with social identity theory’s claim that groups will underestimate the similarity between their own group and members of an outgroup to achieve a distinct and positive social identity (Tajfel & Turner, 1986; Turner et al., 1987), feminist lesbians perceived absolutely no similarity between their own values and those of gay men. In addition, all groups in the present study underestimated the actual degree of value similarity, but feminist lesbians were particularly inclined to do so. To the extent that the relation between feminist lesbians and gay men is an intergroup one, analyses of the relation between feminist lesbians’ attitudes toward gay men and their perceptions of value differences do suggest that intergroup attitudes are systematically tied to perceptions that an outgroup violates cherished values (Kinder, 1986; Kinder & Sears, 1981). Moreover, feminist lesbians saw gay men as giving less priority to freedom, inner harmony, and happiness, values that feminists ranked 4th, 7th, and 9th in their hierarchy of 18 values, supporting Herek’s (1986) and Shavitt’s (1989) suggestion that symbolic attitudes are self-expressivein the sense of being tied to values that are central to the self-concept. As the relation between feminist lesbians’ attitudes toward gay men and their perceptions of value incongruence occurred over and above the amount of interpersonal contact these lesbians had with gay men, it is unlikely that lack of knowledge of gay men’s value priorities is responsible for the symbolic nature of feminist lesbians’ attitudes. Rather, these findings provide some support for Snideman and Tetlock’s (1986a, 1986b) claim that symbolic attitudes are rationalizations of prejudicial attitudes in the form of appeals to values. Thus, just as people may appeal to values to justify their attitudes toward social issues (Kristiansen & Zanna, 1988), they may also exaggerate perceptions of intergroup differences to bolster their social identity. To
Downloaded by [Central Michigan University] at 05:45 24 December 2014
68
The Journal of Social Psychology
the extent that values, in contrast to beliefs and attitudes, are intimately tied to the self-concept, as suggested by Rokeach (lW, 1!V3), perceptions that an outgroup violates cherished values may be a particuIarly effective way of affirming the worth of an ingroup relative to an outgroup, thereby enhancing self-regard (Lemyre & Smith, 1985). Moreover, the vague nature of values (Rokeach, l%l), in contrast to beliefs or attitudes, may facilitate this process. The correlational nature of the present study, however, makes it impossible to say whether perceptions that an outgroup had different values caused negative intergroup attitudes or intergroup attitudes caused perceptions of value differences. The validity of these causal suggestions therefore await the findings of experimental research.
REFERENCES Allen, V. L., &Wilder, D. A. (1979). Group categorization and attribution of belief similarity. Small Group Behavior, 10, 73-80. Brewer, M. B. (1979). In-group bias in the minimal intergroup situation: A cognitive-motivational analysis. Psychological Bulletin, 86, 307-324. Brewer, M. B., Ho, H.K., Lee, J. Y., & Miller, N. (1987). Social identity and social distance among Hong Kong school children. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 13, 156-165. Ettorre, E. M. (1980). Lesbians, women and society. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul. Herek, G. M. (1986). The instrumentality of attitudes: Toward a neofunctional theory. Journal of Social Issues, 42, 99-114. Kinder, D. R. (1986). The continuing American dilemma: White resistance to racial change after 40 years. Journal of Sociul Issues, 42, 151-171. Kinder, D. R., & Sears, D. 0. (1981). Prejudice and politics: Symbolic racism versus racial threats to the good life. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 40, 414-431.
Kristiansen, C. M.,& Zanna, M. P. (1988). Justifying attitudes by appealing to values: A functional perspective. British Journal of Social Psychology, 27, 247-256. Lemyre, L., & Smith, P. M. (1985). Intergroup discrimination and self-esteem in the minimal group paradigm. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 49, 660-670.
Moms, C. (1956). Varietiesof humun value. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Norusis, M. J. (1985). SPSSX advanced statistics guide (pp. 220-221). New York: McGraw-Hill. Office of Population Censuses and Surveys (1980). Classipcation of occupations, 1980. London: Her Majesty’s Stationery Office. Rokeach, M. (l%l). Belief versus race as determinants of social distance: A comment on Triandis’ paper. Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology, 62, 187-188. Rokeach, M. (1%7). Value survey. Sunnyvale, CA: Halgren Tests. Rokeach, M. (1%8). Beliefs, attitudes, and values: A theory of organization and change. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass. Rokeach, M. (1973). The nature of human values. New York: Free Press. Shavitt, S. (1989). Operationalizing functional theories of attitudes. In A. R. Prat-
Downloaded by [Central Michigan University] at 05:45 24 December 2014
Kristiansen
69
kanis, S. J. Breckler, & A. G. Greenwald (Eds.), Attitude structure and function (pp. 311-337). Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum. Sniderman, P. M.,& Tetlock, P. E. (1986a). Symbolic racism: Problems of motive attribution in political analysis. Journal of Social I m e s , 42. 129-150. Sniderman, P. M.,& Tetlock, P. E. (1986b). Reflections on American racism. Journal O f Social I . a , 42, 173-187. Tajfel, H., & Turner, J. C. (1986). The social identity theory of intergroup behavior. In S. Worchel & W. G.Austin (Eds.), psVchology of intergroup relations (2nd ed., pp. 7-24). Chicago: Nelson-Hall. Triandis, H. C. (l%l). A note on Rokeach’s theory of prejudice. Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology, 62, 184-186. Turner, J. C., H o g , M. A., Oakes, P. J., Reicher, S., & Wetherell, M. S. (1987). Rediscovering the social group: A self-categorization theory. Oxford: Blackwell. Williams, J. A. (1984). Gender and intergroup behavior. Towards an integration. British Journal of Social Psychology. 23, 31 1-316. Williams, J., & Giles, H. (1978). The changing status of women in society: An intergroup perspective. In H. Tajfel (Ed.), Di/ferentiation betwen social groups (pp. 431-446). New York: Academic Press.
Received April 13, 1989
