The New Palgrave: A Dictionary of Economics Eatwell John; Newman Peter; Milgate Murray ISBN: 9780230279803 DOI: 10.1057/9780230279803 Palgrave Macmillan Please respect intellectual property rights This material is copyright and its use is restricted by our standard site license terms and conditions (see http://www.palgraveconnect.com/pc/connect/info/terms_conditions.html). If you plan to copy, distribute or share in any format including, for the avoidance of doubt, posting on websites, you need the express prior permission of Palgrave Macmillan. To request permission please contact [email protected].
2048
cycles in socialist economies
In the Marxist–Leninist project of socialist economy the elimination of cycles in economic activity is the expected result of central planning replacing the ‘anarchy’ of capitalist markets. Ex-ante coordination of the activities of government, households and firms according to a consistent, feasible and efficient plan should, in principle, ensure the continued full employment of labour and other resources along smooth growth paths instead of the recurring bouts of booms and recessions and persistent unemployment characteristic of capitalism. The experience of those capitalist countries which, especially since World War II, have tried to implement a social-democratic version of this project while maintaining free enterprise does not differ significantly, at least qualitatively, from that of more conventional capitalist economies. Built-in stabilizers and anticyclical management of demand may have reduced the amplitude of fluctuations and the depth of unemployment (though some government intervention has been deemed cyclical because of leads and lags); the individual cost of fluctuations and unemployment has been partly collectivized by the welfare state; but the undesired phenomena have persisted. The same is true for Yugoslavia, a country which has implemented an associationist form of socialism introducing self-management on a large scale but has retained enterprise initiative and markets. Other countries attempted to implement the marxist-leninist project – state ownership, central planning, equalitarianism, ‘democratic centralism’ under the leadership (and practical monopoly of power) of the communist party, such as the Soviet Union, the East European Six, Mongolia, China, Cuba and the other countries loosely classed as centrally planned economies or CPEs. These countries have been successful in eliminating fluctuations in the degree of labour employment. Full employment of labour was reached in the Soviet Union at the inception of the First Five-Year Plan (1928) as a result of full-scale mobilization of labour and in the other countries in the course of reconstruction after the wars that brought about the new system. Ambitious accumulation policies maintained full employment; the wage pressure generated by labour shortage itself, combined with government commitment to price stability, added sustained excess demand for consumption which contributed further to full employment stability, without any need for specific policies to support it. Full employment has been the by-product of growthmanship. In view of the persistent microeconomic inefficiency of central planning and the underfulfilment of labour productivity targets it can also be said, in a sense, that full employment of labour has been achieved ‘by default’. If, however, the decentralization process currently undertaken in most centrally planned economies were to reproduce unemployment tendencies no doubt specific policies would be adopted to restore and stabilize full employment.
10.1057/9780230279803 - The New Palgrave: A Dictionary of Economics, Edited by John Eatwell, Murray Milgate and Peter Newman
Copyright material from www.palgraveconnect.com - licensed to Carleton University - PalgraveConnect - 2015-05-05
cycles in socialist economies
cycles in socialist economies
Outside labour employment the performance of socialist planning has been less satisfactory than originally expected. In the Soviet Union, since the completion of reconstruction and the launching of accelerated industrialization in 1928, and in the other socialist countries since the corresponding dates in their economic history, fast growth of all performance indicators in peacetime until circa 1960 has smoothed small-scale cyclical phenomena, reducing them to fluctuations of positive growth rates rather than of levels of income and consumption. Since then, partly because of the gradual exhaustion of labour reserves and of easily accessible natural resources, partly because of the systemic microeconomic inefficiency exacerbated by the lack of such reserves, a discernible slowdown of growth trends has been accompanied by the appearance of negative rates, i.e. fluctuations of levels as in capitalist countries. Instances range from the early minor case of Czechoslovakia in 1963 to the large-scale income drop of one third in three years in Poland 1980–82. These phenomena are only partly attributable to exogenous shocks and their echoes, whose persistence in the socialist economy was recognized by Oskar Lange (1969), or to adjustment processes such as accelerator-type movements, whose persistence in the socialist economy had been anticipated by Aftalion already in 1909 and recognized by Notkin (1961) and Coblijc– Stojanovic (1968). Partly – indeed mostly – these phenomena are caused by systemic factors which could be classed under three groups: (i) the lack, or at any rate the slowness, of automatic adjustment feedbacks in the economic life of centrally planned economies; (ii) the acceleration of economic activity towards the end of the planning period – be it a month, a year or five years – to avoid the formal and informal penalties of underfulfilment of targets and to obtain the rewards associated with fulfilment and overfulfilment, followed by slackening at the beginning of the next period; (iii) the presence of political feedbacks, such as popular discontent and unrest resulting from deteriorating economic performance, the changes in political centralization induced by manifestations of unrest, the economic management changes associated with political changes; these phenomena adding up to a systemic mechanism of economic/political cycles. Markets, like all servomechanisms or homeostatic (self-regulating) devices, are neither costless nor instantaneous but are automatic in their operation; at the cost of unemployment and possibly with a considerable lag, for example, an unexpected contraction in world trade can be gradually accommodated through lower wages and prices than would otherwise have prevailed, lower exchange rate and higher interest rates regardless of government intervention, capital flows etc. Central planning, like manual control, may or may not be faster and cheaper, or more accurate, than automatic servomechanisms, depending on the relative quality of alternative controls and the actual circumstances, but is never automatic. The experience of centrally planned economies has shown repeated and sometimes glaring instances of inertia and sluggish response to exogenous change, such as persistent accelerated accumulation in the face of rising labour shortages, wage and price stability administratively enforced in spite of rising excess demand for labour and goods, systematic underpricing of imported materials and of exportables
10.1057/9780230279803 - The New Palgrave: A Dictionary of Economics, Edited by John Eatwell, Murray Milgate and Peter Newman
Copyright material from www.palgraveconnect.com - licensed to Carleton University - PalgraveConnect - 2015-05-05
2049
cycles in socialist economies
in spite of sharpening external imbalance. Reliance on monetary budget constraints and the continued presence of consumers’ discretion (if not sovereignty) and some managerial room for manoeuvre make these forms of inertia and delayed response an important handicap for central planners trying to outperform market adjustments. It is precisely inadequate central response to a changing environment (including inadequate ability to innovate institutions and technology) that has given impetus to repeated attempts at reform in the last two decades. The incentive system typical of central planning, strongly and discontinuously geared to the degree of fulfilment of physical targets, leads to frantic speeding-up of activity (shturmovshchina in Russian, literally ‘storming’) towards the end of the planning period. For monthly plans this haste leads to frequent quality deterioration; for yearly plans ‘storming’ leads to output being overestimated, or ‘borrowed’ from the subsequent period (i.e., made up through subsequent unrecorded additional output); so much so that the ratio of December output to that of the following January can be regarded as an index of economic centralization (Rostowski and Auerbach, 1984). For five-year plans, ‘storming’ implies a concentration of investment project completions towards the end of the period and a spate of new starts at the beginning, with corresponding fluctuations. Moreover, the generalized growthmanship and emphasis on capital accumulation typical of the centrally planned economy leads usually to the inclusion in investment plans of more projects than can be completed on schedule, through ‘investors’ (local authorities, ministries, enterprises) underestimating true requirements in order to get a place in the plan and later escalating their demands, and through central planners systematically overestimating capacity and especially labour productivity prospects. Sometimes investment ambition leads to additional investment projects being added after or outside the plan balance (as in Gierek’s Poland). As they say in East European literature, ‘the investment front widens’. Sooner or later specific or generalized bottlenecks of productive or import capacity slow down implementation and reduce or block new starts. Efficiency falls due to investment resources being frozen for periods longer than economically and technically justified, and possibly because of disruption elsewhere in the economy due to resources being sucked in by investment projects given priority over current operations (a ‘supply-multiplier’ effect). Capital – i.e. in Marxian terminology ‘dead labour’ – is made unemployed instead of live labour. The cyclical pattern of starts and completions of projects, mostly within the plan period but sometimes overstepping it, leads to cyclical patterns of capacity and output endogenously generated by the system and not justified by exogenous factors. These processes have been investigated theoretically and empirically by Olivera (1960), Goldman (1964 and 1965), Baijt (1971), Bauer (1978), Dahlstedt (1981), Dallago (1982) and above all by Bauer (1982, in Hungarian, forthcoming in English). Political factors induce cycles in socialist economy directly, through successive leaders trying to reinforce the legitimacy of their rule by appeasing their subjects with short-lived but significant spurts of consumption before the standard growth and accumulation oriented policy typical of socialist governments is resumed and comes up against the constraints discussed in the
10.1057/9780230279803 - The New Palgrave: A Dictionary of Economics, Edited by John Eatwell, Murray Milgate and Peter Newman
Copyright material from www.palgraveconnect.com - licensed to Carleton University - PalgraveConnect - 2015-05-05
2050
cycles in socialist economies
previous paragraph (Mieczkowski, 1978; Hanson, 1978; Bunce, 1980; Lafay, 1981). The association of economic and socio-political factors is investigated by Eysymontt and Maciejewski (1984), who apply discriminant analysis to a large number of indicators of such factors over time in order to identify – and anticipate – periods of crisis; they do not, however, have a model of the actual interaction of political and economic factors. An attempt at constructing such a model is made by Nuti (1979, 1985): a critical relationship is assumed between political centralization and popular unrest, inverse up to a threshold level and direct beyond it; economic centralization is directly related to political centralization and affects – through its impact on investment policy – the level of shortages and inefficiency which in turn fuel political unrest. A recursive model with lagged variables is shown to simulate the kind of recurring rounds of reform attempts and accumulation drives observable in actual socialist economies. Screpanti (1985) has modified such a model applying catastrophe theory and obtaining a political/economic accumulation cycle similar to that of capitalist economies. The further progress of economic reform in centrally planned economies towards market socialism is bound to attenuate and ultimately eliminate the systemic types of economic cycles discussed above. However, as Maurice Dobb had already anticipated in 1939, the diffusion of markets instead of solving the instability problems of the centrally planned economy transforms them into those typical of capitalist economies.
D.M. Nuti
See also business cycles; market socialism; political business cycle; socialism; trade cycles.
Bibliography Aftalion, A. 1909. La réalité des superproductions générales. Revue d’économie politique 23(3), 201–29. Baijt, A. 1971. Investment cycles in European socialist economies: a review article. Journal of Economic Literature 9(1), March, 56–63. Bauer, T. 1978. Investment cycles in planned economies. Acta Oeconomica 21(3), 243–60. Bauer, T. 1982. Tervezès, beruchàzàs, ciklusok. Budapest: KJK. Bunce, V. 1980. The political consumption cycle: a comparative analysis. Soviet Studies 32(2), April 280–90. Coblijc, N. and Stojanovic, L. 1969. The Theory of Economic Cycles in a Socialist Economy. New York: IASP.
10.1057/9780230279803 - The New Palgrave: A Dictionary of Economics, Edited by John Eatwell, Murray Milgate and Peter Newman
Copyright material from www.palgraveconnect.com - licensed to Carleton University - PalgraveConnect - 2015-05-05
2051
cycles in socialist economies
Dallago, B. 1982. Sviluppo e Cicli nelle Economie Est-Europee. Milan: Angeli. Dobb, M.H. 1939. A note on saving and investment in a socialist economy. Economic Journal 43, December, 713–28. Eysmontt, J. and Maciejewski, W. 1984. Kryzysy spolecznogospodarcze w Polsce – ujecie modelowe (Social-economic crisis in Poland-a model approach). Ekonomista. Goldmann, J. 1964. Fluctuations and trends in the rate of economic growth in some socialist countries. Economics of Planning 4(2), 88–98. Goldmann, J. 1965. Short and long term variations in the growth rate and the model of functioning of a socialist economy. Czechoslovak Economic Papers 5, 35–46. Hanson, P. 1978. Mieczkowski on consumption and politics: a comment. Soviet Studies 30(4) October, 553–6. Lafay, J.-D. 1981. Empirical analysis of politico-economic interaction in East European countries. Soviet Studies 33(3), July, 386–400. Lange, O. 1969. Theory of Reproduction and Accumulation. Oxford: Pergamon. Mieczkowski, B. 1978. The relationship between changes in consumption and politics in Poland. Soviet Studies 30(2), April, 262–9. Notkin, A. 1961. Tempy i proportsii sotsialisticheskogo vosproizvodstva (The rate and proportions of socialist reproduction). Moscow: IEL. Nuti, D.M. 1979. The contradictions of socialist economies: a Marxian interpretation. Socialist Register, London: The Merlin Press. Nuti, D.M. 1985. Political and economic fluctuations in the socialist system. European University Institute Working Paper No.85/156, Florence. Olivera, J. 1960. Cyclical growth under collectivism. Kyklos 13(2), 229–52. Rostowski, J. and Auerbach, P. 1984. Storming cycles and central planning. Discussion Paper in Political Economy No.52, Kingston Polytechnic. Screpanti, E. 1985. A model of the political economic cycle in centrally planned economies. European University Institute Working Paper No.85/201, Florence.
10.1057/9780230279803 - The New Palgrave: A Dictionary of Economics, Edited by John Eatwell, Murray Milgate and Peter Newman
Copyright material from www.palgraveconnect.com - licensed to Carleton University - PalgraveConnect - 2015-05-05
2052
2048
cycles in socialist economies
In the Marxist–Leninist project of socialist economy the elimination of cycles in economic activity is the expected result of central planning replacing the ‘anarchy’ of capitalist markets. Ex-ante coordination of the activities of government, households and firms according to a consistent, feasible and efficient plan should, in principle, ensure the continued full employment of labour and other resources along smooth growth paths instead of the recurring bouts of booms and recessions and persistent unemployment characteristic of capitalism. The experience of those capitalist countries which, especially since World War II, have tried to implement a social-democratic version of this project while maintaining free enterprise does not differ significantly, at least qualitatively, from that of more conventional capitalist economies. Built-in stabilizers and anticyclical management of demand may have reduced the amplitude of fluctuations and the depth of unemployment (though some government intervention has been deemed cyclical because of leads and lags); the individual cost of fluctuations and unemployment has been partly collectivized by the welfare state; but the undesired phenomena have persisted. The same is true for Yugoslavia, a country which has implemented an associationist form of socialism introducing self-management on a large scale but has retained enterprise initiative and markets. Other countries attempted to implement the marxist-leninist project – state ownership, central planning, equalitarianism, ‘democratic centralism’ under the leadership (and practical monopoly of power) of the communist party, such as the Soviet Union, the East European Six, Mongolia, China, Cuba and the other countries loosely classed as centrally planned economies or CPEs. These countries have been successful in eliminating fluctuations in the degree of labour employment. Full employment of labour was reached in the Soviet Union at the inception of the First Five-Year Plan (1928) as a result of full-scale mobilization of labour and in the other countries in the course of reconstruction after the wars that brought about the new system. Ambitious accumulation policies maintained full employment; the wage pressure generated by labour shortage itself, combined with government commitment to price stability, added sustained excess demand for consumption which contributed further to full employment stability, without any need for specific policies to support it. Full employment has been the by-product of growthmanship. In view of the persistent microeconomic inefficiency of central planning and the underfulfilment of labour productivity targets it can also be said, in a sense, that full employment of labour has been achieved ‘by default’. If, however, the decentralization process currently undertaken in most centrally planned economies were to reproduce unemployment tendencies no doubt specific policies would be adopted to restore and stabilize full employment.
10.1057/9780230279803 - The New Palgrave: A Dictionary of Economics, Edited by John Eatwell, Murray Milgate and Peter Newman
Copyright material from www.palgraveconnect.com - licensed to Carleton University - PalgraveConnect - 2015-05-05
cycles in socialist economies
cycles in socialist economies
Outside labour employment the performance of socialist planning has been less satisfactory than originally expected. In the Soviet Union, since the completion of reconstruction and the launching of accelerated industrialization in 1928, and in the other socialist countries since the corresponding dates in their economic history, fast growth of all performance indicators in peacetime until circa 1960 has smoothed small-scale cyclical phenomena, reducing them to fluctuations of positive growth rates rather than of levels of income and consumption. Since then, partly because of the gradual exhaustion of labour reserves and of easily accessible natural resources, partly because of the systemic microeconomic inefficiency exacerbated by the lack of such reserves, a discernible slowdown of growth trends has been accompanied by the appearance of negative rates, i.e. fluctuations of levels as in capitalist countries. Instances range from the early minor case of Czechoslovakia in 1963 to the large-scale income drop of one third in three years in Poland 1980–82. These phenomena are only partly attributable to exogenous shocks and their echoes, whose persistence in the socialist economy was recognized by Oskar Lange (1969), or to adjustment processes such as accelerator-type movements, whose persistence in the socialist economy had been anticipated by Aftalion already in 1909 and recognized by Notkin (1961) and Coblijc– Stojanovic (1968). Partly – indeed mostly – these phenomena are caused by systemic factors which could be classed under three groups: (i) the lack, or at any rate the slowness, of automatic adjustment feedbacks in the economic life of centrally planned economies; (ii) the acceleration of economic activity towards the end of the planning period – be it a month, a year or five years – to avoid the formal and informal penalties of underfulfilment of targets and to obtain the rewards associated with fulfilment and overfulfilment, followed by slackening at the beginning of the next period; (iii) the presence of political feedbacks, such as popular discontent and unrest resulting from deteriorating economic performance, the changes in political centralization induced by manifestations of unrest, the economic management changes associated with political changes; these phenomena adding up to a systemic mechanism of economic/political cycles. Markets, like all servomechanisms or homeostatic (self-regulating) devices, are neither costless nor instantaneous but are automatic in their operation; at the cost of unemployment and possibly with a considerable lag, for example, an unexpected contraction in world trade can be gradually accommodated through lower wages and prices than would otherwise have prevailed, lower exchange rate and higher interest rates regardless of government intervention, capital flows etc. Central planning, like manual control, may or may not be faster and cheaper, or more accurate, than automatic servomechanisms, depending on the relative quality of alternative controls and the actual circumstances, but is never automatic. The experience of centrally planned economies has shown repeated and sometimes glaring instances of inertia and sluggish response to exogenous change, such as persistent accelerated accumulation in the face of rising labour shortages, wage and price stability administratively enforced in spite of rising excess demand for labour and goods, systematic underpricing of imported materials and of exportables
10.1057/9780230279803 - The New Palgrave: A Dictionary of Economics, Edited by John Eatwell, Murray Milgate and Peter Newman
Copyright material from www.palgraveconnect.com - licensed to Carleton University - PalgraveConnect - 2015-05-05
2049
cycles in socialist economies
in spite of sharpening external imbalance. Reliance on monetary budget constraints and the continued presence of consumers’ discretion (if not sovereignty) and some managerial room for manoeuvre make these forms of inertia and delayed response an important handicap for central planners trying to outperform market adjustments. It is precisely inadequate central response to a changing environment (including inadequate ability to innovate institutions and technology) that has given impetus to repeated attempts at reform in the last two decades. The incentive system typical of central planning, strongly and discontinuously geared to the degree of fulfilment of physical targets, leads to frantic speeding-up of activity (shturmovshchina in Russian, literally ‘storming’) towards the end of the planning period. For monthly plans this haste leads to frequent quality deterioration; for yearly plans ‘storming’ leads to output being overestimated, or ‘borrowed’ from the subsequent period (i.e., made up through subsequent unrecorded additional output); so much so that the ratio of December output to that of the following January can be regarded as an index of economic centralization (Rostowski and Auerbach, 1984). For five-year plans, ‘storming’ implies a concentration of investment project completions towards the end of the period and a spate of new starts at the beginning, with corresponding fluctuations. Moreover, the generalized growthmanship and emphasis on capital accumulation typical of the centrally planned economy leads usually to the inclusion in investment plans of more projects than can be completed on schedule, through ‘investors’ (local authorities, ministries, enterprises) underestimating true requirements in order to get a place in the plan and later escalating their demands, and through central planners systematically overestimating capacity and especially labour productivity prospects. Sometimes investment ambition leads to additional investment projects being added after or outside the plan balance (as in Gierek’s Poland). As they say in East European literature, ‘the investment front widens’. Sooner or later specific or generalized bottlenecks of productive or import capacity slow down implementation and reduce or block new starts. Efficiency falls due to investment resources being frozen for periods longer than economically and technically justified, and possibly because of disruption elsewhere in the economy due to resources being sucked in by investment projects given priority over current operations (a ‘supply-multiplier’ effect). Capital – i.e. in Marxian terminology ‘dead labour’ – is made unemployed instead of live labour. The cyclical pattern of starts and completions of projects, mostly within the plan period but sometimes overstepping it, leads to cyclical patterns of capacity and output endogenously generated by the system and not justified by exogenous factors. These processes have been investigated theoretically and empirically by Olivera (1960), Goldman (1964 and 1965), Baijt (1971), Bauer (1978), Dahlstedt (1981), Dallago (1982) and above all by Bauer (1982, in Hungarian, forthcoming in English). Political factors induce cycles in socialist economy directly, through successive leaders trying to reinforce the legitimacy of their rule by appeasing their subjects with short-lived but significant spurts of consumption before the standard growth and accumulation oriented policy typical of socialist governments is resumed and comes up against the constraints discussed in the
10.1057/9780230279803 - The New Palgrave: A Dictionary of Economics, Edited by John Eatwell, Murray Milgate and Peter Newman
Copyright material from www.palgraveconnect.com - licensed to Carleton University - PalgraveConnect - 2015-05-05
2050
cycles in socialist economies
previous paragraph (Mieczkowski, 1978; Hanson, 1978; Bunce, 1980; Lafay, 1981). The association of economic and socio-political factors is investigated by Eysymontt and Maciejewski (1984), who apply discriminant analysis to a large number of indicators of such factors over time in order to identify – and anticipate – periods of crisis; they do not, however, have a model of the actual interaction of political and economic factors. An attempt at constructing such a model is made by Nuti (1979, 1985): a critical relationship is assumed between political centralization and popular unrest, inverse up to a threshold level and direct beyond it; economic centralization is directly related to political centralization and affects – through its impact on investment policy – the level of shortages and inefficiency which in turn fuel political unrest. A recursive model with lagged variables is shown to simulate the kind of recurring rounds of reform attempts and accumulation drives observable in actual socialist economies. Screpanti (1985) has modified such a model applying catastrophe theory and obtaining a political/economic accumulation cycle similar to that of capitalist economies. The further progress of economic reform in centrally planned economies towards market socialism is bound to attenuate and ultimately eliminate the systemic types of economic cycles discussed above. However, as Maurice Dobb had already anticipated in 1939, the diffusion of markets instead of solving the instability problems of the centrally planned economy transforms them into those typical of capitalist economies.
D.M. Nuti
See also business cycles; market socialism; political business cycle; socialism; trade cycles.
Bibliography Aftalion, A. 1909. La réalité des superproductions générales. Revue d’économie politique 23(3), 201–29. Baijt, A. 1971. Investment cycles in European socialist economies: a review article. Journal of Economic Literature 9(1), March, 56–63. Bauer, T. 1978. Investment cycles in planned economies. Acta Oeconomica 21(3), 243–60. Bauer, T. 1982. Tervezès, beruchàzàs, ciklusok. Budapest: KJK. Bunce, V. 1980. The political consumption cycle: a comparative analysis. Soviet Studies 32(2), April 280–90. Coblijc, N. and Stojanovic, L. 1969. The Theory of Economic Cycles in a Socialist Economy. New York: IASP.
10.1057/9780230279803 - The New Palgrave: A Dictionary of Economics, Edited by John Eatwell, Murray Milgate and Peter Newman
Copyright material from www.palgraveconnect.com - licensed to Carleton University - PalgraveConnect - 2015-05-05
2051
cycles in socialist economies
Dallago, B. 1982. Sviluppo e Cicli nelle Economie Est-Europee. Milan: Angeli. Dobb, M.H. 1939. A note on saving and investment in a socialist economy. Economic Journal 43, December, 713–28. Eysmontt, J. and Maciejewski, W. 1984. Kryzysy spolecznogospodarcze w Polsce – ujecie modelowe (Social-economic crisis in Poland-a model approach). Ekonomista. Goldmann, J. 1964. Fluctuations and trends in the rate of economic growth in some socialist countries. Economics of Planning 4(2), 88–98. Goldmann, J. 1965. Short and long term variations in the growth rate and the model of functioning of a socialist economy. Czechoslovak Economic Papers 5, 35–46. Hanson, P. 1978. Mieczkowski on consumption and politics: a comment. Soviet Studies 30(4) October, 553–6. Lafay, J.-D. 1981. Empirical analysis of politico-economic interaction in East European countries. Soviet Studies 33(3), July, 386–400. Lange, O. 1969. Theory of Reproduction and Accumulation. Oxford: Pergamon. Mieczkowski, B. 1978. The relationship between changes in consumption and politics in Poland. Soviet Studies 30(2), April, 262–9. Notkin, A. 1961. Tempy i proportsii sotsialisticheskogo vosproizvodstva (The rate and proportions of socialist reproduction). Moscow: IEL. Nuti, D.M. 1979. The contradictions of socialist economies: a Marxian interpretation. Socialist Register, London: The Merlin Press. Nuti, D.M. 1985. Political and economic fluctuations in the socialist system. European University Institute Working Paper No.85/156, Florence. Olivera, J. 1960. Cyclical growth under collectivism. Kyklos 13(2), 229–52. Rostowski, J. and Auerbach, P. 1984. Storming cycles and central planning. Discussion Paper in Political Economy No.52, Kingston Polytechnic. Screpanti, E. 1985. A model of the political economic cycle in centrally planned economies. European University Institute Working Paper No.85/201, Florence.
10.1057/9780230279803 - The New Palgrave: A Dictionary of Economics, Edited by John Eatwell, Murray Milgate and Peter Newman
Copyright material from www.palgraveconnect.com - licensed to Carleton University - PalgraveConnect - 2015-05-05
2052
